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3This annual review on Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE) brings 
together for the first time a comprehensive analysis of challenges facing the EU in the 
areas of both employment and social policy. Replacing two previous reports  - Employment 
in Europe and the Social Situation Report, the ESDE becomes the European Commission’s 
flagship analytical review on employment and social issues. It builds on the Quarterly 
Reviews of the EU Employment and Social Situation which the Commission has started 
producing in 2011 and provides detailed analysis of key structural developments. The 2011 
edition focuses on changes in Europe’s job structure, recent increases in income inequalities, 
the varying patterns of poverty and social exclusion, the problem of in-work poverty, 
challenges and measures in the area of active ageing, and provides an updated analysis of 
intra-EU labour mobility.
The integrated approach which the Commission has applied in preparation of the review 
corresponds to the Europe 2020 strategy. This is a long-term development strategy which sees 
social inclusion, the fight against poverty, greater labour market participation, employment 
and job quality as essential elements for Europe’s prosperity. Europe 2020 emphasizes that 
the objectives of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth are mutually reinforcing and sets 
economic, employment and social policies on an equal footing. This approach also underpins 
the Europe 2020 Integrated Guidelines and the country-specific recommendations adopted 
by the European Council in June 2011. Nearly all social challenges have a strong labour 
market dimension, for example the problem of in-work poverty. At the same time, social 
policy plays a very important role in improving employment outcomes, e.g. as regards the 
inclusion of disadvantaged people or active ageing.
To respond to Europe’s economic crisis effectively and restore sustainable growth, it is 
essential to address the employment and social dimensions of this crisis, as the Commission 
has emphasized in its Annual Growth Survey for 2012. I am confident that this review of 
Employment and Social Developments in Europe provides a comprehensive basis and useful 
tool for such action.
László Andor 
Commissioner for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion
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Executive summary
11
A new integrated approach 
from the European Commission 
to economic, employment  
and social policies…
…whose need has been borne out 
by the protracted crisis…
…is reflected in the new 
Employment and Social 
Developments in Europe review
In 2010 the European Union adopted the Europe 2020 strategy consist-
ing of three mutually reinforcing objectives – smart, sustainable, and 
inclusive growth. Compared with the Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs, 
the Europe 2020 objective of inclusive growth gives a new prominence to 
social issues complementing a strong focus on employment. It stresses the 
need for social inclusion and fighting poverty, as well as increasing labour 
market participation with more and better jobs as essential elements of 
Europe’s socioeconomic model.
The course of events in recent years, with a financial and economic crisis 
which turned into a sovereign debt crisis and extensive recovery packages, 
followed by a wave of austerity measures by most EU governments, has 
clearly highlighted the need for a more integrated approach towards eco-
nomic strategy, as well as towards employment and social policy making. 
The combined role of social protection systems as automatic stabilisers and 
the other labour market and social measures adopted by most Member 
States during the downturn have been instrumental in sustaining jobs and 
disposable household incomes. Moreover, while modern employment poli-
cies are a key prerequisite for a successful recovery and growth strategy, 
they must promote the participation of all and be integrated with equally 
well-designed social policies in order to ensure not only fairer sharing of 
the benefits of growth but also, when the need arises, the pains of reces-
sion or austerity. The social consequences of the economic crisis and the 
reduced fiscal space make efficient,  well-targeted policies in the Member 
States even more crucial.
Developments since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 have shown a 
need for timelier reporting on employment and social trends to inform the 
policy-making process. The European Commission has therefore launched 
quarterly reviews of the EU Employment and Social Situation, providing a 
regular detailed overview and analysis of the most recently available data 
both at EU level and in the Member States. The annual ESDE review will 
mainly focus on issues of a more structural nature which EU employment 
and social policies have to address.
Employment growth has followed the timid economic recovery of the past 
two years with an important lag and resulted in a gain of only 1.5 mil-
lion jobs by mid-2011; much less than the 6 million jobs lost during the 
recession. In addition, employment recovery has been very uneven across 
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Against a bleaker economic and 
social context… 
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
12
…and calls for new approaches to 
income and social inequalities
…specific issues are analysed in 
the 2011 ESDE review
Intensified wage polarisation has 
implications for skills policies…
 Member States. Unemployment rates range from 4.1% in Austria to 22.8 % 
in Spain. In the EU as a whole the unemployment rate has been around 
9.5 % for more than a year with 23.3 million people looking for work, while 
the share of long term unemployed is above 40 % and rising. Youth unem-
ployment is particularly alarming. It has risen to more than 5 million (20 % of 
young people on the labour market) and is above 25 % in 10 Member States, 
with a high of 48 % in Spain. The prospects for sustained and job-rich eco-
nomic recovery have again become more distant with a slowdown in world 
trade and the protracted Euro crisis. Regardless of the outlook, the negative 
social consequences of the great recession are already acutely felt by large 
numbers of EU citizens. In particular, phenomena such as rising long-term 
unemployment, declining incomes, and signs of rising poverty and material 
deprivation in many Member States are significantly increasing the risks of 
long-term exclusion from the labour market and society.
The review focuses on a number of key themes relevant to EU priorities in 
the field of employment and social policies as well as to broader economic 
policy. Despite the limited availability of timely data in some of the areas 
covered, it brings a number of relevant findings which we are confident 
about. It looks at sectoral employment changes during the crisis years 
and their role in wage polarisation. It examines recent trends in income 
inequality as well as patterns of poverty and exclusion in the EU. It analyses 
the phenomenon of in-work poverty from an individual and a household 
perspective. Finally, it revisits the issues of active ageing and incentives for 
longer working lives, as well as worker mobility within the EU.
A trend towards polarisation of jobs existed in the EU before the crisis, 
as new jobs became concentrated in relatively high and low pay levels, 
notably in the service sector, with an apparent predominance of better-
paid jobs. The intensity of the 2008 recession and consequent job real-
location has further intensified this polarisation by massively destroying 
medium-paid jobs in manufacturing and construction. At the same time, 
educational and skills profiles in the new job structure tend to become 
more demanding, thus compromising the chances of reemployment and 
access to well-paid jobs for lower-skilled people who lost their jobs during 
the recession. This highlights the issues of more adaptable wage-setting 
mechanisms, changes in unionisation, income security implications of low 
wages and the need for up- and re-skilling of the workforce at all levels. 
From an individual perspective, choosing the right sorts of skills to develop 
is key for successful professional life. From the perspective of the economy, 
it is crucial to improve skills forecasting, labour market matching, adapt-
ability of enterprises and workers to change, and to develop new sectors 
with sustainable job-creation potential. Low-skilled jobs will continue to 
exist but they will require better literacy, numeracy and other basic skills. 
Availability of more high-skilled jobs will not guarantee that all graduates 
can find work unless tertiary education foresees and adapts to new needs.
The polarisation of wages is one factor impacting on a broader social prob-
lem facing the EU, namely rising inequalities and polarisation of incomes. 
A better understanding of the underlying causes of inequalities is vital 
in order to design and implement tax and benefit systems effectively. In 
the most recent period for which data is available, 2005-2009, some of 
the most unequal EU countries have shown signs of reducing inequality 
as their social systems have matured, while some more equal countries, 
the Nordic countries among them, have seen signs of increasing income 
inequality. However, despite the positive role which social systems played 
in the stabilisation of household incomes during the crisis, and especially 
of those in the lower part of the income distribution scale , the long term 
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114 million Europeans were at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in 
2009. The types of risk and thus 
appropriate policy responses vary 
across the EU…
…but the risk factors and thus 
target groups are rather similar
Over 8 per cent of EU population in 
employment is at risk of poverty…
trend in income inequalities remains a generally upward one. As the eco-
nomic context remains difficult, governments’ fiscal space will remain very 
tight with little prospect of increased levels of social spending. This raises 
a number of important policy questions. Firstly, there is a need to find 
ways of mitigating labour market inequalities by raising participation and 
addressing wage inequalities, including through raising low wages espe-
cially where they lag significantly behind productivity developments, and 
facilitating upward transitions. The review also shows that there is room 
for raising the quality and efficiency of social spending, better exploit-
ing the role of in-kind benefits in mitigating inequalities or reflecting on 
 taxation of top incomes.
Poverty is one extreme result of rising inequalities and as such rightfully 
deserves major attention by policy makers. However, due to its multi-
dimensional nature, measuring and monitoring of poverty is far from 
straightforward, which may hinder effective policy interventions. In the 
framework of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Member States have agreed 
on a three-pronged approach to monitoring poverty and social exclusion. 
The agreed target is defined on the basis of three combined indicators 
which reflect the multiple facets of poverty and exclusion, as well as the 
diversity of situations and priorities in an enlarged EU, namely income 
poverty, material deprivation, and exclusion from the labour market. In 
2009, 114 million Europeans were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
This represents 23 % of the EU population. To tackle the issue efficiently, 
it is vital to identify who exactly are the people facing the greatest risk 
of poverty and social exclusion. The phenomenon is not uniform across 
the EU. Eastern Europeans are more often facing severe material depriva-
tion while exclusion from the labour market prevails in the Northern and 
 Western Member States.  
Lack of strong labour market attachment, youth or old age, particular 
family circumstances, including those caused by care obligations, as well 
as some other individual characteristics such as disability or a migrant or 
minority background are among the key risk factors. Four in ten working-
age Europeans at risk of poverty or social exclusion are inactive. Europeans 
over 65 years of age represent 16 per cent of the overall population but 
22 per cent of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion and 
the risk further increases in the age group over 75. Lone parents and their 
children face drastically higher risks of poverty or social exclusion. Being 
born outside the EU also represents a significant risk factor. These groups 
are clear targets for focused action.
While having a job remains the best safeguard against poverty and social 
exclusion, it does not prevent it. Raising employment rates is good but a 
significant share of adult Europeans at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
are working: over 8 per cent of people with a job are at risk of poverty 
and can therefore be qualified as “working poor”. In-work poverty is a 
serious issue for the EU and a prime example of the need for an approach 
that combines and integrates both social and employment policy  solutions. 
The risk of in-work poverty is higher for people in temporary or part-
time jobs or with low education. However, in-work poverty must also be 
understood from a household perspective, notably as regards the com-
bined involvement of all adult household members in employment and 
the household composition, mainly the presence of children. Households 
working at only half of their potential (e.g. a one-breadwinner couple) 
face a risk of poverty of 20 %, against 5 % for those who realise their full 
potential (e.g. two adults working full time). Having children is a further 
…in particular those living in 
low and medium work intensity 
households…
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Despite concerns about the impact 
of post-enlargement labour 
mobility within the EU during the 
economic crisis…
…and those in low-wage jobs, so 
higher (minimum) wages can help…
…as will tackling labour market 
segmentation
The ageing challenge requires active 
encouragement of firms and workers 
to ensure longer working lives…
...which must go beyond financial 
aspects
aggravating factor for low-work-intensity households; they find them-
selves at twice as high a risk of poverty compared with similar childless 
households. When both parents work, the presence of children has little 
impact on the risk of poverty. The analysis also shows that it is crucial to 
facilitate full-time participation of lone parents.
Low wages are an important factor in in-work poverty, especially in 
countries where decentralised collective bargaining and low collective 
bargaining coverage lead to high earnings dispersion and low minimum 
wages. Higher minimum wages are associated with lower levels of in-work 
poverty, although their effectiveness can in some cases be limited as they 
cannot be easily targeted, and in particular they do not provide support to 
the large majority of the in-work poor who fall outside of their scope (e.g. 
those in self-employment, or casual or part-time jobs).  
Working on a temporary contract is another important characteristic asso-
ciated with in-work poverty. Temporary contracts often carry a wage pen-
alty (on average 14 % lower than for permanent jobs). This is a particular 
concern in countries where the percentage of involuntary temporary work 
is high and transition rates toward better paid or permanent contracts are 
low. The current labour market trends showing that a majority of the jobs 
created are on temporary contracts point to a risk of an increase in in-work 
poverty in these countries in the coming years.   
Active ageing is another subject of this review. Despite clear successes in 
raising the employment rate of older workers over the last decade to close 
to 50 %, achieving the overall employment rate target of 75 % by 2020 
depends on sustained progress in this age category. The working popula-
tion in the EU is projected to age significantly in the coming decades while 
the age-dependency ratio will increase sharply. In combination with fall-
ing fertility rates, living longer will pose a major risk to the sustainability 
of the European Social Model. In order to address this challenge, older 
people should be encouraged and assisted to remain active longer, but 
this requires appropriate policy responses aimed both at both workers and 
firms in so far as market forces alone are unlikely to generate a desirable 
outcome in an efficient and equitable way.
The decision whether to retire or remain on the labour market is not only 
a result of financial considerations. Much deeper pull and push factors 
are at play. As a result, active ageing policies should not be limited to 
removing financial disincentives but should include supportive measures 
specifically targeted at older workers: discouraging early retirement, 
stimulating learning and training to avoid skills obsolescence, adapting 
working conditions to the specific characteristics of older people, making 
work pay, maintaining good health of older workers, and providing care 
for the elderly. Health and safety at work and accessibility and quality 
of healthcare in youth and throughout working life is also important for 
effectively extending working life.
Post-enlargement mobility of workers is the final focus of this review. Since 
2004, intra-EU labour mobility, which is traditionally limited, has increased 
by around 3.6 million movers coming from the new Member States. This 
has raised the issue of the impact of enlargement and increased inflows of 
workers on the economic and social situation in both the receiving and the 
sending countries. As the transition period for the 2004 accession countries 
ended on 1 May 2011, stock is taken of the experience of labour mobil-
ity from these countries. Moreover, some restrictions are still in place for 
Bulgarian and Romanian workers and the start of the third phase of the 
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…no significant impact on local 
unemployment or wages has been 
found for most countries, and the 
risks of brain drain for sending 
countries seem limited overall 
A research agenda for the near 
future in the social…
…and employment fields…
transitional arrangements justifies devoting special analysis to the extent 
and impact of the flows from these countries and the role of transitional 
arrangements. The analysis in this review underpins the Commission’s 
report on the functioning of the transitional arrangements on free move-
ment of workers from Bulgaria and Romania, recently submitted to the 
Council in accordance with the Accession Treaties.
Generally speaking, the post-accession labour mobility flows have been 
limited, compared to the total resident population and the arrivals of 
third-country-nationals (In 2010, EU-12 nationals living in other Member 
States represented slightly more than 1 % of the total population in EU-27, 
compared to almost 4 % for the third country nationals). Moreover, the 
inflows have considerably diminished during the recession, especially in 
the countries that have been the most affected (such as Ireland or Spain). 
While recent movers from the newest Member States have contributed to 
the economies of receiving countries, their labour market integration has 
been more difficult since the recession, especially in Spain. Nevertheless, 
for most countries, no significant impact on local unemployment or wages 
has been found while the risks of brain drain for countries of origin seem 
limited overall. This does not preclude that post-enlargement mobility 
may have had some economic costs for the receiving and sending coun-
tries especially in times of deficient aggregate demand, and more specific 
consequences for the most exposed sectors in the countries of origin, such 
as healthcare. However, restricting free movement of workers cannot 
be the answer to high unemployment in Europe and may have negative 
 side-effects beyond being a curb on workers’ freedom to move.
This new ESDE review represents the first consolidated analytical reflection 
on the social and employment policy agenda put forward by the Europe 
2020 strategy. In this respect, it poses a number of interesting questions 
which deserve more detailed attention in the near future. For instance, 
the importance of economic inequalities in society goes beyond income 
and in order to gain a fuller understanding of the issue, a closer look is 
also needed at the patterns of consumption and wealth distribution in our 
societies. Similarly, poverty is not a static phenomenon - people may fall 
into poverty, but also manage to escape it and providing a more dynamic 
picture is key to effective policy design. 
In the area of employment, understanding the skills requirements of new 
jobs is critical for improving the employability of the European labour 
force and identifying mismatches in the labour markets, as well as for 
lifting the low skilled out of poverty. Low wages are central to in-work 
poverty and wages, alongside other factors, are at the heart of many 
of today’s  discussions about competitiveness and external and internal 
imbalances. Wage polarisation is examined in this review but many other 
aspects of wages and employment can and should be analysed, including 
from the point of view of aggregate demand at EU level. Labour mobil-
ity inside the EU is extensively analysed in this report but migration, i.e. 
mobility from (or to) third countries, may also have significant effects on 
EU labour markets and could be further investigated.
These and other emerging topics should be analysed in this new review in 
the coming years against the background of the Europe 2020 strategy and 
the main employment and social policy challenges in Europe. The focus of 
the ESDE will continue to be shaped in discussion with key stakeholders.
…should continue to reflect the 
Europe 2020 strategy
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DG ECFIN’s autumn forecast projects 
that EU GDP growth will come to 
a standstill around the turn of the 
year, narrowly avoiding a recession 
in the baseline scenario. The project-
ed growth will not be sufficient for 
labour market improvements. A vital 
question is how long this slowdown 
will last and what can be done to try 
to counteract it. This chapter identi-
fies some of the core aspects of the 
EU’s labour market and social situa-
tion underpinning the principal chal-
lenges facing policy makers today 
and in the near future as they strive 
for inclusive as well as smart and sus-
tainable growth within the Europe 
2020 strategy. It does not, however, 
attempt to take a lengthy look at the 
longer term trends in EU labour mar-
kets as this is regularly done in the 
EU Employment and Social Situation 
Quarterly Review(1), the source of 
the graphs below. The analysis starts 
with a look at the latest available 
data and trends and a second section 
looks at the structural challenges and 
opportunities. 
(1) DG EMPL EU Employment and Social 
Situation Quarterly Review, September 
2011 p. 15-24   
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp? 
langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1080& 
furtherNews=yes
1. The currenT picTure 
and key Trends
1.1. Employment
Employment recovery, at best weak 
(see below), is threatened by a bleak-
er macro-economic outlook. EU GDP 
growth has decelerated from 0.7 % 
quarter-on-quarter in the first quar-
ter of 2011, to 0.2 % in the second 
and third quarters. Leading indica-
tors suggest weak growth ahead. 
The Economic Sentiment Indicator 
has declined since March 2011 and 
stands well below its long-term aver-
age, as a result of a broad-based 
 deterioration in sentiment across 
the sectors. According to DG ECFIN’s 
autumn forecast, growth will be weak 
in the second half of this year and in 
2012. Annual average GDP growth in 
the EU is forecast at 0.6 % in 2012 and 
1.5 % in 2013. Employment growth is 
expected to grind to a halt in 2012. As 
a result, unemployment will not fall 
during 2012 and 2013.  
According to the Commission’s busi-
ness surveys, employment expec-
tations in the EU have declined 
continuously since reaching a peak 
in March 2011 in industry, servic-
es, and retail trade. Employment 
expectations in construction remain 
stable at a low level.
Key features of the current European 
employment and social situation
Introduction
Chart 1: Real GDP and employment for the EU, quarterly change
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Post crisis, overall employment 
growth has been slow and hesitant, 
with a predominance of temporary 
contracts. The EU saw employment 
growth return in the fourth quarter 
of 2010, three quarters after GDP 
growth restarted. Whereas jobless 
growth has not been occurring in the 
EU as a whole, growth was far from 
job-rich (0.3 % y-o-y in the  second 
quarter of 2011). Across Member 
States, the situation has been very 
uneven. In the second quarter of this 
year, employment growth was mod-
erately strong (1 % or more y-o-y) in 
some of the hitherto worst affected 
Member States – Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Latvia – as well as in some of 
the less affected ones(2) – Germany, 
Austria, and Sweden(3). Employment 
growth was close to zero in Hungary, 
and slightly negative in Denmark. The 
y-o-y decline exceeded ¾ % in Bulgaria, 
Spain, Romania, and Slovenia, as well 
as in the Programme countries Ire-
land, Greece and Portugal.
1.2. Sectoral changes
Looking at where jobs have been 
added, it is the services sector that 
has led to an employment recovery, 
mainly in financial services and in the 
trade sector. After strong losses, the 
 construction sector is stabilising, but 
the job destruction in the public sec-
tor is expected to intensify. The indus-
trial sector is not yet in growth terri-
tory – except for export-led segments 
as is the case in Germany and Swe-
den - while the unwinding of labour 
 hoarding should be exhausted by 
now and business services are strongly 
positively oriented. This diverse pic-
ture is expected to remain broadly the 
pattern for the next year, although 
any sustained downturn in growth 
will clearly have a negative effect 
(2) Countries with positive employment 
growth over the period 2008Q2-2011Q1.
(3) A short analysis of the labour market in a 
selection of Member States can be found 
in the different issues of the Quarterly 
Review of the EU Employment and Social 
Situation (EE, FR, DE, IE, IT, LV, LT, and UK 
with September issue; BE, DK, EL, ES, PL, 
PT, SI, FI, and SE in the June issue; BG, DE, 
FR, IT, HU, RO, and UK in the March issue).
Chart 2: Employment expectations in the EU by economic sector  
(July 2007- October 2011)
2011M07 2011M102007M07 2007M011 2008M03 2008M07 2008M11 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M07 2010M11 2011M03
2011M07 2011M102007M07 2007M011 2008M03 2008M07 2008M11 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M07 2010M11 2011M03
2011M07 2011M102007M07 2007M011 2008M03 2008M07 2008M11 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M07 2010M11 2011M03
2011M07 2011M102007M07 2007M011 2008M03 2008M07 2008M11 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M07 2010M11 2011M03
2011M07 2011M102007M07 2007M011 2008M03 2008M07 2008M11 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M07 2010M11 2011M03
Industry
Services
Retail
Construction
Financial
Expectations
Long Term average
Expectations
Long Term average
Expectations
Long Term average
Expectations
Long Term average
Expectations
Long Term average
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Ba
la
nc
e 
%
Ba
la
nc
e 
%
Ba
la
nc
e 
%
Ba
la
nc
e 
%
Ba
la
nc
e 
%
Source: DG ECFIN, Business and Consumer Surveys
Introduction:  Key features of the current European employment and social situation
19
via current demand for labour and 
expectations about the future. Secto-
ral differentiation has had an impact 
on wage polarisation (see  Section 2.3) 
with middle-wage dominated sectors 
such as construction being hit espe-
cially hard by the crisis. This is exam-
ined in detail in Chapter 2. 
The two sectors or areas that have 
seen sustained high growth in the 
last decade are those linked with 
environmental and health and social 
work activities, commonly known as 
green jobs and white jobs. Green 
jobs in fact often cover a much wider 
range of employment opportunities 
with many environment-improving 
jobs in non-environmental industries, 
e.g. eco auditors in steel plants or car 
workers producing hybrid vehicles. 
A narrow definition for green jobs 
is those in eco-industries which pro-
duce goods and services to measure, 
prevent, limit, or correct environ-
mental damage to water, air, and 
soil, as well as problems related to 
noise, waste, and ecosystems. This 
includes technologies, products, and 
services that reduce environmen-
tal risk and minimise pollution and 
resources. Growth in employment in 
the eco-industries in 2000-2008 was 
3 % (revised down from 7 %)(4).
Jobs growth in the eco-industry has 
been positive throughout the reces-
sion and is forecast to continue to be 
quite strong. Total numbers employed 
have grown from 2.4 million in 2000 
and 2.9 million in 2006 to 3.0 million 
in 2008. Employment is forecast to 
reach around 3.8 million in 2012. 
Clearly, though respectable in growth 
terms, it is not employment in the 
eco-industries which will power more 
and better jobs. Nonetheless, the 
products and services of this sector 
are enabling productivity gains and 
innovation in many other sectors and 
it is these green skills and associated 
green jobs that can be a major source 
of demand for new jobs.
(4) See forthcoming study by Ecorys “The num-
ber of Jobs Dependent on Environmental 
and Resource Efficiency Improvements”
Chart 3: Member States’ employment in 2011 q2: year-on-year change (1000’s of 
persons) and quarter-on-quarter change (%)
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Chart 4: EU employment by economic activity, changes from 1, 2 and 3 years ago 
compared to 2011Q2 (thousands of persons)
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Chart 5: Jobs dependent on eco-industries
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The health and social work – white 
jobs - sector is much larger than the 
eco-industry sector. Some 19 million 
people worked in the sector in 2000 
and 22 million in 2010. It is forecast(5) 
that 23 ½ million people will be 
working in the sector in 2020. These 
represent 8.7 %, 9.7 %, and 10.0 % 
of all employment in the EU. White 
jobs saw a growth rate of 1.6 % p.a. 
in 2000-2010 compared with 0.5 % 
p.a. for all sectors. Absolute and rela-
tive growth is forecast to slow with 
white jobs growing at 0.6 % p.a. in 
 2010-2020 and all sectors seeing only 
0.3 % p.a. growth.
The size of the sector and its rela-
tively fast growth (twice as high) sug-
gest that it will remain a key actor 
in providing new jobs in the years 
to come and of paramount impor-
tance if macro conditions produce 
low growth. 
(5) CEDEFOP: “2010 Skills: Supply and 
demand in Europe”
Chart 6: Employment growth (EU-27, Norway and Switzerland)
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Chart 7: Employment and unemployment in EU, change compared  
with the previous quarter (thousands of persons)
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Chart 8: Unemployment expectations for the EU and the Member States
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1.3. Unemployment 
and job vacancies
The EU unemployment rate did 
decline slightly between mid-2010 
and early-2011. Since March 2011 
however, it has again increased 
gradually, exceeding its peak of 
early-2010 in October 2011 (at 
9.8%). Again, the situation is very 
diverse across the EU, both in terms 
of levels and decreases or increases. 
Worst off, with substantial increases 
(at least 5 pps since early 2008) 
are Spain, the Baltic States, Ireland, 
Greece and Bulgaria, although a 
turning point has been reached in 
the Baltic States. Unemployment 
rates have declined significantly 
in recent quarters in some Mem-
ber States, including Germany and 
 Sweden. The highest unemployment 
rates are to be found in Spain (22.8 % in 
October 2011), Greece, Latvia and 
Lithuania (all above 15 %) and Ire-
land, Slovakia, Portugal, Bulgaria 
and Estonia (all above 11%), with 
a substantially higher long-term 
component than before the crisis(6). 
The lowest unemployment rates 
are in Austria, Luxembourg and the 
 Netherlands (less than 5 %). Ger-
many (5.5 %) is also quite low and 
has seen steady falls.  
Even if unemployment rates are not 
rising further, they continue to feed 
into long-term unemployment. The 
share of the long-term unemployed 
as a proportion of total unemploy-
ment again exceeds 40 %, and is up 
by one-third compared to the 30 % 
registered two years ago and may 
climb further.
According to the Commission’s con-
sumer survey, consumer unemploy-
ment expectations have risen very 
strongly since August, pointing to a 
far from rosy future.
(6) From less than 2 % of the active popula-
tion before the crisis (end of 2007) to 
more than 7 % in ES, IE,  SK and the Baltic 
states in the second quarter of 2011. 
In SK, where there was already a high 
long-term unemployment rate before the 
crisis, the rate climbed by 3 % to 9.1 %.
Despite the high levels of unem-
ployment, the EU job vacancy rate 
has been picking up and at 1.5 % 
(2011Q2) is higher than one year 
ago (by 0.2 pp). This means about 
six unemployed per vacancy. Some 
countries see rather higher vacancy 
rates – Malta, Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Finland – and, 
with lower unemployment than the 
EU average, a much better demand 
situation of less than three unem-
ployed per vacancy. This latter situ-
ation suggests an economy which 
is much closer to seeing real labour 
shortages in some sectors. How-
ever, Poland, which remained rela-
tively unscathed during the crisis, 
is seeing little rise in vacancies and 
Spain has seen a further decline in 
vacancies to 1.1 %, thus giving a 
rate of about 20  unemployed per 
vacancy.
Plotting the Beveridge Curve, which 
relates job vacancies (measured 
below by the share of firms reporting 
labour shortages) and unemployment 
rates, suggests a risk of increased 
mismatches of skills post-crisis and 
higher so-called  equilibrium unem-
ployment(7). At the EU level, both 
unemployment and vacancy rates 
increased since early 2010, suggesting 
such a risk. Individual Member States 
see rather different movements in 
(7) See also the Quarterly Review of the 
EU Employment and Social Situation, 
March 2011.
their Beveridge Curve. Germany has 
seen a leftwards shift indicating lower 
equilibrium unemployment and less 
labour demand and supply mismatch. 
Conversely, the UK Beveridge Curve is 
similar to the EU-level curve. Diversity 
seems set to continue  irrespective of 
the macro picture.
1.4. Youth
Young people remain the hardest 
hit by the crisis and its aftermath. 
Youth unemployment in Europe 
continued its rise in September 
2011, reaching 21.4 %, over twice 
that of adults and 0.5 pp above 
its level of 12 months ago. Again, 
the situation is very diverse across 
Member States. Germany, the Neth-
erlands and Austria have the least 
severe youth unemployment prob-
lems with rates of 7-9 %. The worst 
rates are in Spain (48 % in Septem-
ber 2011), and Greece, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Ireland and Italy 
(all in the 25-45 % range). In terms 
of changes over the last 12 months, 
the rate has risen most in Greece, 
Cyprus, Spain, Bulgaria, Malta and 
the UK. Rates have declined sig-
nificantly in the Baltic States, from 
very high levels last year. This wor-
rying, if very divergent, pattern is 
likely to continue in the coming 
months and a  faltering recovery 
will worsen things. 
Chart 9: Job Vacancy Rate 2011 q2 and change with the same quarter  
of the previous year
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Chart 11: Beveridge curve Germany
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Chart 12: Beveridge curve UK
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Chart 10: Beveridge curve EU
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The decrease in permanent jobs (see 
Section 2.2) has hit young people 
disproportionally and even though 
over-represented in temporary con-
tracts (see Chart 14), the net growth 
in the latter in recent months has 
not  significantly  benefited young 
 people.(8) 
Even among young workers, the 
incidence of temporary work has a 
marked age profile and is especially 
concentrated among the youngest. 
Furthermore, there are big variations 
between Member States. In Germany, 
Slovenia, France and  Sweden there is 
a steep age profile with temporary 
contracts particularly  concentrated 
among the young. 
For the workforce as a whole, many 
temporary contracts are not chosen 
and the worker would prefer a perma-
nent job. However, for young workers 
temporary contracts are quite often 
linked with an apprenticeship or other 
form of education and training, espe-
cially in Germany, the Netherlands, Lux-
embourg, Austria, and Denmark. 
Temporary contracts account for 
over 50 % of all new hires across the 
EU. Almost 60 % of young people 
(20-24) got a job this way. Again, 
cross country divergences are great: 
more than 70 % of young people 
in Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Poland 
and Sweden were hired through a 
temporary contract. 
To substantially reduce youth unem-
ployment, greater recourse to tempo-
rary contracts should be considered, 
especially those linked with further 
vocational education and training, 
as these can facilitate transitions into 
quality employment, as observed in 
some countries (Austria, Sweden, 
 Slovenia, Germany, the Netherlands). 
(8) See extensive analysis in Employment 
in Europe 2010, Chapter 3, “Youth and 
labour market segmentation”.
Chart 13: Monthly change in the number of unemployed for youth (15-24), adult 
(25-74) and total in the EU July 2008–September 2011
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Chart 14: Temporary employment in Member States for young and all workers, 2010
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Note: Data missing for 15-24 age group in EE.
Chart 15: Fraction of temporary contracts in all contracts in the EU (2010)
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Chart 16: Fraction of temporary contracts in all contracts (2010, EU Member States)
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Chart 17: Main reason for temporary employment 
  - distribution by Member State (2010)
Chart 18: Incidence of temporary contracts among hiring, by 
age
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1.5. Incomes and 
poverty
In most European Countries, auto-
matic stabilisers and the stimulus 
packages adopted at the begin-
ning of the crisis have contributed 
to sustaining households’ dispos-
able income overall. Between 2007 
and 2009, increases in gross dispos-
able household incomes ranging from 
1 to 9 % were recorded in two-thirds 
of EU countries, including countries 
that experienced strong economic 
and employment shocks (see first 
 column in Table 1). 
However, EU-SILC data on the dis-
tribution of individual disposable 
incomes show that the crisis has 
affected incomes in some parts of 
the distribution and during the most 
recent period for which data is avail-
able. For the 2009 reference year 
(EU-SILC 2010), disposable income of 
households has fallen significantly, 
by more than 15 % in the middle 
of the distribution in Lithuania and 
Latvia, by 8 % in Estonia, and by 
2-4 % in Ireland, the UK and Spain.
In most countries, social transfers have 
afforded more protection to people at 
the lower end of the income distribu-
tion from the fall in incomes as com-
pared with the rest of the population 
(slight increase of P10). However in 
some countries (Spain, France, Malta, 
Slovenia) people on low income have 
been relatively more affected than the 
rest of the population. In these coun-
tries, while the richest 10pc of the pop-
ulation (P90) maintained or increased 
their income between 2008 and 2009, 
the poorest 10pc (P10) saw their 
income dropping. In the Baltic coun-
tries, where unemployment exploded 
and safety nets are weak, the fall in 
median household income is consist-
ent with the overall fall in total gross 
household disposable income as reg-
istered in the National Accounts(9). In 
the UK and Ireland, the fall in median 
(9) Some of the discrepancies observed 
between the changes in total gross 
household disposable income record-
ed through national accounts and the 
changes in different points of the distri-
bution as recorded by SILC may be par-
tially explained by methodological biases 
linked to the scope, reference periods 
and definitions. 
Table 1: Change in Real Gross Disposable Income of Households (2007-2009), and changes  
in the levels of household disposable income as measured by EU-SILC
 Change in GDHI (National Accounts)
Change in the level of disposable income  
at different points of the distribution (EU-SILC)
In % of base year 2007-2009
2007-2009 (income reference year using 
SILC 2008 and 2010)
2008-2009 (income reference year using 
SILC 2009 and 2010)
EU-27 1.9
RO 9.2 44.2 32.6 25.8 15.5 8.5 7.8
PL 8.1 19.6 21.3 17.4 6.1 6.5 6.9
SK 7.5 15.6 18.3 26.5 5.5 7.9 7.6
CY 5.3
SE 5.1 7.4 10.0 10.3 2.9 2.4 1.6
PT 5.0 8.6 6.6 1.5 5.5 4.8 3.0
ES 4.0 -11.4 0.6 4.5 -8.9 -2.0 0.7
BE 3.7 8.3 8.2 9.3 0.7 0.8 2.4
FI 3.2 9.5 7.9 5.3 3.5 1.8 0.8
IE 2.9 8.6 1.7 -3.7 -2.0 -2.4 -5.1
SI 2.7 7.1 7.7 9.1 -4.5 -1.1 1.9
UK 2.3 4.3 0.1 1.8 -0.9 -3.9 -4.7
CZ 2.0 11.6 10.8 11.9 1.5 2.5 3.9
FR 1.7 2.9 5.6 5.6 -1.3 1.4 1.7
EL 0.7 13.6 11.2 8.4 4.2 4.1 3.4
DE 0.4 2.6 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3
AT 0.3 8.0 8.5 10.1 2.4 3.7 6.6
LU 0.0 1.4 4.6 3.1 3.6 1.8 -1.4
NL -0.6 4.6 3.9 2.0 3.1 0.7 -0.3
DK -0.8 2.3 6.1 7.9 1.2 2.3 4.9
LT -1.8 -11.9 -2.6 11.4 -25.3 -15.7 -10.8
IT -4.0 1.9 1.9 3.9 1.0 1.9 1.0
HU -7.2 6.6 7.5 5.5 0.4 -0.3 -1.4
EE -7.5 9.2 3.2 8.7 -5.6 -7.8 -5.3
LV -16.7 0.7 -5.4 -5.0 -11.4 -16.7 -15.1
BG 34.4 38.9 29.5 5.1 6.7 2.9
MT 5.8 4.0 7.3 -3.0 -1.8 -0.6
Sources: Eurostat, National Accounts and EU-SILC (ilc_di01). P10, P50 and P90 correspond to the level of income under which 10 % (respectively 50 % or 90 %) of 
the population lives. The figures presented in this table refer to the evolution of these values expressed in national currencies over time.
Reading note: Between 2008 and 2009, the income level under which 10 % of the Belgian population lives increased by 0.7 %
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income observed in 2008-2009 (based 
on the EU SILC survey), shows that the 
stabilisation of incomes observed over 
the 2007-2009 period may only have 
worked at the very beginning of the 
crisis (i.e. in 2008). 
As long term unemployment shares rise 
and unemployment benefits run out, 
there is now a risk of seeing a signifi-
cant decline in disposable income for 
low earners. As their propensity to con-
sume tends to be high, this may have a 
long-term impact on domestic demand. 
The relative risk of poverty has 
remained stable at EU level between 
2008 and 2009 (EU SILC 2009 and 
2010). However there are signs of 
rising poverty in many Member 
States. In a few countries, the decline 
of median incomes, on which the 
poverty lines are set, has automati-
cally led to decreases in or stagna-
tion of the risk of poverty (-4 pp in 
 Latvia,  Estonia, -1.5 pp in the United 
 Kingdom, stagnation in Ireland). This 
apparent improvement in relative 
poverty is misleading as it may reflect 
the fact that people with an income 
slightly below the poverty line may 
move above it although their situ-
ation has not changed or has even 
got worse. In Spain and Slovenia, the 
poverty rate has increased despite 
a similar decrease of the threshold, 
showing a significant decline in living 
conditions in those countries. In Slo-
venia, monetary poverty rates have 
increased by 1.4 pp. 
In 2010 (EU SILC 2010), material dep-
rivation has remained stable at EU 
level, but it has increased by more 
than 3pp for people at risk of poverty, 
pointing to a relative  deterioration 
in living conditions among people 
with the lowest incomes. Dramatic 
increases are recorded in some coun-
tries where the crisis has been espe-
cially severe. Material deprivation 
Table 2a: Evolution of at-risk of poverty rates and material deprivation in the early stages of the crisis;  
by country EU SILC 2008 to 2010 (income reference years 2007 to 2009)
 At risk of poverty Material deprivation
Material deprivation rate of 
people at risk of poverty
Deprived of at least 2 items in 
the economic strain list.
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
EU-27 16.4 16.3 16.4 17.3 17.1 17.4 40.9 41.3 44.8 30.3 30.7 31.3
BE 14.7 14.6 14.6 11.6 11.4 12.3 38.5 39.3 40.3 20.2 20.2 21.1
BG 21.4 21.8 20.7 55.0 55.5 55.6 93.9 93.7 92.7 67.6 66.9 67.7
CZ 9.0 8.6 9.0 16.2 15.6 15.1 49.7 49.8 51.7 31.7 31.9 31.4
DK 11.8 13.1 13.2 5.4 6.0 6.1 17.1 17.9 18.0 9.1 11.3 11.8
DE 15.2 15.5 15.6 13.0 12.5 11.1 41.3 41.2 39.5 24.7 24.0 22.6
EE 19.5 19.7 15.8 12.4 17.1 : 33.8 38.8 53.6 20.4 28.3 37.3
IE 15.5 15.0 : 13.6 17.1 : 29.6 39.5 : 26.7 35.2 :
EL 20.1 19.7 20.1 21.8 23.0 24.1 47.5 52.5 59.0 35.0 39.2 39.0
ES 19.6 19.5 20.7 8.7 11.3 13.2 18.2 24.9 28.9 23.4 28.8 31.8
FR 12.7 12.9 13.5 13.1 13.5 12.6 40.2 41.8 39.9 27.3 26.6 25.6
IT 18.7 18.4 18.2 16.1 15.6 15.9 38.3 36.2 39.2 30.5 31.0 30.8
CY 16.2 16.2 : 23.3 21.2 : 48.0 44.9 : 41.4 39.4 0.0
LV 25.6 25.7 21.3 35.2 39.7 46.1 65.9 65.2 75.4 51.5 60.6 65.2
LT 20.0 20.6 20.2 22.2 27.0 36.0 48.2 49.5 58.3 34.0 43.1 58.9
LU 13.4 14.9 14.5 3.5 4.0 4.1 17.3 16.3 15.0 10.3 12.4 11.8
HU 12.4 12.4 12.3 37.1 40.3 39.9 67.0 73.4 80.1 59.8 64.1 62.8
MT 14.6 15.1 15.5 13.3 14.8 14.7 26.4 34.8 33.4 36.8 34.2 31.8
NL 10.5 11.1 10.3 5.2 5.2 7.2 21.0 21.9 25.4 11.7 10.3 13.6
AT 12.4 12.0 12.1 13.7 10.9 10.6 41.5 36.9 40.6 24.3 20.3 19.8
PL 16.9 17.1 17.6 32.3 29.5 28.4 58.5 57.3 57.0 51.5 49.5 49.0
PT 18.5 17.9 17.9 23.0 21.5 22.5 45.8 45.5 47.2 43.1 41.0 41.3
RO 23.4 22.4 21.1 50.3 49.3 49.2 77.5 77.6 79.4 56.4 57.1 57.4
SI 12.3 11.3 12.7 16.9 16.2 : 42.7 40.9 41.9 32.7 31.4 33.5
SK 10.9 11.0 12.0 27.8 24.5 24.9 59.3 58.4 59.7 42.8 40.2 41.5
FI 13.6 13.8 13.1 9.1 8.2 8.4 28.8 28.4 27.9 18.2 16.5 15.7
SE 12.2 13.3 12.9 4.6 4.8 3.9 14.0 17.5 15.9 10.5 10.7 9.2
UK 18.7 17.2 : 11.3 10.3 : 28.4 25.5 : 21.9 : :
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC
Note: Data for EU-27 2010 Eurostat estimates 
Reading note: The list of economic strains contains the five following items: (1) pay the rent, mortgage, or utility bills, (2) keep the home adequately warm, (3) face 
unexpected expenses, (4) eat meat or protein regularly, (5) go on holiday away from home a week a year.
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increased by more than 10 pp since 
2008 in Lithuania and Latvia, and by 2 
to 5 pp in Hungary Greece, Spain (2008-
2010) and Ireland (2008-2009). People 
below the poverty line in particular 
report increases in material deprivation 
(+20 pp in Estonia, +10 pp in Greece, 
Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary). 
Increasing difficulties in coping with 
necessary expenses are also reported 
by the population in general. The 
number of people who declared fac-
ing at least two difficulties in the 
list of economic strains(10) rose by 
(10) Pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; 
keep their home adequately warm; 
face unexpected expenses; eat meat or 
 protein regularly; go on holiday.
1 pp across the EU. It has increased 
significantly in Greece, Spain, Ireland 
and the Baltic States since 2008. This 
trend is also reflected in the Euro-
barometer study which shows an 
increase of the number of people 
falling behind with their bills and 
credit commitments.
The crisis has led to increased risks of 
long-term exclusion from the labour 
market and society. Between 2008 
and 2010, the share of children and 
adults living in jobless households 
(households with zero or very low 
work intensity) increased from 9 % 
to 10 % in the EU overall. The situ-
ation has significantly worsened 
with an increase of 1 pp or more in 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy, Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. In 2010, the share of people 
living in jobless households exceeded 
10 % in Belgium, Denmark, Germa-
ny, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Hungary 
and the UK. Among such jobless 
 households, lone parents and their 
children are particularly at risk of 
long-term exclusion.
Table 2b: Evolution of the share of jobless households (zero or very low work intensity) and in-work poverty; by country,  
SILC 2008 to 2010 (activity reference years 2007 to 2009)
 People living in jobless households In-work poverty
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
EU-27 9.0 9.0 9.9 8.6 8.4 8.5
BE 11.7 12.3 12.6 4.8 4.6 4.5
BG 8.1 6.9 7.9 7.5 7.4 7.6
CZ 7.2 6.0 6.4 3.6 3.1 3.7
DK 8.3 8.5 10.3 5.1 5.9 6.6
DE 11.6 10.8 11.1 7.1 6.8 7.2
EE 5.3 5.6 8.9 7.3 8.1 6.4
IE 13.6 19.8 : 6.5 5.4 :
EL 7.4 6.5 7.5 14.3 13.8 13.8
ES 6.2 7.0 9.8 10.7 11.4 12.7
FR 8.8 8.3 9.8 6.8 6.7 6.6
IT 9.8 8.8 10.2 8.9 10.2 9.4
CY 4.1 4.0 : 6.4 7.0 :
LV 5.1 6.7 12.2 11.0 11.1 9.7
LT 5.1 6.9 9.2 9.4 10.4 12.3
LU 4.7 6.3 5.5 9.4 10.0 10.6
HU 12.0 11.3 11.8 5.8 6.2 5.3
MT 8.2 8.4 8.4 5.1 6.0 5.9
NL 8.1 8.3 8.2 4.8 5.0 5.1
AT 7.8 7.2 7.7 6.4 5.9 4.9
PL 7.9 6.9 7.3 11.5 11.0 11.4
PT 6.3 6.9 8.6 11.8 10.3 9.7
RO 8.2 7.7 6.8 17.7 17.9 17.3
SI 6.7 5.6 6.9 5.1 4.8 5.3
SK 5.2 5.6 7.9 5.8 5.2 5.6
FI 7.3 8.2 9.1 5.1 3.7 3.6
SE 5.4 6.2 5.9 6.8 6.9 6.5
UK 10.4 12.6 : 8.5 6.7 :
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC (ilc_lvhl11 and ilc_iw)
Note: Data for EU27 2010 Eurostat estimates 
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In 2009, (EU SILC 2010) 8.5 % of 
people employed lived under the 
poverty threshold, a similar level to 
before the crisis. The factors explain-
ing the persistence of in-work pov-
erty are analysed in Chapter 4 of this 
review. In some countries (Belgium, 
Ireland, Greece, France, Latvia, Hun-
gary, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Finland, Sweden and the UK), 
the crisis has led to a reduction in the 
in-work poverty rate due to the fact 
that the most vulnerable workers 
were the first ones to lose their jobs. 
However, the current job situation 
is likely to lead to a further increase 
in in-work poverty in the medium 
term since most of the jobs created 
are under temporary contracts which 
have been identified as a factor of 
in-work poverty in many countries. 
Access to essential health and social 
services has worsened during the cri-
sis. Eurobarometer data shows that 
in some countries citizens report 
facing difficulties accessing health 
care. In October 2010, 29.6 % of EU 
respondents said that the afford-
ability of healthcare had become 
somewhat or much more difficult 
‘in the last six months’. It remains 
to be seen whether the results of 
the 2010 EU-SILC data on the shares 
of people reporting unmet need 
for healthcare will confirm these 
perceptions. Rises in unmet need 
for care might be due to high out-
of-pocket payments that people 
can no longer afford or  weakened 
 public provision of services. 
2. sTrucTural 
challenges and 
opporTuniTies
2.1. Employment rates 
The employment rates of female, 
older, and non-EU workers remain 
challenging. The gap between the 
average male and female employ-
ment rates has decreased since early-
2008, as men were harder hit by 
the crisis(11). Nevertheless, the female 
employment rate remains relatively 
low at 62.6 % in 2011Q2. On the 
other hand, the employment rate of 
older workers has increased  during 
the crisis (to 47.5 % in 2011Q2), main-
ly on account of female, older work-
ers. Among foreigners, citizens from 
other Member States continue to 
show a higher employment rate than 
nationals (at 71.5 % in 2011Q2), while 
the employment rate for  non-EU citi-
zens lags behind, at 58.8 % in 2011Q2, 
10 pp behind the rate of nationals and 
about 5 pp below the pre-crisis level.
2.2. Employment 
contract types
The recent recovery in employment 
mainly stems from a rise in tempo-
rary jobs. The number of workers in 
the EU on a permanent contract has 
risen only moderately over the last 
four quarters. In 2010, 23 Member 
States had seen a fall in the number 
of employees with permanent jobs, 
in comparison to 2009. There was 
however a net gain of permanent 
jobs in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and Sweden. Although the decline 
in permanent contracts has slowed 
during the course of 2010, the most 
significant fact was the increase in 
temporary contracts as of the sec-
ond quarter of 2010.  Germany’s 
employment recovery has come 
about entirely through more tempo-
rary contracts which now account for 
(11) See also the September 2011 issue of 
the Quarterly Review of the EU Employ-
ment and Social Situation, p. 16 and 
following. Employment rates are for the 
20-64 age group.
Chart 19: The change in the percentage of people falling  
behind bills and credit commitments
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Chart 20: Employment rates by sex, age groups and nationality (%), 2007-2011q2
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15 % of all employees. Though more 
flexible, high shares of temporary 
contracts in overall employment may 
mean reduced investment in train-
ing and they are often seen as being 
among the main drivers of in-work 
poverty. While such contracts facili-
tate labour market entry, if people 
remain trapped in them – which 
is more likely in times of labour 
market slack(12) – this would under-
mine progress towards the inclusive 
growth objective. Countries where 
this is a big issue include Spain, Italy, 
 Portugal, Poland, France, Cyprus, 
Germany and Sweden both because 
of the high prevalence of temporary 
contracts and the high risk of  poverty 
associated with them. Worsening 
(12) See Employment in Europe 2010 p. 144, 
establishing a significant correlation 
between long-term unemployment and 
the probability of transition from tem-
porary to permanent work.
expectations may well delay any pick 
up in permanent jobs. Segmentation 
will remain constant or even rise.
2.3. Inequality and 
polarisation
Inequalities and polarisation of incomes 
threaten social cohesion and sustain-
able growth. Rising inequalities and 
polarisation of incomes were observed 
before the crisis. This threatened 
social cohesion and the investments 
in human capital that are  necessary 
for inclusive and sustainable growth. 
However, between 2005 and 2008, 
EU-level income inequality, as meas-
ured by the Gini indicator, was rather 
 stable. Nonetheless, in some countries, 
especially those with a lower level of 
initial inequality, there was a consid-
erable increase (Germany, Sweden). 
The long-term trend of over-propor-
tionate increases in very high income 
continued. The crisis does not seem to 
have increased inequalities across the 
board, as capital income was hit hard 
and short-term work arrangements and 
social transfers often kept income levels 
up. However, across Europe, the crisis 
has hit some groups that face increased 
marginalisation harder (migrants, the 
homeless, Roma). These groups will 
continue to be most vulnerable in the 
coming months. Two recent studies 
show that on-going fiscal consolida-
tion reforms are likely to have strong 
distributional impacts. In particular, 
they highlight the regressive impacts 
of the reforms in the UK, notably on 
families with children, and the over-
all progressive impacts of the reforms 
undertaken in Ireland so far(13). Both 
case studies highlight the likely regres-
sive impacts of cuts in expenditure on 
social services. What the crisis certainly 
changed is the perception of inequali-
ties and fairness. According to an as 
yet unpublished Eurobarometer on the 
basis of field work undertaken in late-
June and early-July, there is no Member 
State where people think that inequali-
ties and poverty are handled better 
than they were five years ago. Unsur-
prisingly, the share of people who are 
discontented with the way inequalities 
and poverty are handled now is high-
est in countries that have been strongly 
affected by the crisis, notably in Greece 
(90 %), Latvia and Lithuania (89 %), and 
Romania (87 %).
The crisis has led to increased risks 
of long-term exclusion from the 
labour market and society. In a 
number of countries, large unem-
ployment shocks have led to a sig-
nificant increase in the number of 
people having to rely on unemploy-
ment benefits and social assistance. 
The highest increases were observed 
in Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Greece 
and Romania for unemployment 
(13) Jenkins, Brandolini et al., ‘The Great 
Recession and the Distribution of 
Household Income’, study presented at: 
‘Incomes Across the Great Recession’, 
XIII European Conference of the Fon-
dazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, Palermo, 
10 September 2011, http://www.frdb.
org/upload/file/report_1_palermo.pdf
Chart 21: Year-on-year change in permanent, temporary, self employment,  
and total employment (15-64) (thousands of persons), 2006-2011
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Chart 22: Contribution to year-on-year employment change, 2011 q2,  
in Member States (pps of total employment)
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benefits and in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, 
 Slovenia and Slovakia for social assis-
tance benefits. The persistence of 
high rates of long-term unemploy-
ment (above 6 % in mid-2011) in 
most of these countries (see Foot-
note 8) is likely to aggravate this 
trend further. Long-term exclusion 
from the labour market weakens the 
capacity of individuals to re-enter the 
labour market and to take an active 
part in society.
Wage polarisation continued dur-
ing the great recession. In the EU 
as a whole, job losses during the 
period 2008-2009 were concen-
trated in the middle wage levels, 
the highest 20 % of earners actu-
ally saw a net increase in jobs, and 
the lowest 20 % only a small fall. 
To some extent, this  polarisation 
mirrors the pattern of 1998-2007 
when all wage levels saw an increase 
with the biggest increases in the 
highest and lowest levels. At nation-
al level, the situation has been 
quite diverse with Austria,  Bulgaria, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Latvia, the 
 Netherlands, Poland and  Portugal 
seeing increased polarisation. 
However, some countries saw only 
an increase in lower-wage jobs – 
Greece, Denmark, the UK,  Romania 
and Hungary - while others saw an 
increase concentrated in higher pay 
levels – Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Germany. Polarisation, albeit in 
diverse forms, seems likely to con-
tinue in the immediate post-crisis 
phase, irrespective of whether this 
brings growth or a renewed dip.
2.4. Productivity, 
wages and unit labour 
costs
Economic recovery has seen labour 
productivity growth return to pre-
crisis levels while labour cost increases 
and thus unit labour cost growth 
have remained modest. In the EU 
overall, nominal unit labour costs 
are increasing at around 1 % p.a. as 
wages grow marginally faster than 
productivity. The growth in nominal 
unit labour costs was not interrupted 
during the crisis, as reductions in 
compensation per employee were 
broadly neutralised by a decline in 
productivity.
Between 2001 and 2010, some coun-
tries have seen big rises in unit labour 
costs compared to the EU average 
Chart 23: Long-term unemployment rates in the EU by sex
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Chart 24: Long-term unemployment rates in 2010q2 and 2011q2
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Chart 25: Annual productivity and labour cost growth in the EU (annual% change)
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of 13.9 % – especially  Romania, 
 Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia 
and Hungary (all more than 50 %) 
but also, albeit to a lesser extent 
(by 25-50 %), Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland, the Czech  Republic, 
Denmark, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia,  Lithuania, Malta and the 
UK. Others have seen much lower 
increases, especially  Germany and 
Poland (respectively 6 % and 10 %), 
whose price competitiveness at least 
before exchange rate effects has thus 
been enhanced. This variation in unit 
labour costs was driven more by dif-
ferences in nominal labour costs than 
differences in labour productivity. 
Germany with 11.5 % had the EU’s 
lowest rise in compound growth of 
compensation per employee in 2001-
2010. Most of the euro area coun-
tries saw increases of 25-40 %, while 
Ireland saw 50 % and Greece 58 %. 
Compound growth of labour produc-
tivity averaged 8.0 % in the EU (and 
5.1 % in the euro area).  Germany 
performed a little above the euro 
area average at 5.4 %. Spain, Greece 
and Ireland did (much) better at 
7.4 %, 15.6 %, and 17.4 % though 
this was clearly insufficient to off-
set their much higher wage growth. 
Most dramatic though is the case of 
Italy which saw compound labour 
productivity ‘growth’ of -4.6 %. The 
only other EU country to see nega-
tive growth in 2001-2010 was Luxem-
bourg with -0.5 %. Poland’s competi-
tive strength is to a significant extent 
built on its labour productivity grow-
ing by 34.2 % in 2001-2010. 
Wage growth seems unlikely to 
increase in the coming months 
and even if productivity grows 
sustainably, unit labour costs will 
remain subdued overall. If growth fal-
ters, productivity will probably suffer 
again putting renewed pressure on 
competitiveness in some countries. 
In such countries, wage restraint may 
be necessary to improve competitive-
ness and restore external imbalances. 
2.5. Skills mismatches
The labour market is undergoing sig-
nificant structural shifts in occupa-
tions and skills needs, both in the 
short term as a result of sector shifts 
during the recession (see Chapter 1), 
and due to the trend towards high- 
and medium-level qualifications, 
driven by the growth in knowledge- 
and skill-intensive occupations(14). 
Despite the increasing availability of 
a highly-qualified workforce, there 
is not only an on-going risk of short-
ages of specific types of skills, but also 
of under-utilisation of existing skills 
and competences(15). The experience 
from past recessions shows that more 
(14) CEDEFOP, 2010, Skills supply and demand 
in Europe, Medium-term forecast up 
to 2010, http://www.cedefop.europa.
eu/EN/publications/15540.aspx, recently 
updated (“What next for skills on the 
European labour market?”), Briefing 
note, http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/
Files/9059_en.pdf
(15) CEDEFOP, 2010, “The skill matching chal-
lenge, analysing skill mismatch and pol-
icy implications”, http://www.cedefop.
europa.eu/EN/Files/3056_en.pdf
qualified people may face difficul-
ties in finding jobs with appropriate 
levels of education and skill, thereby 
leading to under-utilisation of their 
skills and competences. At the same 
time, the technological upgrading of 
occupations may reduce the employ-
ment opportunities of low-qualified 
people who have lost their jobs. 
The risk of increased skills mismatches 
was already noted in Section 1.2 with 
an outwards shifting Beveridge Curve. 
Getting the right skills for the right 
jobs can reduce mismatches and is 
a further opportunity that must not 
be missed especially in order to avoid 
long term unemployment. Short-term 
matching is particularly about more 
effective retraining or apprentice-
ships for young people. Longer-term 
matching requires better vocational 
education and training systems.
Vacancies do exist and indeed have 
increased in the last year. They are 
unfilled for a number of reasons but 
the unemployed lacking the neces-
sary skills to fill them, as well as lack-
ing geographical mobility, can be 
addressed urgently. With the right 
skills, the unemployed can get back 
into work sooner and find work that 
makes the best use of their (new) 
skills. The economy also benefits if 
labour input is increased in this way 
and obviously fiscal constraints are 
lightened. Public employment services 
are in the front-line of re-skilling the 
unemployed but private employment 
agencies are also increasingly involved 
in providing new skills for job seekers. 
Chart 26: Productivity growth vs. nominal compensation by country
Chart 26.1: Compounded productivity growth > 10 % –  
2001-2010 and nominal compensation growth
Chart 26.2: Compounded productivity < 10 % –  
2001-2010 and nominal compensation growth
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Charts 26.1 and 26.2 illustrate that strong ULC growth stems from compensation growth exceeding productivity growth and that differences in 
compensation growth is the prime driver of the differences in ULC growth across Member States. 
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Despite the deep impact of the crisis 
on employment in the manufactur-
ing, construction and the financial 
sector, and the ensuing wage polari-
sation, there remains broad poten-
tial for employment recovery in 
these sectors. In the Member States 
which experienced the strongest 
recent employment recovery, such 
as Germany, Sweden and Poland, 
the export-led manufacturing sector 
was a strong driver due to its reli-
able demand for technicians(16). This 
tends to underscore the importance 
of wage moderation (see Section 
2.4) and justifies hopes that the job 
losses seen during the crisis are not 
irreversible. The financial sector is a 
case in point, as it was one of the 
fastest growing sectors in 2010 after 
the strong contraction in 2008-2009 
(see Chart 4).
2.6. Renewed fiscal 
stimuli and “automatic” 
stabilisers
How much room is there for fiscal stim-
uli in view of the worsening economic 
situation? The expectation of a growth 
deceleration in coming months turns 
attention to the room for fiscal stim-
ulus. Currently, employment policies 
need to face the limited fiscal space in 
 several Member States(17). Employment 
(16) See European Vacancy Monitor July 2011
(17) In October 2009, the ECOFIN Council 
agreed on principles for the fiscal exit 
strategies that it underlined the need for 
a timely consolidation of public finances, 
while keeping a balance between stabi-
lisation and sustainability and taking 
country-specific circumstances into account. 
.In the current situation of fragile market 
confidence and persisting and, for some 
Member States, intensified market pres-
sures ensuring sustainability is the most 
promising strategy to underpin econom-
ic stabilisation. The ECOFIN council of 
4 November has called Member States to 
fully implement their commitment under 
the SGP as well as the recommendation 
issued under the EU Semester and the EDP 
for the Member States concerned. Member 
States should moreover take into account 
the following principles in the design of 
their fiscal plans:  
- Member States benefiting from a finan-
cial assistance programme should stick to 
the targets as agreed in the programme 
and should fully and timely implement the 
policy measures, including in particular 
policies must be focused on those 
groups at risk of social exclusion while 
remaining consistent with the recom-
mended rapid pace of fiscal consoli-
dation. These policies should speed 
up moves towards a more growth-
friendly tax structure (shifting part 
of the tax burden away from labour, 
to indirect, environmental and property 
taxes) and support  low-income groups 
(who have the highest  propensity to 
consume). Labour market policies also 
need to address the significant mis-
matches created by the economic crisis 
while reforms of employment protec-
tion legislation need to improve real-
location of labour between different 
sectors and fight duality.
When allowed by fiscal consolida-
tion constraints, the dampening role 
of automatic stabilisers could sup-
port the economy. Automatic stabi-
lisers cushion household disposable 
income and household demand in 
the event of macroeconomic shocks. 
A recent study(18) found that, in the 
case of a proportional income shock, 
structural reforms, agreed in the respec-
tive Memorandum of Understanding.   
- Member States facing market pres-
sure should also achieve the headline 
targets contained in the latest update 
of their Stability or Convergence Pro-
grammes or in more recent budgetary 
plans, independently of macroeconomic 
conditions, and stand ready to pursue 
further consolidation measures if needed.  
- Member States that have accumulated a 
significant adjustment gap under the EDP 
or have a high deficit should step up their 
consolidation efforts and aim for a sustain-
able correction of the excessive deficit by 
the agreed deadline. The measures neces-
sary to close significant adjustment gaps 
under the EDP should be specified as soon 
as possible and no later than in the 2012 
budgets and implemented rigorously with-
out delay; limited downside revisions to the 
macroeconomic scenario should not result 
in delays in the correction of the excessive 
deficit.  
- Member States which do not have an 
excessive deficit and which are on an 
appropriate path towards the MTO and 
where fiscal risks are limited could use 
the flexibility allowed by the Stability and 
Growth Pact and namely let the automatic 
stabilisers work around the path of struc-
tural fiscal adjustment, while ensuring the 
long term sustainability of public finances.
(18) Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl (2010), ‘Auto-
matic Stabilisers and Economic Crisis: 
US vs. Europe’, NBER Working Paper 
No 16275, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16275.pdf.
38 % of the shock would be absorbed 
by automatic stabilisers in the EU, 
against 32 % in the US (with consid-
erable heterogeneity in the results 
among Member States: from 25 % 
for Estonia to 56 % for Denmark). 
The graph below shows that, under 
the scenario of the autumn fore-
cast, the share of social protection 
expenditure in GDP is projected to 
decline slightly in 2011-2013, but 
to remain above the pre-crisis level 
(2007). In view of weaker growth 
prospects and possibly more strin-
gent fiscal requirements, it remains 
to be seen whether Member States 
can afford increased social  protection 
expenditure.
Another recent study(19) looked at the 
impact of the 2008-2009 recession on 
household income. It concluded that, 
although GDP fell, gross household 
disposable income rose in most Mem-
ber States between 2007 and 2009. 
The household sector on aggregate 
was protected from the impact of 
the downturn by additional support 
of governments through the tax and 
benefit system. Table 1 (from the lat-
ter study) illustrates, for a selection 
of OECD countries, the role of auto-
matic stabilisers and fiscal stimulus 
during the recent recession. 
Column (1) shows that gross house-
hold disposable income (GHDI) rose 
in most countries between 2007 and 
2009 (Switzerland, Greece, Den-
mark and Italy are the exceptions). 
This contrasts with the results in 
 Column (3), which shows what the 
change in GHDI would have been in 
the absence of automatic stabilisers 
and fiscal stimulus (as social benefits 
and taxes are kept at their 2007 
values in these calculations). In this 
case, GHDI would have fallen (or 
have risen by a maximum of ½ %) 
in all selected EU Member States, 
except Belgium.
(19) Jenkins, Brandolini et al., ‘The Great 
Recession and the Distribution of 
Household Income’, study presented at: 
‘Incomes Across the Great Recession’, 
XIII European Conference of the Fon-
dazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, Palermo, 
10 September 2011, http://www.frdb.
org/upload/file/report_1_palermo.pdf.
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The automatic stabilisers and 
(limited) discretionary measures have 
played an important role in support-
ing household incomes and aggre-
gate demand. Limited room for fis-
cal manoeuvre would make their 
operation more difficult if the EU 
heads into renewed recession but 
they can still play a significant part 
in  offsetting measures, particularly 
where  fiscal space allows. 
Chart 27: Key macro variables and social protection expenditure in EU-27
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Table 3: Illustration of the role of automatic stabilisers  
and fiscal stimulus during the recent recession )
Changes 2007–9 GHDI (1)
GHDI holding social benefits 
at 2007 value  (2)
GHDI holding social benefits 
and taxes at 2007 values (3)
Norway 8.3 5.4 8.3
Belgium 3.7 0.8 1.9
Switzerland -0.2 0.5 1.5
Germany 0.5 -1.4 0.5
France 2.2 0.3 0.5
Finland 4.5 1.5 0.1
Austria 1.4 -1.2 0.1
Netherlands 0.3 -2.4 -0.5
Spain 4.0 0.0 -1.9
Greece -1.3 -3.4 -2.4
UK 2.5 -1.6 -3.0
Denmark -1.2 -3.2 -3.7
Sweden 4.2 3.0 -3.8
USA 2.5 -0.7 -4.6
Italy -3.3 -5.2 -5.1
Ireland 3.7 -1.8 -7.4
Source: Jenkins, Bardolini et al., 2011
Notes:  GHDI = Gross Household Disposable Income 
(1): percentage change in real GHDI, 2007-9 and 2009. 
(2), (3): percentage change in GHDI when social benefits held at 2007 values (2),  
and social benefits and taxes and social contributions at 2007 values (3). 
Estimates for Greece and Switzerland refer to one year change, 2007-8, only.  
Countries ranked by column 3 values.
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1. inTroducTion
There were five million fewer people 
in paid employment in the EU-27 in 
the second quarter of 2010 than in 
the second quarter of 2008 as a result 
of the economic crisis, the most severe 
in a generation. This chapter describes 
the impact of this recession on the 
structure of employment in the EU-27 
using a relatively straightforward 
methodology for analysing employ-
ment developments that was devel-
oped in the US during the 1990s. This 
is referred to as the ‘jobs approach’ 
and it is seen to be consistent with 
general EU employment policy con-
cerns, which are often expressed in 
terms such as ‘more and better jobs’ 
and ‘new skills for new jobs’. 
The methodology describes employ-
ment shifts in terms of jobs, where a 
job is understood as a given occupation 
in a given sector. This is an intuitively 
attractive definition and corresponds to 
what people think of when describing 
themselves in terms of their work – for 
example, being a secretary in a hospital, 
a salesman in a car showroom, or a sci-
entist in the chemical industry. Moreo-
ver the concepts of occupation and sec-
tor correspond to the two fundamen-
tal dimensions of structural change, in 
which the ‘sector’ gives a description of 
what type of economic value is being 
 created, and the ‘structure of occupa-
tions’ gives some indication of how this 
value is being created. 
Empirically, the definition corresponds 
to standard classifications of occupa-
tions (ISCO-88) and sectors (NACE rev. 
2.0), both of which are used as bench-
mark systems by Eurostat and (with 
some national variations) by Europe-
an national statistical institutes. The 
approach implies a structural view of 
employment and of employment shifts 
and tells us in what jobs employment 
is growing, or declining, over a given 
period, with the jobs being defined at 
quite a fine level of detail in terms of 
both occupation and sector. 
The richness of the jobs approach 
also enables us to make some quali-
tative evaluation of these quantita-
tive employment shifts. The approach 
requires not only the definition of a 
job in an intuitive (but conceptually 
coherent and empirically practical) 
way, but also an analytically use-
ful way of evaluating or classifying 
these jobs. The originator of the jobs 
approach, Nobel Prize winning econ-
omist Joseph Stiglitz, used the median 
wage of a job as a way of qualita-
tively ranking jobs. Indeed wages, as a 
measure of monetary compensation, 
are seen as a useful indicator with 
which to classify jobs, and in the US in 
particular, used as a general proxy for 
quality of work – see Levy and Mur-
nane (1992), Ilg and Haugen (2000), 
and Wright and Dwyer (2003). 
Apart from the intrinsic monetary value 
of the wage, the principal reasons for 
adopting the wage as a means of 
ranking jobs are twofold. Firstly, wage 
income is both more measurable, and 
generally more widely measured, than 
other individual dimensions of job qual-
ity(1) such as cognitive richness of work, 
or work autonomy, which are also less 
often and less systematically addressed 
in surveys. Secondly, on the assumption 
that the wage of a job is likely to cor-
relate with unobserved or less easy-to-
observe dimensions of work, earnings 
are a ‘sufficient salient aspect of job 
quality’ (Wright and Dwyer, 2003) to 
be used as a proxy even if the concept 
itself is multidimensional. 
Recent European research on job 
or work quality has followed the 
US example and acknowledged the 
importance of the wage dimension 
with Leschke and Watt (2008b, p. 6) 
observing that ‘wages are arguably 
the most important field in regard to 
job quality’. In this argument wages 
are not just related to immediate 
purchasing power but also to other 
payments, such as pensions and 
social security benefits. Moreover, 
the status of a job in society is strong-
ly related to its wage as well as to a 
number of non-pecuniary job charac-
teristics such as skill-level, autonomy, 
cognitive richness, and job security. 
In other words, the use of wage as 
(*) By John Hurley and Donald Storrie 
EMCC, Eurofound 
(1) However, the lack of availability of com-
prehensive wage data for EU Member 
States does make the task of establish-
ing national job-wage rankings more 
 difficult than in the US (see Annex 2).
Shifts in the job structure in Europe 
during the recession(*) 
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a proxy of quality does not imply an 
exclusive regard for the monetary 
aspects of a job, but reflects the fact 
that wage levels are correlated with 
non-monetary aspects of job quality. 
The purpose of the original American 
jobs-based analysis was to answer a 
particular policy concern in the 1990s, 
namely that, while nobody denied 
that the US was producing more 
employment, critics were arguing that 
the bulk of this employment growth 
appeared to be in low quality jobs. 
Joseph Stiglitz, then economic advi-
sor to President Clinton, employed a 
jobs-based methodology to classify 
jobs created during this period with a 
view to testing the evidence. 
The conclusion drawn was that the 
majority of the jobs created were 
of better quality, with 68 % of new 
employment being in jobs paying 
above the median wage (CEA 1996). 
Erik Olin Wright and Rachel Dwyer 
(2003) went somewhat further, utilis-
ing a more nuanced application of 
the jobs approach (based on divid-
ing employment into job quintiles or 
deciles rather than the simple dichot-
omy of above- and below-median 
wage jobs used by Stiglitz), and con-
firmed that the distribution of employ-
ment growth in the United States in 
the 1990s had indeed been skewed 
towards higher-paid jobs. However, 
the latter research also noted signifi-
cant growth at the bottom as well as 
the top of the wage scale, with a ‘hol-
lowing out’ of the middle. This was 
taken as evidence of a more polarised 
expansion, in contrast to the employ-
ment growth of the 1960s, which had 
been more consistently skewed in 
favour of higher paid jobs.(2) 
(2) The jobs methodology has been promi-
nent in the polarisation research debate 
and Goos and Manning have found-
ed evidence of polarised employment 
growth first in the UK (Goos and Man-
ning, 2007) and more recently in the 
EU-15 (Goos and Manning, 2009). It 
should be noted that there are impor-
tant differences between the methodol-
ogy used by these authors and both the 
cited US research and Eurofound work. 
Other similar approaches can be found in 
OECD (2001) and OECD (2003) and more 
recently in Oesch and Rodrigues (2010).
Between the turn of the millennium 
and the onset of the current economic 
crisis in 2008, job growth was higher 
in EU-27, and significantly so in EU-15, 
than in the US – a reverse of the pattern 
in the previous decade. In an attempt to 
classify the jobs created in this ‘golden 
age’ of European job creation, Euro-
found’s Jobs Project (2006-2008) traced 
structural change between 1995 and 
2006 in terms of median wages in jobs 
in 23 Member States. The motivations 
for carrying out the analysis were similar 
to those behind the original American 
work, namely to make an empirical eval-
uation of whether employment growth 
had been combined with, or had come 
at the expense of, overall employment 
quality. The Lisbon Strategy framework 
of more and better jobs justifies such an 
analysis as both timely and relevant. 
This was the first application of the jobs-
based methodology to EU labour mar-
kets. The report found differing patterns 
of employment shift across EU Mem-
ber States, with the two most common 
being polarisation (greater growth at 
both ends with less growth in the mid-
dle of the wage structure) and upgrad-
ing (jobs growth skewed to the top 
of the wage distribution). Overall the 
aggregate pattern for the EU (EU-23, 
as noted) was one of upgrading, with 
some limited evidence of polarisation 
(Fernández-Macías and Hurley, 2008). 
The fact that this aggregate pattern 
broadly corresponded to that observed 
in a comparable earlier period of 
employment expansion in the US gave 
some support to the idea that there 
are common underlying determinants 
of structural change in employment in 
developed market economies. A com-
bination of technological change and 
globalisation are the most frequently 
cited factors but a plausible inference 
from the variety of national quintile 
patterns identified in the EU analysis is 
that institutional factors – which tend 
to vary from country to country - serve 
to mitigate or modulate the impacts of 
these more universal vectors of change 
(Oesch and Rodrigues 2010). 
The sustained employment growth 
of recent times in both the US and 
Europe is now in the past but, while 
the original purpose of the Jobs Pro-
ject methodology was to study the 
changes in the structure of jobs over 
a longer time period of employment 
growth, it is equally possible to exam-
ine the shifts since the advent of the 
recession in 2008. Perhaps of most 
interest is to view the developments 
in the last two years against the 
backdrop of the previous decade. For 
example, has the qualitative change 
in the employment structure in the 
EU-27 during the recession diverged 
from the experiences of the recent 
decade, or is it more an accelera-
tion of previously observed structural 
trends? As we will see in this chapter, 
it turns out to be primarily the latter. 
It is important to emphasise the poten-
tial to expand the jobs-based approach. 
With a stable frame of jobs defined 
by NACE and ISCO, other sources of 
data that use these codes can be used 
to evaluate or classify jobs. Indeed in 
this chapter we also present a rank-
ing of jobs according to the estimated 
average number of years of schooling 
of the job holders. This can be inter-
preted as a measure of the skill con-
tent of the job, based on the Eurostat 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) variable 
‘ hatlevel’, which captures the high-
est level of educational attainment 
of individual respondents. A more 
multidimensional job ranking has also 
been elaborated based on a synthetic 
indicator of non-pecuniary job quality 
(Fernández-Macías, Hurley and Storrie, 
2011). This uses data from Eurofound’s 
European Working Conditions Survey 
of 2005 and takes advantage of the 
fact that this survey has a richer cover-
age of quality of work dimensions than 
the EU LFS (though with more mod-
est sample sizes). To these three ways 
of generating job quality proxies, we 
can potentially add others – share of 
permanent workers, share of graduate 
job-holders, etc. The approach of using 
a crosshatching of sectoral and occupa-
tional classification offers a structural 
view on labour market change that is 
both flexible and extensible.
The text box explains the basic steps 
of the jobs methodology.
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Methodological note: the ‘jobs-based’ approach
The key (simplified) steps of the approach are as follows.
1. Using the standard international occupation (ISCO-88) and sectoral (NACE Rev. 2.0) classifications at a two-digit level, we create a matrix 
counting 88 different sectors on the horizontal axis and 27 occupational groups on the vertical axis. This generates a matrix of 2 376 ‘job’ cells. 
In practice some of the possible combinations of occupation/sector do not exist (there are unlikely to be many precision craft workers in insur-
ance companies for example) but the country total of job cells with employment varies from over 1 600 in Italy to just over 500 in Luxembourg. 
2. We generate two separate job rankings in each country, one based on mean hourly wage and a second based on mean educational level 
of the job-holders. The wage ranking is our principle means of characterising jobs in terms of their ‘quality’ and the education-based ranking 
is a secondary ranking.
3. We allocate jobs to quintiles in each country based on our job-wage and education-wage rankings for that country. This creates two job-
to-quintile assignments for each country, one based on wages and one on education. The best-paid or highest-skilled jobs will be assigned 
to the fifth quintile, the lowest-paid or -skilled to the first. Each quintile in each country should represent 20 % of employment in the second 
quarter of 2008, i.e. employment in the job is used as a weight before assigning to quintiles.* Hereafter, both job-to-quintile assignments 
remain fixed for each country and we shift our focus to the EU LFS quarterly employment data where what we are interested in is the shift in 
employment at the quintile level in each country. 
The reason for abstracting from job-level to quintile-level is strictly pragmatic: it allows us to make manageable the presentation of a very 
rich set of data in each country. 
Chart 1 illustrates in simplified format the above three steps using some of the large employing top- and bottom-paid jobs at the EU level as 
examples (while the jobs are correctly assigned in terms of EU quintile, the individual job-wage ranks, that is 1–4, 1105–1108, are made up 
and for illustrative purposes only. See Annex 1 for the wage and education quintiles of a selection of high-employing individual jobs). 
4. We then simply sum net employment change between the second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2010 (in numbers of persons 
employed) for each quintile in each country to establish whether net job growth has been concentrated in the top, middle, or bottom of the 
employment structure. This generates a series of charts similar to Chart 3. Except where otherwise indicated, all charts in the review describe 
net employment change by quintile for the indicated country or for the EU as a whole. The EU aggregate charts are based on applying a 
common EU job-wage or job-skill ranking. 
The resulting quintile charts give a simple, graphical representation of the extent of employment change in a given period as well as an indication 
of how that change has been distributed across jobs of different pay or skill levels. Chart 2, for example, illustrates employment change using job 
wage quintiles for the EU-27 as a whole during the crisis. The figure should be read from the leftmost bar (the lowest-paid jobs) to the rightmost 
(the highest-paid jobs). Net employment change is represented on the vertical axis; the fact that most of the bars are below the zero line confirms 
that net job losses were extensive (a decline of employment of around 2.7 million low-to-medium quintile wage jobs) and that employment grew 
only in the highest-paid jobs.
(*) Large, ‘lumpy’ jobs with a big share of employment can tend to make the quintile employment totals uneven in some countries. However, in 
only one country – Romania – does this lead to individual quintiles containing more than 22.5 % or less than 17.5 % of a country’s employ-
ment. This should be borne in mind when looking at charts for Romania. The single most common job in the country – skilled agricultural 
workers in crop and animal production – alone accounted for 20 % of employment in the second quarter of 2008 and this results in an 
 oversized bottom quintile and undersized second quintile. 
Chart 1: Job rankings and quintile assignments carried out for each country
Rank Sector
1 Financial services
2 Legal/accounting
3 Education
4 Human health activities
…
…
1105 Agriculture
1106 Services to buildings
1107 Education
1108 Food manufacture
Lower 20%
paid
Mid-low
paid
Mid
paid
Mid-high
paid
Higher 20%
paid
Occupation
Corporate managers
Other professionals
Teaching professionals
Life science and health professionals
Skilled agriculture/fishery workers
Sales/services elementary occupations
Sales/services elementary occupations
Craft workers
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2. daTa
The EU LFS is the source of all data 
used in the rest of this review, both 
the changes in number of job hold-
ers (of the working age population, 
15-64 years of age) and the wages and 
education variables used to rank jobs. 
Regarding the wage data, it should 
be noted that the wage variable we 
use – incmon, from the EU LFS 2008 
annual data – was voluntarily sub-
mitted to Eurostat by the national 
statistical institutes (NSIs) in the coun-
tries covered and Eurostat has not yet 
assessed the reliability of this variable. 
It does not form part of the obligatory 
EU-LFS data submissions and conse-
quently was not available for all mem-
ber states. For this review, we have 
used EU LFS 2008 annual wage data 
for 12 member states; national sources 
contributed the data for  Denmark. 
The job-wage ranking for the other 
Member States was constructed as 
a weighted average of the availa-
ble wage data for these 13 countries. 
Annexes 2 and 3 describe in detail 
how this was done and offer some jus-
tification for applying a common job-
wage ranking where lack of adequate 
national data made it unavoidable.
It should be noted that, as of 2009, 
Eurostat has a mandate to begin col-
lecting wage data from the NSIs as 
an obligatory variable in their annual 
data submissions for the EU-LFS. The 
2009 annual data already contained 
wage data in decile format (incdecil) 
for 21 Member States. This develop-
ment, and the availability of data from 
the 2010 Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey in 2012, should help to generate 
more robust job-wage rankings for all 
 member states in the near future. 
Technically, recession in the EU 
began in the second quarter of 2008 
and ended in the third quarter of 
2009 after five quarters of consecu-
tive negative growth. The quarterly 
peak-to-trough period of employ-
ment decline in EU-27 was from 
Q3 2008 to Q1 2010, during which 
employment in the EU shrank by over 
nine million (a reduction of over 4 % 
of total employment). In this review 
we use a two-year timeframe (second 
quarter of 2008 to the second quar-
ter of 2010) for our analysis, as it cov-
ers the period from before the col-
lapse of the Lehman Brothers bank 
in September 2008 (seen by many as 
the trigger for the global crisis) to 
just after the stabilisation of EU-27 
unemployment rates at around 9.5 % 
(where they remained until May 2011). 
There are other justifications for 
opting for this timeframe. In a 
recession, reductions in employ-
ment tend typically (but not system-
atically) lag output declines by two 
to three quarters (as they likewise 
tend to do in reverse in recovery 
periods), which justifies extend-
ing the period to beyond that of 
quarter-on-quarter output declines. 
Also, since the focus is on changes 
in employment levels (which are 
not seasonally adjusted), it is con-
venient to select the same quarter 
in the two target years as a way of 
removing seasonal effects. 
3. changes in job 
sTrucTure during 
The recession
In this section, the ‘jobs approach’ 
is used to describe employment 
developments during the recession, 
looking first at overall shifts in the 
employment structure in the EU-27, 
and then drawing some comparisons 
between this period of employment 
decline and the preceding decade 
of employment expansion. The vary-
ing patterns of change in the indi-
vidual Member States during the 
most recent period are described 
with employment change during the 
recession broken down into its com-
ponents in terms of major sectoral 
aggregations, as well as worker char-
acteristics (gender, age, etc.) and 
employment status. The objective is 
to show how the broad employment 
changes identified in the quintile 
charts interact with other dimensions 
of labour market development – the 
increasing participation of women, 
shifts in employment by sector of 
activity, changes in employment sta-
tus – and how the recession has 
affected these interactions.
This method also offers further possi-
bilities of breaking these net employment 
changes down by gender, employment/
professional status, working-time cate-
gory (full-time, part-time), etc., which we 
explore later. 
For a more extensive description of the 
data-processing involved in the jobs 
approach, see Annex 3. Further back-
ground documentation includes Stehrer 
and Ward (2008) and Fernández-Macías 
and Hurley (2008) from the original Euro-
found research investigating employ-
ment change in the EU over the period 
 1995–2006.
 Chart 2: Net employment change, second quarter 2008 to second quarter 2010,  
by wage quintile (thousands)
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3.1. Comparison of 
pre-recession and 
recession periods using 
job-wage quintiles
In the decade to 2007, employment 
levels in EU-27 increased by over 
20 million. Earlier analysis of this 
period of employment expansion 
using the jobs approach (Fernandez-
Macias, 2010; Fernandez-Macias and 
Hurley 2008) emphasised the follow-
ing broad developments:
•	 Net employment growth was 
strongest in the top two quintiles 
with higher paid jobs, especially 
in knowledge-intensive services, 
accounting for the majority of net 
new jobs
•	 Employment growth was compara-
tively subdued in low-medium and 
medium-paying jobs, linked in part 
at least to the secular decline in 
employment in the manufacturing 
sector 
•	 Employment growth was relatively 
more robust in lower-paid jobs 
than in medium-paying jobs. This 
was associated with the expansion 
of less knowledge intensive service 
sectors (restaurants, hotels, retail, 
etc.) and the ‘de-standardisation’ 
of lower-paid jobs. 
•	 A variety of quintile patterns were 
observed at the national level, 
although many conformed broadly 
to one of three types: polarising; 
upgrading; or growth in the middle. 
Chart 3 below sets, side-by-side, the 
employment shifts by job-wage quin-
tile in the EU during the  period of 
employment expansion up to 2007 
against the same shifts during the 
recession. How do the two patterns 
compare? Apart from the obvi-
ous difference – the change from 
strongly positive to strongly nega-
tive employment growth – the pat-
terns of relative employment shift by 
quintile are broadly similar with the 
decline in aggregate EU employment 
between 2008 quarter two and 2010 
quarter two strongly concentrated 
in middle- and lower-middle paying 
jobs (Chart 3, right pane). 
These were also the two quintiles 
recording relatively weak growth in 
the pre-recession employment expan-
sion. Despite the recession, jobs in the 
top quintile actually increased employ-
ment by around 1 % per annum using 
the wage-based measure, and around 
2 % per annum using the education-
based measure (see Chart 5). High-
er-paid and skilled jobs were much 
more resilient to the effects of the 
recession than lower-paid and (espe-
cially) lower-skilled jobs. They were 
also the main beneficiaries of employ-
ment growth during the long preced-
ing period of European employment 
expansion. Moreover, the relative 
employment shift in jobs at the lower-
end of the wage spectrum was also 
similar to that in the preceding expan-
sion: employment grew relative to (or 
declined less markedly than) medium-
paying jobs, but declined relative to 
higher-paying jobs. 
Employment change during the cri-
sis in the EU-27 as a whole can be 
characterised as polarised, with some 
element of upgrading. Chart 3 also 
makes clear that the  recession has 
‘hollowed out’ the labour market by 
disproportionately affecting those 
jobs in the middle of the wage distri-
bution. This is a common finding of 
previous analyses in both the US and 
UK using a similar methodology and 
applied job-wage or occupation-wage 
rankings (Wright and Dwyer 2003, 
Goos and Manning 2007) to ana-
lyse employment shifts over  longer 
periods. In other words, employment 
trends are relatively positive in jobs at 
the top and at the bottom, and rela-
tively negative in the middle, giving 
rise to an overall polarisation of the 
labour market as the ‘middle disap-
pears’. It is noteworthy, however, that 
these earlier trends should not only 
persist, but become amplified, during 
a severe downturn.
Chart 3: Changes in EU employment levels by wage quintile, 1998–2007  
and Q2 2008—Q2 2010q (thousands)
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Note: The two charts are broadly comparable in terms of the method used to generate them, but the 1998–2007 chart is based on the original EU job project’s job-
wage rankings, which relied on various EU data sources (2000–2002, see Stehrer and Ward, 2008 for details) using the older NACE classification (Rev. 1.1) and for 
only 23 Member States. Bulgaria, Poland, Malta, and Romania were not included due to unavailability of data. Inclusion of data from these countries is unlikely to have 
significantly altered the overall pattern observed, however, as they accounted for less than 15 % of total EU-27 working  population in 2000. 
Source: EU LFS (authors’ calculations), Fernández-Macías (2010)
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At the national level, Chart 4 presents 
net employment change between the 
second quarter of 2008 and the sec-
ond quarter of 2010 by wage quintile 
for all Member States, and for the 
EU-27 as a whole. In virtually all coun-
try charts, employment-losing quin-
tiles outnumber employment-gaining 
ones, though those countries where 
the recession impacted less severely 
(such as Germany, Poland, and the 
Benelux countries) tended to have 
countervailing growth,  especially in 
the highest-paid jobs. The chart illus-
trates the extent of the variation in 
the size of the impact of the reces-
sion on employment by country. The 
six countries that recorded peak-to-
trough employment declines of 10 % 
and more each have a concentra-
tion of job loss in low-skilled, but 
 medium-paid, jobs.
These declines are attributable in 
large part to the plight of construc-
tion jobs in those countries where 
the preceding construction booms 
Chart 4: Annual employment change by wage quintile, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (%)
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 collapsed from 2007 onwards, with 
construction-led movements in the 
Irish and Spanish labour markets being 
particularly remarkable. Both coun-
tries experienced comparably frenetic 
employment growth in the decade 
preceding the crisis (Table 1). The Irish 
labour market almost doubled in size 
between 1992 and 2007, while Spain 
accounted for over one in three net 
new jobs created in the EU15 between 
1995 and 2006 (Fernández-Macías and 
Hurley, 2008, p. 14). 
Much of the growth was, however, 
in an overheated construction sec-
tor, and the collapse has been even 
more dramatic. Spain alone shed a 
million construction jobs between the 
beginning of 2008 and 2010. Employ-
ment in construction fell respectively 
33 % and 45 % in Spain and Ireland 
between 2008Q2 and 2010Q2 and by 
even more in some of the Baltic mem-
ber states. The bursting of national 
property bubbles has had repercus-
sions well beyond the labour market, 
but it was also the single most impor-
tant factor behind the decline in 
employment in those countries where 
the recession struck hardest. 
When Eurofound carried out its 
original jobs-based analysis of EU 
LFS data covering the earlier period 
1995–2006, three main patterns of 
employment growth were identified 
at national level: polarised growth, 
upgrading, and growth in the mid-
dle (as well as two further hybrid or 
mixed categories). Labelling differ-
ent national growth patterns in this 
way makes sense over an 11-year 
period as the change can be consid-
ered as largely structural. The short 
timeframe of the current analysis – 
two years – and the fact that it is self-
evidently an exceptional period of job 
destruction, may make a repetition of 
the same exercise somewhat artificial. 
Nonetheless, with this caveat (and 
others),(3) it is worth considering the 
(3) Four Member States were not covered in 
the earlier period due to unavailability 
of data (Bulgaria, Malta, Poland, and 
Romania). Also, the quintile assignments 
were based on national wage data for 
all 23 Member States for the 1995-2006 
analysis. This is our preferred method. 
extent to which the patterns identi-
fied earlier still apply. Our definition 
of employment polarisation is adjust-
ed to reflect changed circumstances: 
it refers to any country where job 
destruction has been especially con-
centrated in medium-paid jobs. Table 
1 summarises the pre- and post-crisis 
patterns of employment growth. 
The first thing to observe is that 
the list of countries with polarising 
employment change has lengthened. 
Two original countries – Cyprus and 
France – have been joined by eight 
new Member States. The list is influ-
enced, in particular, by employment 
declines in the construction sector, 
which tend to concentrate in middle-
paying jobs. This is clearly the reason 
why Ireland, Spain, the UK, and two 
of the Baltic States appear under 
the ‘polarised’ heading in 2008-
2010, but not beforehand. Indeed, 
the fast-growing employment in the 
construction sector in 1995–2006 
(Fernández-Macías and Hurley 2008, 
p. 25) served to disguise polarisation 
in the overall employment structure 
for the earlier period in some coun-
tries. By contrast, its sharp decline in 
the post-crisis period has  accentuated 
any  underlying polarisation. 
In this review, in order to cover employ-
ment developments in all 27 Member 
States, we use a national ranking for 13 
Member States and a common European 
job-wage ranking for those 14 countries 
where adequate wage data were not 
available (see Annex 2 and 3 for details). 
The number of countries in the 
upgrading and hybrid polarisation/
upgrading categories remained 
roughly the same over the two peri-
ods. In these countries, employment 
destruction was concentrated in low-
er-paid jobs, while better-paid jobs 
experienced growth. In the recession, 
this was decisively the case in ‘pure’ 
upgrading countries such as Luxem-
bourg, Germany, and Sweden, while 
hybrid polarisation/upgrading coun-
tries such as Austria and Belgium fea-
ture significant job loss in medium-
paid jobs, little change in lowest-paid 
jobs, and growth at the top. 
It is important to bear in mind that 
a country’s employment structure 
can be categorised as ‘upgrading’ 
even as it experiences a compara-
tively high reduction in employment. 
Thus, Slovakia, for example, added 
employment in the top quintile but 
lost even more in the bottom three 
quintiles, and is hence classed as 
‘upgrading’. Poland, on the other 
hand, is an example of hybrid polari-
sation/upgrading, despite being 
amongst the Member States with the 
most resilient labour markets during 
the crisis and enjoying employment 
growth in the reference period.
The countries that displayed a more 
obvious upgrading pattern during 
the recession were Germany, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, and Slovakia. In Germa-
ny, growth in top-paid jobs was great-
est in high-level occupations in both 
Table 1: Patterns of employment change at national level – comparison  
of pre- and post-crisis periods
Pattern of 
employment change 1995–2006 2008–2010
Polarisation
Cyprus, France, 
Hungary, Netherlands, 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, 
France, Greece, Ireland, 
Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, UK 
Hybrid polarisation/
upgrading
Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Slovenia, UK 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Netherlands, Poland 
Upgrading
Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Slovakia 
Hybrid upgrading/
growing middle
Czech Republic, Spain, 
Italy, Sweden 
Growth in middle Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia 
Downgrading Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania
Not classified Estonia, Malta, Romania
Source: EU LFS (authors’ calculations), Fernández-Macías and Hurley (2008)
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the public sector (the category of 
‘other associate professionals’ in pub-
lic administration) and private sectors 
(‘engineering science professionals’ in 
computer programming and consul-
tancy as well as machinery manu-
facture). Meanwhile, job losses were 
greatest for agricultural  labourers in 
the bottom quintile. 
In Sweden and Slovakia, the pat-
tern at the top was not dissimilar. 
Engineering science professionals (in 
computer programming/consultancy 
and head offices in Sweden; in com-
puter programming/consultancy and 
construction in Slovakia) as well as 
teaching professionals in education 
were the three jobs in which top-
quintile growth was the strongest. 
The category of ‘other professionals’ 
in financial services and public admin-
istration as well as extraterritorial 
organisations accounted for most top 
quintile employment growth in Lux-
embourg, reflecting the  specificities 
of its employment structure. 
A new label, ‘downgrading’, was 
necessary to cover the change of sign 
of employment change between the 
two periods. No countries experi-
enced ‘growth in the middle’ during 
the crisis period, but a number expe-
rienced a deterioration of employ-
ment structure, according to this 
method, with job destruction greater 
in higher-paid jobs, while lower-paid 
employment either grew or suffered 
only relatively small declines. There 
was no equivalent pattern in the 
period 1995–2006, as only one of 23 
countries covered recorded marginal-
ly greater job growth in the  bottom 
quintile than in the top quintile (in 
the Netherlands, the most obviously 
polarising country in the earlier peri-
od). During the recession, the group 
of ‘downgrading’ countries covers 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, 
Hungary, and Lithuania.
As a list of the top employment-
gaining and losing jobs indicates, 
there is no obvious common expla-
nation for this development in 
these five countries. Instead, the 
common pattern reflects the quite 
diverse sectoral and occupational 
employment shifts that become 
apparent when looking beyond the 
quintiles to see which jobs account 
for the patterns. 
In Italy, the largest growing job by 
some margin has been in low-paid 
household services (+150 000). Job 
decline in the top quintile in Italy is 
attributable, to a significant degree, 
to job losses in public administration 
and education, which tended to be 
more resilient elsewhere. Italy is also 
the only Member State in which all 
of the ‘higher’ white collar occu-
pational grades (officials/legislators, 
managers, professionals, and associ-
ate professionals) experienced job 
declines. Cumulatively, these higher-
level occupations accounted for just 
over 500 000 job losses – equivalent 
to net Italian employment loss over 
the two-year period. This is clearly 
a distinctive pattern compared with 
most other Member States, where 
employment losses were concentrat-
ed lower down the occupational and 
wage distribution. 
In Denmark, four of the five largest 
growing jobs in the Denmark were 
low-paid, first quintile jobs, includ-
ing retail salespersons and restau-
rant service workers. The biggest 
growth in Hungary was in lower-
level public administration workers 
(in ‘elementary occupations’). The 
decline in top-paid jobs in Lithuania 
was accounted for by construction 
workers and managers – specific sec-
toral wage inflation in some of the 
pre-recession boom countries having 
pushed construction jobs into higher 
quintiles than they occupy, on aver-
age, in other countries.
The picture is rather disparate, 
therefore, and it would be unwise 
to assume that these are structural 
trends given the short timeframe of 
the current analysis. Nonetheless, 
certain countries exhibit a deterio-
ration of their employment struc-
ture during the recession. Overall, 
the patterns of employment shift 
are even more varied across coun-
tries than those that were present-
ed in the original analysis covering 
1995–2006 (Fernández-Macías and 
Hurley, 2008). 
3.2. Comparison of 
employment shifts 
using job-wage quintiles 
and job-skill quintiles
One of the advantages of the jobs-
based approach is that different job 
quality proxies can be used to gener-
ate the quintiles, and these can serve 
to validate or corroborate the quin-
tile patterns generated using the 
job-wage rankings. One possibility 
is to use the average education level 
of the job-holders as a proxy of the 
skills level of the job. While educa-
tional attainment levels are more 
properly attributes of job-holders 
rather than of the jobs themselves, 
they nonetheless cast an interesting 
alternative perspective on the qual-
ity of employment shifts. There is, in 
any case a high  correlation between 
Chart 5: Employment shifts, comparing job-education quintiles and job-wage 
quintiles EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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 job-wage and job- education 
 rankings  reflecting returns to edu-
cation, differential productivity lev-
els, etc. Hence we would generally 
expect the pattern of employment 
shifts to be similar using job-skill and 
 job-wage quintiles. 
This indeed turns out to be the case for 
the EU-27 aggregate shifts, as Chart 5 
illustrates. The broad patterns are simi-
lar. Employment grew in the top wage 
and education quintile, but this was 
the only quintile in which employment 
grew, with net losses across all other 
quintiles whether based on skill or 
wages. However, we can also see some 
noteworthy differences in the patterns 
of employment shift, depending on 
whether wages or education is used as 
criteria for ranking jobs. 
In practice, employment shifts dur-
ing the recession were more clearly 
upgrading using education quintiles 
rather than wage quintiles. This is 
reflected in stronger growth at the 
top where employment increased by 
approximately 2 % per annum using 
job-education rankings, compared to 
1 % using wage rankings. This is 
consistent with earlier findings from 
the UK (Felstead et al., 2007), where 
skill-based measures of job quality 
point unambiguously to upgrading 
of the employment structure: as seen 
already, wage-based measures tend 
to paint a more shaded picture com-
bining upgrading and polarisation. 
The second principle difference is 
that employment declines tended 
to be skewed more to the low end 
using education quintiles, but more 
to the middle when using the wage 
quintiles. While the second quintile 
(low-medium paid and skilled jobs) 
shows a similar scale of employment 
decline according to both criteria, 
employment losses are relatively 
larger in the lowest education quin-
tile, and in the middle wage quintile. 
Chart 5a offers some explanation 
for these differences. It compares 
weighted averages of the educa-
tion and wage quintile values across 
all jobs for the main sector and 
occupational groupings (the data is 
re-aggregated to the 1 digit level; 
presenting information at the 2 digit 
level is not practical). Broadly, higher 
paid sectors and occupations tend 
also to have higher education levels. 
What this also shows, however, is that 
those low-education jobs that suf-
fered most from employment decline 
during the recession – in sectors such 
as construction and manufacturing, 
and in occupations such as plant and 
machine operators or craft and relat-
ed trades workers – tend to place 
higher in job-wage hierarchies than 
in job-education hierarchies, with the 
wage-education differential being 
particularly large in the construction 
sector(4). These types of jobs tend to 
be closer to the medium in terms of 
pay, and closer to the bottom in terms 
of educational attainment.
Thus one significant aspect of the 
employment declines during the 
recession is their concentration in 
jobs where skill-wage mismatches 
are more pronounced, i.e. where the 
generally observed wage-skills cor-
relation are weaker. This may have 
important ramifications in terms of 
(4) However, the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED), or 
years of completed full-time education, 
are weaker proxies of skill levels in job 
that are more reliant on apprenticeship 
and on-the-job learning.
the re-employment for those losing 
relatively high-paid jobs in manu-
facturing and, in particular, in con-
struction. Much of this employment 
will not reappear in the short-medi-
um term and the education levels 
of those losing these jobs are, in 
many cases, unlikely to equip them 
for equivalently paid jobs in other 
 growing sectors, generally in services. 
3.3. Patterns of 
employment shift 
during the recession: 
by activity 
Manufacturing and construction 
As already indicated, the two broad 
sector categories that have suffered 
the brunt of the recession’s labour 
market impact have been construc-
tion and manufacturing. Between 
the second quarter of 2008 and the 
second quarter of 2010, over 10 % 
of pre-crisis employment was lost in 
both sectors even though employ-
ment levels in the EU in all other sec-
tors actually increased in total over 
the course of the crisis.
Despite having broadly similar work-
force demographics, construction 
and manufacturing are dissimilar in 
Chart 5a: Comparison of mean job-wage and job-education quintile value, by sector 
and occupation (employment-weighted, EU-27)
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terms of their productive logic. Con-
struction is the most cyclical of all sec-
tors, whereas manufacturing is the 
most ‘structural’ in that it involves 
substantial fixed capital investment 
and long time horizons to reap the 
benefit of these investments. On this 
basis, therefore, one might predict 
that the decline in employment dur-
ing the current recession in manufac-
turing is likely to be more permanent 
than that in construction. However, 
there are many factors that tend to 
complicate this simple picture.
For one thing, the extent of the 
boom–bust cycles in national con-
struction sectors during this recession 
make it unlikely that construction-
sector employment will recover all 
the losses any time soon, with a 
large proportion of job losses in 
construction effectively becoming 
structural. Meanwhile, manufactur-
ing employment during the recession 
has followed quite distinct national 
patterns, with large output declines 
being accompanied by only modest 
employment declines in some Mem-
ber States (Germany notably) but 
with the reverse in other countries 
(such as Spain). In other words, firms 
appear to have hoarded labour in 
some countries, while in others they 
appear to follow the dictum of ‘let 
no crisis go to waste’, and conducted 
a more ruthless cutback in employ-
ment levels in order to improve 
productivity, etc. (Differences in 
response may depend on many fac-
tors – the nature of the contractual 
relationships, the nature of the out-
put decline (cyclical or structural), the 
extent to which employment levels 
in the sector/firms were  appropriate 
pre-crisis, etc.) 
Job loss in the construction sector was 
heavily concentrated in medium-paid 
and medium-to-low paid jobs, while 
the manufacturing sector destroyed 
employment across the wage distribu-
tion, but most heavily in the same two 
quintiles (Chart 5). Such employment 
losses in manufacturing would have 
been even heavier had it not been 
for the existence of short-time work-
ing schemes in a majority of Member 
States, as well as negotiated flex-
ible working time agreements, which 
served to maintain employment – 
in particular during the peak crisis 
quarters of late 2008 and early 2009. 
Construction sector jobs accounted 
for net job destruction of over 1.9 mil-
lion jobs – over 35 % of the total net 
decline in employment. 
White-collar workers were not 
exempt from the impact of the drop 
in construction sector employment, 
with engineers/professionals and cor-
porate managers in the sector being 
among the jobs experiencing the larg-
est declines. Employment fell most 
sharply in those Member States where 
the construction sector had grown, as 
a result of property and development 
booms, to account for between 11 % 
and 13 % of the workforce at the 
beginning of 2008 (compared with 
8 % in the EU as a whole). In Latvia 
and Lithuania, the fact that construc-
tion job losses were predominantly in 
the two top-paid quintiles is, in itself, 
a confirmation of boom-led wage 
inflation in the sector before the crisis 
(Chart 7) while the same jobs appear 
more frequently in middle or lower 
quintiles in other countries. 
Chart 6: Job loss in manufacturing and construction by wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Chart 7: Job loss in manufacturing and construction in Lithuania and Latvia, 
by wage quintile Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Manufacturing was the broad sector 
category that suffered the great-
est employment decline in absolute 
terms between the second quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2010 
(3.8 million jobs) with the bulk of 
the losses in low-technology manu-
facturing (clothing/textiles, furniture 
and wood products, etc.) as show in 
Chart 8, and with jobs that were pre-
dominately in the low- wage quin-
tiles. However, Bulgaria, Estonia, and 
Hungary stand out in this regard 
in that there was also quite a sig-
nificant employment loss in the high-
technology manufacturing sectors in 
jobs located in the middle job-wage 
quintile.
This occurred in both the more and 
less developed European economies, 
and was largely in heavy capital-
intensive sectors such as fabricat-
ed metals, and cars and machinery. 
These sectors account for much of 
the considerable high-technology 
net job loss in the middle quintiles 
(machine operators and other metal 
and machinery workers) in Sweden 
and the Czech Republic in particu-
lar, and to a lesser extent in France, 
 Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
It is striking that job loss in high-tech-
nology jobs in the middle were very 
limited in Germany (Chart 9) – a result 
which is almost certainly explained 
by the more extensive reduction in 
average hours worked that took 
place in Germany  compared with 
other countries. Indeed, Germany 
continued to distinguish itself as the 
major source of employment growth 
in high-technology manufacturing, 
with four of the top eight growing 
jobs in the highest quintile belong-
ing to the occupational classifica-
tion of physical, mathematical, and 
engineering science  professionals, in 
various sectors. 
Services
Given that over 70 % of the working 
population is employed in the servic-
es sector, services might be expected 
to have a sizeable influence on the 
aggregate representation of employ-
ment change during the recession. 
This was certainly the case in the 
decade preceding the crisis, when 
services accounted for virtually all 
growth at the top and the bottom of 
the job-wage distribution (Fernán-
dez-Macías and Hurley 2008, p. 29). 
However, the recent slowdown in 
the growth of employment in servic-
es means that the main polarisation 
tendencies are, to a larger extent 
than before, accounted for by the 
collapse of middle-wage ranking jobs 
in manufacturing and construction. 
In fact, the rapid decline in manufactur-
ing and construction means that, even 
though employment growth in services 
has declined  appreciably, the propor-
tion of employment accounted for by 
services jobs  continues to increase. 
Chart 8: Job loss in high and low tech manufacturing by wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Chart 9: Job loss/gain in high and low tech manufacturing by wage quintile, 
Germany, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Chart 10: Job loss/gain in services by wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Before the recession, the large, pre-
dominantly state-funded, education 
and health and care sectors were 
important sources of employment 
growth and, since the recession, 
these have been even more signifi-
cant contributors to job growth – not 
least in the top wage quintile. Even 
during the peak crisis quarters of 
the last quarter of 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009, employment in edu-
cation and health continued to grow 
and, over the period Q2 2008Q2–
Q2 2010, these sectors recorded 
net growth of approximately 3 % 
and 5 % respectively. As Chart 10 
illustrates,(5) however, while employ-
ment grew across the board in the 
predominantly state-funded sector 
and with a strong bias towards high-
er-paid jobs, employment in private-
sector services declined markedly in 
middle-ranking jobs. 
Another way of breaking down 
employment change in the services 
sector is in terms of the ‘knowl-
edge intensiveness’ of the sectors 
in which the change is taking place 
(in line with the Eurostat distinction 
between ‘knowledge intensive’ and 
‘less knowledge intensive’ services). 
Aside from health and education 
professionals, the major contributors 
to the jobs growth in the top quintile 
of knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 
were science professionals in com-
puter services, consultancy, and other 
business services. Indeed, knowledge 
intensive services have remained rel-
atively unaffected during the crisis, 
enjoying employment growth across 
all quintiles (Chart 10). They alone 
account for the net growth in high 
paid and medium-high paid jobs in 
the EU-27. Growth was also evident 
in lower-paid KIS jobs, primarily in 
residential care, but also in smaller 
expanding sectors such as gambling/
betting, information services, and 
head offices/corporate headquarters. 
(5) Chart 10 uses the following breakdown: 
‘Private services including retail’ = ‘retail’ 
plus ‘other private services’ (NACE Rev. 
2.0, G–N, R–U); ‘Public services plus 
utilities’ = ‘health’, ‘education’, ‘public 
administration’ and ‘utilities’ (NACE Rev. 
2.0, E–F, O–Q).
By contrast, less knowledge intensive 
services (LKIS) suffered employment 
losses across the board (Chart 11). 
Retail was the sector that contrib-
uted most to the declines – especially 
in the lower quintiles – while losses 
were also notable in postal services 
(in the second quintile, and in the 
concluding phase of deregulation 
in the EU), in warehousing (in the 
fourth quintile), and in transport 
and personal services (in the fourth 
quintile). There was some counter-
vailing LKIS employment growth in 
food and beverage services, but this 
was not enough to offset the losses 
elsewhere. 
Looking at individual countries, we 
see that KIS employment was a par-
ticularly important determinant of 
whether countries recorded growth 
or relatively mild declines in high-
er-paid jobs. These were generally 
the same type of job and sector as 
for the aggregate EU figure – that 
is, with many jobs for profession-
als, especially in the predominantly 
state-funded sectors of health and 
education. A more private-sector mix 
of jobs was evident, however, in 
Belgium, France, and Poland, among 
others, while Hungary is something 
of an anomaly in that there was 
significant growth in low-paid public 
sector KIS jobs.(6)
The recession increased the propor-
tion of employment in KIS in every 
Member State, but especially in those 
labour markets most affected by the 
crisis, rising by eight percentage 
points in Estonia, six in Ireland, and 
four in Spain and Lithuania.
(6) Very early on in the crisis Hungary (and 
Romania) increased public employment 
as a countercyclical measure. See ILO 
(2010) for details.
Chart 11: Job loss and gain in KIS and LKIS by wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 to Q2 2010, (thousands)
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Chart 12: Proportion of employment in KIS, before and after crisis
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3.4. Patterns 
of employment 
change during the 
recession: by worker 
characteristics 
The following sections show how 
the net employment shifts during 
the recession were distributed by 
gender, age, employment status, and 
other demographic variables. Specifi-
cally, employment change is broken 
down by quintile and by the follow-
ing background variables: gender, 
age, country of birth, and various 
employment status dichotomies: full/
part-time, self-employed/employ-
ee, and fixed-term/permanent. The 
original job-to-quintile assignments 
already established are maintained 
for each country, and the charts are 
used to describe, first, the starting 
distribution in the second quarter of 
2008 and, secondly, the net shift in 
employment (between this quarter 
and the second quarter of 2010) for 
the main categories of the select-
ed background variable across the 
 quintiles in each country. 
Gender
During the decade prior to the cri-
sis, the gender employment gap 
continued to close, with growth in 
female employment being greater 
than growth in male employment in 
both relative and absolute terms. The 
recession has accelerated this con-
vergence, however, because of the 
greater impact of the crisis on sec-
tors that are male dominated. Thus 
the gender employment gap – 45 to 
55 in 2007 - has narrowed a fur-
ther percentage point. In the more 
extreme cases, such as all three Baltic 
States, men went from outnumbering 
women in employment before the cri-
sis to being outnumbered by women 
in the wake of the crisis. Here again 
the culprit was construction and, to a 
lesser extent, manufacturing. 
Throughout the EU, men accounted 
for over 80 % of the net decline in 
employment between 2008 and 2010, 
and this tended to be overwhelming-
ly in middle-paid and lower-middle 
paid jobs. How does this compare 
to the pre-crisis period? From 1995 
to 2006, growth was more or less 
equally skewed towards higher-paid 
jobs for both men and women. How-
ever, there was some evidence at 
that time of greater polarisation for 
women than men, with comparatively 
higher growth in female employment 
in the lower quintiles (Fernández-
Macías and Hurley, 2008, pp. 41–43; 
see also Grimshaw and Figueiredo, 
2011). Overall, however, the main 
observation was that growth in 
female employment was greater in 
every job quintile: for example, three 
out of every five new highly paid 
 white-collar jobs went to women. 
Notwithstanding convergences in the 
gender distribution of work in recent 
decades and the higher proportion 
of newer well-paid jobs going to 
women, the distribution of men and 
women across the job-wage quintiles 
was still quite uneven at the outset 
of the crisis. As Chart 13 illustrates, 
women outnumbered men by almost 
two-to-one in lowest-quintile jobs, 
while there were many more men 
in low-medium and medium quintile 
jobs. The differences in higher-paid 
jobs were less marked. 
Female employment has had a com-
paratively soft landing during the 
crisis, both in qualitative and quanti-
tative terms. Almost all the employ-
ment growth in the top quintile in 
the EU-27 has gone to women (Chart 14). 
This has resulted largely from the 
continued expansion of professional-
grade jobs in the health and educa-
tion sectors. Meanwhile, net female 
job losses have been exclusively in 
middle- and low-paid jobs, with high-
est employment losses for females in 
four bottom quintile jobs including 
retail salespersons, blue-collar work-
ers in textiles/clothing manufacture, 
and in agriculture. In fact, a clear con-
trast is visible between the patterns 
of employment decline for men and 
women, with an upgrading pattern 
Chart 13: Distribution of male and female employment by wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 (millions)
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Chart 14: Job loss/gain for men and women by wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 to Q2 2010, (thousands)
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evident for women and a stark polari-
sation pattern for men – a partial 
reverse of the patterns observed dur-
ing the pre-crisis period.
The upgrading of female employ-
ment during the recession can be 
observed in particular in the west-
ern European ‘older’ Member States, 
including Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden (as well as those 
Member States that suffered busts in 
construction). Each of these countries 
more or less reflects the overall EU 
gender contrast, with polarised job 
loss for men, and bottom-skewed job 
loss for women. In terms of sectoral 
employment shifts, the explanations 
for top quintile growth are in most 
cases the well-rehearsed ones, namely 
faster female employment growth in 
health and education skewed towards 
 higher-paid occupations ( professionals 
and associate professionals). 
Age 
Recessions always tend to hit 
 younger workers especially hard. 
Limited experience and opportunity 
to acquire workplace skills mean that 
their labour market attachment is 
generally more tenuous than that 
of older workers, being more likely 
to be in non-permanent work, and 
more vulnerable to formal and infor-
mal applications of ‘last-in,  first-out’ 
type redundancy policies. 
The distribution of younger workers 
across job quintiles reflects some of 
the disadvantages they face. In the sec-
ond quarter of 2008, younger workers 
were twice as likely to be employed in 
the lowest-paid jobs as in the highest-
paid jobs (Chart 15). By contrast, older 
workers were more evenly distribut-
ed across quintiles, with a small bias 
towards higher-paid jobs. 
Compounding any inherent labour 
market disadvantages, recessions 
lead to a sharp fall-off in recruit-
ment and this tends to impact dis-
proportionately on younger appli-
cants. By definition, all first-time job 
 applicants are out of work but they 
tend, on average, to remain so for 
much longer periods both during 
and after recessions, with well-doc-
umented ‘scarring’ effects on their 
future employability and earnings 
(Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). 
Before the crisis, youth unemployment 
rates had been declining in the EU, fall-
ing from around 18 % in 2000 to 15 % 
by 2008, before rising to around 21 % at 
present (data from Eurostat). This is more 
than double the rates for those the work-
ing age population (15–64 years of age) 
as a whole, with especially high rates in 
countries such as Spain (where nearly half 
of persons aged 15-24 are unemployed) 
as well as Greece and Slovakia.
As we see in Chart 16, employment loss 
has affected both younger and core-
age workers (those aged between 30 
and 49 years) mainly in middle-ranked 
and lower-middle ranked jobs. These 
categories of workers account for all 
the net job loss in the EU between the 
second quarter of 2008 and the second 
quarter of 2010. Given that the chart 
characterises absolute employment 
change, and that those aged under 30 
years account for a much lower share 
of overall employment than core-age 
workers, their relative share of over-
all employment loss is much higher. 
Younger workers also suffered job 
losses across all quintiles and did not 
share in any of the net employment 
gain in the highest-paid jobs.
Perhaps the most striking feature of 
all is that employment of older people 
has proved comparatively impervious 
to the recession,  enjoying growth 
across all cohorts.(7) Net employment 
(7) An important qualification is that, because 
the charts breaking employment change 
down by age group are cross-sectional, 
and break employment into age groups 
and job quintiles in two separate peri-
ods (Q2 2008 and Q2 2010), they include 
important cohort shifts as well as net 
employment loss/gain for each age group. 
The growth of the older worker category 
is augmented by the greater inflow of 
48–49 year-olds than the outflow of 63–64 
year olds, for example. The decline of the 
younger age group also appears in starker 
relief for similar cohort reasons, though 
the effect in this case is the opposite.
Chart 15: Distribution of employment by age group and wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 (millions)
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Chart 16: Job loss/gain by age group and wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 to Q2 2010, (thousands)
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growth for the older age category in 
the EU was skewed towards higher-
paying jobs, with professional and 
associate professional jobs account-
ing for over half of the total net 
gains of 1.8 million jobs (compared 
to net losses respectively of over 
4 million jobs in the under-30 age 
category, and of 2.7 million in the 
core-age category). But there were 
also gains in lower-paid jobs for 
older workers – for example, 240 000 
new jobs in elementary occupations, 
where there was a notable job loss 
for the young and core-age groups 
(a combined loss of 950 000 jobs). 
Overall, there were net employment 
gains for older workers in 53 of the 
88 NACE Rev. 2.0 two-digit sectors, 
compared with 36 for core-age work-
ers (between 30 and 49 years) and 
22 for younger workers (those aged 
under 30). In the health sector, all net 
employment growth was enjoyed by 
older workers, while growth in edu-
cation and residential care activities 
was more equally shared between 
older and core age workers. The sec-
tors in which employment growth 
was greater for core-age workers 
than for older workers tended to 
be private services (management 
consultancy, civil engineering, other 
professional, scientific and technical 
activities at the higher end, and food 
and beverages and buildings services 
at the lower end). Those in which 
older workers benefited most from 
employment growth tended to be 
in public services (health, education, 
and social work activities). 
The less severe the scale of the reces-
sion in national labour markets, the 
more likely that employment growth 
in top-paid jobs was shared across 
the age cohorts. This was the case in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, and Poland, though only in 
the latter did employment growth for 
younger and core-age workers outstrip 
that of older workers. On the other 
hand, the employment destruction in 
the Member States that experienced 
deeper adjustments – such as the Baltic 
States, Bulgaria, and the Czech Repub-
lic – did not spare older workers. 
In summary, the recession impact-
ed especially unfavourably on the 
employment levels of younger work-
ers in the EU, while the employment 
of older workers increased across 
the board but with a skew towards 
higher-paid jobs. The consequence 
of this, of course, is that the age pro-
file of the EU workforce grew older, 
while that of the growing ranks of 
the unemployed grew younger. 
Foreign-born workers 
One of the paradoxes of the cross-bor-
der movements of workers in Europe 
is that internal mobility remains com-
paratively weak, despite freedom of 
movement being one of the core 
legal rights of EU citizens. Around 
3.4 % of EU-born workers work in 
a Member State other than that of 
their birth. The proportion of non-EU 
workers in the EU-27 is twice as high 
(over 6.6 % of the total in 2008)(8) as 
(8) Some caution is required regarding indi-
cated estimates of the proportion of 
foreign-born workers in the EU work-
force due to partial data on the coun-
try of birth question from Germany, 
where all non native-born workers were 
coded as ‘non-response’. It does not 
make much sense to calculate an EU 
aggregate employment shifts in foreign-
born/native-born employment without 
accounting for the sizeable foreign-born 
population in the EU’s most populous 
country; hence the pragmatic solu-
tion used is to reclassify 80 % of the 
total German non-response figure as 
 foreign-born workers (this equates to 
around 4.1 million persons, a conserva-
tive estimate given that the German 
foreign-born workforce was already esti-
mated at 4.15 million in 2000). This total 
is then assigned to two exclusive catego-
ries, foreign EU nationals and non-EU 
nationals, in proportion to their known 
that of foreign EU nationals despite 
greater, and in some cases growing, 
legal obstacles to their incorporation 
into the labour force. 
During the crisis, however, this gap 
tended to diminish as the numbers of 
workers born outside the EU work-
ers declined and those of foreign 
workers born in the EU increased. 
Again, the absolute figures are rela-
tively marginal so this can be only 
considered as limited evidence of an 
increase in internal EU labour mobil-
ity at the expense of third-country 
immigration. It is, in any case, a pre-
liminary estimate given that it relies 
on quarterly EU LFS data rather than 
the more definitive annual data. 
Overall, and excluding countries 
where the level of change was 
marginal, four countries reported 
a decline in foreign-born worker 
levels, and 14 countries reported 
a gain. The foreign-born work-
ing population declined most over 
the period in Ireland (where it fell 
by 105 000) and Spain (a fall of 
372 000). Meanwhile, the foreign-
born working population rose most 
in Italy (by 405 000  persons), in the 
UK (136 000 workers), and in Swe-
den. Employment gains for foreign-
born workers took place mainly 
in  low-paid jobs while declines 
were concentrated in medium-
paid jobs, often in  construction or 
 manufacturing. 
ratio in the German non-citizen working 
population (the ratio being 42:58).
Chart 17: Distribution of employment by country of birth and wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 (millions)
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The marked growth of employ-
ment for foreign-born workers in 
the bottom quintile was seen in 
several Member States – Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Sweden, UK – and occurred in 
conjunction with a sharp decline 
in native employment in the same 
quintile (in all countries except the 
UK). This suggests a replacement 
of native by foreign-born employ-
ment. The jobs principally affected 
were in lower-level services jobs in 
household and personal services, 
retail, food and beverages, and 
agriculture. 
Foreign-born workers are more 
likely to work in jobs in the lower 
quintiles than in the higher quin-
tiles. Across the EU, there were 
nearly twice as many foreign-born 
workers in the lower two quintiles 
compared to the top two quintiles. 
The proportion of foreign-born 
workers in lower-paid jobs is espe-
cially high in the southern Member 
States (Chart 19). Conversely, their 
proportion in highly paid jobs is 
very high in newer Member States 
such as Poland and Romania, even 
though absolute levels of foreign 
workers remain very low in these 
countries. This may be related to 
the placement of foreign-born pro-
fessional staff in faster growing 
post-accession countries. 
The countries in which employment 
grew more or less across the quin-
tiles for foreign-born workers were 
Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, and Sweden 
– even if, in all cases, the growth was 
skewed towards lower quintiles. 
With German data unavailable, it 
is not possible to verify whether 
immigration policies favouring the 
entry of skilled foreign workers 
have been successful there in rais-
ing the educational/wage profile 
of new foreign-born labour market 
entrants. However, foreign-born 
employment in the higher quintiles 
has grown in the EU, if not spec-
tacularly. While being substantial 
in a knowledge-intensive services 
economy such as Luxembourg, it 
has been much lower overall than 
has foreign-born employment in 
bottom-quintile jobs. 
3.5. Patterns of 
employment change 
during the recession: 
by employment status
Self-employment and work on part-
time and temporary contracts has 
become increasingly common in 
European labour markets in recent 
decades. However, in the years 
preceding the recession, these EU-
wide trends were halted or even 
reversed. Of course, the EU aver-
age figures (both growth rates and 
levels) include significant variation 
between Member States, with some 
being strongly identified with one 
form or other of non-standard work 
– for example, Spain with fixed-
term work and the Netherlands with 
part-time work. In the central and 
eastern European Member States 
(CEE), levels of part-time and fixed-
term employment remain compara-
tively low, while higher rates of self-
employment are in large part relat-
ed to higher shares of  agricultural 
employment. 
The consequences of the reces-
sion have been mixed as regards 
employment status. On the one 
hand, part-time employment has 
increased quite sharply (and this 
is not solely due to the increased 
employment of women relative to 
men) and some of the replacement 
of full-time by part-time work may 
be another manifestation of labour 
hoarding and possibly temporary in 
nature rather than permanent. On 
the other hand, the proportion of 
fixed-term employment fell – espe-
cially in the 2008–2009 phase of 
the recession – as the non-renewal 
of fixed-term contracts was often 
the path of least resistance for 
employers when dismissals were 
 considered inevitable. 
Chart 18: Job loss/gain for native and foreign born workers, by wage quintile, 
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Chart 19: Pre-crisis foreign-born working population in EU-27 – proportion of total 
employment and proportion in jobs in top two quintiles, Q2 2008 (%)
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Part-time work
Despite the growth of part-time 
work, it still tends to be more preva-
lent among lower-paid jobs (partly 
as a result of part-time/full-time pay 
differentials). This is reflected in the 
distribution of part-time workers 
which before the crisis in the second 
quarter of 2008 included a dispro-
portionate share of lowest quintile 
employment (Chart 20). 
Part-time employment grew in all five 
quintiles between the second quarter 
of 2008 and the second quarter of 
2010 (Chart 21), but in a polarised way 
with gains more evident in low-paid 
jobs and in highly paid jobs, and only 
marginal growth in the middle. In 
the earlier Eurofound analysis of the 
1995–2006 employment expansion in 
Europe, part-time growth had been 
similarly distributed, with the only dif-
ference being a more distinct skewing 
towards  low-paid employment. 
One other major difference emerg-
es, however, when we break down 
part-time growth by gender. Of the 
1.2 million new part-time jobs cre-
ated, as many were male as were 
female, despite more than 80 % of 
the existing part-time jobs being 
held by females. New male part-
time employment has been created 
primarily in lower quintile jobs in 
agriculture, food and beverages, 
and in building and landscape ser-
vices, while over two-thirds of female 
part-time employment growth was 
in higher-paid jobs – in education, 
health, and professional services.(9) In 
other words, the polarisation of part-
time employment took place along 
two axes – gender and pay. 
Part-time employment grew across the 
quintiles in Austria, Belgium, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. In 
the latter three CEE countries, this 
growth comes from a very low base 
(5 % or less of total employment). 
(9) A caveat here is that the job may be a 
well-paid job from the jobs project per-
spective – that is, characterised by high 
mean hourly pay across all workers in 
the job – but may be less well-paid and 
attractive in its part-time form. 
In Estonia and Ireland, sharp falls in 
full-time employment were matched 
by modest gains for part-time employ-
ment, again across jobs at all levels of 
pay. For some of the larger Member 
States, including Italy, France, and the 
UK, part-time growth was strongest in 
low-paid employment, but with some 
countervailing growth in well-paid 
jobs in France and the UK. Only in 
Sweden was part-time employment 
destroyed to any significant extent – 
and nearly all of the loss was in the 
two lowest quintiles (mainly residen-
tial care and social work and, to a 
lesser extent, some retail jobs). 
 Self-employment
During the 1995–2006 employ-
ment expansion, over two mil-
lion net new self-employed jobs 
were created. The profile of this 
growth was monotonically top-
skewed at aggregate EU level (for 
the 23 Member States covered) 
with over half the total growth 
in self-employment taking place 
in top-quintile jobs (primarily in 
the professions), while job destruc-
tion took place in lower-paid jobs 
(primarily in agriculture). Despite 
these developments, those in self-
employment at the outset of the 
recession were more likely to be in 
lower paying jobs. The polarised 
distribution in Chart 22 is nonethe-
less indicative of the heterogene-
ity of self-employment, with large 
numbers of predominantly self-
employed agricultural workers in 
lower quintiles, and self-employed 
professionals and owner/managers 
in the top quintiles.
During the recession, the levels of 
self-employment in the EU declined 
by around 1 %, relatively less than 
the labour market as a whole. The 
types of jobs affected tended to be 
somewhat different from those in 
the preceding expansion: for exam-
ple, agricultural self-employment 
declined, but not dramatically so. 
They tended also to vary from coun-
try to country and, as a result, the 
pattern of change by quintile lends 
itself less easily to interpretation. 
Chart 20: Distribution of full-and part-time employment by wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 (millions)
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Chart 21: Loss and gain of full-/part-time jobs by wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Self-employed job losses were great-
est in medium-low paid jobs – mainly 
in construction and to a lesser extent 
in manufacturing. The other quintiles 
showed relatively small gains and losses. 
The effect of the crisis on self-employ-
ment has been un-dramatic at the EU 
level, but there have been notable 
rises in some Member States – France, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic - 
skewed sharply to lower-paid jobs 
in the latter, and combined with a 
fall-off of dependent employment 
in the same quintiles. Job losses in 
self-employment have been relatively 
greatest in Portugal as well as in those 
countries that experienced booms 
and subsequent busts in construction 
(the Baltic States, Ireland, and Spain). 
Employment on fixed-term 
contracts
Employment on fixed-term contracts 
grew more or less evenly across the 
quintiles in the pre-crisis period from 
1995 onwards. It also grew faster 
 relative to overall employment, indi-
cating a shift away from perma-
nent to temporary work although, 
as mentioned, much of this shift 
occurred in earlier, rather than more 
recent, years. 
As with other forms of non-stand-
ard or atypical work, the distribu-
tion of jobs in the second quarter 
of 2008 was skewed towards lower-
paid jobs, though – as already noted 
in the case of part-time work – pay 
differentials favouring permanent 
workers tend to push jobs with 
a high proportion of temporary 
workers into the lower quintiles.
During the recession, fixed-term 
employment was one of the first 
forms of employment to suffer and 
fell especially sharply in (lower) medi-
um-paid jobs. Modest gains were reg-
istered in top and bottom  quintiles 
(indicating polarised growth). 
Chart 22: Distribution of (self-) employment by wage quintile, EU-27,  
Q2 2008 (millions)
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Chart 23: Job loss and gain of employees and self-employed, by wage quintile, 
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Chart 24: Distribution of employment by contract type and wage quintile,  
EU-27 (millions)
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Chart 25: Job loss and gain by contract type and wage quintile,  
EU-27, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010 (thousands)
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Much of the net decline of fixed-
term employment was the result of 
developments in two sectors (man-
ufacturing and construction) and 
in one country (Spain). If Spain is 
excluded, fixed-term employment 
added nearly 250 000 jobs across 
the EU during the crisis. The share 
of fixed-term employment in total 
employment in Spain fell from 34 % 
to 25 % between 2006 and 2009.  
The time profile of employment 
changes for fixed-term employment 
indicates both its sensitivity to the 
business cycle and its acute vulnerabil-
ity during the early phase of the reces-
sion. Between the second quarter of 
2008 and the second quarter of 2009, 
fixed-term employment declined by 
1.7 million jobs, before registering 
gains of around half this amount in 
the following 12 months with a net 
creation of 850 000 fixed-term jobs 
between the second quarter of 2009 
and the second quarter of 2010.(10) 
Employer caution in recruiting per-
manent staff has led to an increase 
in temporary hiring and, since the 
third quarter of 2009, the majority of 
workers in the EU who have been in 
their jobs for less than 12 months are 
working on fixed-term rather than 
permanent contracts.
4. conclusions 
This review describes the shifting struc-
ture of the European labour market 
over the course of the recession. The 
basic unit used to describe this struc-
tural change is a job, defined as an 
occupation in a sector. It is argued that 
a jobs-based approach is useful from 
both a conceptual and policy perspec-
tive. Average wages are used to assign 
a qualitative dimension to the jobs, 
while average education level offers a 
complementary ranking criterion. 
(10) The quarter-to-quarter movements are 
even more abrupt, though some of this 
is due to seasonality. A large concentra-
tion of the decline in temporary employ-
ment took place in the six-month period 
between the third quarter of 2008 and 
the first quarter of 2009 and amounted 
to over three million net job losses. 
Some of the most useful empiri-
cal conclusions are to be drawn by 
comparing the results of the EU-
wide shifts between 2008 and 2010 
with the patterns of job expansion 
between 1998 and 2007. Up until the 
recession, the EU experienced strong 
overall employment growth, but with 
appreciably higher growth in the top 
(fifth) wage quintile, followed by the 
fourth quintile. However, there was 
also an appreciable growth in the 
bottom quintile, with only limited 
employment growth in the second 
and third quintiles. This pattern was 
characterised as ‘upgrading’ with 
some ‘polarisation’. Thus, compared 
to the strong job growth in the US a 
decade earlier, growth in the EU was 
somewhat less polarised, with the 
top jobs showing more growth than 
the jobs at the bottom.
It is also to be noted that while the 
period between 2008 and 2010 was 
one of rapid employment contrac-
tion, it exhibits a similar pattern 
to that of the preceding decade in 
terms of the distribution of employ-
ment shifts across the wage struc-
ture, but with an acceleration of the 
previous trends. 
During the preceding decade of job 
growth, the polarisation tendency was 
accounted for largely by the growth 
of services jobs at the two ends of 
the wage distribution. However, it is 
the massive job loss in manufactur-
ing and construction – and the ensu-
ing collapse of the middle-ranking 
jobs – that has driven the increased 
 polarisation through the recession. 
While some of the fall in manufac-
turing employment in the middle 
quintile is in high-technology sec-
tors (in France, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Sweden, for example), most of 
the employment decline in manu-
facturing in the middle quintile is in 
low-technology manufacturing such 
as food processing and textiles. Con-
struction is the other sector account-
ing for job loss in the middle. Just 
as the construction boom supported 
the middle-ranking quintiles in the 
preceding decade, the collapse of 
construction in many counties accen-
tuates the decline of the middle, 
compared with the long-term trend. 
The decrease in manufacturing is 
less likely to be cyclical, though the 
continued significant growth in high-
technology manufacturing in Ger-
many (mostly in the well-paid top 
quintile) is also very striking. 
The persistence of overall job growth 
in the top quintile during the reces-
sion (while not occurring in all Mem-
ber States) is striking. Even in Ireland 
and Spain, two of the countries expe-
riencing some of the greatest decline 
in employment, the number of jobs 
in the top quintile increased. As in 
the preceding decade, though, job 
growth in the top was due mainly 
to an increase in knowledge inten-
sive services (KIS). These include both 
public services (mainly in education 
and health) and private services 
(business services). Since the reces-
sion, the relative importance of pub-
lic services for top quintile growth 
has increased.
Growth in top-paid jobs was also 
overwhelmingly in KIS, while the 
decline in numbers in the lowest-
paid jobs was comparatively modest. 
Other factors contributing to declin-
ing employment in the middle of 
the job-wage distribution include the 
polarised distribution of employment 
change for part-time and temporary 
work. In addition, shifts in the gender 
composition of the labour force have 
been polarising with women under-
represented in the middle of the job-
wage distribution and men, who suf-
fered the greater  employment losses, 
over-represented. 
Perhaps the most important long-run 
factor behind the ‘disappearing mid-
dle’ is the polarisation of services sec-
tor employment, with employment 
being generated at the top and the 
bottom of the employment structure, 
but comparatively little in middle-
ranking jobs. Hence services cannot 
be relied upon to fill the gap cre-
ated by the decline in manufacturing. 
Moreover, this is one of the polarising 
forces in the labour market whose 
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 importance is likely to continue to 
grow and become one of many fac-
tors likely to engender greater wage 
inequality. It also has the potential 
to increasingly segregate employ-
ment into low-quality and high-
quality ‘blocs’, thereby limiting the 
career mobility possibilities for those in 
lower-end employment and exac-
erbating problems of job-skills mis-
match and over-qualification. 
Women had benefitted most from 
employment growth during the pre-
ceding decade, and also fared bet-
ter than men during the recession 
given that the employment lost in 
construction and manufacturing was 
largely male-dominated. By contrast, 
the few sources of (generally high 
quality) employment growth were in 
female-dominated jobs in health and 
education. Overall four ‘male’ jobs 
were lost for every one ‘female’ job 
during the crisis, though the sharply 
gendered distribution of losses at the 
beginning has tended to give way to 
a more equal pattern of loss in the 
later stages of the recession and dur-
ing the initial recovery. Overall, the 
employment shifts show a strongly 
‘polarised’ development for men but 
an ‘upgrading’ pattern for women.
The recession has also seen changes 
in the age profile of the European 
workforce, with one of the most 
striking features being the signifi-
cant increase in employment among 
those aged between 50 and 64 years. 
Moreover, the employment data 
reveal that, while the employment 
of older workers has increased in all 
wage quintiles, it was mainly located 
at either end, but particularly at the 
top. Younger workers, on the other 
hand, were the most exposed to the 
effects of the crisis and their numbers 
declined in all quintiles. 
The picture in terms of employment 
status is mixed. Most of the net fall in 
temporary employment in the EU is 
attributable to developments in the 
Spanish construction sector. Exclud-
ing Spain, temporary work grew over 
the recession period and has grown 
especially rapidly since 2009. Part-
time work has also expanded in all 
quintiles with the greatest growth 
in the top and bottom quintiles 
but, unusually, with the growth in 
the number of part-time jobs being 
equally distributed among men and 
women. New part-time employment 
for men has been created primarily 
in lower-quintile jobs in agriculture, 
food and beverages, and in build-
ing and landscape services, however, 
while over two-thirds of the growth 
in female part-time employment was 
in higher-paid jobs in education, 
health, and professional services. 
There has been some reduction in 
the levels of foreign-born workers 
employed in the EU-27. Again, how-
ever, this has been heavily influenced 
by developments in the construction 
sector, which tends to have a mobile 
workforce and where booming pre-
crisis demand in some Member States 
encouraged an increase in the pro-
portion of foreign-born workers. 
If we look beyond those countries 
where construction sector declines 
were the dominant vector of labour 
market change, we can see high lev-
els of growth of employment of non-
native workers in Belgium, Cyprus, 
Italy, and Sweden, with such growth 
more likely to be in lower paid jobs, 
notably so in Italy. 
There is much to suggest that further 
changes in both the quantity and 
quality of jobs are imminent. Some 
of these changes appear somewhat 
more predictable than others. For 
example, some Member State govern-
ments have announced their inten-
tion to significantly restructure the 
public sector while market prospects 
for many private-sector developments 
remain uncertain, with the ultimate 
employment impact depending also 
on adjustment lags following on from 
the recession. In such a situation, 
the jobs methodology provides useful 
timely information on the possible 
nature of  changes in the job structure 
across the EU.
The recession has already changed 
somewhat the pattern of job growth 
compared with the decade before – 
from one of ‘upgrading’ with ‘some 
polarisation’ to ‘stronger polarisation’ 
and ‘some upgrading’. As most of the 
growth at the top of the income struc-
ture was attributable to public-sector 
jobs, any impending restructuring of 
public sector employment would pre-
sumably lead to even more downgrad-
ing, raising concerns about the strength 
of the recovery in the private sector. 
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annex 1: employmenT change in eu-27 2008–2010
Table A1: Jobs with the largest employment decline, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010
ISCO 
(2-digit) Occupation
NACE 
(2-digit) Sector Quintiles Employment levels and decline (thousands)
    Wage Education 2008 q2 2010 q2 Decline Decline (%)
71 Extraction and building trades workers 43
Specialised construction 
activities 2 2 6 365 5 518 -847 -13.3
71 Extraction and building trades workers 41 Construction of buildings 3 1 3 252 2 920 -332 -10.2
93
Labourers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing, 
and transport
43 Specialised construction activities 2 1 521 272 -250 -47.8
93
Labourers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing 
and transport
41 Construction of buildings 2 1 804 631 -172 -21.4
82 Machine operators and assemblers 25
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment
2 2 607 439 -169 -27.8
12 Corporate managers 43 Specialised construction activities 5 4 394 234 -161 -40.8
52 Models, salespersons, and demonstrators 47
Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 1 3 8 617 8 466 -151 -1.8
72 Metal, machinery, and related trades workers 25
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment
3 2 1 658 1 517 -141 -8.5
74 Other craft and related trades workers 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 1 1 752 639 -114 -15.1
21
Physical, mathematical 
and engineering science 
professionals
43 Specialised construction activities 5 5 309 197 -112 -36.2
74 Other craft and related trades workers 31 Manufacture of furniture 2 2 663 552 -111 -16.8
71 Extraction and building trades workers 42 Civil engineering 3 1 500 399 -101 -20.2
41 Office clerks 69 Legal and accounting activities 3 4 944 845 -98 -10.4
42 Customer services clerks 64
Financial service activities, 
except insurance and pension 
funding
4 4 720 622 -98 -13.6
82 Machine operators and assemblers 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 1 1 421 323 -98 -23.2
51 Personal and protective services workers 86 Human health activities 2 3 2 486 2 388 -98 -3.9
61
Market-oriented skilled 
agricultural and fishery 
workers
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 1 119 23 -96 -80.9
83 Drivers and mobile-plant operators 52
Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 3 2 635 540 -95 -14.9
41 Office clerks 43 Specialised construction activities 3 3 558 471 -87 -15.7
41 Office clerks 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3 3 1 051 968 -84 -8.0
Source: EU LFS (author’s calculations)
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Table A2: Jobs with the largest employment gain, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010
ISCO 
(2-digit) Occupation
NACE 
(2-digit) Sector Quintiles Employment levels and gain (thousands)
    Wage Education Q2 2008 Q2 2010 Gain Gain (%)
51 Personal and protective services workers 87 Residential care activities 2 3 1 582 1 868 287 18.1
23 Teaching professionals 85 Education 5 5 8 176 8 397 221 2.7
32 Life science and health associate professionals 86 Human health activities 4 5 3 974 4 187 213 5.4
22 Life science and health professionals 86 Human health activities 5 5 2 626 2 789 163 6.2
21
Physical, mathematical, 
and engineering science 
professionals
62 Computer programming, consultancy, and related activities 5 5 1 020 1 166 146 14.3
92 Agricultural, fishery, and related labourers 1
Crop and animal production, 
hunting, and related service 
activities
1 1 1 229 1 360 131 10.7
24 Other professionals 84
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
5 5 1 961 2 090 129 6.6
33 Teaching associate professionals 85 Education 4 4 1 681 1 806 125 7.5
51 Personal and protective services workers 85 Education 2 3 1 235 1 347 112 9.1
24 Other professionals 88 Social work activities without accommodation 4 5 319 429 110 34.5
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 81
Services to buildings and 
landscape activities 1 1 1 981 2 089 109 5.5
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 97
Activities of households as 
employers of domestic personnel 2 1 1 829 1 937 108 5.9
51 Personal and protective services workers 56
Food and beverage service 
activities 1 2 4 397 4 503 107 2.4
72 Metal, machinery and related trades workers 33
Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 4 2 435 537 101 23.3
34 Other associate professionals 66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 4 4 511 611 100 19.5
34 Other associate professionals 87 Residential care activities 3 4 481 579 98 20.3
41 Office clerks 86 Human health activities 3 3 793 891 97 12.3
12 Corporate managers 70
Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy 
activities
5 5 150 248 97 64.8
21
Physical, mathematical, 
and engineering science 
professionals
35 Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply 5 5 150 226 76 50.4
93
Labourers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing, 
and transport
42 Civil engineering 2 1 178 252 74 41.8
Source: EU LFS (author’s calculations)
Table A3: Employment shifts in jobs with greatest employment, Q2 2008 to Q2 2010
ISCO 
(2-digit) Occupation
NACE 
(2-digit) Sector Quintiles Employment levels and change (thousands)
    Wage Education Q2 2008 Q2 2010 Change Change (%)
52 Models, salespersons, and demonstrators 47
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 1 3 8 617 8 466 -151 -1.8
23 Teaching professionals 85 Education 5 5 8 176 8 397 +221 +2.7
61
Market-oriented skilled 
agricultural and fishery 
workers
1 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 1 1 6 795 6 825 +30 +0.4
71 Extraction and building trades workers 43 Specialised construction activities 2 2 6 365 5 518 -847 -13.3
51 Personal and protective services workers 56 Food and beverage service activities 1 2 4 397 4 503 +107 +2.4
32 Life science and health associate professionals 86 Human health activities 4 5 3 974 4 187 +213 +5.4
83 Drivers and mobile-plant operators 49
Land transport and transport via 
pipelines 3 2 3 834 3 776 -57 -1.5
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ISCO 
(2-digit) Occupation
NACE 
(2-digit) Sector Quintiles Employment levels and change (thousands)
    Wage Education Q2 2008 Q2 2010 Change Change (%)
34 Other associate professionals 84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 4 4 2 991 2 926 -64 -2.1
71 Extraction and building trades workers 41 Construction of buildings 3 1 3 252 2 920 -332 -10.2
22 Life science and health professionals 86 Human health activities 5 5 2 626 2 789 163 +6.2
41 Office clerks 84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 3 4 2 591 2 545 -46 -1.8
51 Personal and protective services workers 86 Human health activities 2 3 2 486 2 388 -98 -3.9
13 General managers 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3 2 2 369 2 308 -61 -2.6
24 Other professionals 84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 5 5 1 961 2 090 +129 +6.6
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 81
Services to buildings and landscape 
activities 1 1 1 981 2 089 +109 +5.5
51 Personal and protective services workers 84
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 4 3 2 051 2 061 +10 +0.5
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 97
Activities of households as employers 
of domestic personnel 2 1 1 829 1 937 +108 +5.9
51 Personal and protective services workers 87 Residential care activities 2 3 1 582 1 868 +287 +18.1
51 Personal and protective services workers 88
Social work activities without 
accommodation 1 2 1 850 1 851 0 0.0
51 Personal and protective services workers 96 Other personal service activities 1 3 1 817 1 842 +25 +1.4
72 Metal, machinery, and related trades workers 46
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2 2 1 825 1 814 -11 -0.6
33 Teaching associate professionals 85 Education 4 4 1 681 1 806 +125 +7.5
34 Other associate professionals 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 4 4 1 767 1 719 -48 -2.7
72 Metal, machinery, and related trades workers 25
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment
3 2 1 658 1 517 -141 -8.5
34 Other associate professionals 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 4 3 1 431 1 446 +15 +1.0
24 Other professionals 69 Legal and accounting activities 5 5 1 386 1 389 +3 +0.2
92 Agricultural, fishery, and related labourers 1
Crop and animal production, hunting 
and related service activities 1 1 1 229 1 360 +131 +10.7
51 Personal and protective services workers 85 Education 2 3 1 235 1 347 +112 +9.1
1 Armed forces 84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 5 3 1 344 1 339 -5 -0.4
41 Office clerks 46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3 3 1 318 1 237 -81 -6.1
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 85 Education 1 1 1 239 1 188 -51 -4.1
21
Physical, mathematical, 
and engineering science 
professionals
62 Computer programming, consultancy, and related activities 5 5 1 020 1 166 +146 +14.3
21
Physical, mathematical, 
and engineering science 
professionals
71
Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis
5 5 1 147 1 158 +11 +1.0
74 Other craft and related trades workers 10 Manufacture of food products 1 1 1 136 1 075 -61 -5.4
13 General managers 56 Food and beverage service activities 2 1 1 095 1 061 -34 -3.1
91 Sales and services elementary occupations 84
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 2 1 1 054 1 043 -11 -1.0
42 Customer services clerks 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 2 1 053 1 033 -20 -1.9
41 Office clerks 64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 4 4 1 020 995 -25 -2.5
41 Office clerks 47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2 3 1 051 968 -84 -8.0
72 Metal, machinery and related trades workers 28
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 3 3 982 920 -62 -6.3
Source: EU LFS (author’s calculations)
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annex 2: 
consTrucTion of  
job-wage rankings
To generate country job-wage 
rankings, we use wage data from 
an extraction from the 2008 annual 
EU LFS datafile provided by Euro-
stat. This extraction contains aggre-
gated data, not microdata, and 
contains wage data for only a lim-
ited number of Member States at 
present. The countries for which 
we have used the wage data are 
Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
 Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and 
the UK. Independently, we have 
used  Danish national data based 
on company-level administrative 
registers from organisations that 
employing at least 10 people. This 
data is generally recognised as 
being of very good quality.
The EU LFS 2008 annual data extrac-
tion includes weighted population 
estimates for all available combi-
nations of the following variables: 
occupation (ISCO 2-digit), sector 
(NACE 2-digit), avrgehwusual (aver-
age weekly working hours for hold-
ers of a specific job in a specific 
country), and avrgeincmon (aver-
age net take home monthly work 
income for holders of a specif-
ic job in a specific country). We 
generate an estimate of mean net 
hourly wage per job using the fol-
lowing formula (mean net hourly 
wage=avrgeincmon /(4*avrgehwu-
sual). This is used to generate an 
ordinal job-wage ranking in each of 
the 13 countries for which we have 
wage data. 
In these countries, the job-wage 
rankings are used to assign jobs to 
quintiles in each country based on 
data (from the EU LFS) on employ-
ment levels in the second quarter 
of 2008 by job for that country. 
This assigns a quintile value of 1 to 
those jobs that contain the lowest-
paid 20 % of employment and a 
quintile value of 5 to those that 
contain the highest-paid 20 % of 
employment. In other words, jobs 
are assigned to quintiles in each 
Member State based on the job-
wage ranking, using employment 
as a weight. 
As we have data for only 13 Member 
States, we are faced with the issue of 
how to include the other 14 Member 
States in our analysis. We have opted 
to use the existing data from these 
13 Member States to generate a com-
mon EU job-wage ranking, which 
we then apply to those countries for 
which we have no wage data, as well 
as to the EU-27 overall. This solution 
is of course not ideal but allows us 
to cover employment developments 
in all Member States, the main point 
of this comparative exercise. In its 
defence, we can point to the high 
correlation of existing national job-
wage rankings (Table A4, Annex 3); 
the same jobs tend to be ranked 
similarly from country to country. We 
conducted the process according to 
the following steps. 
1. We generate a min-max stand-
ardised version of each national 
job-wage ranking that we have 
already generated for the 13 Mem-
ber States with the highest-paid 
job scoring close to 1 and the low-
est paid job scoring 0, based on the 
formula (Xi – Xmin)/(Xmax – Xmin), 
where Xi is the rank order of job i 
in a specific country, Xmin is the 
rank order of the lowest-paid job 
(= 1) and Xmax is the rank order 
of the highest-paid job (= total 
number of jobs) identified in the 
Member State. 
2. We calculate the weighted mean 
of the resulting 13 scores for 
each job (NACE x ISCO combina-
tion) using the working popula-
tion of the country as a weight. 
Why use weighting? The coun-
tries for which we have wage data 
include a combination of smaller 
and larger Member States. On 
the assumption that larger sam-
ples generate more robust job 
wage estimates, especially given 
the detailed breakdown required 
by the jobs approach, we elected 
to weight the EU mean standard-
ised score by country employment 
totals (for 2008). The effect of 
this is to give substantial weight 
to France, the UK, Italy, and 
Poland, the four largest coun-
tries of the 13 in the overall EU 
standardised score. Arguably, this 
group of four countries is not in 
any case an unrepresentative EU 
sub-sample as it runs along both 
an ‘old’–’new’ Member State axis 
and a north–south axis. Our Euro-
pean job-wage ranking is simply a 
ranking of these weighted mean 
scores (on a scale of 0–1) for each 
job identified. 
3. In the 14 Member States where 
we have no wage data, we use 
our European job-wage ranking 
to assign jobs to quintiles in each 
country based on data (from the 
EU LFS) on employment levels in 
the second quarter of 2008 by job 
for that country. We also use this 
common EU job-wage ranking to 
generate job-wage quintiles at EU 
aggregate level. As before, this 
assigns a quintile value of 1 to 
those jobs that contain the lowest-
paid 20 % of employment and a 
quintile value of 5 to those that 
contain the highest-paid 20 % of 
employment. In other words, jobs 
are assigned to quintiles in each 
Member State based on the job-
wage ranking using employment 
as a weight. 
One practical advantage of the EU 
job-wage standardised score is that 
it covers more jobs (as always, occu-
pation * sector combinations) allow-
ing us to compensate for limited 
coverage of the national rankings 
generated from the 2008 annual 
EU LFS data. If jobs are not ranked 
– for instance, because there were 
no wage observations for an indi-
vidual job in a country in the EU LFS 
2008 annual data – they cannot be 
assigned to quintiles, and employ-
ment changes in them will have to 
be disregarded. To avoid this, we 
take advantage of the EU stand-
ardised scores to ‘fill in the gaps’ 
of the national rankings for the 14 
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Member States. We do this by inter-
polating the EU standardised scores 
in the national standardised scores 
where we have no wage data for a 
particular job in the national data. 
It should be pointed out that this 
interpolation applies only to a very 
small proportion of employment in 
each country where we already have 
national wage rankings so it has lit-
tle impact on the overall results or 
quintile charts. 
As already noted, assignment of jobs 
to quintiles does not always lead to 
a smooth share of 20 % of employ-
ment per quintile. Some jobs are 
‘lumpy’, accounting for a large share 
of employment in a given country. 
The job of skilled agricultural work-
ers in agriculture accounts for fully 
20 % of Romanian employment. It 
is, however, only in this country that 
such lumpy jobs distort unreasonably 
the initial allocation of employment 
to quintiles. In all other countries, 
the allocation is reasonably even. 
The charts themselves record the net 
employment change (or flows) at 
quintile level in each country between 
the second quarter of 2008 and the 
second quarter of 2010.  Separately, 
for some background variables, we 
have included an indication of the 
EU-27 distributions of empl oyment 
across the quintiles (stocks). 
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annex 3: noTes on 
The job-wage rankings
It is difficult to be conclusive regard-
ing some of the data issues relating 
to wages. Availability of wage data 
in the EU LFS is a very recent devel-
opment and, to our knowledge, they 
have yet to be used in any research. 
However, it should be noted that we 
use not the wage itself but a wage 
ranking and that these rankings are 
then further aggregated into five 
big groups or quintiles ranked in 
terms of average wage level. The 
allocation of all national employ-
ment from between 400 and 2 000+ 
national job ‘cells’ (see Table A6) into 
five quintiles of equal employment 
size implies limited demands on the 
wage data and, as the country quin-
tile charts and breakdowns demon-
strate, they generate  generally very 
 plausible results.
One of the reasons for the robust-
ness of the jobs approach is that it 
includes some inherent  self-correcting 
mechanisms. At our level of detail, any 
within-quintile error in the ranking 
would have no impact on the results. 
Erroneous wage data is only a problem 
when a job is allocated to the wrong 
quintile. Such misallocations are much 
more likely to occur when there are 
few observations in a particular NACE/
ISCO cell in the EU LFS, but by defini-
tion these small jobs will tend to have 
much smaller impacts in terms of shifts 
in employment levels than the bigger 
jobs. Ultimately, the most important 
determinant of the shape of the quin-
tile chart in each country is the shifts 
in levels of employment in larger-
employing jobs and, for these jobs, 
wage estimates are based on many 
observations and are likely to be more 
 reliable and accurate. 
While comprehensive national wage 
data are of course preferable, it should 
also be pointed out that there are 
some practical advantages to using 
an EU ranking over national rankings. 
Above all, the EU ranking benefits 
from having appreciably more obser-
vations than national rankings. Partic-
ularly in small jobs in small countries, 
the EU ranking  provides a higher level 
of statistical confidence for the wage 
estimates of the population mean of 
the NACE/ISCO cell. The EU standard-
ised ranking also tends to ‘smooth 
out’ outlier national job-wage rank-
ings that may be attributable to sta-
tistical artefacts arising from small 
numbers of  observations.
There are many things the jobs 
approach can do to cast a light on 
developments in terms of employment 
structure, but – as with most methods - 
there are also things that it cannot do. 
Firstly, the fact that it is relative and 
highly aggregated means that it can-
not reflect the scale of the inequalities 
that exist in terms of wages between 
jobs in the different countries. This is a 
subject of growing importance, but it 
is one about which the jobs approach 
cannot say much as it does not cover 
changing wage distances or relativi-
ties between jobs. What it does is 
provide relevant data on the related 
issue of the distribution of employ-
ment shifts across the wage structure. 
Secondly, it should be stressed that 
the jobs approach can say nothing 
about changes in the quality of a given 
job. Whether or not individual jobs 
are becoming relatively better paid or 
reflecting a higher level of education 
is of course an interesting question 
but is beyond the scope of this review. 
The wage measures are fixed in 2008. 
What the development of the quintiles 
show is how the changing quantity 
of employment in the following two 
years is allocated among the fixed, 
pre-defined ranking of jobs by wages. 
Our main focus is on the employment 
structure, not on the wage structure. 
Thirdly, we use job-wage rankings and 
quintile assignments that are fixed in 
time (in the second quarter of 2008). 
While relative job-wage hierarchies 
are reasonably robust over time, they 
do change and so using a fixed ranking 
does imply some degree of oversimpli-
fication (even if this is probably only a 
very minor issue for the short two-year 
period we cover in this review). 
Table A4: number of job (ISCO 2-digit x NACE 2-digit) combinations  
wage-ranked by country
LU EE DK EL LV PT LT PL BE HU UK FR IT EU-27
413 773 871 964 982 1 005 1 073 1 084 1 161 1 172 1 262 1 268 1 639 2 041
Source: EU LFS (authors’ calculations)
Table A5: Pairwise correlations of country job-wage rankings  
(weighted by employment in job)
 BE DK EE FR EL HU IT LT LU LV PL PT UK
BE 1.00             
DK 0.78 1.00            
EE 0.51 0.70 1.00           
FR 0.79 0.86 0.61 1.00          
EL 0.78 0.74 0.52 0.76 1.00         
HU 0.72 0.81 0.67 0.74 0.70 1.00        
IT 0.85 0.84 0.55 0.85 0.86 0.76 1.00       
LT 0.56 0.69 0.73 0.64 0.59 0.68 0.58 1.00      
LU 0.82 0.77 0.43 0.81 0.84 0.68 0.88 0.50 1.00     
LV 0.58 0.71 0.69 0.64 0.57 0.69 0.61 0.66 0.56 1.00    
PL 0.70 0.79 0.67 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.68 0.68 1.00   
PT 0.82 0.80 0.59 0.82 0.83 0.76 0.88 0.61 0.83 0.63 0.76 1.00  
UK 0.78 0.87 0.65 0.85 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.69 0.81 0.68 0.76 0.80 1.00
Source: EU LFS (authors’ calculations)
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annex 4: job-
educaTion rankings 
To generate country job-skill/educa-
tion rankings, we used educational 
level attainment data from the EU 
LFS quarterly data, from Q2 2008q1 
to Q2 2010. This data is available for 
all Member States. Using pooled data 
across all 10 quarters we estimated 
the average years of completed edu-
cation for each job in each country 
based on the following conversion 
table. Thereafter, we followed a sim-
ilar method to that outlined above 
for wages when calculating an over-
all EU job-skill/education ranking and 
quintile assignment:
As we are interested only in ranking 
jobs within each country, the fact 
that duration may vary for the same 
educational level from country to 
country need not concern us. We are 
only interested in the within-country 
relative positions of jobs based on 
average years of completed educa-
tion. The job education/skill rank-
ings are then used to assign jobs to 
quintiles in each country based on EU 
LFS data on employment levels (from 
the second quarter of 2008) by job 
for that country. We generate the 
EU education quintiles based on the 
aggregated EU-27 data. 
Table A6: Mapping of ISCED levels of attainment with years of full-time education
Variable: hatlevel (ISCED 
educational attainment levels 0–6)*
Description (completed level of 
education)
Equivalent years of completed 
full-time education
0–1 Primary education 6
2 Lower secondary 10
3 Upper secondary 13
4 Post-secondary, non-tertiary 14
5 Tertiary, first stage (degree) 17
6 Tertiary, advanced (PhD) 21
* International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
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annex 5: defining 
high and low Tech 
manufacTuring and 
knowledge inTensive 
services
Sector (NACE rev. 2.0 two-digit) 
breakdowns used for high- and 
low-tech manufacturing and knowl-
edge-intensive services (KIS) and less 
knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 
(for reference, see document on 
the Eurostat web site: epp. eurostat.
ec .europa.eu /cache / ITY_SDDS/ 
Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf)
Manufacturing
High- and medium-high 
technology (= high tech 
manufacturing)
Manufacture of chemicals (20); basic 
pharmaceutical products (21); comput-
er, electronic and optical products (26); 
electrical equipment, machinery, auto, 
transport equipment, etc. (27 to 30).
Low- and medium-low 
technology (=low tech 
manufacturing)
Manufacture of food products, bev-
erages, tobacco products, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather and related 
products, wood and of products of 
wood, paper and paper products, 
printing and reproduction of record-
ed media (10 to 18); coke and refined 
petroleum products (19), rubber and 
plastic products, other non-metallic 
mineral products, basic metals, fabri-
cated metal products, except machin-
ery and equipment (22 to 25); Repair 
and installation of machinery and 
equipment (33); furniture and other 
manufacturing (31 and 32). 
Services
KIS
Water transport, Air transport (50, 
51), Publishing activities, Motion 
picture, video and television pro-
gramme production, sound record-
ing and music publishing activi-
ties, Programming and broadcast-
ing activities, Telecommunications, 
Computer programming, consul-
tancy and related activities, Infor-
mation service activities (58 to 63); 
Financial and insurance activities 
(64 thru 66), Legal and account-
ing activities, Activities of head 
offices; management consultancy 
activities, Architectural and engi-
neering activities; technical testing 
and analysis, Scientific research and 
development, Advertising and mar-
ket research, Other professional, 
scientific and technical  activities, 
Veterinary activities (69 to 75); 
Employment activities (78); Secu-
rity and investigation activities (80); 
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security, Educa-
tion, Human health and social work 
activities, Arts, entertainment and 
recreation (84 to 93). 
LKIS
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
(45 thru 47); Land transport and 
transport via pipelines (49); Ware-
housing and support activities for 
transportation, Postal and courier 
activities (52, 53); Accommodation 
and food service activities (55, 56); 
Real estate activities (68); Rental and 
leasing activities (77);
Travel agency, tour operator reser-
vation service and related activities 
(79); Services to buildings and land-
scape activities (81); Office admin-
istrative, office support and other 
business support activities (82); Activ-
ities of membership organisations, 
Repair of computers and personal 
and household goods, Other per-
sonal service activities (94 to 96); 
Activities of households as employers 
of domestic personnel; Undifferenti-
ated goods- and services-producing 
activities of private households for 
own use, Activities of extraterritorial 
organisations and bodies (97 to 99). 
Chapter 1  Shifts in the job structure in Europe during the recession
63
references
Autor, D., Katz. L, and Kearney, M. 
(2006), ‘The polarization of the US 
labor market’, American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings, 96 
(2), May 2006, pp. 189 – 194, avail-
able online at http://econ-www.mit.
edu/files/573
Autor, D., (2010), The polarization of 
job opportunities in the US labour 
market – Implications for employ-
ment and earnings, paper jointly 
released by the Center for American 
Progress and the Hamilton Project, 
April 2010, available online at http://
econ-www.mit.edu/files/5554
Bell, D. and Blanchflower, D. (2010), 
Youth unemployment: déjà vu, IZA 
Discussion Paper, IZA No 4705, Janu-
ary 2010
Council of Economic Advisors (1996), 
Job creation and employment oppor-
tunities: The US labour market 1993–
1996, Office of the Chief Economist, 
Washington DC
Davoine, L., Erhel, C., and Guergoat-
Lariviere, M. (2008a), A taxonomy of 
European labour markets using qual-
ity indicators, CEE research report 
No 45, Centre d’études de l’emploi, 
Noisy-le-Grand
Davoine, L., Erhel, C., and Guergoat-
Lariviere, M. (2008b): ‘Monitoring 
quality in work: European Employ-
ment Strategy indicators and beyond’, 
International Labour Review, Volume 
147, Issue 2–3, June 2008
Diez Guardia, N. and Pichelmann, K. 
(2006), Labour migration patterns in 
Europe: Recent trends, future chal-
lenges, European Economy Economic 
Papers, European Commission,  Brussels 
European Commission (2008), 
Employment in Europe 2008, Publica-
tions Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg
Eurostat (2009), Sustainable develop-
ment – demographic changes, (page 
from Eurostat’s Statistics explained 
website), Luxembourg, avail-
able online at http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/ 
Farber, H.S. (1997), Job creation in 
the United States: Good jobs or bad?, 
Working Paper number 385, Prince-
ton University
Felstead, A., Gallie, D., Green, F., 
and Zhou, Y. (2007), Skills at work, 
1986 to 2006, ESCR Centre on Skills, 
Knowledge, and Organisational Per-
formance, Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge
Fernández-Macías, E., Hurley, J., and 
Storrie, D. (eds.) (2011, forthcoming): 
Transformations of the employment 
structure in the EU and the US, 1995–
2007, Palgrave Macmillan, London
Fernández-Macías, E. and Hurley, J., 
Eurofound (2008), More and better 
jobs? Patterns of employment expan-
sion in Europe – ERM report 2008, 
Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg
Fernández-Macías, E. (2010) Changes 
in the structure of employment and 
job quality in Europe, PhD thesis, 
University of Salamanca
Goos, M. and Manning, A. (2007), 
‘Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising 
polarization of work in Britain’ in The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 
MIT Press, Vol. 89 (1), pp. 118–133
Goos, M., Manning, A., and Salo-
mons, A. (2009), ‘The polarisation 
of the European labour market’, in 
American Economic Review Papers 
and Proceedings,Vol. 99, No 2, 
pp. 58–63
Grimshaw, D. and Figueiredo, H. 
(2011), ‘Women’s changing job 
structure in Europe: patterns of job 
concentration, low pay and welfare 
employment’, in Fernández-Macías, 
Hurley and Storrie (2011, forthcom-
ing) op. cit
Hurley, J., Mandl, I., Storrie, D., and 
Ward, T. (2009), Restructuring in 
recession – ERM report 2009, Publica-
tions Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg
Hurley, J., Storrie, D. and Jungblut, 
J., Eurofound (2011), Shifts in the 
Job Structure in Europe during the 
Great Recession, Publications Office 
of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
Available online at http://www.euro-
found.europa.eu/publications/html-
files/ef1141.htm.
Ilg, R. (1996), ‘The nature of employ-
ment growth, 1989–1995’, Monthly 
Labor Review, Vol. 119 (6), pp. 29–36
Ilg, R. and Haugen, S. (2000), ‘Earn-
ings and employment trends in the 
1990s’, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 
123 (3), pp. 21–33
ILO (2010), Effect of the economic 
crisis on public administration, Inter-
national Labor Organisation
Krugman, P. (2008), The return of 
Depression economics and the crisis 
of 2008, Penguin, London
Leschke, J., Watt, A. with Finn, M. 
(2008a), Putting a number on job 
quality: constructing a European job 
quality index, ETUI working paper 
2008.3, European Trade Union Insti-
tute for Research, Education and 
Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS), 
 Brussels 
Leschke, J. and Watt, A. (2008b), 
Job quality in Europe, ETUI working 
paper 2008.7, European Trade Union 
Institute for Research, Education, 
and Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS), 
Brussels 
Levy, F. and Murnane, R. (1992), ‘US 
earnings levels and earnings inequal-
ity: a review of recent trends and 
proposed explanations’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 30 (3)
Munoz de Bustillo, R. and Anton, J.I. 
(2011, “Immigration and the seg-
mentation of labour in Europe” in 
Fernández-Macías, Hurley and Storrie 
(2011, forthcoming) op. cit.)
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
64
OECD (2001), OECD Employment 
Outlook 2001, Paris
OECD (2003), OECD Employment 
Outlook 2003, Paris
Oesch, D. and Rodrigues Menes, J., 
“Upgrading or polarization? Occu-
pational change in Britain, Germany, 
Spain and Switzerland, 1990-2008”.  
Available at SSRN: http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1616630
Pouliakas, K. and Theodossiou, I. 
(2010), ‘Differences in the job satis-
faction of high-paid and low-paid 
workers across Europe’, International 
Labour Review, Vol. 149, No 1
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009), 
‘The aftermath of financial crises’, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 99 
(2), pp. 466–472
Smith, M., Burchell, B., Fagan C. and 
O’Brien C. (2008), ‘Job quality in 
Europe’, Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 39, Issue 6, pp. 586–603
Stehrer, R., Ward, T. and Fernández-
Macías, E. (2008), Recent changes in 
the structure of employment in the 
EU and their implications for job 
quality, Eurofound, Dublin, availa-
ble online at http://www.eurofound.
europa.eu/docs/research/changes-
structurequality.pdf
Stehrer, R. and Ward, T. (2008), 
Recent changes in the job structure 
of the EU – Technical report, Euro-
found, Dublin, available online at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/
docs/research/technicalreport.pdf
Stiglitz, J. (2010), Freefall: Free mar-
kets, and the sinking of the world 
economy, Penguin, London
Vidovic, H. (2007), Recent changes 
in the jobs structure of the EU: Lit-
erature Review, Eurofound, Dub-
lin, available online at http://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/docs/research/
literaturereview.pdf 
Wright, E.O. and Dwyer, R. (2003): 
‘Patterns of job expansions in the 
USA: a comparison of the 1960s and 
1990s’, in Socio-Economic Review 
Vol. 1, No 3, pp. 289–325
Chapter 2  Are our societies working fairly? Recent changes in income inequality
65
1. inTroducTion
The economic crisis has put inequali-
ties high on the political agenda, and 
made this an issue of serious public 
concern. (Box 1). It is recognised that 
inequalities are a fact of life and una-
voidable and that while they have 
increased in many countries, some 
countries have managed to reduce 
them, and there has been an  overall 
decline in inequalities between 
 countries since 1990. 
There is an increasing recognition 
that social policy can reduce inequal-
ity and poverty while simultaneously 
improving the economic functioning 
of the country as reflected in the 
idea of inclusive growth in the EU’s 
Europe 2020 strategy, with referenc-
es to “a high-employment economy 
delivering economic, social, and terri-
torial cohesion” in which “benefits of 
growth and jobs are widely shared”.
This review summarises current 
income inequalities in the EU and 
supports the goal of inclusive growth. 
It is part of a research agenda that 
will also cover both the social and 
economic impact of inequalities and 
the impact of different policies on 
those inequalities.
Some inequality is inevitable. Ine-
quality can be both the result 
and originator of better individual 
and social performance. To some 
extent they reflect productivity, 
the value added created for soci-
ety, and this is inherently unequal. 
The possibility of doing better in 
terms of living standards can cre-
ate a good performance incentive, 
while in the extreme case if all 
the possible gains are taken and 
redistributed, one would only vol-
untarily make an extra effort. In 
the end, policies aimed at reduc-
ing inequalities may also lead to 
welfare losses. (Okun, 1975). 
However, the importance of these 
factors are often overstated. Pay 
differences reflect many factors 
beyond productivity differences – 
for example, belonging to a cer-
tain occupation. (Kampelmann, 
2011) Also, disadvantages seem 
sticky, there is a low wage mobility 
among the low wage earners and 
higher wage mobility among the 
higher wage earners. Differences 
in wealth are much greater than 
differences in income (see Box 4), 
and much less related to individ-
ual performance. In the end, even 
if differences are inevitable, the 
question is, whether the current-
ly observable big differences are 
justified and socially desirable – 
whether there is a performance 
 difference of a million times.
There are a number of reasons why 
a high level of inequalities, or rapidly 
increasing inequalities, may be detri-
mental both economically and socially.
Compromising the sense of  
fairness, stirring unrest
In almost all societies, people have a 
basic sense of fairness and hence care 
about the distribution of economic 
resources across individuals in their 
society. They care about their relative 
position in society, and their actions 
are guided by the perceived fairness 
of distribution, i.e. whether they con-
sider they receive a fair share. In the 
light of these concerns, all advanced 
economies have set in place redis-
tributive policies and transfers pro-
grammes, often applying progressive 
taxation that effectively redistributes 
significant shares of National Prod-
uct across income groups. On the 
other hand, increased inequalities 
can cause rifts in society that under-
mine cohesion and trust, which are 
the cornerstones of society, and may 
even lead to civil unrest. 
Wasting human capital,  
economic potential
There is a growing acceptance that 
equality could actually foster growth 
through better use of human capital, 
wider opportunities among the more 
disadvantaged, and fewer negative 
spill-over effects of inequality on the 
society at large (Asplund 2004; Korpi 
1985, 2005). 
Are our societies working fairly?  
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Potential threat to democracy
Differences in income translate in 
different potential of influencing 
others and for making changes in 
society. If the incomes or wealth of 
a part of the population are much 
higher than that of the rest, this 
implies a concentration of purchas-
ing power, which may translate 
into a concentration of power. Even 
if the eventual danger is not so 
much democracy’s sudden replace-
ment by autocracy, there can be 
a gradual decline in democracy’s 
quality. (Karl, 2000)
Potential source of  
economic crisis
A number of economists have 
argued that there is a causal link 
between increasing inequality 
and the financial crisis - although 
opposite opinions also exist – 
and this is an area of analysis 
and policy where many different 
types of social scientists meet, and 
often collide. 
One potential channel is psycho-
logical: the lavish consumption 
and glamorous lifestyle of the rich 
shifts the reference point up on 
the status scale. The middle classes 
struggle to maintain their status 
and social recognition by emulat-
ing the luxurious lifestyle of the 
wealthy. In order to try to make 
up for through consumption what 
they have lost in status, they get 
into debt. (Frank et al. 2010) 
Another channel is macroeconomic, 
directly connected to the first. As 
Kumhof and Rancière (2010) frame 
it: ‘the key mechanism, reflected 
in a rapid growth in the size of 
the financial sector, is the recycling 
of part of the additional income 
gained by high income households 
back to the rest of the population 
by way of loans, thereby allowing 
the latter to sustain consumption 
levels, at least for a while. But with-
out the prospect of a recovery in the 
incomes of poor and middle income 
households over a reasonable time 
horizon, the inevitable result is that 
loans keep growing, and therefore 
so does leverage and the prob-
ability of a major crisis.’ Indeed, 
Kumhof and Rancière found an 
association between inequality and 
indebtedness. 
While in the US and some EU coun-
tries private indebtedness may have 
filled the demand gap, in other EU 
countries it may have been gov-
ernment spending – which also 
resulted in financial vulnerability. As 
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2009, 4) con-
clude “although the crisis may have 
emerged in the financial sector, its 
roots are much deeper and lie in a 
structural change in income distri-
bution that had been going on for 
twenty-five years”.
Clearly, inequalities, and different 
type of inequalities, are matters 
where it is unwise to jump to con-
clusions, which is one of the basic 
 reasons for the current analysis.
Structure of the chapter
This chapter concentrates on income 
inequality, which is a crucial form of 
inequality. Having a lower income than 
others, relative deprivation in the space 
of incomes, can yield absolute dep-
rivation in the space of capabilities 
(Sen, 1995). Indeed, income inequal-
ity is highly connected to inequality 
of health, opportunity, and wealth – 
and this is a major reason why we 
care about it. These other aspects of 
inequality are not studied here – or to a 
very limited extent, like wealth inequal-
ities, but are undoubtedly important 
and will be part of our future research.
The chapter that follows starts with a 
discussion of some basic measures of 
income inequality, before moving on 
to explore recent changes in income 
inequality, and to address the prin-
cipal causes of these developments. 
The next part of the chapter addresses 
the redistributive impact of the tax-
and-benefit systems in the EU Member 
States: asking how have taxes, social 
transfers, and in-kind benefits been 
able to mitigate the growing inequality 
of market incomes? In this the interplay 
between the different drivers of ine-
qualities, including the policy changes 
in the tax and benefit system, are stud-
ied through individual country cases. 
The concluding section discusses the 
policy implications of the current 
situation and empirical analyses, 
and identifies and presents areas for 
future research.
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Box 1: Public perceptions  
of inequalities.
One major reason for studying inequalities 
at the present time is the preoccupation of 
the public. Numerous recent opinion polls 
have shown that a considerable proportion 
of EU citizens worry about inequalities and 
poverty. In a recent Social Climate Survey, 
for example, 64 % of EU respondents gave a 
negative judgement on the way inequalities 
and poverty are addressed in their countries, 
with only one country (Luxembourg) having 
an overall positive opinion. Dissatisfaction 
reached very high levels in a majority of 
countries, including Greece (90 %), Lithu-
ania and Latvia (89 %), Romania (87 %), 
and France (81 %)(1) (Chart 1). A predomi-
nantly negative assessment of trends over 
the last five years complements the bleak 
picture. For example, as many as 79 % of 
Greeks, 62 % of Romanians, and 60 % of 
Portuguese believe that the way inequalities 
and poverty are addressed have worsened, 
and there is no EU country where the overall 
opinion is positive concerning the trend in 
inequality(2) (Chart 2).
In another recent European survey(3), 
respondents were asked to assess whether 
current income differences are too large(4) 
and whether the wealth of the country 
should be redistributed in a fair way to all 
citizens.(5) 
As shown on Chart 3 and 4, the survey 
found that 88 % of EU respondents either 
totally agreed or tended to agree that the 
income differences between people in their 
country are far too large, while 85 % either 
totally agree or tend to agree that their 
national government should ensure that 
the wealth of the country is redistributed 
in a fair way to all citizens.
(1) Special Eurobarometer No 370 on 
‘Social climate’, data collected June 
2011, question QA2.7. http://ec.europa.
eu /pub l i c_op in ion /a r ch ives /ebs /
ebs_370_en.pdf
(2) Ibid. Question QA4.8.
(3) Special Eurobarometer No 355 on ‘Pov-
erty and Social Exclusion’, data collect-
ed August-September 2010, Question 
QA14.3.
(4) Special Eurobarometer No 355 on ‘Pov-
erty and Social Exclusion’, data collect-
ed August-September 2010, Question 
QA14.2.
(5) Special Eurobarometer No 355 on ‘Pov-
erty and Social Exclusion’, data collect-
ed August-September 2010, Question 
QA14.3.
Chart 1: Eurobarometer survey: How would you judge the way inequalities  
are addressed in our country
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Source: Special Eurobarometer No 370 on ‘Social climate’, data collected June 2011
Chart 2: Eurobarometer survey: Compared with five years ago, the way  
inequalities and poverty are addressed in our country…
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Chart 3: Eurobarometer survey: Nowadays in (our country) income  
differences between people are too large…
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Comparing the perceived inequalities and 
the desire for redistribution in the EU-15 
(these have a longer history of market 
economy than formerly socialist member 
states), there seems to be a rather strong 
correlation(6) with the income disparities 
defined by the Gini coefficient on house-
hold income, as shown on Chart 5. This 
may be also driven by the fact that high 
inequality countries were usually harder hit 
by the crisis. (The four most unequal coun-
try according the Gini coefficient in 2009 in 
the EU-15 included Portugal, Greece, the 
United Kingdom and Spain).
A recent French survey on the ‘Perception 
of inequalities’(7) commissioned by the Jean 
Jaurès Foundation and carried out by IFOP, 
a pollster, indicates a disquietingly negative 
assessment of social fairness, notably in the 
large continental economies. Over 70 % of 
French, German, Italian, or Spanish respond-
ents believe they are living in a ‘rather’ or 
‘very unfair’ society (See Chart 6). 
(6) Correlation coefficient would be 0.53 
between the Gini coefficient obtained 
from EU-SILC 2009 and the perception 
of inequality measured in August 2010.
(7) ‘Perception of inequalities, Compari-
son of views in 12 countries’ a sur-
vey conducted by IFOP, France for the 
Jean Jaurès Foundation. Data collected: 
April 2010, sample size ca. 600 persons 
by country, method: internet, CAWI. 
(www.ifop.com/?option=com_publicati
on&type=poll&id=1191&language=2)
Chart 4: Eurobarometer survey: The (national) government should ensure the 
wealth of the country is redistributed in a fair way to all citizens
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Chart 5: Gini coefficient (2009) and perceived inequality in the EU-15
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Chart 6: IFOP survey on fairness: Today, would you say that our country is…
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Also four-fifths of German and French 
respondents believe inequalities have 
increased over the previous ten years 
(Chart 7). 
2. measures of  
inequaliTy
There are many different forms of 
income, and various different ways of 
measuring income inequality. Atkin-
son demonstrated a long time ago 
(1970) that the choice of a measure 
is not merely a technical question, 
but also influences the results. He 
recognised that opting for one indi-
cator rather than another contains 
an implicit judgement on which dif-
ferences in income distribution are 
the most important ones, for exam-
ple the gap between the  middle 
classes and the rich (e.g. P90/P50), 
or between the poor and the rich 
(e.g. P90/P10). (For definitions 
of inequality indicators see the 
explanatory Box 2) 
For this reason we present the results for 
multiple indicators throughout the chap-
ter: notably the Gini coefficient, the per-
centile ratio (P90/P10,P90/P50, P50/P10), 
and the ratio between the highest and 
the lowest income quintile (S80/S20), i.e. 
the quintile share ratio. As will be seen, 
however, despite the underlying differ-
ence, the quintile share ratio and the Gini 
coefficient are very closely related in the 
EU, as illustrated in Chart 8.(1)
(1) While S80/S20 and the Gini coefficient 
are strongly correlated, one can see that 
the same level of inequality according 
to one indicator can be judged quite 
differently if we look at the other. For 
example, in 2009 both Spain and Portu-
gal had an S80/S20 of 6.0, a high level of 
inequality, where the top 20 % income 
earners had six times as much income as 
the bottom 20 %. However, according to 
the Gini indicator, Portugal was much 
more unequal than Spain; it had a Gini 
indicator of 35.4 while Spain 32.3. This is 
because in Portugal people with very low 
income and those with very high income 
both had relatively a higher share of 
total income than in Spain. (The lowest 
income earner 20 % of the population 
had 7.2 % of total income in Portugal 
and 6.4 % in Spain. The top 20 % income 
earner had 43.2 % of total income in 
Portugal and 38.3 % in Spain.)
Chart 7: IFOP survey on fairness: Overall, in the last ten years,  
would you say that inequalities in your country…
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countries, a survey conducted by IFOP, France for the Jean Jaurès Foundation. Data collected: April 2010
Chart 8: Correlation between the Gini coefficient and  
the Quintile Share Ratio, 2009 
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Box 2: Inequality indicators
Inequality indicators usually satisfy three important criteria:
•	 Anonymity and symmetry: it does not matter who the high and low earners are.
•	 Scale independence: the level of average earnings – whether a country is rich or poor – does not matter.
•	 Population size independence: the size of the country’s population does not matter.
The indicators analysed here fulfil all these three.
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income among individuals deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality and 100 (or 100%), perfect inequality. Practically, it measures the 
area between the Lorenz curve (which plots the cumulative shares of total income against the cumulative share of the population) and a line 
defined by hypothetical perfect equality in income distribution.
The percentile ratio compares the income received by the pth centile to another centile, for example P90/P10 or P90/P50.
The income quintile share ratio or the S80/S20 ratio calculates the ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the 
highest income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income (the bottom quintile). 
The Atkinson index allows for varying sensitivity to inequalities in different parts of the income distribution; it incorporates a sensitivity param-
eter (ε), which can range from 0 (meaning that the researcher is indifferent about the nature of the income distribution), to infinity (where the 
researcher is concerned only with the income position of the very lowest income group). In practice, (ε) values of 0.5, 1, 1.5, or 2 are used.
Besides these most widely used indicators there are a number of others, e.g. Generalised Entropy measure of inequality, and its specific variety, 
the Theil index.
Relative advantages of the used inequality indicators
The relative advantage of the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index are that, if income is transferred from a rich person to a poor person, 
the resulting distribution is more equal. This transfer sensitivity (named after Pigou and Dalton) does not necessarily hold for the percentile 
and the quintile ratio.
The use of Gini coefficient is supported by the fact that it is the one most widely used in the inequality literature, and provides robust results. 
The Atkinson index is one of the most popular welfare based measures of inequality. While the Gini coefficient gives equal weight to every 
difference from equality, the Atkinson index allows for greater weight to be placed on changes in a given portion of the income distribution. 
Thus two countries may have the same Gini coefficient, with one a small, but very disadvantaged underclass and the other where everybody 
has a good share of income, but there is a small group of very rich, while the Atkinson index can differ as it can be made sensitive to changes 
at the lower end of the income distribution, which is the end that usually arouses more concerns.
The relative advantage of the quintile, and the percentile ratio is that they provide an easily understandable measure of inequality, and allow 
for seeing how relative differences within the income distribution develop (e.g. comparing P90/P50 and P50/P10 helps identifying whether 
changes in relative income are due to changes at the top or at the bottom of the distribution). Indicators that consider the extremes of the 
distribution, like S80/S20, are more advantageous if changes in the middle of the distribution are of less concern.
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3. income inequaliTy  
in The eu
When speaking about income inequal-
ity, one usually thinks of inequality of 
disposable income, on a personal level. 
However inequality in terms of the 
various components of income also 
merits particular analysis. (See Box 3.) 
3.1. Current situation 
across the EU Member 
States and recent 
changes
3.1.1. Current disposable 
income inequalities in the 
EU-27
The most recent figures show con-
siderable inequalities in the distribu-
tion of income among the popula-
tion of the European Union Member 
States. On average in 2009 the 20 % 
with the highest income within a 
country received 5x as much income 
as the 20 % of the population with 
the lowest ‘equivalised disposable 
income’. This ratio varies consid-
erably across the Member States 
(Chart 9), from less than 4x in the 
Central European and Nordic coun-
tries (SI, CZ, HU, SK, AT FI, SE, BE, 
NL) to 6x or more in Spain, Portugal, 
Lithuania, Romania, and Latvia. 
Country ranking by another inequal-
ity indicator, the Gini coefficient, 
gives a similar picture (Chart 10). 
Amongst the EU-27 Member States, 
the country closest to equality was 
still  Slovenia (22.7) followed by 
 Hungary (24.7),  Slovakia, and  Sweden 
(both 24.8). At the other end, we 
again find  Latvia (37.4), Lithuania 
(35.5),  Portugal (35.4), and Romania 
(34.9). The EU-27 average for the 
Gini coefficient was 30.4.
3.1.2. Trend changes in 
disposable income inequalities
Almost all indicators suggest that 
income inequalities have been rising 
in the industrialised nations since 
1970 (Jenkins and Micklewright 2007 
[see also Chart 11 on the decreasing 
trend of the EU-15 aggregate value 
in the mid-1990s)] but with consider-
able variations between countries 
in terms of both the patterns and 
 timing of changes. 
The principal reasons given for the 
overall trend include a polarisation 
in market-derived incomes (a grow-
ing difference between low and very 
high earnings, the increasing impor-
tance of unevenly distributed capital 
income, the emergence of long-term 
unemployment, and  job-rich  versus 
job-poor households) as well as 
changes in family structure (smaller 
households).
Chart 10: Income Inequality in the EU, Gini, 2009 
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Chart 9: Income Inequality in the EU, Quintile Share Ratio, 2009 
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Chart 11: Evolution of Gini and Quintile Share Ratio, EU-15, 1995-2009
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Box 3: Definitions of income
The definition of income is not straightforward, and deciding which definition to use will affect the findings of any kind of research. The most 
widely used concept in income distribution studies is that of ‘disposable income’, referring to the income that households have at their disposal 
after payment of direct taxes and receipt of cash benefits. In traditional studies on redistribution, inequality and poverty at market income level 
are compared to rates at a disposable income level. 
The usual assumption is that people live in households, share their current incomes, and may be subject to family taxation schemes. Since 
living together is seen to result in economies, the individual income is counted from the total disposable income of a household (i.e. the sum 
of the income of all members) divided by the number of people living in the household, and weighted to allow for the economies associated 
with collective consumption. The weights used in the analysis here, and in most studies, conform to the modified OECD scale, which attributes 
weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to everyone else aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 14. Each person in the household is 
finally assigned the same ‘equivalised disposable income’. This is the income definition that is most often used in this chapter.
However, cash income is an inadequate proxy for the purpose of studying economic well-being. (OECD 2008) First of all, people can have 
relatively high living standards even with low incomes. Secondly, income is only an indirect measure of household consumption opportunities. 
Thirdly, the use of annual income may be a poor proxy of longer run conditions. This is one of the reasons why the review also looks at the 
impact of in-kind benefits (in Section 4.3.1.).
Defining stages of redistribution.
Market income = wages + salaries + self-employment income + occupational and private pensions + capital income
Gross income = market income + cash benefits + private transfers + other cash income
Disposable income = gross income – income taxes and social security contributions
Final income = disposable income + in-kind benefits (– indirect taxes)
Equivalised household disposable income = income adjusted with equivalence scales to reflect the household composition and structure
Source: Harding et al. 2004, p. 10, OECD 2008, p. 99.
Indirect taxes are outside the scope of the current review, but previous studies, with a focus on their redistributive impact, have already 
exposed their regressive character. Despite methodological differences, all the studies reviewed by Warren (2008) agree on the significant 
regressive impact on income distribution caused by consumption taxes: the poor consume a higher share of their income, and thus are paying 
higher consumption tax, compared to their disposable income. This is an increasingly important issue as governments are facing the need to 
raise revenues. Similarly, increasing energy taxes for environmental concerns would also hit the poorest the hardest if its regressive character 
is not taken into account in the design of taxes (EC 2008, p. 6). 
One might question whether concentrating on income in general is, in fact, a good way of seeking to measure of poverty or inequality. For 
example, Wolff (1998, p. 131) has argued that the focus should be on wealth, which might prove a better proxy of household consumption 
opportunities. This measure would take into account everything that an individual owns (including the estimated rental value of housing). 
Fewer studies have concentrated on inequalities in wealth than in income, but the evidence suggests that wealth is distributed more unequally 
than human capital, earnings, or income (Davies 2009). 
Our consumption and well-being are not only determined by current income, but also by past and future expected incomes (Sandmo 1999, 
p. 141). Moreover, in some countries, home production (e.g. food grown for own use) can complement low monetary income just as the 
availability of public services frees up income for other uses. If we wish to study living conditions, it might become desirable to concentrate on 
consumption directly rather than proxies of consumption opportunities. However, consumption cannot reflect macroeconomic evolutions, or 
sudden changes in individual conditions, very well. A US study shows that fluctuations in consumption inequality tend to be more muted than 
fluctuations in income inequality (Heathcote et al. 2010). In other words, in the face of a job-loss or any other economic problem, households 
rely on savings or increased borrowing in order to smooth out or maintain consumption.
Even if we manage to compile a more comprehensive notion of income, however, we will still fail to measure the exact economic well-being 
of households or individuals. As Amartya Sen (2000, p. 76), has written:
“While we can decide to close our eyes to this issue by simply assuming that there is something homogeneous called ‘the income’ in terms 
of which everyone’s overall advantage can be judged and interpersonally compared (and that variations of needs, personal circumstances, 
prices, etc. can be, correspondingly, assumed away)… there is the further problem of interpersonal comparisons taking note of variations of 
individual conditions and circumstances.” 
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While income inequalities also 
increased in the EU overall, this does 
not mean that inequalities increased 
always and everywhere. In some 
countries inequalities were decreas-
ing for a significant part of the peri-
od – in France for example the Gini 
indicator decreased from 34 in 1970 
to 30 in 1979, and has remained 
below that level ever since. Data for 
the late 1990s also show a strong 
reduction in inequalities in EU-15, 
followed by an increase in the 2000s.
Moreover lately there appears to have 
been a convergence of inequality lev-
els between the EU Member States as 
shown in Chart 12 and 13: among the 
15 EU Member States for which we 
have a time series for 1997-2009, both 
the difference between the standard 
deviation of Gini indicators, and the 
difference between the country with 
the highest and the lowest Gini (the 
range) has diminished, continuously. In 
other words, in those countries where 
income inequality was the greatest, it 
decreased the most, while in many of 
the countries with lower level of ine-
quality, the inequality gap widened. 
Chart 13: Standard deviation and the minimum-maximum range of  
the national Gini indicators in the EU-15, 1997-2009 
19981997 1999 2000 20022001 20042003 20062005 20082007 20102009
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Range
Standard  deviation
Source: Eurostat ECHP, Eurostat EU SILC and national estimates. 
Note: years chosen where data for all EU-15 was available.
Chart 12: Range of the Gini coefficient in the EU-15 countries, 1997-2009 
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Note: data shown for years where data for all EU-15 countries was available
Chart 14: Scatter plot on the changes in Inequality (S80/S20)  
in the EU-15, 1995-2001  
(in percentage)
Chart 15: Scatter plot on the changes in Inequality (S80/S20)  
in the EU-27, 2005-2009  
(in percentage)
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Looking at changes in individual 
countries (Chart 14 and 15), it is 
possible to distinguish four broad 
categories of changes concerning all 
EU Member States: 
•	 first, countries with low level 
of inequality that witnessed an 
increase in inequality, most notably 
Denmark, Germany, and Sweden; 
•	 second, a slight decrease in ine-
quality in countries with low initial 
level of inequality, for example 
Hungary and Slovakia; 
•	 third, countries with relatively high-
er income inequality where inequal-
ity increased, for example Bulgaria; 
•	 fourth, countries with high ine-
quality where inequality decreased 
while still remaining among the 
most unequal, including the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Estonia, Portugal, 
Poland, and Romania. 
Table 1 and 2 break national chang-
es in disposable income inequality 
into changes in the  upper versus 
the lower part of the distribution 
between 2005 and 2009. While the 
European averages were rather sta-
ble here as well, there were signifi-
cant changes in some countries. 
While in some countries inequalities 
changed both at the top and bottom 
of the distribution, in others changes 
concentrated more on one part of 
the distribution (Table 2). 
The increase in inequalities is 
explained to a great extent by the 
rise of the very high incomes, but 
this is not well captured in the usual 
survey-based measurements of ine-
quality (see Box 4).
Table 1: Additional Income Inequality Indicators
2005 2009
GEO/TIME P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini
SE 2.7 1.6 1.6 23.4 2.9 1.6 1.8 24.8
DK 2.7 1.6 1.7 23.9 2.8 1.6 1.8 27.0
NL 2.9 1.7 1.7 26.9 3.0 1.8 1.7 27.2
FI 3.0 1.7 1.7 26 3.1 1.7 1.8 26
SI 3.0 1.7 1.8 23.8 2.8 1.6 1.7 22.7
CZ 3.0 1.8 1.7 26.0 2.7 1.7 1.6 25.1
DE 3.0 1.7 1.8 26.1 3.6 1.8 1.9 29.1
AT 3.1 1.7 1.8 26.2 3.1 1.7 1.8 25.7
BE 3.1 1.7 1.9 28 3.1 1.7 1.9 26
SK 3.1 1.7 1.8 26.2 3.1 1.8 1.7 24.8
HU 3.2 1.8 1.8 27.6 3.0 1.7 1.8 24.7
FR 3.2 1.8 1.8 27.7 3.4 1.9 1.8 29.8
LU 3.3 1.8 1.8 26.5 3.5 1.9 1.9 29.2
MT 3.3 1.8 1.8 26.9 3.4 1.8 1.9 27.8
CY 3.6 1.9 1.9 28.7 3.5 1.8 1.9 28.4
IE 4.0 1.9 2.1 31.9 3.5 1.9 1.9 28.8
IT 4.2 1.9 2.1 32.8 4.1 1.9 2.1 31.5
BG* 4.2 1.9 2.2 31.2 4.9 2.1 2.4 33.4
ES 4.4 2.0 2.2 31.8 4.5 2.0 2.3 32.3
UK 4.4 2.1 2.1 34.6 4.1 2.0 2.0 32.4
EL 4.5 2.1 2.2 33.2 4.3 2.0 2.2 33.1
EE 4.6 2.2 2.1 34.1 4.1 2.0 2.0 31.4
LV 4.9 2.2 2.2 36.1 5.6 2.2 2.6 37.4
PL 5.2 2.1 2.4 35.6 3.9 1.9 2.0 31.4
LT 5.4 2.3 2.4 36.3 4.8 2.2 2.2 35.5
PT 5.5 2.5 2.2 38.1 4.7 2.2 2.1 35.4
RO* 6.2 2.2 2.8 37.8 5.4 2.1 2.6 34.9
EU-27 8.9 2.0 4.4 30.6 8.0 2.1 3.8 30.4
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat EU SILC. 
Note: a) In percentile ratios a ratio of 1 means equal distribution of income between the percentiles compared. A decrease in ratios p90/p10, p90/p50, and 
p50/p10 indicate greater equality. b) Data for BG 2006 instead 2005, data for RO 2007 instead 2005.
Table 2: Changes in the top (P90/P50) versus (P50/P10) of the distribution, 2005-2009
Inequality increased
Polarisation: increase both  
on top and bottom 
Lagging middle classes: inequalities  
increased on the top
Lagging poor: inequalities increased  
at the bottom
Bulgaria, Germany Latvia, Sweden
Inequality decreased
Cohesion: decrease both  
on top and bottom
Middle classes catching up:  
 inequalities decreased at the top
Bottom catching up: inequalities  
decreased at the bottom
Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania,  Portugal, United Kingdom
Ireland
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat EU SILC.
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Box 4: The top incomes and wealth
‘Though richer societies are not happier than poorer ones, within any society happiness and riches go together.’ – Richard Layard(1)
This box focuses on growing inequalities resulting from the rise of incomes at the very top of the distribution. Research shows that a large 
part of the change in the income structure of the developed Western societies over the past 30 years is attributable to the income growth of 
a relatively small number of high earners.
The 2008 markets collapse and the subsequent bail-outs of financial institutions with tax-payers money resuscitated the debate on the social fair-
ness of the market economy and the equitable sharing of the risks, benefits, and costs of economic activity among the rich and the middle classes.
The rise of inequalities due to the rise of the top incomes has been best documented so far in the US and the UK where incomes at the top 
started rising steadily after 1979 to either achieve (in the US) or approach (in the UK) century-long highs. This ended several decades of what 
has been called the post-war ‘Great Compression’(2) – a period of unprecedented income equality. Since then, the top incomes have risen 
continuously, while the lower and the middle classes saw their incomes stagnate. The financial sector offered the greatest income gains in the 
2000s but, being at the epicentre of the crisis, it was hardest hit. Though the income data available to analyse this phenomena hardly reaches 
beyond the beginning of the crisis, there are signs that the crisis wiped out some of the income gains from the previous years, and interrupted 
the rise of the top incomes to some degree. However, this reversal, moderate when compared to earlier gains, may prove temporary if the 
earlier patterns of economic and business activity return.
While the income data based on household surveys that is typically used in the European Union to assess income inequalities proves less 
suitable for monitoring the top earners, tax data compiled by researchers Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Facundo 
Alvaredo and put into an elaborate resource known as the World Top Income Data Base(3) provides for more detailed inquiries into the income 
trends at the very top in a number of countries. 
Currently available data suggest the disparities grew much less in continental Europe than elsewhere. (See also Chart 17-19). However, as 
some of the personal income of the top earners may be disguised as corporate income, tax data about the declared income does not solve 
inherent difficulties in grasping the top incomes. Furthermore, survey data, which underlie the official European Union statistics on income, 
are by its very nature poorly adapted to investigate very high incomes with high earners likely to be reluctant to reveal their income in surveys 
or to refuse to take part in the survey altogether. 
(1) Richard Layard: ‘Human Satisfaction and Public Policy.’ The Economic Journal, 1980: p. 737.
(2) Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo: ‘The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-century’, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics Vol. 107, No 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 1-34, Oxford University Press.
(3) For the full list of contributors to the World Top Incomes Data Base see: http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes
Chart 16: Average after tax income, by brackets in the US 1979-2007 (in 2007 dollars)
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United States
In the US, most of the changes in the top 
decile are due to dramatic changes in the 
top percentile, whose income share rose 
from 8.9 per cent in 1976 to 23.5 percent 
in 2007. The share of an even wealthier 
group—the top 0.1 per cent—has more 
than quadrupled from 2.6 per cent to 
12.3 per cent over this period. (Atkinson, 
Piketty, Saez (2011))
As noted by the OECD (2011b), some of 
the increase in the share of top income 
recipients can be attributed in some coun-
tries (notably the US) to the increased 
use of pass-through entities (particularly 
S-corporations and limited liability part-
nerships in the US) rather than the previ-
ously standard corporate form, with more 
business income therefore being reported 
as personal income in order to benefit 
from a lower tax rate.
United Kingdom
A recent study by the UK-based Insti-
tute for Fiscal Studies(4) demonstrates how 
income in the UK grew unevenly at each 
percentile of the income distribution, but 
with this dynamics being most pronounced 
the further away from the middle – i.e. at 
the top and bottom. (See Chart 20.)
France and Germany
In France, the GDP growth over the period 
from 1976 till 2006 masks stark per-
sonal income disparities between various 
income fractiles. (Chart 21 and 22.)
(4) Wenchao Jin, Robert Joyce, David 
Phillips, Luke Sibieta: ‘Poverty and 
Inequality in the UK 2011’, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies Commentary 118, 
London, Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies. http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/
comm118.pdf
Chart 17: Income of the top 10 % as a percentage of the total income in the US, UK, 
FR and SE, 1970-2009
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Source: The World Top Incomes Data Base, a web resource authored by Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez
Chart 18: Income of the top 1 % as a percentage of total income in the US, UK, FR,  
and SE, 1970-2009
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Source: The World Top Incomes Data Base, a web resource authored by Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez
Chart 19: Income of the top 0.1 % as a percentage of total income in the US, UK, 
FR, and SE, 1970-2009
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Source: The World Top Incomes Data Base, a web resource authored by Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, 
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Chart 20: Average annual real income growth in the UK by income percentile,  
1979-2009/10
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Chart 21: Changes in declared taxable income in France for various fractiles versus  
GDP growth (1970=100)
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Income versus wealth
As income distribution captures only a 
snapshot aspect of inequality, it does not 
reflect the real command of resources that 
has been accumulated over decades and 
generations, i.e. wealth and its distribu-
tion which researchers usually conclude 
provide an even greater material disparity 
than that conveyed by income only.
Research by Bach, Beznoska, and Steiner 
(2011) suggests that in Germany in 2007 
the bottom half of the distribution owned 
only 2 % of the total net wealth, the top 
10 % more than 60 % of wealth, the top 
1 % owned more than 23 %. Landais, 
Piketty, and Saez (2011) come to very 
similar conclusions regarding the wealth 
concentration in France 2010: the bot-
tom 50 % own 4 % of the net wealth, the 
middle 40 % own 34 %, the top 10 % own 
62 %, and the top 1 % own 24 %. They 
also argue that a structure where the poor 
own less than 5 %, the middle classes own 
30-35 %, and the rich own over 60 %, 
represents a typical pattern to be found in 
most European countries.
In the US the wealth concentration is a 
matter of particularly heated debates and 
is usually deemed more pronounced than 
in Europe. In the US the bottom 50 % own 
only 2 %, the middle 40 % own 26 %, the 
top 10 % own 72 % (Kennickell, 2009). 
For the top 1 % the figures cited vary con-
siderably between researchers. For exam-
ple Edward N. Wolff (2010) argues that 
‘between 1989 and 2007, the share of the 
top percentile actually declined sharply, 
from 37.4 to 34.6 %, though this was 
more than compensated for by an increase 
in the share of the next four percentiles. 
As a result, the share of the top five 
percent increased from 58.9 % in 1989 to 
61.8 % in 2007, and the share of the top 
quintile rose from 83.5 to 85.0 %.’ The 
Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality 
(2009) cites 33 % (2001) for the wealth 
share of the top percentile while Joseph 
Stiglitz (2011) has claimed that the top 
1 % control 40 % of US wealth. 
Chart 22: Income changes in the top fractiles of the distribution, Germany (1992=100)
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3.1.3. Impact of the crisis
Statistically speaking, inequality has 
not increased or even declined slight-
ly in many countries in the early 
phase of the crisis as capital income 
was severely hit (see also Jenkins 
et al. 2011). At the lower end of 
the income distribution a number of 
pensioners and benefits recipients 
were not directly affected as income 
support schemes were reinforced, 
but this does not mean that they 
were spared by the crisis. Job losses 
were significant, and as shown by 
Chapter 1, unequal in their impact 
on different wage segments: they 
were especially pronounced at the 
middle of the distribution, hitting 
also the bottom somewhat, while the 
top quintile of jobs even saw a net 
increase between the second quarter 
of 2008 and 2010. Moreover a reduc-
tion in absolute income can restrain 
actual consumption more and yield 
a bigger actual loss of life quality for 
a poorer person than a similar per-
centage reduction in the income of a 
richer person. 
The long-term effects of the crisis 
may turn out to be harsher, how-
ever, as recovery does not neces-
sarily guarantee jobs for all those 
who became unemployed and face 
risks of long-term exclusion. In short, 
income shocks may prove permanent 
and income losses at the bottom 
of the distribution can be persis-
tent. Heathcote et al. (2010) found 
that, in the United States, earnings 
at the 10th percentile declined by 
a fifth in the 1980-82 downturn, 
and they did not return to the pre-
recession levels until the late 1990s. 
Brugiavini, Weber et al. (2011) found 
different effects in different types 
of welfare states: in Nordic coun-
tries formal insurance mechanisms 
eventually undo the effects of finan-
cial hardship on earnings, and avoid 
the spill over to consumption and 
to permanent income. In Southern 
European countries informal insur-
ance mechanisms prevail and these 
mitigate the effects on earnings, but 
are unable to cope with the more 
persistent shocks – which are then 
translated in consumption. In many 
continental countries financial hard-
ship seem to matter most, as both 
formal and informal responses seems 
to be weaker. 
Box 5: Impact of austerity and anti-crisis measures
Countries responded to the crisis with a variety of measures, some of which were designed to mitigate the impact, while others were more 
focused on achieving financial stability through austerity packages. Some studies have already been undertaken in order to analyse the impact 
of different anti-crisis measures, (Callan et al. 2011), (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2011), (Leventi et al. 2010) (Callan, Nolan, and Walsh, 2011).
These studies suggest that the distributional impact was greatly influenced by the design of the measures (e.g. in Greece the pensioners’ 
solidarity contribution sought to place a much higher burden on higher pensions than on low ones), and, while taxing high income more can 
have an equalising effect, taxing consumption can have the opposite effect. 
Measures that generally reduce inequality 
•	 levying higher taxes on the top incomes, on wealth
•	 reinforcing entitlements for social security based support (e.g. longer unemployment benefits)
•	 wage subsidies
•	 tax credits for the very low income earners
•	 short term working arrangements allowing to stay in employment
•	 additional support for very low income families (e.g. for school start)
•	 fighting tax evasion
Measures that generally increase inequality 
•	 cut in in-kind benefits (e.g. education, healthcare)
•	 cut in social transfers
•	 increase in consumption, value added tax
Measures that have an ambiguous effect on inequality
•	 introduction of means tested benefits in place of universal benefits
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3.2. Causes of 
increasing inequality 
and lessons to learn
Various factors impact on the struc-
ture of income inequality in Euro-
pean societies. Understanding the 
reasons behind changing inequali-
ties is obviously extremely impor-
tant for finding the best-fit instru-
ments to tackle what are seen to be 
socially unjust or economically inef-
ficient disparities. While national 
cases (see fifth section) illustrate the 
idiosyncratic paths of each coun-
try, some main factors have been 
demonstrated to influence income 
inequality: some resulting from 
the changes in the labour market, 
unionisation, and forms of employ-
ment, some caused by greater immi-
gration flows and changes in social 
structures, while globalisation and 
technological advances seem to play 
a role as well. The extent to which 
the impact of these factors can be 
offset by policy intervention varies 
and appropriate solutions can be 
contested. Some of the drivers for 
growing inequalities will be dis-
cussed below, while a more meticu-
lous analysis of changes in income 
inequality can be found in OECD 
(2011b).
3.2.1. Market income 
inequalities
Earnings inequalities
Market income is the main source of 
household income and in all countries 
wages and salaries account for the 
largest proportion of it ( Brandolini 
and Smeeding 2009). For this reason, 
changes in the distribution of earn-
ings have a significant and direct 
effect on income inequality. In the 
EU-27, with 90 % of all workers earn-
ing less than EUR 4 000 (gross) per 
month, and 50 % earning less than 
EUR 1 230. The great dispersion of 
earnings within the EU is, however, 
due to a large extent to differences 
between Member States.
Several studies note that increas-
ing inequality is principally linked 
to greater earnings inequality. How-
ever, it is important, not only to note 
this relationship but also to under-
stand what is behind this recent trend 
in wage dispersion. Based on the 
important OECD (2011) contribution 
in the field, we can summarise the 
key drivers for wage inequality, as 
noted in Box 6. 
All of these factors have been exten-
sively studied in the literature on eco-
nomic inequality which have demon-
strated that the interconnectedness 
and relationship between them are 
very complex. 
In terms of technological advances 
in general, the dominant feature is 
that there is a skills-bias such that 
there is more demand for better edu-
cated people. Some research shows, 
however, that this rising demand for 
skilled labour has existed since the 
late 19th century (Goldin and Katz 
2007). Nevertheless, it is important 
to distinguish between different 
types of innovation. Technological 
changes, together with globalisation, 
can lower the demand for unskilled 
labour in the EU with off-shoring 
and international competition being 
facilitated by information technolo-
gies (Blau and Kahn 2009, P. 195). 
Box 6: Key Drivers of changes in wage inequality -   
impact on overall earnings inequality
1. Technological advances and globalisation
 Trade integration: =
 Foreign direct investments and deregulation: =
 Technological progress: +
2. Policies and institutions
 Declining union coverage: =/-
 Product market deregulation: +/=/-
 Less strict employment protection legislation: +
 Declining unemployment  benefit replacement rate: +/=/-
3. Education
 Increased educational level: -
Source: Regression analysis for 22 OECD countries in OECD, 2011b
Note: A positive/negative sign indicates an effect which increases/decreases overall inequality, “=” 
indicates an insignificant effect. Multiple signs indicate different effect under different assumptions.
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Previous empirical evidence on the 
employment consequences of tech-
nological change is mixed, and 
depends largely on the forms of 
innovation and the levels of unit 
(firms, sectors, or the whole econo-
my) (Vivarelli 2007). Process innova-
tion in the form of introduction of 
robots in the manufacturing pro-
cess may increase inequality as it 
reduces the demand for unskilled 
workers while increases productiv-
ity and rewards for skilled workers. 
On the other hand, some product 
innovations that lead to an increase 
in total consumption, such as the 
development of mobile phones, may 
stimulate employment and, on bal-
ance, reduce wages inequality. 
In terms of education and invest-
ment in human capital: people with 
higher education can respond and 
adapt better to the changes in skills 
demand while many low-skill jobs 
can be easily moved across borders. 
However, low-wage countries such 
as China and India are now able to 
compete for high-tech jobs as well 
due to the fast expansion of higher 
education and their massive invest-
ment in human capital and R&D. As 
a result, globalisation has definitely 
changed the labour market in the 
West (Freeman 2009). 
The OECD study found that techno-
logical progress (measured as business 
R&D investments as a percentage of 
GDP) has indeed impacted on earn-
ings inequality over the past decades, 
while the effect on trade integration 
was found to be insignificant. On 
a positive side, education is seen to 
have exerted an important equalising 
impact on earnings inequality, offset-
ting almost entirely the increase in 
inequality due to technological and 
institutional changes (OECD 2011b).(2) 
(2) Furthermore, Giesecke and Verwiebe 
(2009) found out that wage differentials 
between highly-educated and workers 
with a low level of education have also 
decreased in Germany between 1985 
and 2006. However, wage differen-
tials between occupational classes have 
increased.
Immigration, as one aspect of 
globalisation, has received a fair 
share of attention in the litera-
ture, but there is no consensus on 
its impact on the wage structure 
of the non-immigrants. According 
to the analysis by Kahanec and 
Zimmermann (2009), high-skilled 
immigration substantially reduces 
inequality while low-skilled immi-
gration increases it, but with highly 
complex underlying mechanisms, 
suggesting also a need for more 
studies on the inequality impact in 
the country of origin of migrants.
In terms of the national level, labour 
market institutions obviously impact 
on earnings distribution and the eco-
nomic incentives presented to both 
workers and employers. Differences 
in labour market regulation may shed 
light, especially on variations between 
countries, since it is generally recog-
nised that centralised wage-setting 
institutions and trade unions tend to 
compress wages (Blau and Kahn 2009, 
196; Visser and Checchi 2009). In gen-
eral, increasing inequality seems to 
coincide with decreasing the number 
of union members and less strict regu-
lation of minimum wages or collective 
bargaining. However, as Visser and 
Checchi (2009, 245) remark, causality 
between union decline and inequality 
can go both directions: union decline 
can increase inequality but growing 
inequality may also reduce union 
memberships since workers feel less 
protected. 
In addition to technological changes, 
institutional changes are seen as the 
main determinants of wage inequal-
ity in the OECD countries. Both prod-
uct market deregulation and trend 
towards more relaxed employment 
protection are associated with higher 
inequality. Based on data for the UK, 
Faggio et al. (2010) claim that most 
of the increase in individual wage 
inequality can be accounted for by an 
increase in inequality between firms 
and within industries, rather than 
within-firm or between-industry; this 
could mean that collective bargain-
ing is more likely to happen within 
firms than for an entire industry.
In addition to wage dispersion, the 
pattern of employment and unem-
ployment affects market income ine-
quality. OECD (2011b) analysed what 
share of the increasing inequality can 
be attributed to two opposing forces, 
wage and employment effects, respec-
tively. Their findings show that rising 
wage dispersion has been offset by 
the equalising effect of rising employ-
ment rates. This means that the high 
unemployment rates of the current 
economic recession will increase the 
gap between rich and poor if the 
unemployment benefits do not offset 
the income loss with high enough 
replacement rate (Chart 23). 
The increasing use of part-time and 
temporary contracts also impacts 
the market income inequality for 
obvious reasons. Findings based on 
Structure on Earnings Survey (SES) 
2006 data illustrate the substantial 
wage penalty temporary contracts 
often involve. After controlling for 
a number of personal characteristics, 
such as education, age, and gen-
der, estimates show that temporary 
workers earn, on average, signifi-
cantly less than permanent work-
ers in the EU (with the gap being 
as high as 36.5 % in Portugal and 
29.4 % in Poland). Young people 
in particular are often trapped in a 
poor situation in which they move 
between temporary jobs and unem-
ployment (European Commission 
2010a, p. 152). In general, countries 
with high levels of inequality also 
have a greater incidence of low pay 
(Lucifora and Salverda 2009, p. 267).
Capital income inequalities
While the share of capital income in 
total income is quite small, its con-
tribution to income inequality has 
doubled in the past two decades, and 
has been especially significant in the 
Nordic countries (OECD 2011b).
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3.2.2. Household income 
inequality
In addition to the factors impact-
ing market income inequality, there 
remain others that influence inequal-
ity, namely demographic factors and 
the redistributive capacity of the 
tax-and-benefit system. Three demo-
graphic aspects in particular have 
been studied: changes in the age 
structure, changes in household living 
arrangements, and changes in ethnic 
and racial composition of the popula-
tion (Burtless 2009, p. 443). Their dis-
tributional effects will be summarised 
in this section while redistributive 
policies will be analysed more care-
fully in the next section, with a few 
empirical illustrations. 
The demographic structure of Euro-
pean societies has changed radi-
cally during the past few decades: 
with, most notably, increases in the 
proportion of elderly people in the 
population and an increase in sin-
gle-parent families and those living 
alone. These changes have not only 
translated into higher public spend-
ing but have also influenced income 
inequality and poverty as a growing 
sub-group of population - those 
past retirement age - will depend 
on pensions and public transfers as 
their main sources of income (Burt-
less 2009). Although there are major 
differences between countries in the 
level of pensions (in Italy, for exam-
ple, pensions are often higher than 
the average salary), pensions are 
typically lower than pre-retirement 
wages, as a result of rising numbers 
of low-income households .
Changes in household composition, 
notably the tendency towards more 
single-parent families or people liv-
ing alone, have an important nega-
tive impact on living standards by 
limiting the possibility of pooling 
and sharing resources, and benefit-
ing in general from economies of 
scale in living costs. As a result, sin-
gle-parent families generally face a 
much greater risk of poverty in com-
parison to two-parent households 
with the same number of children. 
(For details, see Chapter 3 of the 
review on patterns of poverty.)
Jäntti (1997) studied the impact of 
demographic factors on inequality in 
five countries over a four to seven year 
span in the mid-1980s. His findings 
show, however, that the age structure 
or living arrangements do not explain 
increasing inequality and the main 
contributor to inequality seemed to be 
earnings inequality, as corroborated 
recently by an OECD study (2011b), 
although, as Lerman (1996) notes, it 
is obviously difficult to isolate demo-
graphic changes from wider social and 
economic transformations that are 
generally interconnected, and often 
mutually reinforcing.
Another aspect of household forma-
tion that has been investigated by 
researchers is the so-called ‘assor-
tative mating’ or ‘marital homoga-
my’, in other words the correlation 
between spouses’ earnings. While 
the relationship was not common 
in the past, it has now grown in 
many countries, especially in the UK, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, and 
Sweden (OECD 2011). Many studies 
argue that this trend also increases 
inequality, but the OECD study finds 
only a modest impact. In any case, as 
Kenworthy (2010) notes, it is difficult 
to think what policy makers can, or 
should, do to influence this trend.
Household structure and changes in 
values and attitudes can also have 
a significant bearing on job oppor-
tunities for women. Harkness (2010) 
has found an inverse relationship 
between female employment and 
income inequality in OECD coun-
tries. This implies that, despite the 
employment gap between low and 
highly educated women, women’s 
earnings exert an equalising impact 
on income distribution. The author 
argues that increasing employment 
opportunities for women in general, 
and reducing employment inequal-
ity between women, will have a sig-
nificant impact in terms of narrowing 
income inequality in Western socie-
ties. Furthermore, this impact would 
be more effective than diminishing 
the gender pay gap. Indeed, OECD 
(2011b) found a strong equalising 
impact of raising female employment 
in all  investigated  countries.(3)
(3) For an overview of policies impacting 
gender related inequalities, one might 
see Corsi et al. 2010.
Chart 23: Unemployment rate in EU-27 during the 2000s
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
20
11
Q1
20
10
Q3
20
10
Q1
20
09
Q3
20
09
Q1
20
08
Q3
20
08
Q1
20
07
Q3
20
07
Q1
20
06
Q3
20
06
Q1
20
05
Q3
20
05
Q1
20
04
Q3
20
04
Q1
20
03
Q3
20
03
Q1
20
02
Q3
20
02
Q1
20
01
Q3
20
01
Q1
20
00
Q3
20
00
Q1
Total
Women
Under 25 years old
%
Source: Eurostat
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
82
4. The effecTiveness of 
The Tax-benefiT sysTems
4.1. Introduction
The European social model is built 
on the principle that the benefits 
of social progress should be shared, 
with a particular focus on the 
effective redistribution of income. 
Extensive evidence is available to 
show that levels of poverty and ine-
quality depend on the public poli-
cies, redistributive characteristics of 
the welfare state, and the scope of 
transfers and taxes (Ringen 1987; 
Mitchell 1991; Smeeding 2005). As 
income inequalities have increased 
in many countries recently, concern 
about the redistributive efficiency 
of social polices has increased, as 
has pressure to analyse the contri-
bution of the various factors con-
tributing to equality or inequality, 
with a view to identifying best-fit 
practises.
Redistribution is seen to be necessary 
because the market would produce 
more unequal distribution of wel-
fare than is tolerable in a democratic 
society (Ringen 1987). Even in eco-
nomically developed societies, it is 
the case that inequalities in income 
and wealth correlate with other ine-
qualities, for example in healthy life 
expectancy, education, and political 
power. In general, economic ine-
qualities get translated into social 
inequalities that have detrimental 
effects on well-being.
Various policies impact on income 
distribution. The ‘early’ ones in the 
distributive process can include 
forms of state activity, such as 
labour market policies, or regulatory 
policies such as environmental poli-
cies – all of which influence the way 
markets behave in the first place. 
In contrast, redistributive policies 
intervene at the end of the pro-
cess and seek to modify the income 
distribution that has been shaped 
by regulatory policies and market 
mechanisms (Ringen 1987). 
The OECD study (2008) concluded 
that cash transfers function as the 
main redistributive tool in compari-
son to taxes and in the context of the 
current financial crisis, it is important 
to know what mix of benefits and 
taxes could be the most efficient or 
fair relative to policy objectives. The 
structure and financing of social pro-
grammes also vary across Europe and 
these factors too need to be included 
in the analysis on income inequal-
ity. Hence there is a need to assess 
the limits and recent tendencies of 
redistribution through the social pro-
tection systems that are currently in 
place in the EU Member States. 
4.2. Limitations of 
redistribution studies
In all studies that attempt to exam-
ine the redistributive impacts of the 
tax-and-benefit system, we encounter 
the so-called ‘counterfactual’ prob-
lem. It means that we cannot clearly 
decipher the pattern of the alterna-
tive distribution – that which would 
have occurred if there had been no 
state intervention – against which to 
compare the real distribution in order 
to estimate the equalising impact of 
taxes and benefits (Ringen 1987, 178). 
Bergh (2005) criticises the standard 
method of comparing income dis-
tribution - before and after taxes 
and transfers - because it incorrectly 
supposes that the before situation 
is independent of the welfare state. 
Obviously, the design of taxes and 
benefits influences individual behav-
iour: the decision to have children, 
the incentive to work more or to 
save money, women’s attachment to 
labour market, etc. (Danziger et al. 
1981; Bergh 2005). The same is true 
with respect to in-kind benefits: in the 
absence of public day care or elderly 
care services, fewer women would 
take up paid work, education would 
be purchased from private markets, 
and employers would possibly provide 
health care insurance and childcare to 
a larger extent, all potentially chang-
ing the distribution of market and 
disposable income as we now know it. 
OECD (2008, 118) notes that standard 
approach also fails to acknowledge to 
what extent public transfers can sub-
stitute for private arrangements. For 
example, in a public pension system 
with high replacement rates, such as 
in Nordic countries, future pension-
ers very rarely make supplementary 
retirement plans. In short, these fac-
tors together with regulatory policies, 
such as minimum wages, influence 
income distribution even before the 
introduction of redistributive policies: 
therefore the distribution of market 
income in these comparisons may be 
unrealistically inegalitarian. Measur-
ing the extent of inequality is thus 
more straightforward than estimat-
ing the distribution via government 
intervention (Saunders 2010, p. 528). 
4.3. The impact of 
tax-benefit system on 
income inequality
The main part of this section pre-
sents an empirical analysis of ine-
quality based on original income 
and disposable income in 2005 and 
2009 with a view to assessing the 
effectiveness of the tax-and-benefit 
system. Unfortunately, we might 
only find stronger evidence about 
the consequences of the crisis and 
budget cuts in the coming years. 
The following section investigates 
the redistributive effectiveness of in-
kind benefits. Box 7 discusses briefly 
the recent changes in the European 
tax systems in relation to inequality, 
the economic crisis, and the sustain-
ability of the financing of the wel-
fare state. More detailed analysis 
on the evolution can be found in 
the European Commission’s recent 
publication “Taxation Trends in the 
European Union” (Eurostat 2011). 
This section compares two situations: 
inequality of original income, i.e. 
market income and old age pen-
sions, versus inequality of dispos-
able income after the intervention 
of taxation and policies (see 4.2). 
Original income includes employee 
cash and near cash income, non-cash 
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employee income, cash benefits from 
self-employment (while losses are 
excluded), the value of goods pro-
duced for own consumption, income 
from rental of property and land, 
regular inter-household cash trans-
fers received, interests, dividends 
and profit from capital investment, 
income received by household mem-
bers under 16 years old, and pen-
sions from individual private plans 
as well as old age benefits. The last 
income source includes state fund-
ed pensions in order to avoid the 
problem of unrealistic counterfactual 
as discussed above (this method has 
also been used in Atta-Darkua and 
 Barnard 2010).
Charts 24 and 25 illustrate the redis-
tributive effect of taxes and benefits 
in the EU member states in 2009. We 
see that taxes and cash benefits clearly 
reduce income inequality regardless 
of the inequality measure used. The 
Gini coefficient decreases by 19 % 
on average, and the P90/P10 ratio 
by 34 %. However, the differences 
between countries are considerable: 
in Hungary, Denmark, Ireland, and 
Slovenia inequality is cut by a third 
(Gini), while in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Latvia the effect does not reach 10 % 
(see Table 3). Over the last decades, 
the maturing social protection has 
helped reducing  inequality, while new 
trends in labour market and house-
hold structures are challenging the 
effectiveness of social security systems 
in many countries. Chart 26 shows 
that the connection between the 
level of original income inequality 
Box 7: Developments in tax systems
Tax fairness is a major concern for the design of the European welfare states and which inevitably involves many trade-offs. While the top 
rate of personal income tax was increased recently in some countries (e.g. UK, PT, FR, IT) to cope with austerity, as shown by Eurostat 
(2011) the historical trend is for there to be a reduced progressivity of personal income tax, and a simultaneous rise in value-added-tax, 
which is regressive in nature. On the one hand, focusing relief on lower-income households has the advantage that a greater proportion 
of the tax break is spent immediately, supporting demand. On the other hand, emphasis on consumption taxes can boost competitiveness 
and efficiency of the economy. 
Personal Income Tax
Income (re)distribution is heavily influenced by the progressivity of the tax system. The progressivity of personal income taxes (PIT) has been 
significantly reduced in the last decades: top tax rates were reduced and more flat rate systems introduced. The EU-27’s top average personal 
income tax rate was reduced from 47.3 % in 1995 to 37.1 % in 2011, with the reduction accelerating after 2000, most noticeable in Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
However, since the onset of the crisis, the trend has halted in many countries as governments are under pressure for more redistribution: 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain increased the top PIT rates in 2011 as did Greece, Latvia, and the United Kingdom in 
2010 (European Commission 2011, p. 31). 
As a consequence of the most recent changes, in 2010, for the first time in several years, the top PIT rate increased in the EU. However, 
there is still a notable difference between old and new Member States: in 2011, the average top PIT rate of the Central and Eastern European 
countries is 23.3 %, well-below the old EU-15 countries average of 48.1 %. Furthermore, all the flat rate systems in the EU were introduced 
by new Member States. 
In several EU countries, the progressivity of the personal income tax is partly offset by the regressive structure of social security contributions 
due to the contribution ceilings in place in many Member States. However, Kenworthy (2010) demonstrates that, across countries, inequality 
reduction achieved via government transfers correlates strongly with tax revenues as a share of GDP. Consequently, he argues that, from the 
perspective of redistribution, the key aspect of taxation is its quantity rather than its progressivity.
Consumption Taxes
While the rate of value added tax has been somewhat stable over the past decade, it has increased in a majority of countries since the begin-
ning of the economic crisis. The change has been impressive in both magnitude and speed, as the rate increased on average by 2.5 percentage 
points in just three years (Eurostat 2011, p. 32). This is likely to reflect the willingness of the governments to shift the tax burden from labour 
to consumption due to the pressure of international competition and the supposedly more efficient character of consumption taxes (as seen 
from a government tax-raising perspective). However, the increase in VAT is felt hardest in the lowest income classes as they spend relatively 
more of their income (O’Donoghue et al. 2004; Warren 2008). Moreover, OECD (2007, p. 5) argues that the efficiency benefit and the embed-
ded work and saving incentives of consumption taxes widen the gap between the rich and the poor even further. These concerns have so far 
limited the extent to which governments rely on these indirect taxes.  
Capital Taxation
Equity considerations feature prominently in the debate on the taxation of capital given that capital is usually taxed more lightly than labour 
income and often taxed at flat rates. Substantial cuts in the corporate income rate have reinforced the likelihood of individuals adopting a 
legal form of corporation in order to avoid the payment of personal income tax on their labour income.
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and redistributive impact is weak. In 
other words, countries with the big-
gest market inequality are not neces-
sarily those that redistribute the most. 
Brandolini and Smeeding (2009, 
pp. 94-95) find that the redistribu-
tive impact of taxes and cash trans-
fers increased substantially from the 
1960s and then stabilised or dropped 
around the 1990s in many countries. 
The UK has witnessed the most dra-
matic change, from a situation close 
to the Nordic countries in the 1980s 
to a model more similar to the US in 
recent times. 
The size of social expenditure clearly 
matters for reducing income inequal-
ity. However, as Chart 27 shows, effi-
ciency of spending is also important. 
With the same expenditure (as % of 
GDP), there are countries where the 
combined effect of the tax and bene-
fit system is reducing original income 
inequality (measured as the Gini 
indicator of market income and old 
age benefits, before tax and other 
transfers) two or three times as much 
than some other Member States (e.g. 
Hungary and Ireland  versus Spain, 
Finland versus Greece).
Chart 24: Income inequality (Gini coefficient) in 2009,  
in descending order for original income inequality
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Source: Calculations based on EU-SILC 2009. 
Note: a) Original income: market income and old age benefits, for full definition see the introduction of 
Section  4.3. b) Data for NL missing.
Chart 25: Income inequality (P90/10) in 2009, in descending order  
for original income inequality
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Source: Calculations based on EU-SILC 2009. 
Note: a) Original income: market income and old age benefits, for full definition see the introduction of 
Section  4.3. b) Data for NL missing.
Chart 26: Correlation between original income inequality (p90/p10)  
and redistributive effect of taxes and transfers  
(% reduction in income inequality, not considering the impact of old-age benefits)
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4.3.1. The impact of in-kind 
benefits on income inequality
Table 4 illustrates yet another redis-
tributive mechanism of the welfare 
state, that of in-kind benefits (see 
Chapter 3 for further explanation 
on the method and reasoning; for a 
more detailed analysis, see Vaalavuo 
2011). All indicators of inequality 
used in the table show a consider-
able reduction in inequality when 
we move from disposable income to 
final income. If we focus our atten-
tion on the results for 2009, we see 
that in Romania the impact is the 
most significant; inequality decreases 
by 53 % when we look at the quintile 
share ratio, and by 27 % and 43 % for 
the two other measures. On average, 
inequality is reduced by 36 % (s80/
s20) in all countries, down from 37 % 
in 2006.
The level of reduction is tightly 
connected to the initial level of 
inequality as shown in the scat-
ter plot (Chart 28): countries with 
higher level of inequality in dispos-
able income are likely to have a 
greater redistributive effect of in-
kind benefits. In fact, in countries like 
Denmark and Spain where income 
inequality increased from 2006 to 
2009, the effect of in-kind benefits 
grew as well. On the other hand, 
when income inequality decreased 
during this period, as it did in Latvia, 
Portugal, Hungary, and Slovakia, the 
redistributive impact of public servic-
es diminished. These effects should 
be taken into account when drawing 
policy conclusions from the results. 
Chart 27: Correlation between social protection expenditure (without old age 
benefits, % of GDP, 2008) and redistributive effect of taxes and transfers  
(not considering impact of old age benefits, % reduction in Gini)
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Table 3: Income inequality (Gini coefficient) in 2009, in descending order  
for redistributive effect 
2009 Original income Disposable income
Redistributive effect: 
reduction in Gini
HU 0.36 0.25 32%
SI 0.33 0.23 30%
IE 0.41 0.29 30%
FI 0.36 0.26 28%
SE 0.33 0.25 25%
BE 0.35 0.26 24%
AT 0.34 0.26 24%
CZ 0.33 0.25 23%
LU 0.38 0.29 23%
DK 0.34 0.27 22%
MT 0.35 0.28 21%
DE 0.37 0.29 20%
UK 0.40 0.32 19%
FR 0.37 0.30 19%
PT 0.42 0.35 17%
SK 0.30 0.25 16%
IT 0.37 0.32 14%
EL 0.38 0.33 13%
EE 0.36 0.31 13%
PL 0.36 0.31 12%
CY 0.32 0.28 11%
LT 0.39 0.36 9%
LV 0.40 0.37 7%
BG 0.36 0.33 7%
RO 0.38 0.35 7%
ES 0.35 0.32 7%
NL 0.27
Source: Calculations based on EU-SILC 2009 
Note: a) Original income: market income and old age benefits, for full definition see the introduction of 
Section 4.3.  b) Data for NL missing.
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Chart 29, on the other hand, shows 
that no common pattern can be 
found in the redistributive effect 
of cash benefits and in-kind ben-
efits. There is a slight negative cor-
relation between the two; in other 
words, countries redistributing heav-
ily through in-kind benefits fail to do 
so through the tax-benefit system. 
We should not, however, jump to 
conclusions that this is a purposefully 
designed complementary system of 
redistribution.
 
Chart 28: Connection between disposable income inequality and reduction in 
 inequality (P90/P10) due to in-kind benefits, 2009 
Disposable income inequality (P90/P10)
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Chart 29: Reduction in inequality (P90/P10) through cash and in-kind benefits, 2009
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5. counTry sTories 
As the current economic crisis has 
increased the number of unem-
ployed by more than 5 millions, this 
has inevitably affected the incomes 
at the disposal of households. Unem-
ployment is likely to stay high for 
some time, while the protection 
against the income loss that it usually 
induces is handled in different ways 
across the EU. This section illustrates 
the above discussion on trends, caus-
es, and consequences of inequality 
at the country level. Case studies can 
deepen our understanding on the 
implications of different social poli-
cies practised and of various struc-
tural and cultural settings.
Germany
Incomes in Germany are becoming 
more unequal. While disposable 
income inequality was relatively flat 
between 1980-2000, a rapid increase 
in inequality started thereafter. This 
is due partly to changes in household 
structures - an increase in single and 
lone parents - as well as a strong 
increase in wage inequalities, the 
spreading of part-time and agency 
work, and tax and benefit reforms.
The increase in wage inequality was 
particularly strong, but the tax and 
redistributive system were able to 
compensate for a while, and mitigat-
ed the change in disposable income. 
Wage inequality increased in the 
1980s mostly at the top of the distri-
bution. (Dustmann et al. 2009) Since 
the mid-1990s, the number of low 
paid workers also started to increase. 
The labour market policies accentu-
ated polarisation as the proportion 
of middle income earners decreased 
significantly. Changes in the German 
labour market model over the past 
decade have had significant conse-
quences on income distribution, and 
at least partly explain rising inequal-
ity (Kenworthy, 2010). First of all, the 
traditional wage-setting system and 
coordination have slowly been dis-
mantled and the wages increased only 
slowly, in some years even below the 
inflation rate. Secondly, a new form 
of employment, exempt from heavy 
payroll taxes and minimum wage, 
was initiated in 2003 and these ‘mini-
jobs’ now account for about 15 % 
of  German employment (Bosch et al. 
2009, cited in Kenworthy 2010). Over-
all, the number of low-paid employees 
in Germany rose from some 4.5 million 
in 1995 to some 6.5 million in 2006, 
hence by 2 million, or about 43 % 
(Kalina and Weinkopf 2008). Third-
ly, the Hartz reforms seems to have 
increased the willingness of job can-
didates to make compromises regard-
ing wages and working conditions 
(Eichhorst et al., 2010)
Parallel to the changes in the labour 
market, in the mid-2000s the dura-
tion and generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits were reduced. Los-
ers were mainly singles, and couples 
without children receiving unem-
ployment assistance before (Goebel 
and Richter 2007). 
As a result, the proportion of the 
population at both margins of the 
income distribution increased. On the 
whole, the polarisation continued in 
2005-2009 as well, with the deciles 
with lower income losing their share 
of the total income, while top deciles 
increasing their share (Chart 30).
The economic crisis was handled 
in a way that helped to reduce 
inequalities, at least temporar-
ily. Employment and income levels 
remained rather stable, as labour 
market adjustments were achieved 
through short term working 
arrangements, other forms of flex-
ible labour arrangements, and the 
German government’s aggressive 
stimulus packages (Grabka-Frick, 
2011). Consequently, between 2008 
and 2009, there was a small reduc-
tion in S80/S20 to 4.5 and Gini to 
29.1 – still, these levels are well 
above the levels of inequality seen 
before 2005 (Chart 31).
Chart 30: Germany: Percentage point change in the income share  
of the deciles, 2005-2009.
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Chart 31: Evolution of the Gini Coefficient in Germany, 1984-2009.
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Greece
In one of the most unequal countries 
of the EU, dynamic growth since 
the mid-1990s helped raising living 
standards, but high levels inequali-
ties remain, partly due to the low 
poverty reduction impact of social 
protection. The consequences of the 
current budget cuts and the unprec-
edented economic and social crisis 
will only be fully felt later. However, 
for the moment, the impact on job 
opportunities has been considera-
ble, and the unemployment rate of 
young people is especially alarming.
Income inequality had decreased 
slightly in Greece between 1995 and 
2009, if measured by the Gini indica-
tor. Still, Greece continues to remain 
among the most unequal countries 
in the EU-15, and has the highest 
share (19.7 % in 2009) of population 
at risk of poverty.
In the two decades before the cri-
sis, the relative income of middle-
class families had improved, and 
relative poverty was also reduced 
(it decreased from 23-22 % in 1995-
1996 to 20 % in 2008). This was 
partly due to the fact that high 
economic growth allowed a gradual 
increase in expenditure on social 
protection benefits (from 21.8 % of 
the GDP in 1996 to 24.5 % in 2007) 
in a social security system dominated 
by a universal coverage approach. 
As a result, the redistributive role of 
the social security system is rather 
limited, as illustrated by the below 
average poverty and inequality 
reduction impact of social transfers 
other than pensions. 
Meanwhile Greece shows relatively 
high levels of inequality with a Gini 
coefficient that has remained quite 
stable, with a 2 point reduction dur-
ing the last years and a quintile share 
ratio showing similar developments. 
The crisis led to a loss of absolute 
income, and some groups, especially 
the new unemployed, were hardly 
hit. However, according to estima-
tions based on Euromod, between 
2009 and 2010 there was (only) a 
slight increase in inequalities (Mat-
saganis and Leventi 2011). Taking 
into account the impact of the VAT 
increase, there may have been to a 
considerable increase in inequality. 
(Matsaganis and Leventi 2011) 
Hungary
Following a strong increase after 
1989, income inequalities in Hungary 
remained stable, and they still count 
among the lowest in the EU.
Accelerating a trend that started ear-
lier, the economic transition after 
1989 brought a strong increase in 
income inequality that was exacer-
bated by the drop in real income. 
The main reasons were the loss of 
1 million jobs in a country of 10 mil-
lion, and a strong increase in wage 
differences. Employment situation 
polarised rapidly, and many active 
aged sank in poverty, while pen-
sioners were relatively spared – the 
at-risk of poverty rate is now signifi-
cantly lower for households with a 
head above 60 years, than for house-
holds headed by a 35-59 years old. 
(TÁRKI, 2010) Following these rapid 
changes, between 1995 and 2009, 
income inequality remained broadly 
stable, even declined periodically. 
Between 2007 and 2009, a period of 
austerity, income inequality increased 
only slightly. While real disposable 
income declined by 7 %, the very 
rich and very poor fared worse than 
the middle classes, so inequality was 
kept moderate. (Toth and Medgyesi, 
2011) Changes in VAT, not reflected 
in the disposable income indicators 
likely impacted poorer more. 
Chart 32: Evolution of the Gini Coefficient in Greece, 1995-2009.
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Chart 33: Evolution of the Gini Coefficient in Hungary, 1987-2009.
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Since 2009, entitlements for social 
transfers were reduced, and the pro-
gressive personal income tax was 
replaced by a flat tax, benefiting 
higher income deciles much more – 
changes that may have impaired the 
inequality reducing effect of the tax 
system (as suggested by Benedek, 
2006).
Ireland
Strong and sustained growth, tax 
reforms, and increased social trans-
fers and increased labour market 
participation in households helped 
raising household incomes overall. 
While fiscal consolidation was imple-
mented in a generally equitable way, 
the fiscal crisis may threaten the level 
of public expenditure and can lead to 
rising inequalities later. 
Ireland experienced a period of 
strong economic growth from the 
early 1990s, leading to a strong 
improvement in living standards, 
when the median income almost 
doubled between 1994 and 2001. 
While real income grew generally, 
incomes grew more for recipients 
of labour and capital income (situ-
ated usually towards the top of the 
distribution) and less for recipients 
of state support. (Layte, Nolan, and 
Whelan, 2004) This led to an increase 
in the at-risk of poverty rate (from 
16 % to 22 %) although it impacted 
the Gini indicator only moderately.
The economic boom was accom-
panied by a significant increase in 
employment. Strong demand for low-
skilled employees appears to have 
kept up their returns, and Ireland 
did not experience the pronounced 
increase in earnings inequality and 
widening gap between those with 
high and low levels of education. 
(Nolan, Callan, and Maitre, 2011)
In the 2000s, the at-risk of poverty 
rate fell from 22 % to 14 %, greatly 
due to a big increase in social trans-
fers. The poverty reduction effect of 
social transfers (excluding pensions) 
increased from 26 % to 61 % in that 
period. As a result, Ireland’s tax and 
cash benefit system was among the 
most equalising in the EU, as shown 
in Section 4.3. This characteristic was 
maintained during the recession: the 
households have been relatively well 
protected during the early phase of 
the recession. Despite the severity of 
the recession – an 11 per cent con-
traction in GDP, a 7  % point reduc-
tion in the employment rate   total 
household income even increased by 
over 3½ per cent over 2007-9. (Jen-
kins et al, 2011) The at-risk of poverty 
rate also continued to decline, from 
16.5% to 14 per cent in this period. 
This is greatly attributable to the 
stabilising effect of social transfers, 
together with a decline in median 
income. The fact that inequalities 
were kept moderate is to a large 
extent due to the nature of auster-
ity adopted – e.g. progressive cuts in 
higher public sector salaries. (Callan, 
Nolan and Walsh, 2011). However, 
the distributional impact of cuts in 
social services has not yet been quan-
tified, the study warns that they 
are likely to affect more the most 
vulnerable, including families with 
children. In addition, the prolonged 
unemployment crisis, with conse-
quent rise in long-term unemploy-
ment, is leading to higher levels of 
basic  deprivation. 
Finland
Reforms of the tax and benefits 
system have led to an increase in 
inequalities since the mid-90s but, 
despite this, Finland remains among 
the more equal countries of the EU.
During the recession in the begin-
ning of 1990s the disposable income 
of all households fell markedly while 
the crisis affected different parts of 
the distribution differently (Atkinson 
and Morelli 2010, 47). The decrease 
was greatest in 1992 when incomes 
fell by 4-5 %, but the at-risk-of-pov-
erty rate fell as well, suggesting that 
incomes at the bottom part of distri-
bution were reduced less sharply. 
In 1995 incomes increased again 
as the technological boom created 
many jobs and the public sector 
employment increased (Gustafsson 
and Johansson 1997). However, the 
increase was especially significant in 
the top quintiles at the end of the 
decade. One reason for the gains of 
the top quintiles is that the share of 
capital income in these quintiles had 
increased, and capital income is taxed 
less than income from work. This was 
balanced at the beginning of 2000s 
when increase of income of the mid-
dle quintiles was more rapid than in 
the top quintiles. More recently the 
incomes of the top quintile decreased 
on average by 1 % while, in other 
income classes, they increased (on 
average by 5 % at the bottom of the 
distribution), thus narrowing income 
inequality in 2009 (Statistical Office of 
Finland 2011). 
Inequality measured by Gini coef-
ficient was quite stable in the 1980s 
and until the mid-1990s. Since then 
the income distribution has been 
less equal, with inequality increasing 
more than in many other EU countries 
Chart 34: Gini indicator in Finland, 1996-2010
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(OECD 2008). The main reason for this 
is that the role of taxation in mini-
mising income differences has weak-
ened. At the same time the share of 
cash benefits of households’ income 
have decreased and the role of mar-
ket income has increased. 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned 
that Finland’s tax-and-benefit system 
is among the most redistributive in 
the EU after Ireland and Denmark.
France
Long-term trend of reduction of ine-
qualities and poverty started in the 
1970s despite an increase in market 
income inequalities due to segmen-
tation of the labour market and the 
polarisation of jobs between job-rich 
and job-poor households. However, 
the latest data show signs of growing 
inequality in the 2000s.
Levels of inequality have remained 
relatively unchanged since 1979. In 
the 1970s, a period of strong growth, 
income inequality as measured by the 
inter-decile ratio (D9/D1) dropped 
from 4.6 to 3.5. Despite a rise in 
unemployment rate in the early 
1980s, this ratio has remained rela-
tively stable, although it increased 
from 3.2 back to around 3.5 between 
2005 and 2008. While the relative sit-
uation of old age pensioners has con-
tinued to improve since the 1970s, 
the relative situation of workers and 
unemployed has weakened. 
During the last decade, the most 
significant changes have been seen 
at the top of the income distribu-
tion , with the very rich becoming 
much richer than others. Between 
2004 and 2007, the income of the 
top 0.1 % increased by 40 %, while 
the top 10 % increased their reve-
nue little more than the population 
average (Solard, 2010), Still, even 
the broader top, the ten percent 
of the population with the high-
est income is getting clearly richer 
-  between 2005 and 2009, when 
the bottom 9/10 of society had 
been loosing income share, while 
the top 10  % increased its share 
from 22.9  % of total income to 
25.1 %. Looking at a longer term 
time series, the pattern is even 
more pronounced. In this sense, 
France seems to be following the 
pattern found much earlier in the 
US and the UK. 
Political measures just after the crisis 
as well as the introduction of the 
‘revenue de solidarité active’ and 
more generally the stabilising impact 
of the social protection system have 
contributed to limit the impact of the 
crisis to some extent. Nevertheless, 
the poorest remain the most hit, and 
the income of the lowest decile, with 
a higher proportion of unemploy-
ment benefits and less earnings, has 
only slightly decreased (-0.1 % in real 
terms in 2009 recession year), while 
the highest half of the revenue dis-
tribution has increased. (Insee 2011).
Poland
Following the transition, economic 
expansion brought higher inequali-
ties, but it improved the material 
situation of households.
In the 1990s, the transition shock 
and the ensuing economic expan-
sion in Poland brought higher 
income inequalities, especially 
above the median income. Differ-
ent factors led to increased inequal-
ity, including the education level, 
unemployment, and different situa-
tion of urban as against rural areas 
Chart 35: Percentage point changes in income shares  
of the deciles, France, 2005-2009
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Chart 36: Growth of declared taxable income in France, 1970-2006
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(larger cities correspond to higher 
average income level). However, 
the improved material situation of 
households is one of the reasons 
for the decrease in income inequali-
ties observed since 2005, bringing 
Poland closer to the EU average.
A major recent survey(4) of social con-
ditions and lifestyles carried out in 
more than 12 000 Polish  households 
shows historically high levels of eco-
nomic optimism, life satisfaction, and 
material prosperity. The poll also con-
firms the positive macroeconomic fig-
ures (sustained growth and relatively 
low unemployment) and draws a pic-
ture of a nation spared by the eco-
nomic crisis, with less the one-third of 
respondents feeling affected by the 
crisis, and over 80  % of respondents 
rating the past year as successful. 
Unemployment, which reached 20  % 
at the moment of Poland’s entry in 
the EU has fallen steadily to reach a 
low of 9 % in June 2011. 
Sizable labour migration of the Poles 
to the Western countries of the EU, 
notably the UK, Ireland, and the Neth-
erlands has certainly contributed to the 
reduction of the unemployment rate. 
The 2011 survey testifies to a historical 
success of the economic transition with 
only 26 % declared  themselves as not 
having stable  revenues allowing them 
to afford current needs compared to 
as many as 74 % in 1993. The system 
of social transfers, which is credited 
with keeping the income  inequalities 
from rising excessively during the most 
(4) The survey in question is called ‘Diagno-
za społeczna’ (Polish for ‘Social Diagno-
sis’) is a large scale inquiry into the social 
conditions of the Poles and has been 
co-financed by the European Social Fund 
and the National Bank of Poland, first 
carried out in 2000. The 2011 wave is the 
6th in a sequence and was carried out 
in 12 300 Polish households. Full report 
shall be published in December 2011 
on www.analizy.mpips.gov.pl (The Polish 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy).
challenging years of the  transition into 
the market economy(5), has now been 
compromised through the budgetary 
constraints and the subsequent cuts 
in social spending. The ‘Social diag-
nosis’ data indicate a clear growth of 
inequalities at the tails of the distribu-
tion: the income of the bottom decile 
households going down by 23  %, 
while the income of the top decile 
rose by 24  % between 2011 and 2000. 
This striking change is poorly reflected 
in the Gini coefficient which remains 
insensitive to such changes. 
United Kingdom
After a strong increase in income ine-
qualities in the 1980s, improved redis-
tribution through the  tax-benefit 
 system has partly mitigated the sharp 
polarisation of earnings. The redis-
tributive impact of in-kind benefits is 
also above the EU-average and grew 
strongly during the late 2000s.
(5) Anna Kurowska: ‘The dynamics of income 
inequality in Poland in a comparative 
perspective – major conclusions from 
research and statistical data’ p. 7, Insti-
tute of Social Policy Working Analyses 
and Papers 2/2011, University of War-
saw, http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/doc_
download/201-analizyips-22011-en.html
After being flat in the 1960s and 1970s, 
UK income inequality increased very 
rapidly in the 1980s, the Gini indicator 
rising from 0.25 to around 0.34, turn-
ing the UK from one of the most equal 
countries of the EU-15 into one of the 
most unequal. This was a result of a 
combination of factors: higher rates of 
 household ‘worklessness’, meaning a 
growing polarisation between house-
holds with two earners and those 
with no one at work; rising income 
disparities as high income increased 
while low incomes stagnated, union 
power was curbed, and demand 
for low skilled labour declined; as 
well as benefit cuts and simultane-
ous tax cuts for top income earners. 
(Hills et al., 2009)
Between 2000 and 2009, income equal-
ities remained rather unchanged. In 
2009, the Gini coefficients stood at 
32.4 (EU-27: 30.4) while the S80/S20 
income share ratio is 5.2 (EU-27 4.9). 
Chart 37: Annual real income growth by quintile group in United Kingdom
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Government expenditure plays a 
role in mitigating income inequali-
ties. Social protection expenditure as 
share of GDP has slightly decreased 
between 2000 and 2008 standing at 
22.7 % (2000: 25.5 %), and was lower 
than the EU-27 average reaching 
25.3 % in 2008. 
In the UK there is a much stronger 
correlation between educational 
achievement and socio-economic 
background than in most other EU 
countries (OECD, 2010). A further key 
challenge for the UK is the significant 
proportion of children living in job-
less households: at 17.5 % this is the 
highest level in the EU, where the 
overall average is 10.2 %. 
Although redistribution was 
reduced, some government inter-
ventions had a mitigating effect 
on inequalities and also reduced 
poverty, especially poverty among 
children living in lone-parent fami-
lies, in two-parent households, and 
in pensioner  households. Notably, 
new childcare policies introduced 
in the late 1990s also played a role 
by giving parents easier access to 
public day care places and thereby, 
to the labour market – and helped 
to reduce the fraction of chil-
dren in poverty (before housing 
costs) from 26.7 % in 1996–1997 to 
19.7 % in 2009–2010. (Data from 
Jin et al., 2011) 
During the 2008 recession average 
living standards were maintained, 
 supported by large increases in 
benefits and tax credit rates and, 
 compared to 2008, the 2009 Gini 
indicator as measured by EU-SILC 
also decreased somewhat. Further-
more, it is likely that the increase 
of the top income tax rate in 2010 
also had an alleviating effect on ine-
quality – while cuts in government 
expenditure, may have an increasing 
effect. 
The UK experience in the 1980s and 
1990s demonstrated that there is no 
guarantee that a rapid growth of liv-
ing standards at the top will trickle 
down to those at the bottom. On 
the other hand, government policies 
aimed at education, strong financial 
incentives for people reliant on social 
welfare to take up work, employ-
ment assistance, viable child care 
provision, redistribution, and high-
er taxation of the top incomes can 
 contribute to alleviate inequalities. 
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6. concluding 
remarks
This chapter has discussed the cur-
rent situation of income inequality 
in the European Union with a focus 
on changes in inequality and factors 
explaining changes and mechanisms 
of redistribution. In general, in the 
period 2005-2009 we see a certain 
convergence in the inequality levels 
in the EU. Some of the more une-
qual countries have shown positive 
signs of reducing inequalities as their 
social systems have matured, while 
more equal countries, the Nordic 
countries among them, have wit-
nessed signs of increasing inequal-
ity. This happened while long-term 
inequalities were on the rise, and the 
growth of very high incomes con-
tinued. The last three decades have 
seen a significant increase in incomes 
of the richest segments of society 
in many developed economies. The 
fragmentary data available suggest 
the concentration of income – and 
the wealth and power that go with 
it – is now reverting to levels not 
experienced since the beginning of 
the 20th century. 
In the absence of up-to-date data, 
the impact of the global economic 
crisis of the past years is still not 
clear. Earlier evidence suggests that 
while crises can lead to reductions in 
inequalities, these tend to be short 
lived, with inequalities often rising 
rapidly once the crisis is over. 
What the crisis has done has been 
to change perceptions of inequali-
ties and to put the question of fair-
ness back on the political agenda. All 
over Europe people feel – according 
to Eurobarometer and other polls 
– that the level of inequality is exces-
sive and that economic problems and 
increasing rates of unemployment can 
 worsen the situation even further. 
This underlines the need to build on 
a more inclusive growth as envisaged 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy. The 
global recession demonstrates that 
years of economic growth have not 
necessarily produced all the results 
wished for, and that many of the 
jobs created were often precarious 
and informal. And in so far as part of 
that growth was based on unsustain-
able financial foundations and envi-
ronmental degradation, it did not 
offer equal opportunities for people. 
Government transfers, the tax system, 
and public services have not always 
been able to mitigate the rising earn-
ings inequality, as shown in this chap-
ter. Moreover, in the face of forth-
coming budget cuts and the growing 
pressure of an ageing population, the 
system might fail to work as efficient-
ly as it has before. Additionally, many 
of the drivers of increasing market 
inequality, and the factors  influencing 
household income inequality, are 
becoming too strong for the current 
social policies to tackle. 
The analysis shows, however, that 
there is room for improving the 
effectiveness of welfare state in miti-
gating inequalities through efficien-
cy gains and improvements in the 
structure of social spending, and not 
only through raising expenditure. In 
some EU countries the same expendi-
ture (as % of GDP) can go with three 
times as big a reduction in income 
inequality. This suggests clear effi-
ciency reserves in better policies aim-
ing at reducing inequalities – even 
if the incentive effect and general 
impact of programs also have to be 
considered.
Changes in inequalities as well as 
uncertain public perceptions call for 
further research:
•	 Firstly to understand better why 
our societies are becoming more 
unequal 
•	 Secondly to analyse the conse-
quences of them becoming more 
unequal
•	 And thirdly to analyse how differ-
ent policies impact on inequalities 
in order to better assure prosperi-
ty, promote fairness, prevent social 
conflicts, and maintain the stability 
of our societies.
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1. inTroducTion
In June 2010, the EU governments 
committed themselves to reduc-
ing poverty and social exclusion 
in Europe by 20 million people by 
2020 – a target that represents an 
important step forward for the 
EU as a whole. This is also one of 
the main objectives of the Europe 
2020  strategy.
The target population is based on a 
combination of three indicators: the 
number of people considered at risk 
of poverty; the number of severely 
materially deprived persons; and the 
number of people below 60 years 
of age who are living in households 
with very low work intensity. Some 
114 million Europeans are part of 
one of these groups in 2009, and are 
thus considered at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. 
The added value of this measure-
ment is that the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion extends the original 
concept of relative income poverty to 
cover both non-monetary dimensions 
of poverty and situations of exclusion 
from the labour market. This reflects 
the EU ambition to tackle poverty 
through an integrated strategy, as 
promoted by the European Commis-
sion for the past several years. Com-
plementing the analysis of monetary 
poverty with other dimensions is cru-
cial in helping governments to fine-
tune their actions and to develop 
effective strategies to improve their 
redistributive policies and promote 
active inclusion.
This chapter describes in detail 
this aggregate indicator and its 
components, and discusses the rea-
sons why they have been chosen. It 
also presents the most challenging 
forms of poverty that we face in 
the EU, and describes the profile of 
the most-at-risk subgroups of the 
population.
2. a seT of Three  
indicaTors To describe 
poverTy and social 
exclusion
In 1975, the European Council had 
defined the ‘poor’ as ‘those indi-
viduals or families whose resources 
are so small as to exclude them 
from the minimum acceptable way 
of life of the Member State in 
which they live.’ This definition 
is rooted in research and political 
works aiming at defining poverty 
in developed countries. In these 
countries, the aims of government 
go beyond ensuring minimum sub-
sistence levels for their citizens to 
ensuring that all citizens benefit 
from the general level of prosper-
ity of the society. According to 
the original EU concept,  poverty 
is  relative, graduated, and multi-
dimensional. This concept differs 
from the United Nations definition 
of ‘deprivation of basic human 
needs’ (United Nations, 1995) that 
has been seen as most appropriate 
for measuring poverty in develop-
ing countries, or of concepts such as 
an ‘accumulation of disadvantages 
that is beyond reach of macro-eco-
nomic policies’ (Dahrendorf, 1990), 
or of ‘permanent dependence on 
the State’ ( Engbersen, 1991).
2.1. A multifaceted 
indicator to go beyond 
a monetary approach 
There is now wide recognition that 
poverty is a multidimensional phe-
nomenon (Kolm, 1977, Atkinson and 
Bourguignon 1982, Bourguignon, 
2003) and that the use of a multidi-
mensional indicator helps to reflect 
the multiple facets of poverty and 
exclusion. Such indicators have been 
widely supported by research work 
(Förster et al., 2004, Layte et al., 2000, 
Förster 2001). This chapter provides 
evidence showing that the various 
forms of poverty and social exclusion 
that the Member States face are bet-
ter described by a three-dimensional 
index than by a single-dimension 
one, and that, as a policy tool, it bet-
ter reflects the diversity of situations 
and priorities across  Member States 
in an enlarged EU.
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The monetary poverty component is 
a measure of relative poverty indicat-
ing the proportion of  people with an 
income below 60 % of the national 
median income, which varies both 
between countries(1) and over time. 
This relative measure is clearly rel-
evant for monitoring poverty, and 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate remains 
the agreed main headline indicator 
used to quantify poverty at the EU 
level. Following its endorsement by 
the European Council in 2001 in the 
context of the Laeken indicators of 
social inclusion, it has been used in 
various EU processes (the Social Open 
Method of Co ordination, the Lis-
bon strategy) and is also widely used 
by national governments and by the 
OECD. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is 
particularly useful for monitoring the 
impact of employment and redistribu-
tion policies aimed at its reduction.
However, relative measures have 
shortcomings when used for interna-
tional comparisons, or when shocks 
bring big changes to the threshold 
as has happened during the crisis 
(see below). The increased political 
focus on the definition of the target 
has highlighted these weaknesses 
and encouraged the use of absolute 
poverty thresholds to help provide 
a fuller picture (Förster et al., 2004). 
(1) For example it ranges in 2009 from 
€2 700 to €40 000 a year for a household 
of 2 adults and 2 children younger than 
14  (source: Eurostat EU SILC).
Options to define absolute poverty 
thresholds based on budget stand-
ards are explored (European Com-
mission, 2011) although such indica-
tors are still a long way from being 
implemented as monitoring tools.  
In this context the second and third 
components of the indicator under-
pinning the EU target indicator pro-
vide absolute measures of poverty, 
and cover broader aspects of social 
exclusion. Severe material depriva-
tion is defined in terms of the lack of 
nine essential items. The list of items, 
as well as the threshold of 4 ‘lacks’, 
remains the same across countries 
and remains stable over time (until 
the list of items is reviewed). In the 
same way, very low work intensity 
households (or jobless households) 
are identified on a common basis, 
with an absolute threshold common 
in space and time.
Severe material deprivation and very 
low work intensity indicators also have 
the advantage of setting EU-wide 
common thresholds that are appropri-
ate for ‘Social Europe’ as a whole (see 
below)(2), which is not the case with 
the ‘risk of poverty’ which is defined in 
terms of national thresholds.
(2) Combining the relative monetary pover-
ty definition with the absolute material 
deprivation indicators has been explored 
by Förster et al. (2004) among other 
options, and is considered as the best 
option to apprehend poverty and social 
exclusion in an enlarged Europe. 
The following subsections discuss 
each of these dimensions separately. 
Special attention is paid to the added 
value they bring to globally agreed 
targets, as well as the methodo-
logical choices leading to their final 
definition. Then their articulation is 
discussed, as well as their further 
 possible developments.
2.2. Shortcomings 
of at-risk-of-poverty 
rates based on national 
thresholds are revealed 
at times of crisis
The at-risk-of-poverty measure counts 
the number of people whose dis-
posable income is below 60 % of 
the median equivalised income(3) of 
their country. The 60 % value for the 
threshold has been largely used since 
(3) Equivalised income is a measure of 
household income that takes account 
of the differences in a household’s size 
and composition, and thus is equivalised 
or made equivalent for all household 
sizes and compositions. The equiv-
alised income is calculated by dividing 
the household’s total income from all 
sources by its equivalent size, which 
is calculated using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale. This scale attributes a 
weight to all members of the household: 
1.0 to the first adult; 0.5 to the second 
and each subsequent person aged 14 
and over; 0.3 to each child aged under 
14. The equivalent size is the sum of the 
weights of all the members of a given 
household. 
Box 1: The EU SILC survey, an integrated tool to measure the risk of poverty and social exclusion across Europe
SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) is a household survey, covering the 27 EU Member States since 2007. It is the reference 
source at EU level for statistics on income and living conditions and for common indicators for social inclusion in particular. This unique survey 
enables the measurement of the risk of poverty, material deprivation, and work intensity. This important property makes it possible to observe 
whether the indicators occur together or not for given individuals. The sample size exceeds 400 000 individuals.
The EU SILC measures in detail the total household disposable income. It has to be borne in mind that the income reference period is a fixed 
12-month period (such as the previous calendar or tax year) for all countries except the UK for which the income reference period is the current 
year and Ireland for which the survey is continuous and income is collected for the last twelve months. In the so-called ‘register countries’ (Den-
mark, Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and Slovenia), most income components are obtained through administrative registers.
Material deprivation is observed through a series of questions on the lack of each item of a list of 9 and the enforced nature of that lack. The 
extensive list of these items is: pay the rent, mortgage or utility bills (1), keep the home adequately warm (2), face unexpected expenses (3), 
eat meat or protein regularly (4), go on holiday (5), cannot afford to buy a television (6), a washing machine (7), a car (8), or a telephone (9).
There is no special reference period (present time). 
Work intensity is observed through a retrospective calendar based on the previous year excepting the UK and Ireland for which the reference 
period for work intensity is similar to income reference period. Individuals are invited to self-assess their position on the labour market. All 
this information can be linked to household data. 
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its choice ten years ago at the Laeken 
European Council. The choice of 60 % 
instead of 50, 40, or even 70, as was 
sometimes done before, remains an 
issue for discussion, however. Atkin-
son, Marlier, and Nolan (2004) report 
that the choice is fairly arbitrary and 
mainly designed to ensure continu-
ity with the previous indicator, and 
they recommend maintaining moni-
toring indicators based on these 
other thresholds in order to capture 
the shape of the income distribution 
around the 60 % threshold. In fact 
the poverty measurement is sensitive 
to the threshold value because of 
variations in income distributions (see 
Chart 1) with, for example, accumula-
tion of individuals around the middle 
earnings position resulting in signifi-
cant variations in the poverty rates.
The use of national thresholds has 
often been questioned, especially in 
the context of an enlarged Europe. 
Indeed, the relative risk-of-poverty 
measure ‘reflects the experience of 
income deprivation within European 
countries and leaves aside income 
gaps between countries. […] Tak-
ing the Member States as reference, 
society reflects the fact that social 
policies are decided on the country 
level while on-going European inte-
gration builds an argument for using 
“Europe” as the reference society’ 
(Förster et al., 2004). 
Treating the EU as a whole does 
indeed imply the need for a common 
threshold defined at the EU level, 
and the idea has been explored in 
several papers (for example European 
Commission 2007, ‘Comparing Poverty 
Indicators in an Enlarged EU’ Wheelan 
and Maitre 2010, Förster et al. 2004, 
European Commission 2011). 
The European Commission (2007) 
estimated that around 100 million 
Europeans in 2004 lived under a pov-
erty threshold defined at the  EU-level 
(estimated at €22 a day), and that 
some 23.5 million had to get by 
on less than €10 a day, and nearly 
7  million on less than €5 a day. 
Förster et al. (2004) compared the 
distribution of poor people defined 
on a national-threshold basis and on 
a European common threshold-basis. 
The study was based on the EU-15 plus 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slo-
venia. The authors estimated that set-
ting up national poverty lines results 
in an estimate of 60 million poor 
people, two-thirds of whom would 
be living in the four largest Member 
States (France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Italy). However, with a 
common poverty threshold, the distri-
bution of poverty ‘changes dramati-
cally’ with 74 million poor people, of 
whom only half of them would live in 
the four largest countries. 
Finally, the European Commission 
(2011) estimates poverty rates based 
on a common poverty line similar 
to the US threshold (see Box 2). The 
results ‘look much more like the distri-
bution of extreme poverty you might 
expect in the EU. The EU-15 and 
Slovenia have much lower poverty 
rates than the risk-of-poverty rate. 
The EU-10+2 have much higher rates’. 
One drawback of the risk of poverty 
indicator is its ambiguous evolution 
in periods of rapid growth or of 
crisis. Indeed, the risk of poverty 
depends on the poverty threshold, 
which is determined by the general 
level of income and its distribution in 
the whole population. This threshold 
may change from one year to anoth-
er as individual incomes change. This 
is especially the case when an eco-
nomic crisis occurs. After the shock, 
the various types of revenue are not 
hit at the same time nor to the same 
extent by the crisis. Work incomes 
are generally the first to decrease 
as the situation on the labour mar-
ket get worse. But other incomes, 
such as pensions and social ben-
efits, do not adjust immediately(4). As 
the highest incomes decrease while 
the others remain unchanged, the 
global income distribution changes. 
The median income, and therefore 
the poverty threshold, falls. People 
earning an income slightly below 
the poverty line may then move 
above it even though their situa-
tion has not changed or may even 
have worsened. 
This phenomenon is clearly apparent 
in some recent statistics. Available 
data currently show that poverty 
thresholds fell by 17 % between 2008 
and 2009 in Latvia, 16 % in Lithuania, 
and 2 % in Ireland(5). Statistically, this 
fall in the poverty thresholds has led 
to apparent decreases in the risk of 
poverty by 4 percentage points in 
Latvia, 5 percentage points in Esto-
nia, and stagnation in Lithuania and 
Hungary(6). 
(4) A recent report from Jenkins et al. (2011) 
based on EU SILC data, shows that this is 
exactly the current situation in Ireland. 
The study shows that the population is 
not uniformly hit by the crisis. Pension-
ers aged 60 or over saw increases in their 
income, while adults of working age 
and children have seen a decline of their 
income of 3 to 6 percentage points.
(5) Reference years 2008 and 2009 refer to 
SILC data 2009 and 2010 (ilc_il01).
(6) See also the case of France, where the 
latest data are already available. ‘Les 
niveaux de vie en 2009’, Insee Première 
No1365 - August 2011.
Chart 1: Risk of poverty upon various threshold definitions, EU-27, 2009
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For such reasons, the use of budget 
standards methods to define pov-
erty thresholds is quite interest-
ing. These methods rely on poverty 
thresholds defined with reference to 
a basket of goods and services that 
are considered as necessary to reach 
an acceptable standard of living. 
However, the choice of threshold 
remains a matter of concern and 
raises ethical issues, especially if the 
basket of necessary goods is defined 
in a normative way. Who decides 
what is essential? Political considera-
tions may come into the play, espe-
cially if the basket of goods is used 
as a reference point in determining 
the level of social benefits. 
The European Commission (2011) sug-
gests that methods based on the mobi-
lisation of focus groups and experts 
usually produce quite ‘generous’ 
baskets of goods, leading  thresholds 
‘to be at or above relative poverty 
thresholds‘. For example, experiences 
in developing budget standard in the 
UK, Belgium (Flanders), and Austria 
resulted in amounts above the 60 % 
of median income threshold. In other 
cases, especially when the purpose is 
to set a level for minimum income, 
experts and parliamentary committees 
tend to come to much more ‘parsimo-
nious’ baskets (e.g. the  Netherlands, 
see Table 1). In practice the imple-
mentation of such methods in a trans-
national comparative setting can raise 
important technical problems since the 
basket of goods has to take account 
of a variety of individual situations, 
and reflect very different consumption 
patterns across the EU. Ensuring that 
the thresholds really do measure com-
parable situations of hardship would 
require developed consumption data 
and prices, harmonised at the EU level, 
which the current EU framework for 
household budget surveys does not 
yet provide. 
Table 1: Budget standard examples for a single person of working age
UK Minimum 
Income Standard 
2008
Netherlands 
NIBUD budget 
2008 
Ireland 
Vincentian 
2006 
Flanders CSB 2008
€ppp per year 2007 prices
Food 2 499 1 761 2 949 1 604
Clothing 473 522 723 414
Fuel 558 881 327 1 107
Rent 3 240 3 403 2 921 4 169
Total necessities 6 770 6 566 6 921 7 294
Total budget 13 018 8 599 15 039 10 129
€ppp per year 2008
Relative threshold 11 126 11 485 10 901 “10 046 (Belgium)”
Source: ‘The measurement of extreme poverty‘ – European Commission (2011) and Eurostat (ilc_li01)
Box 2: Absolute poverty measures in the United States and Italy
The use of absolute poverty measures is widespread among poor countries. The World Bank, for example, uses poverty rates based on 
$1/$1.25/$2 a day thresholds, where those thresholds are generally based on food-energy-intake and cost-of-basic-needs estimations (Ravail-
lon, 2010, European Commission 2011). 
Absolute poverty measures in developed countries are much less widespread. The United States traditionally uses them, as well as Canada 
and Australia and, in Europe, Italy has had a revised version of an absolute poverty measure since 2005. 
In the United States, absolute poverty thresholds were developed by the Census Bureau in the 1960s, based largely on estimates of the mini-
mal cost of food needs, to measure changes in the poor population. The thresholds are estimated on the basis of the minimum food-needs, 
multiplied by a factor of three to cover housing expenditure and clothes(1). They are adapted to age and household characteristics to cover 
up to 48 various situations. For example, a family of five members with two children, their parents, and a great-aunt will be considered as 
poor in 2009 if their income is less than $26 245 a year. The official poverty thresholds do not vary geographically, but they are updated for 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index. 
However, this indicator is in debate as the standard of living in America has changed since the threshold was fixed in the 1960s. A supplemental 
poverty measure is currently under process and should be published in the autumn of 2011(2). This alternative measure is not intended to replace 
the official poverty measure, but is intended to explore new definitions of poverty thresholds. The new threshold is established on the basis of 
expenditures on a set of commodities that all families must purchase: food, shelter, clothing, and utilities. The expenditures of a family which 
is not poor, but under the median will be used as a reference. Among main improvements, the calculation should integrate in-kind benefits in 
resource definition and various thresholds depending on the housing status (renters/owners with a mortgage, and owners without a mortgage).
Istat, the Italian statistical Institute, disseminates absolute poverty estimations for the households residing in Italy, based on Household Budget 
Survey data. The absolute threshold is computed on the basis of the minimum spending necessary in order to acquire the basket of goods and 
services considered as essential. 
This threshold varies upon household composition with special attention to detailed age classes, regional location, and the size of the city. It is 
updated based upon local price indexes for goods and services. For example, the monthly absolute threshold for a couple ranged in 2008 from 
€1 037 a month in a densely populated area in the North to €728 a month in small cities in Southern regions. The relative poverty threshold 
was set at €999.70. In 2008 the absolute poverty rate was equal to 4.9 % whereas the relative poverty incidence was 13.6 %. 
(1) The coefficient as been set as 3 as at it was estimated that food expenditures covered about one-third of total expenditure at that time. 
(2) See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/SPM_TWGObservations.pdf quoted by European Commission (2011) for more detail.
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2.3. Material 
deprivation 
complements income-
based approaches
In 1985 the European Council defined 
poverty in a slightly different way com-
pared with the 1975 definition quoted 
below, indicating that ‘the poor should 
be taken to mean persons, families, 
and groups of persons whose resourc-
es (material, cultural, and social) are so 
limited as to exclude them from the 
minimum acceptable way of life in the 
Member States in which they live’. This 
implies that direct measures of poverty 
(related to consumption or access to 
resources) should complement indi-
rect  approaches (i.e.  income-based 
 measures). 
However, while the first theoreti-
cal framework of direct measures of 
poverty dates from the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, based on Townsend’s 
seminal works, the use of this type 
of indicator by research workers and 
official compilers of statistics is much 
more recent (2000s for research work, 
and 2009 for official use), reflecting 
the huge amount of harmonisation 
and technical developments that had 
taken place (Townsend, 1979) as well 
as political obstacles to be overcome. 
The current definition of material 
deprivation in the European poverty 
target speaks of an enforced lack of 
4 items on a list of 9. These 9 items 
are themselves divided in two sub-
dimensions, called ‘economic strain’ 
(the 5 first items) and ‘durable goods’ 
(the 4 last items). The list covers the 
ability/inability to: 
1. pay the rent, mortgage, or utility 
bills 
2. keep the home adequately warm
3. face unexpected expenses
4. eat meat or protein regularly
5. go on holiday
6. not being able to afford to buy a 
television
7. not being able to afford to buy a 
washing machine
8. not being able to afford to buy a 
car
9. not being able to afford to buy a 
telephone. 
This definition calls for discussion 
with respect to several points. First, 
individual preferences have to be 
taken into account, to ensure that 
people living without a TV set by 
choice, for example, would not be 
considered as deprived. As pointed 
out by Fusco et al. (2010), ‘it is 
essential to stress that the focus 
on material deprivation […] is not 
on the lack of items due to choice 
and lifestyle preferences but on 
the enforced lack – i.e. that peo-
ple would like to possess (have 
access to) the lacked items but can-
not afford them’. In practice the 
EU SILC questions related to each 
deprivation items are designed to 
enable a distinction to be made 
between the ‘lack’ of an item and 
its ‘enforced lack’. 
The contents of the list itself also 
deserve attention. As developed by 
Guio (2009), the list is very close to 
the original proposals of Townsend 
(1979). The theoretical EU SILC list 
of items has, however, been vali-
dated in practice in empirical studies 
that follow the methodology pro-
posed by Mack and Lansley (1985). 
These authors suggested identify-
ing  relevant items by collecting the 
views of people around which ‘social 
perceived necessities’ are constitut-
ed. On that basis the Eurobarometer 
2007 survey investigated whether 
the items were considered as essen-
tial by the population and Dickes 
et al. (2008), and Fusco et al. (2009) 
report that almost all items were 
considered as necessary by at least 
half of the population. 
Chart 2: Income quintile gradient of the severe material deprivation rate, 2009
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Besides confirming the social recog-
nition of the necessity of the items, 
an important property for the select-
ed items is to avoid an automatic 
selection of specific subgroups. For 
example, low public amenities and 
limited access to public transport, 
which were considered as potential 
candidates at the beginning, were 
seen to be too closely related to a 
specific urban population and were 
left out. The absence of ‘lack of com-
puter’ in the list is also frequently 
noted. As developed by Guio (2009), 
this item appears to reflect signifi-
cant differences between age/educa-
tion groups (and was, moreover, not 
considered as necessary by half of the 
population). 
Apart from these selection criteria, 
items must also be useable in terms 
of identifying a ‘poor’ population. 
Chart 2 shows that the discrimi-
natory power of severe material 
deprivation largely decreases with 
income quintiles. 
However, the list represents signifi-
cant progress even if more work still 
needs to be done. First, as discussed 
in Förster et al. (2004), the diver-
sity of situations within Europe make 
some items much more relevant in 
some new Member States than in 
existing ones, with the TV set being 
quoted as an example. 
Beyond these considerations, there 
is the issue of the development 
and enlargement of future depri-
vation indicators into more ambi-
tious areas in order to embrace all 
aspects of social inclusion. Access 
to culture, education, transports, 
and participation in the knowledge 
society could be integrated in forth-
coming steps (see section 3 for a 
further discussion on these aspects) 
where some concrete advances 
were made in the EU SILC ad hoc 
module of 2009, which explored a 
wider list of items, with the active 
research support of Eurostat. 
Apart from the content of the 
item list, the relative importance 
and weights of each item within 
the list also deserves consideration, 
including issues such as whether 
the weight could be allowed to 
vary between countries or be com-
mon across the EU. Guio (2009) has 
raised all these questions in some 
detail and explored various options 
for weighting the items (preva-
lence, national preferences…) but 
concluded that the unweighted 
option is best, not least since dif-
ferent weighting options did not 
appear to affect the overall results. 
Moreover, weights can change 
with time, and weighting options 
could lead to counter-intuitive 
situations, in which a person lack-
ing fewer items might be more 
deprived than a person lacking 
more items, if the former’s items 
were more highly weighted.
The threshold of four items to depict 
severe material deprivation has been 
chosen for a mixture of empirical 
and practical reasons since a previ-
ous threshold of 3 items had result-
ed in excessively high, and politically 
unmanageable, estimates of levels of 
deprivation across the EU (see Chart 3). 
2.4. Tackling poverty 
and social exclusion 
through labour market 
attainment
Including information about social 
participation in a risk-of-poverty or 
social exclusion objective is seen as 
crucial in the context of the Europe 
2020 strategy. Indeed, the agreed 
phrasing ensures that ‘benefits of 
growth are widely shared and the 
[poor] … are enabled to take an 
active part in society’ is the reason 
that tackling job market exclusion 
has been integrated in the actions to 
reduce poverty and social exclusion. 
Indeed, seen from a labour market 
perspective, it is widely recognised 
that ‘having a job remains the best 
safeguard against poverty and exclu-
sion’ (European Commission 2010).
It can be argued, of course, that this 
form of social participation is not the 
only way of taking an active part in 
society, and that domestic tasks, vol-
unteering, and political or cultural 
engagement can be equally relevant 
ways of pursuing social integration 
and inclusion. Equally, however, it 
can be argued that more attention 
should be paid to the social environ-
ment in which poor people may find 
themselves, whether this concerns 
exclusion from social benefits (pen-
sions, public healthcare), absence of 
family or other social relationships, 
or lack of access to public transpor-
tation or public facilities such as 
 libraries, social centres, etc. 
These various forms of social exclu-
sion are difficult to capture through 
the kinds of quantitative indica-
tors that are favoured in official 
policy monitoring. However, recent 
modules of the EU SILC survey have 
explored such issues as banking 
exclusion and social participation, 
and these could be used as a basis 
for developing more complementary 
indicators. 
Chart 3: Sensitivity of material deprivation rates to the thresholds, 2009
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In Australia, the independent Social 
Inclusion Board identified indica-
tors to cover social inclusion in five 
fields: poverty and low income; lack 
of access to the job market; lim-
ited social support and networks; 
the effects of the local neighbour-
hood; and exclusion from services, 
all described through 31 indicators 
(Saunders, 2010). Abe (2010) like-
wise explores the possibilities of 
covering such dimensions in Japan, 
and includes issues of social rela-
tions and exclusion from institu-
tional systems beside the more tra-
ditional concerns about material 
deprivation and income poverty. 
Nevertheless, developing the meas-
urement of these aspects to the 
point where they can be turned 
into acceptable indicators is chal-
lenging and will, no doubt, require 
further research effort.
In the meantime, however, labour 
market inclusion is still seen by many 
as the most important way of pursu-
ing social inclusion, with the empha-
sis on identifying what is needed 
in order that the household can 
improve its capacity to meet its own 
needs. The European Commission has 
widely commented in that sense dur-
ing recent years, particularly working 
with the Member States through 
the Open Method of Coordination. 
Communications of 2005(7), 2006(8), 
and 2008(9) all put the emphasis on 
labour market participation as a way 
of achieving social inclusion. 
The 2008 European Commission’s 
Recommendation (2008/867/EC) 
stipulates that if ‘sufficient resourc-
es and social assistance remains 
a reference instrument for Com-
munity policy in relation to pov-
erty and social exclusion, […] new 
policy instruments have emerged. 
[…] One such instrument is the 
Open method of coordination on 
(7) Working together, working better, 
COM(2005)706
(8) Concerning a consultation on action at 
the EU level to promote the active inclu-
sion of the people furthest from the 
labour market, COM(2006) 44
(9) Active inclusion of people excluded from 
labour market, C(2008) 5737
social protection and social inclu-
sion (OMC), the objectives of which 
include the active social inclusion 
of all, to be ensured by promoting 
participation in the labour market 
and by fighting poverty and exclu-
sion among the most marginalised 
people and groups. Another instru-
ment is the European employment 
strategy, which aims, inter alia, to 
strengthen social inclusion, fight 
poverty, prevent exclusion from the 
labour market and support integra-
tion into employment of people at 
a disadvantage’. 
However, the presence of job exclu-
sion within the monitoring tool 
is not without controversy. At 
the EU level, very few researchers 
have explored the idea of combin-
ing income poverty and  material 
 deprivation with exclusion from 
labour market. Nolan and Whelan 
(2011) suggest that the inclu-
sion of this indicator distorts the 
usual social class gradient. Indeed, 
‘households with very low work 
intensity refers to the situation 
of people who live in households 
where nobody works (or work very 
little), but that are not necessarily 
living on very low income’ (Europe-
an Commission 2011). In this view, 
including labour market exclusion 
in a policy monitoring tool shows 
that there is a political will to ‘mon-
itor the efforts of Member States 
to combat labour market exclusion, 
including in its most severe forms’. 
The agreed indicator of very low 
work intensity refers to the ratio 
between the number of months that 
Chart 4: Income quintile gradient of the people in very low work intensity, 2009
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all  working age household mem-
bers(10) have worked(11) during the 
income reference year, and the total 
number of months that could theo-
retically have been worked by the 
same household members. 
The choice of a threshold at 0.2 was 
guided by several considerations. 
The first was the desire to capture 
situations where household members 
work so little during the year that 
they cannot expect to earn a living 
only from labour market participa-
tion. As is shown in Chapter 4, below 
the 0.2 threshold poverty rates tend 
to be very high, while above that 
threshold the risk of poverty tends to 
drop significantly. 
(10) A working age person is defined as a 
person aged 18-59, not being a stu-
dent aged between 18 and 24. The 
households composed only of children, 
of students aged less then 25 and/or 
by people aged 60 or more are totally 
excluded from the indicator computa-
tion. Household members aged 60 or 
more are totally excluded from the indi-
cator computation (even if they live with 
working age people). On the other hand, 
the pensioners aged less than 60 as well 
as the students aged 25 and more are 
considered as working age people and 
are therefore included in the computa-
tion of the household work intensity.  
(11) For persons having worked part-time, 
an estimate of the number of months in 
terms of full time-equivalent is comput-
ed on the basis of the number of hours 
usually worked per week.
Another consideration was to provide 
an approximate number for jobless 
persons that were close enough to 
the existing jobless household meas-
ure based on the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS)(12). The definition of work differs 
between both sources, however. In the 
LFS, a household is considered ‘job-
less’ if no one has worked during the 
past 4 weeks, irrespective of what hap-
pened before. The period under consid-
eration in SILC is a whole year however, 
hence the criterion ‘zero work’ over 
12 months would have a much stronger 
criterion than the LFS indicator. Finally, 
a work intensity of 0.2 corresponds to 
the situation of a work intensity lower 
than one day per week on average, or 
two and a half months per year, which 
is quite low. 
People living in jobless households gen-
erally have lower incomes (Chart 4). 
However, around 10 % of those living 
in jobless households in EU-27 live 
with income in the top three upper 
quintiles. This is mainly due to workers 
who have retired early, who are out 
of the labour market but aged less 
than 60 and therefore considered as 
jobless, and earn incomes in the high-
est income quintiles. Whether early-
retired persons should be part of the 
target population or not belongs to 
the political debate. At the opposite 
(12) See the Chapter 4 for a complete dis-
cussion of the labour market exclusion 
indicators. 
end, the income composition of those 
living in jobless households within 
the lowest income quintiles is clearly 
more benefit-dependant than other 
incomes with 15 % on average of the 
gross income based on unemployment 
benefits, 18 % on disability or sickness 
benefits, and 10 % due to family or 
education related allowances.
2.5. Summarising  
the three dimensions:  
an ‘and’ or an ‘or’? 
The development of three main dimen-
sions of poverty or social exclusion is 
progressing well, but the challenge 
of ensuring their full application in 
Europe remains. While several influen-
tial researchers may agree on the ben-
efit of combining various dimensions 
when observing poverty, the question 
whether and if so, how, they should be 
aggregated is yet to be resolved. Ravail-
lon (2011) questions whether it is real-
istic to envisage a single index measure 
of poverty, and suggests developing  a 
credible set of multiple indices instead 
of a single one. However, the computa-
tion of a single indicator is an effective 
way of communicating in a political 
environment, and a necessary tool in 
order to monitor 27 different national 
situations.
The current definition of the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion at the EU 
level retains the incidence of at least 
one of the three dimensions to be 
considered as poor or socially exclud-
ed. This is what we could call a wider 
definition, as opposed to a more 
restricted one where a combination 
of the three indicators is required. 
Förster et al. (2004) built an indicator 
in that stricter way, focusing on people 
both at risk of poverty and of being 
deprived. The authors argue that their 
concept of ‘consistent poverty’ ‘does 
not claim to be able to include all peo-
ple who should possibly be regarded 
as poor, […] but emphasise a group of 
people with not only low incomes but 
who are highly restricted with central 
and basic goods and amenities’. 
Chart 5: Income composition for people by work intensity of the household, 2009
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An advantage of the wider definition 
is that it removes some of the obvious 
weaknesses of current indicators, not 
least with respect to their implied pol-
icy messages. For example, in the New 
Member States, the poverty thresholds 
are relatively low, and people above 
the threshold may not necessary meet 
all their needs – in other words they 
are likely to be materially deprived 
and deserving of policy attention. 
At the same time, a jobless excluded 
household might also warrant policy 
attention, even if its income was above 
the poverty threshold, if it turned 
out to be excessively or un-necessarily 
 dependant on social benefits. 
3. sTeps forward: 
improving The 
measuremenT of poverTy
3.1. Improvements in 
income measurement
Since 2007, the income definition in the 
EU SILC has improved to the point that 
its income measurement now fulfils 
most of the recommendations of the 
international Canberra Group on the 
definition of household income, with 
various types of incomes now inte-
grated (employee income, self-employ-
ment income, current transfers, private 
 pensions plans) (Wolff et al. 2009). 
The possible inclusion of imputed 
rents and other non-monetary income 
components as  recommended by Can-
berra (interest paid on mortgage, 
value of goods produced for own-
consumption, gross non-cash employ-
ee income) have been reviewed, but 
methodological issues persist that can 
significantly affect comparability. For 
example, imputed rents are sensitive 
to the size and characteristics of the 
private rental market. They are also 
sensitive, by definition, to the imput-
ed value of houses, which is strongly 
affected by economic and financial 
conditions, notably in periods of crises 
(e.g.  Ireland today). The component 
‘interest paid on mortgage’ is also 
sensitive to country differences in the 
practices for the reimbursement of 
loans (short term/long term).
Hence further progress is still needed 
in income measurement. The lowest 
incomes in particular deserve special 
attention, as ‘for the lowest tail of the 
income distribution, the level of mate-
rial deprivation is often not the high-
est’ (Fusco et al., 2009), which is puz-
zling. Self-employment incomes might 
especially benefit from improvements 
as they can sometimes lead to inap-
propriate measures. Fusco et al. (2009) 
shows that self-employed people tend 
to present a higher risk of poverty and 
lower material deprivation. Research 
in the reference period for income 
could help in addressing that issue(13). 
3.2. Taking in-kind 
benefits into account 
The provision of in-kind services, such as 
childcare, is investigated by many Mem-
ber States as a means to combat pov-
erty. The free provision of such services 
has real and direct impacts on people’s 
welfare and labour market participa-
tion. However, this is not adequately 
reflected in the current measures of 
poverty and social exclusion as the tra-
ditional measure of income inequality 
and poverty based on ‘equivalised’ dis-
posable income does not reflect them 
(Marical et al. 2006; Smeeding et al. 
2008; Vaalavuo 2011). In-kind benefits 
in income measures is an important 
matter of concern in order to address 
the lack of access to the resources nec-
essary to permit minimum standards 
of living and participation in society 
(Nolan and Whelan 2007; Cappellari 
and Jenkins 2007). 
Among in-kind benefits, healthcare 
and education are the most impor-
tant in general, while personal social 
(13) A self-employed person could indeed 
earn an abnormally low-income dur-
ing a given year even though he/she 
earns a significantly higher revenue on 
a medium-term period. Therefore, that 
person could be considered as poor for 
that year, but not necessarily materially 
deprived, as he/she benefits from sav-
ings or durable goods corresponding to 
higher income-level standards of living.
 services are, in the majority of coun-
tries, almost non-existent. An imputa-
tion of in-kind benefits on income (see 
the Box 3) shows that, in a large major-
ity of countries, in-kind transfers are 
pro-poor. All in all, the bottom income 
quintile benefits more than the richest 
quintile, although the second or third 
quintile occasionally benefit the most 
from in-kind benefits. 
Healthcare spending is quite equally 
distributed across income classes – 
though highly concentrated across 
individuals in a given year(14) – while 
education is slightly more progres-
sive. The major exception to this 
egalitarian notion is with respect 
to early childhood education and 
 childcare (see Chart 6). 
The socio-demographic structure of 
the society naturally affects the results. 
As the elderly are often generally eco-
nomically worse-off than the rest of 
the society, it is normal that the spend-
ing on healthcare and elderly care 
goes, to a large extent, to the bottom 
income quintile. Similarly, the econom-
ic situation of families with children 
determines the shape of the distribu-
tion. As poverty rates for children and 
for the elderly are often above the 
average rate for whole population, 
public services that particularly benefit 
these two categories are more likely to 
deliver resources to the bottom end of 
the income distribution. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the 
resources devoted to early childhood 
education and childcare (ECEC) ser-
vices are seen to benefit the rich 
more than the poor in half of the 
countries. Estimating the fairness of 
childcare benefits is not straightfor-
ward, however: do more affluent 
people have better access to publicly 
provided childcare services; or are 
they richer because of these services 
(and thus, have better access to the 
labour market)? 
(14) See for instance the Joint Report on 
Health Systems prepared by the 
European Commission and the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee, p.148, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/occasional_paper/2010/
op74_en.htm
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Chart 6: Distribution of in-kind benefits across income quintiles, 2009
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Box 3: In-kind benefits imputation method 
This analysis focuses on the most important expenditure categories of the welfare state, namely early childhood education and childcare 
(ECEC), primary and secondary education, healthcare, and elderly care. Some other in-kind benefits, notably active labour market services, 
social housing(1) and public transport, are not integrated into this analysis. 
In order to estimate the redistributive effect of public services, the standard approach in the field (Smeeding et al. 1993; Marical et al. 2006; 
for a more detailed discussion on various methodological issues, see Vaalavuo 2011) is followed. The monetary value of in-kind benefits is 
based on the ‘cost of production’, that is, on the public expenditure on the service in question. The spending is further divided by the number 
of users in order to calculate the value of the benefit for an individual beneficiary (see table).
The allocation of benefits to individuals varies according to the service. Imputation is based on real use when the data allows: that is, in the 
case of early childhood education and childcare as well as education for those above 16 years old. For the rest, the allocation of benefits is 
determined by age and, in the case of healthcare and elderly care, gender. This method, of course, omits many other factors that may influ-
ence the use of services: for example, educational level and income class are found to affect the use of healthcare services and the reliance on 
formal elderly care services depends for example on the marital status and availability of informal care. Chart 6 partly illustrates the magnitude 
of this data deficiency: we see that in all countries the people in the poorest quintile have a greater likelihood of not receiving healthcare. 
(1) Some previous studies analysed the redistributive or poverty-reduction effect of social housing. As housing costs are usually the largest expendi-
ture category in household budget, public policies that help families to meet these costs are obviously important. Housing allowances are taken 
into account in the disposable income as cash transfers but in-kind benefits, such as lower rent paid in social housing, are not automatically 
accounted for. 
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In general, it can be argued that 
childcare services give parents the 
opportunity to choose between work 
and family, and make dual-earner-
ship possible, while the availability 
of free or subsidised care can partic-
ularly help single-parents to escape 
poverty through paid employment. 
From a social inclusion and anti-
poverty perspective, this implies that 
it is important, to design systems in 
ways that ensure that high-quality 
services are accessible regardless of 
the income level. Because parents 
pay some fees for childcare in most 
countries, user contributions need 
to be income-related so that the 
progressivity of the system is guar-
anteed and the day care option 
remains a good alternative for also 
those with potentially low earnings 
(see  Chapter 4).
All in all, cash benefits cannot sub-
stitute for in-kind benefits as cash 
income still determines the level of 
economic autonomy of the house-
hold. However, the question of 
access to, and availability of, services 
is fundamental in terms of both 
research and policy. It seems that 
in-kind transfers benefit the poor to 
a considerable degree and make up 
a large share of the final income of 
poor households (see Chart 6). Thus, 
when facing the economic recession 
and budget cuts, the risk that these 
reforms might hit the poor the hard-
est, and render even more difficult 
a sustainable and inclusive recovery, 
needs to be recognised.
3.3. Possible 
improvements in 
measurement of 
material deprivation
The development of the EU indica-
tor of material deprivation is quite 
recent, and represents an important 
step forward in measuring poverty 
and social exclusion at the EU level. 
However, it still needs to be improved, 
as requested by the European Council. 
The forthcoming revision of EU SILC, 
and the foreseen revision of the pov-
erty target in 2015, makes it necessary 
to urgently reflect on how to improve 
on previous achievements. The fol-
lowing points need to be addressed 
in that context.
Przywara (2010) on future healthcare projections has calculated healthcare expenditures by age and gender, and disability rates reflecting the 
needs for elderly care are from the 2009 Ageing Report (European Commission, DG ECFIN 2008). Education for those below 16 years old is 
based solely on age as indicated in Eurostat data. Analyses are based on the EU SILC 2006 and 2009 data for 23 and 26 countries respectively. 
In-kind benefits imputation method
Value of in-kind benefit Source Allocation Source
ECEC
Public spending on child day care ESSPROS Childcare at day care centre by hourly use EU SILC
Public spending on pre-primary education Eurostat Education at pre-school by hourly use EU SILC
Education
Public spending on primary education Eurostat “For below 16 years old: Probability according to enrolment by age and ISCED level” Eurostat
Public spending on secondary education Eurostat “For above 16 years old: ISCED level currently attended” EU SILC
Healthcare Public spending on health care by age DG ECFIN Estimated spending for each age and gender separately DG ECFIN
Elderly care Public spending on old age in-kind benefits and long-term care ESSPROS
Disability rates by age and gender for those above 
65 years old DG ECFIN
Note: Variable only for those above 16 years old. For this reason, the imputation is based on age only for those below this age.
Table 2: Discriminatory power of potential deprivation items, 2009  
(in % of the population)
Enforced lack of a colour TV Enforced lack of a computer
At risk of 
poverty
Not at risk 
of poverty Total
At risk of 
poverty
Not at risk 
of poverty Total
EU-27 1.6 0.2 0.4 16.4 5 6.9
BE 2.2 0.3 0.6 16 2.8 4.7
BG 9 0.3 2.2 47.1 20.8 26.5
CZ 1.1 0.1 0.2 26.5 5.2 7
DK 3.2 0.2 0.6 3.7 1.4 1.7
DE 1.9 0.3 0.5 9.3 2 3.1
EE 1.2 0.1 0.3 16.8 4.7 7.1
IE 1.8 0.1 0.4 13.7 4.3 5.7
EL 0.1 0 0.1 20.5 9.2 11.4
ES 0.2 0 0.1 12.8 5.2 6.6
FR 0.6 0.1 0.2 14.8 3.5 4.9
IT 0.8 0.1 0.3 12.6 3.1 4.9
CY 0.3 0 0.1 9.6 4.2 5.1
LV 1.9 0.3 0.7 31.6 10.2 15.7
LT 1.4 0.4 0.6 25 8 11.5
LU 0.1 0.1 0.1 6.6 0.6 1.5
HU 3.1 0.7 1 29.5 10.9 13.2
MT 0.6 0.3 0.3 6.9 1.4 2.3
NL 0.4 0 0.1 2.8 1 1.2
AT 2 0.2 0.4 13.5 3 4.2
PL 1.6 0.3 0.5 23.8 8.8 11.4
PT 1.8 0.2 0.5 19.2 8.1 10.1
RO 6.8 0.7 2.1 51.7 24.8 30.8
SI 2.6 0.3 0.5 12.5 3.9 4.8
SK 1.2 0.2 0.3 27 7.8 9.9
FI 4.4 0.6 1.1 12.5 2.1 3.5
SE 1.9 0.4 0.6 3.4 1 1.3
UK 0.8 0.1 0.2 7.9 2.3 3.3
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC (ilc_mddu)
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First, the list of items could be 
expanded in order to cover the sit-
uation of material deprivation in 
a more robust way. A list of nine 
items is very concise and may not 
always fully capture material depri-
vation in each country. For example, 
the enforced lack of a colour-TV 
seems quite appropriate to isolate 
the poorest in most countries (see 
Table 2), but it actually affects less 
than 1 % of the population at risk of 
poverty in 9-12 countries. 
Several similar indicators are usu-
ally based on larger lists of items. 
For example, Abe (2011) uses a list of 
nine items to describe material dep-
rivation in Japan corresponding to 
the ‘durable goods’ part of the EU-
material deprivation; a five item list 
to measure economic and  financial 
stress; with an additional three item 
list to cover housing deprivation. In 
France, the national statistical insti-
tute Insee uses a list of 28 items to 
measure material deprivation; in Ire-
land, the list developed by Economic 
and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
contains 11 items, including social 
inclusion and housing items; while 
deprivation is measured in the UK 
through a list of 21 items weight-
ed by the prevalence of each item 
 within the population.
Another way to address the issue of 
variability within Europe could be to 
consider options including thresholds 
based on varying lists of items for 
country groups. The possibility could 
also be explored of building depriva-
tion indicators on the basis of a com-
mon list of items applying to all coun-
tries, together with  supplementary 
country specific items to capture more 
accurately deprivation in all countries 
(for example, owning a pair of warm 
boots is more relevant in Finland than 
it is in Portugal). 
Different thresholds could also be 
envisaged, with different weights 
given to the EU core components (e.g. 
‘deprived’ if affected by 4 out of 9 EU 
items and 1 out of 3 national items 
or by 5 out of 12 items). Of course, 
such options deserve detailed exami-
nation and are difficult to implement, 
and choosing items with comparable 
importance within country groups, 
making international comparisons 
possible, and setting appropriate 
thresholds, is challenging.
It would also be relevant to try to 
integrate new items within the list. 
For example, the enforced lack of a 
computer, or a cellular phone could 
be considered (see Table 2). Previous 
researches (Guio et al. 2009), based on 
the 2007 Eurobarometer survey, have 
concluded that both items presented 
the drawbacks of not being consid-
ered as necessary by a significant 
share of the population (especially 
the computer). However these crite-
ria, which are already several years 
old, deserve to be re-assessed as they 
are likely to have evolved significantly 
since the measures were chosen.
Finally, access to services such as inter-
net access, or bank access, are neces-
sary steps for improvements in the 
deprivation measure. Once again, 
there are a number of obstacles. For 
example, it is necessary to take into 
account the density of the area, as the 
lack of a given item (for example easy 
access to food shops or public trans-
port) cannot be assessed in the same 
way for inhabitants of rural areas 
as against urban areas. Moreover, 
Chart 7: Potential items for future indicators of material deprivation
Lack of an internet connection
Accessibility of postal or banking services
Lack of a mobile phone
0
20
40
60
80
100
Not deprivedDeprivedNot at riskAt risk 65 or more18-64 years old
Age At risk of poverty Severe material deprivation
Age At risk of poverty Severe material deprivation
Less than 17
TOTAL
0
20
40
60
80
100
Not deprivedDeprivedNot at riskAt risk 65 or more18-64 years oldLess than 17
TOTAL
0
20
40
60
80
100
Not deprivedDeprivedNot at riskAt risk Thinly
populated area
Intermediate
Type of area At risk of poverty Severe material deprivation
Densely
populated area
TOTAL
No, for some other reason
No, because the household cannot afford it 
Yes
No, for some other reason
No, because the household cannot afford it 
Yes
Very easily
Easily
With some difficulty
With great difficulty
%
 o
f t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC 2009 ad hoc module
Chapter 3  Patterns of poverty and social exclusion in Europe
111
the importance of specific items (for 
example internet connection, mobile 
phone, or access to banking services) 
will vary greatly between different 
population subgroups (age groups for 
internet and mobile phone, rural or 
urban areas for access to banking ser-
vices, see Chart 7). Such items do not 
meet the usual criterion of being uni-
formly spread among the population 
and this could result in an artificial 
selection of the subgroups (for exam-
ple, inhabitants of rural areas would 
be considered as more deprived than 
inhabitants of urban areas because 
of miscellaneous criteria). Addressing 
these obstacles is challenging but nec-
essary to improve the indicators.
3.4. Enlarging 
deprivation to non-
monetary goods and 
their redistributive 
capacities
In 1985, the European Council’s defi-
nition of poverty took on board 
‘material, cultural and social’ con-
cerns. However, while the mate-
rial deprivation items capture the 
material side, the social and cultural 
dimensions are not yet fully reflected 
in relation to the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. 
The added value of moving from 
income-based to non-monetary 
measures was that it made it pos-
sible to capture access to non-mon-
etary goods for which there is no 
real open market (e.g. health, edu-
cation, social relationships), or for 
areas of the economy where the 
market is less than perfect (like 
real estate) (Bourguignon et al., 
2003). In respect of this, Ravail-
lon (1996) proposed a four dimen-
sional approach of poverty, which 
 specifically including access to 
 non-market goods. 
Being able to include such aspects 
within the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion is crucial since these 
factors have an important redis-
tributive impact, and can help to 
 distinguish between those groups 
who largely benefit from them and 
those who are excluded. For exam-
ple, in some countries, students 
live on low income, but they have 
access to a range of services (such as 
subsidised healthcare, housing and 
transport, public internet access, 
and other facilities) that allow them 
to enjoy a certain degree of auton-
omy and to participate in society. 
It is therefore worth addressing 
the question of whether they need 
further support. In other countries, 
students cannot afford to leave the 
parental home and fully depend on 
family resources. The lack of access 
to resources and to support ser-
vices might hamper their  mobility 
and capacity to find a job, training 
opportunities, or to form a family. 
The introduction of measurements 
of access to education, healthcare, 
banking services, or transport could 
be promising ways of developing 
material deprivation indicators. How-
ever, enlarging the current indicators 
gathered by EU SILC is challenging 
and far from easy. A 2007 EU SILC 
module on housing explored how 
to integrate some aspects of acces-
sibility (to grocery services, banking, 
public transport, healthcare services, 
and school) but showed that it was 
not generally possible to do this 
through a single question, and that 
Chart 8: Income quintile gradient of the share of persons declaring an unmet need 
for medical examination due to lack of resources, 2009
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Note: Persons facing an unmet need for care due to lack of resources corresponds to those who declared 
an unmet need for care for one of the following reasons: ‘too expensive’, ‘too far to travel’ or ‘too long 
waiting time’.
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it was necessary to ask a number 
of questions in order to satisfyingly 
describe deprivation, and to avoid 
the artificial selection of population 
 subgroups(15).
Enlarging the list of items to other 
dimensions, such as social partici-
pation (relations, friends) is also a 
promising perspective. Estimating 
the scope of a social network could 
indeed be an important step for-
ward in seeking to capture social 
inclusion/exclusion. A previous 2006 
ad hoc module of the SILC-survey 
explored such aspects as ‘getting 
together with relatives or friends at 
least once a month’. It appeared that 
this item showed large differences 
between the experiences of people 
at risk of poverty or those that were 
not, and between severely materially 
deprived people and those that were 
not. However, those dimensions are 
quite difficult to integrate into statis-
tical questionnaires, and they might 
be weakened by issues of memory, 
time-reference, or definition(16).
Lastly, monitoring access to health-
care is clearly an important aspect of 
the assessment of Members States’ 
efforts to prevent and tackle social 
exclusion. Unmet need for care, for 
example, shows an important gradi-
ent between people at risk of pov-
erty and those who are not and, 
to an even greater extent, between 
those who are severely materially 
deprived people and those who are 
not (see Chart 8). The EU SILC 2009 
ad hoc module has sought to respond 
by counting the number of visits to 
general practitioners and specialists, 
and demonstrating that the most 
deprived are generally less likely to 
visit the doctor, except for those with 
major health problems that require 
10 or more visits a year to the doctor 
(see Chart 9 and Chapter 2). 
(15) For example, as it has already been dis-
cussed, access to public transportation 
is quite difficult to address and requires 
fine-tuning questions to avoid an artifi-
cial selection of rural inhabitants.
(16) For example, it might be quite challeng-
ing, especially in an international compari-
son perspective, to establish the distinction 
between a friend and a relative.
3.5. Opening the 
black-box of the 
household level
The current material deprivation 
indicator is produced at the house-
hold level. It assumes that all mem-
bers of the household suffer from 
the same deprivation. If one member 
of the household feels they have ‘an 
enforced lack’ the whole household is 
considered as deprived in this respect 
since resources are seen as being 
equally shared within the household. 
However, some research work ques-
tions whether that assumption is 
 reasonable (Jenkins, 1991).
The 2009 EU SILC module explored 
that question, by addressing some 
items at an individual level (e.g. 
mobile phone, spend a small amount 
of money on oneself, visits to the 
general practitioner…). Micro-level 
analyses of possible intra-household 
inequalities will help to test wheth-
er deprivation could vary between 
household members, for exam-
ple between men and women, or 
between adults and children. 
Opening the Pandora box of intra-
household resource distribution 
obviously raises the question of the 
measurement of child deprivation. 
‘In families with a tight budget, the 
redistribution of resources could be in 
favour of the child, since the parents 
are trying to alleviate the impact of 
economic strain on the living stand-
ard of the child’ (Engsted-Maquet and 
Guio, 2006) although there can also 
be cases where children are relatively 
deprived (notably in cases of  alcoholic 
or drug-dependent adults). 
The 2009 EU SILC module on depriva-
tion has sought to capture a number of 
child-specific deprivations which could 
make it possible to build child specific 
deprivation indicators. However, one 
basic obstacle is that children under 15 
are not interviewed. More over, fami-
lies with more than one child when 
interviewed are asked to respond in 
relation to all their children, not for 
each child, which may make it difficult 
to interpret the results.
3.6. A better 
understanding of the 
population excluded 
from the labour market
The dimension of labour market exclu-
sion also deserves fuller consideration. 
As the following analyses shows, the 
jobless population is quite heteroge-
neous and needs to be examined in 
more detail. For example, just as it 
might be questionable to include stu-
dents in the poverty target if they ben-
efit from non-market services, it might 
also be questionable to include in the 
poverty target a disabled person not at 
risk of poverty, but outside the labour 
market for disability reasons(17).
(17) We do not address here the discussion 
of the suitability of inclusion of disabled 
persons into the labour market, which is 
out of the scope of that report.
Chart 9: Number of visits to general practitioners and specialists, by risk of poverty 
and severe material deprivation, EU-27, 2009
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Further work would also be required 
in order to detail the links between 
the risk of poverty and labour mar-
ket exclusion. A deeper knowledge 
of the situations of the people living 
in low work intensity households, 
but not at risk of poverty would 
help, especially by investigating how 
far above the poverty line these peo-
ple are, and what their main sources 
of income are. Are these people liv-
ing on adequate disability benefits? 
In such cases, do they belong to the 
target? The answer will depend on 
sensitive political choices regarding 
the re-activation of people on dis-
ability benefits. Are these people 
living on capital income? Can they 
be considered socially excluded? 
A better characterisation of these 
populations would certainly help 
the debate. For instance, it would 
be helpful to analyse  the poli-
cies or other reasons for differences 
between Member States. 
3.7. Towards a 
dynamic and graded 
target?
The dynamics of poverty are also 
an important aspect to investigate. 
Poverty is not a permanent state 
and individuals might stay/exit/
enter or even re-enter into it again. 
From a political point of view, it is 
crucial to address those in persis-
tent poverty, to prevent those who 
might enter (or re-enter) poverty 
from doing so, and to help others 
to escape from it. Evidence shows 
that poverty persistence is higher in 
North America than it is in Europe 
and that, within Europe, pover-
ty episodes are longer in Britain 
and Ireland (Valetta, 2004 Damioli, 
2009) than elsewhere. It also shows 
that those who stay in poverty for 
extended periods of time are main-
ly old people in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, and Ireland, 
while it is mainly households with 
children, low labour attainment, 
and low educational attainment in 
France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(Damioli 2009). 
A better understanding of poverty 
dynamics would help to target those 
most at need and better prevent the 
others from entering into persistent 
poverty. The longitudinal dimension of 
EU SILC, which is still under-exploited, is 
a significant potential source of greater 
understanding even if some technical 
issues have until now inhibited its full 
use. For example, the use of longitudi-
nal data is the only way to test whether 
those currently at-risk-of-poverty remain 
the same from one year to another or 
completely turn-over (see Chart 10). Thill 
and Eiffe (2010) demonstrate that longi-
tudinal data adds value to much social 
political analysis and show that there 
are, in reality, some changes in material 
deprivation (especially those related to 
non-durable items) from one year to 
another for individuals.
The depth, or intensity, of poverty 
is another dimension which would 
be relevant to include in the pov-
erty measurement. Being considered 
at risk of poverty because of being 
labelled by one indicator does not 
have the same meaning as being 
there as a result of accumulating the 
three characteristics. The next section 
provides some evidence on that point 
by discussing the ways the dimensions 
overlap at the country level.
3.8. Short term social 
diagnosis
The recent economic crisis has high-
lighted the need for short term moni-
toring of poverty. The detailed nature 
of the EU SILC survey, as well as 
its developed treatments, inevitably 
means some delays in data availabil-
ity. This is reinforced by the fact that 
some crucial data, such as income or 
the activity status during each month 
or during month-to-month refers to 
the previous year. This means that 
there is often a two-year delay in 
the information becoming available. 
In line with the Council conclusions 
(2010) asking for an enhancement 
in timeliness, efforts are being made 
by the European Statistical System to 
shorten these delays while maintain-
ing good data quality, and best prac-
tices of some Members States(18) could 
be shared in order to try to gain time.
Other ways to be able to get fresher 
information would include investigat-
ing which of the existing pieces of 
information of EU SILC might serve, in 
effect, as an ‘advanced indicator’. The 
severe material deprivation indicator 
can illustrate that point. Indeed, while 
its ‘durable goods’ component may 
not be very responsive to economic 
shocks, the ‘economic strain’ dimension 
may well be more responsive. Examina-
tion of the recent evolution of these 
items just after the crisis shows that 
items such as ‘ability to face unexpected 
expenses’ or ‘ability to afford a week of 
holidays away from home’ have been 
responsive to the crisis while the global 
indicator was still stable. This could 
be reinforced by developing questions 
relative to the current situation of the 
household or immediate future(19).
(18) For example, Spain and Latvia are able 
to disseminate early estimates of main 
indicators.
(19) For example ‘Do you expect to face unem-
ployment/significant loss of revenues/finan-
cial difficulties within the next 6 months?’
Chart 10: Persistent risk of poverty and risk of poverty in some EU countries, 2009
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3.9. Covering extreme 
poverty: a necessary 
improvement of 
existing tools 
There is now large evidence of the 
income distribution of the overall pop-
ulation thanks to the efforts dedicated 
to produce the EU SILC survey. How-
ever, if this tool is well-adapted to 
cover the whole population, it encoun-
ters also some limitations to capture 
extreme situations, namely most 
extreme poverty. Homeless people are 
not captured by classic statistical sur-
veys(20). Persons currently not residing 
in households, as persons  temporarily 
(20) In non register-countries, samples are 
selected among lists of residences and 
not lists of persons. For that reason, it is 
by definition impossible to select home-
less people in a sample. 
institutionalised (health home), or 
people living in institutions, prisons, 
hospitals, hostels, or even camps are 
also not captured (European Commis-
sion, 2011). Such subgroups might, 
however, be concerned.
Building a sample of homeless 
requires more sophisticated meth-
ods, for example a joint initiative of 
statistical institutes and institutions 
hosting homeless people. Advanced 
statistical methods make it then pos-
sible to establish random samples of 
people visiting  institutions by select-
ing subsamples within visitors of insti-
tutions (see European Commission, 
2004, 2009). Eurostat, the statistical 
office of the European Commission, 
is also conducting a new initiative to 
collect national estimations on home-
less people across the EU-27 through 
census data communication.
Some population subgroups are also 
more difficult to capture, even if their 
members are covered by classical sur-
veys as they are impossible to be 
distinguished afterwards. For exam-
ple, the Roma might be covered by 
the EU SILC if they live in regular 
residences, but there is technically no 
means to identify them in the data. 
Current work on poverty mappings 
at regional levels could, however, 
 provide information in that direction.
Chart 11: Risk of poverty or social exclusion by country, 2009
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4. poverTy and  
social exclusion forms 
across europe
On the basis of the EU definition, in 
2009, some 23 % of the total popula-
tion of the European Union are at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion, amount-
ing to 114 million people. The risk var-
ies widely between countries, howev-
er, ranging from over 40 % in Bulgaria 
or Romania to 14-17 % in the Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Finland, and Slovenia (see Chart 11). 
The risk of poverty or social exclusion 
fell slightly between 2005 and 2009 
(see Chart 12), mainly due to the 
reduction in the number of people 
considered to be severely materially 
deprived in the new Member States, 
where living standards had improved 
considerably during this period. How-
ever, this apparent stability masks 
diverging situations between Mem-
ber States following the 2008 crisis, 
with poverty or risk of exclusion 
having increased in several countries 
– Latvia, Hungary,  Lithuania, Ireland, 
and Estonia – in 2009. 
The relative importance of the three 
dimensions that make up the com-
bined EU indicator of being at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion is not the 
same in all countries. 
The risk of poverty (16 % in 2009 for 
the EU-27 as a whole) ranges from 
26 % in Latvia, 22 % in Romania and 
Bulgaria, to 9 % in the Czech Repub-
lic and 11 % in Slovakia, the Nether-
lands, and Slovenia. 
While 8 % of the EU-27 population 
faces severe material  deprivation, 
this is mainly concentrated in the 
new Member States with more than 
40 % of the total population suf-
fering from material deprivation 
in Bulgaria, 32 % or Romania, and 
22 % in Latvia and 20 % in Hun-
gary. On the other hand, less than 
2 % of the population is affected in 
Luxembourg,  the Netherlands, and 
Sweden. 
9 % of the EU-27 population live in 
a jobless household, with Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary, 
and Germany being the most concerned 
by exclusion from the labour market. 
Chart 12: Dynamics of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by country
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Chart 12: Dynamics of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by country
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Chart 12: Dynamics of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by country
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Chart 13: Patterns of overlaps of the dimensions of poverty or social exclusion among countries, 2009  
(% of the national population at risk of poverty or social exclusion)
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4.1. Member States 
are facing various 
forms of poverty 
Taken together, the various dimen-
sions of the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion combine to suggest patterns 
across Member States, confirming the 
view that poverty is a multidimension-
al challenge and that several indicators 
are needed in order to capture it(21). 
Across the European countries, vari-
ous forms of poverty and social exclu-
sion are distinguishable implying the 
need for appropriately adapted policy 
responses. Four major groups can be 
identified by clustering the countries 
with similar profiles(22) (see Chart 13), 
although they differ in the way the 
dimensions occur and overlap. 
4.1.1. Severe material 
deprivation prevails in 
Bulgaria and Romania
Severe material deprivation remains 
the most challenging form of pov-
erty and social exclusion in Bulgaria 
and Romania, where 75 % and 90 % 
respectively of the people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion are 
severely materially deprived. Chart 
13 shows, however, that a proportion 
of those at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, while being severely mate-
rially deprived, are not  necessarily 
poor in monetary terms. 
In both countries, GDP per capita 
remains low despite high growth rates 
during the past years (see Table 3). 
(21) See Ravaillon 2011, On multidimensional 
indices of poverty, Policy research work-
ing paper n°5580, World Bank
(22) A cluster analysis at the country level was 
run on the following variables: the risk 
of poverty or social exclusion, the share 
within the people at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion of people at risk of pov-
erty, severely materially deprived (SMD) 
and living in households with very low 
work intensity (LWI). The following vari-
ables have also been introduced: the share 
of people monetarily poor but not SMD nor 
in LWI, the share of people in LWI but not 
SMD nor at risk of poverty, and the share of 
people in LWI and at risk of poverty. Eucli-
dean distance between countries according 
to those dimensions was calculated and 
clusters have been built on this basis. 
Moreover, social protection benefits, 
especially for those people who are 
eligible for means-tested benefits, 
represent a lower share of GPD than 
in other countries, and the impact of 
redistribution is lower than it is in the 
rest of Europe (see Chapter 2). 
The positive aspect is that, over the 
past five years, poverty and espe-
cially severe material deprivation has 
declined strongly in both countries as 
a result of economic growth and an 
increase in resources devoted to social 
policy intervention(23). However, recent 
data suggests that the economic crisis 
has halted this progress. Some of the 
economic strains in the list of depriva-
tions captured by the EU SILC survey 
clearly illustrate this, with the share 
of people unable to pay utility bills 
rising dramatically in 2008 and 2009 
in Bulgaria and Romania, in part due 
to the rise in energy prices in 2009. 
The share of people unable to afford 
a meal with meat or protein every 
second day increased by 7 percentage 
points in Bulgaria and 4 percentage 
points in Romania between 2008 and 
2009. This could be partly explained by 
an increase in meat prices during that 
period, especially in Bulgaria, but also 
by ‘coping’ strategies – a World Bank 
survey on household coping strategies 
during the crisis highlighting the fact 
that 35 % of households faced income 
losses in Bulgaria after the crisis, and 
60 % in Romania reduced their food 
consumption to cope with the crisis(24).
4.1.2. Forms of poverty in 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary
While material deprivation remains rel-
atively important in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, the pattern of 
poverty or social exclusion is more even, 
with only a limited proportion of the 
population accumulating more than 
one type of poverty and social exclu-
(23) See Social protection committee report 
2011, European Commission.
(24) See: World Bank, The Jobs Crisis: House-
hold and Government Responses to the 
Great Recession in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 2011.
sion and, despite relatively low GDP per 
capita, their policy structures appear to 
have ensured a sufficient redistribution 
to contain inequalities and limit the risk 
of  poverty (Chapter 2). 
4.1.3. A shared form of 
poverty and exclusion in 
some eastern and southern 
Member States characterised 
by monetary poverty and 
deprivation 
In some South European Member 
States (Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus) 
as well as some Central and  Eastern 
Europe  Member States (Latvia, 
 Lithuania, and Poland), the popula-
tion at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion is mainly ‘monetary poor’ but 
also tend to some extent to be ‘mate-
rially deprived’ as a result of redistri-
bution policies being insufficient to 
offset the effects of high levels of 
income inequality (see Table 3). 
Five years ago, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Poland presented quite different 
profiles of poverty and social exclu-
sion, with severe material depriva-
tion posing much greater concern. 
Economic growth, together with 
increased resources devoted to social 
policy interventions, has contributed 
to a significant improvement in over-
all living standards, including among 
the lowest income groups. 
However the proportion of peo-
ple who were severely materially 
deprived increased in Lithuania and 
Latvia between 2008 and 2009, after 
several years of decline. Income lev-
els have also dramatically decreased 
since 2008, with the median equiv-
alised income dropping by 17 % in 
Latvia and 16 % in Lithuania between 
2009 and 2010 (reference years 2008 
and 2009). Statistically, this fall in 
median income has resulted in a 
reduction in the poverty thresholds, 
which has led to misleading indica-
tions from the at-risk-of-poverty data 
(-4 percentage points in Latvia, and 
stagnation in Lithuania(25)).
(25) 2010 EU SILC data up to now available 
for only a few countries.
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
120
4.1.4. Monetary poverty in 
a group of EU-15 and EU-10 
countries 
The group of countries comprising 
Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, Austria, 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slo-
venia includes an important number 
of people at risk of poverty who are 
not suffering from labour market 
exclusion or material deprivation. 
This is particularly true for Estonia, 
Spain, Luxembourg, and Sweden. 
4.1.5. Labour market 
exclusion in some EU-15 
countries 
Tackling labour market exclusion is 
a priority in the fight against pov-
erty and social exclusion in a number 
of Western and Northern Member 
States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Finland, the UK, and 
especially Ireland). In households at 
risk of poverty and social exclusion 
in these Member States, the propor-
tion of the population above 18 years 
of age living in a household with 
very low work intensity reached 48 % 
in the Netherlands, 46 % in Belgium, 
and above 30 % in Denmark, Finland, 
 Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
Within this group, Ireland stands out 
as having more than 60 % of those at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion found 
living in a jobless household. This is 
a direct consequence of the econom-
ic crisis, which hit Ireland particularly 
severely. Unemployment rose sharply 
between 2008 and 2009, with the num-
ber of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion increasing by 100 000. Dur-
ing that period, and despite the crisis, 
the risk of poverty has been stable in 
Ireland due to a statistical effect of 
the income distribution. In this respect 
a recent study(26) shows that the total 
income composition changed after the 
crisis due to the fall in the share of total 
income from employment, resulting in 
a decrease of the poverty threshold. 
Due to these changes, the population 
has not been uniformly hit by the crisis. 
While pensioners aged 60 or over expe-
rienced increases in their incomes, and 
moved above the poverty line, adults 
of working age and children have seen 
a decline of their revenue of 3 to 6 per-
centage points, and moved somewhat 
below the poverty line. 
(26) S. Jenkins et al. (“The Great Recession 
and the Distribution of Household 
Income”).
Table 3: GDP per capita, social expenditure and possible determinants of poverty or social exclusion by country
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EU-27 23 500 30.4 15.4 13.1 2.3 69.1 62.5 35.1 46.0 18.8 13.6
Group 1
BG 4 600 33.4 17.4 8.2 7.5 0.7 68.8 64.0 24.8 46.1 2.3 4.7
RO 5 500 34.9 23.0 7.6 6.9 0.7 63.5 56.3 24.5 42.6 9.8 1.0
Group 2
CZ 13 100 25.1 52.0 10.6 10.2 0.4 70.9 61.4 26.5 46.8 5.5 8.5
SK 11 600 24.8 35.7 9.7 9.2 0.5 66.4 58.2 22.8 39.5 3.6 4.4
HU 9 300 24.7 57.1 13.5 12.3 1.2 60.5 54.4 18.1 32.8 5.6 8.5
Group 3
LV 8 200 37.4 15.2 7.0 6.7 0.2 67.1 66.8 27.7 53.2 8.9 4.3
CY 21 200 28.4 28.6 11.0 9.4 1.6 75.7 68.1 35.5 56.0 8.4 13.4
EL 22 900 32.3 20.1 15.4 13.4 2.0 63.7 56.3 28.0 44.1 12.8 25.4
LT 7 900 35.5 29.9 9.3 9.0 0.2 67.2 67.5 21.5 51.6 8.3 2.2
PL 8 100 31.4 27.5 9.3 8.6 0.8 64.9 57.6 26.8 32.3 8.4 26.5
PT 15 900 35.4 26.3 12.9 11.2 1.7 71.2 66.1 31.3 49.7 11.6 22.0
Group 4
EE 10 300 31.4 23.9 8.6 8.5 0.1 69.9 68.8 28.9 60.4 10.5 2.5
ES 20 800 33.1 13.2 14.5 12.9 1.6 65.8 52.7 22.9 42.2 6.0 12.1
IT 25 200 31.5 20.7 12.9 11.6 1.3 61.7 49.7 21.7 35.7 14.3 12.5
SI 17 300 22.7 48.6 12.9 11.3 1.7 71.9 67.9 35.3 35.6 10.6 16.4
AT 32 800 25.7 50.2 15.8 14.5 1.3 74.7 69.4 54.5 41.1 24.6 9.1
FR 29 300 29.8 45.8 17.8 14.3 3.5 69.5 65.0 31.2 38.8 17.3 14.5
LU 76 600 29.2 44.8 14.5 13.9 0.6 70.4 61.5 26.7 38.2 18.2 7.2
MT 14 200 27.8 34.6 10.8 8.6 2.2 58.7 39.6 44.0 27.9 11.3 4.9
SE 31 300 24.8 50.0 17.3 16.5 0.8 78.3 75.7 38.3 70.0 27.0 15.3
Group 5
DK 40 300 27.0 58.0 17.8 16.9 0.9 77.8 74.8 63.6 57.5 26.0 8.9
FI 32 500 25.9 47.3 16.7 15.6 1.1 73.5 72.4 39.6 55.5 14.0 14.6
NL 34 600 27.2 45.9 17.3 14.4 2.9 78.8 72.7 68.0 55.1 48.3 18.2
BE 31 400 26.4 45.3 17.9 16.7 1.2 67.1 61.0 25.3 35.3 23.4 8.2
DE 29 300 29.1 35.7 17.2 14.1 3.1 74.8 69.8 46.2 56.2 26.1 14.5
UK 25 300 32.4 43.1 13.9 11.3 2.6 73.9 68.2 48.4 57.5 26.1 5.7
IE 35 700 28.8 60.0 16.3 11.9 4.5 66.7 61.7 35.4 51.0 21.2 8.5
Sources: Eurostat, National accounts (2009), EU SILC (2009) , LFS (2009), and ESSPROSS (2008)
(*)Note: The impact of redistribution is measured as the reduction in percentage points of the risk of  poverty before and after social transfers.
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All the above countries, as well as 
most of the rest of the EU-15, have 
high levels of redistributive social 
expenditures, but they face rath-
er different patterns of poverty or 
social exclusion from the previous 
group. This may suggest weaknesses 
in the design of social policies such 
that they fail to cover all groups 
in the labour market. In particu-
lar, monetary poverty among jobless 
households is relatively high in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Germa-
ny, and Ireland. This appears to be 
related to the use of income-based 
benefits in all of these countries, in 
so far as these benefits create dis-
incentives for their beneficiaries to 
participate in the labour market. In 
that context, the United Kingdom is 
a specific case in that jobless house-
holds face risk of poverty more often 
than in the rest of Europe, presum-
ably because unemployment benefits 
are less  generous than elsewhere.
In terms of poverty and social exclu-
sion in Germany, the share of job-
less households decreased between 
2005 and 2009, with activity rates 
increasing, especially among older 
workers (+9 points between 2005 
and 2009). This increase in labour 
market participation did not lead to 
fewer people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion, however, but to an 
increase of in-work poverty(27). 
5. who are The people 
aT risk of poverTy or 
social exclusion?
The sections of the population fac-
ing poverty or social exclusion, and 
the type of poverty and exclusion 
they face, vary greatly across coun-
tries. A better understanding of the 
labour market status, and family and 
personal characteristics, of those at 
risk is crucial to the development of 
effective policies. 
(27) It is, however, not possible for the 
moment to address whether those peo-
ple are the same or not, but further work 
could investigate in that sense.
5.1. Students, 
housewives or disabled 
persons: four in ten 
Europeans at risk 
of poverty or social 
exclusion of working 
age are inactive
Within the population at risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion, four adults in 
ten of those aged 18-59 are inactive 
but not retired, compared to one in 
five within the whole population, with 
the share being significantly higher 
than in the population as a whole 
in Denmark (61 % vs. 18 %), Sweden 
(43 % vs. 14 %), the United Kingdom, 
France, and Finland (see Chart 14). 
Inactive people of working age is a 
relatively complex population sub-
group, including inactive women of 
working age along with persons out 
of the labour market for health rea-
son, as well as students. 
Evidence from different Member States 
shows that people who declare them-
selves as being permanently disabled(28) 
are over-represented among people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion com-
pared to the whole population (see 
Chart 15). They represent 9 % of the peo-
ple at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
aged 18-59 in Europe, but only 3 % of 
the whole population of this age group. 
This raises issues about the adequacy and 
design of policy tools aimed at address-
ing disability and sickness across Europe. 
Policy instruments able to provide access 
to the labour market also play an impor-
tant role, as well as measures in favour 
of education, given that people with 
disabilities also have, on average, lower 
levels of educational attainment(29). 
(28) EU SILC contains information on disability 
pensions/benefits received by individuals 
and self-declared reason for inactivity 
which constitute several characterisations 
of disabled persons. When put together, 
both data show a high correlation at a 
national level, indicating that the self-
declared disability status is valuable. 
(29) See OECD (2010), Sickness, Disability and 
Work: Breaking the Barriers: A Synthesis 
of Findings across OECD Countries, OECD 
Publishing.
The share of disabled persons within 
the population at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion, compared to the 
population aged 18-59, is particularly 
significant in Belgium (14 % vs. 4 %), 
Czech Republic (15 % vs. 4 %), Hun-
gary (16 % vs. 8 %), Estonia (17 % vs. 
5%), Finland (20 % vs. 5 %), Sweden 
(12 % vs. 2 %), Ireland (15 % vs. 5 %), 
the United Kingdom (18 % vs. 4 %), 
and Poland (12 % vs. 6 %)(30). 
A number of these countries are also 
those where self-declared disability 
among those of working age is high-
est (Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom...). Some 
of them are also part of countries 
with the lowest share of disability 
benefit expenditures dedicated to 
active measures to integrate disabled 
people in the labour market, such as 
investment in employment support 
or vocational rehabilitation (Czech 
Republic, Finland, Hungary, and the 
United Kingdom)(31). 
Persons not employed and fulfilling 
domestic tasks, such as care for chil-
dren or other dependants, are over-
represented in the population at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in most 
Southern countries, with Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Malta, and Cyprus (and Bel-
gium and Ireland) mainly concerned. 
These persons remain excluded from 
the labour market and also face 
greater difficulty to participate again 
in the labour market after a period 
of inactivity. They are also more 
likely to face lower income in the 
future, with lower pensions. Increas-
ing divorce rates can also lead to a 
damageable loss of revenue. 
Policy actions aimed at increasing the 
labour market participation of inac-
tive people of working age include 
the tackling of disincentives in the 
tax and benefit system ( notably with 
respect to second income earners) as 
well as the provision of affordable 
care services for children and other 
dependants (see also Chapter 4).
(30) Source: DG EMPL calculations based on 
EU SILC (2009).
(31) Ibidem.
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Chart 14: Activity status of the population of working age by risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2009. 
Full coverage of Member States in Annex 2
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
0
20
40
60
80
100
Whole population
EU-27
Retired
Other Inactive
At work
Unemployed
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
IT
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
DE
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
DK
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
FR
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
PL
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
Whole population
Whole population
FI
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
RO
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
SE
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
EL
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
SK
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
Whole population
UK
At risk of poverty 
or social exclusion
ES
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
%
 o
f n
at
io
na
l p
op
ul
at
io
n
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU SILC 
Population aged 18-59
Reading note: in the EU-27, 38 % of the population aged 18-59 at risk of poverty or social exclusion is at work against 71 % in the whole population. 
Activity status is self-declared in EU SILC. Therefore results might differ from LFS figures.
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Finally, students appear to represent 
a large part of people at risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion in a number of 
countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, 
Germany, Finland, and the Nether-
lands. They are less present within 
the population at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion than in the rest of 
the  population in the new Member 
States. More generally, those aged 18 
to 24 face a higher risk of poverty and 
severe material deprivation than the 
rest of the population, although the 
situation of students as well as those 
aged 18-24 has to be put in perspec-
tive. Students are more likely than 
the rest of the population to benefit 
from access to a number of in-kind 
benefits, such as  subsidised housing 
and transport, public  internet access, 
and other facilities. 
Moreover, the age at which young 
people leave the parental home and 
the age at which they enter active life 
 varies significantly between  countries.(32) 
Opportunities to leave the parental 
home depend on both the national 
labour market perspectives for young 
people and the level of support avail-
able, either in cash (specific allowances, 
social security rights, subsidised study 
(32) See Eurostat 2008, “Men and Women 
in Europe” for average age for leaving 
parental home and Eurostat 2010, Statis-
tics in focus No 50 for a detailed portrait 
of young adults living with their parents.
Chart 15: Composition of inactive population of working age by risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2009  
Full coverage of the Member States in Annex 2
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loans, etc.) and in-kind (subsidised 
housing or transport, etc.).
In countries where young people tend 
to leave their parental home at a later 
age, a large proportion of them con-
tinue to benefit from their parents’ 
income. They are therefore not con-
sidered as poor even if their personal 
economic situation is inadequate(33). 
On the other hand, in countries with 
early departures from parental house-
holds (as Sweden or Denmark), the 
share of young people considered to 
be the head of their own household 
is significant, and so is the risk of 
 poverty among young adults(34). 
Given the above, it is appropriate for 
future research to explore to what 
extent students should be treated 
separately in the analysis of poverty 
and social exclusion, with possible 
indicators relating to their self-reli-
ance, the duration of low income 
periods, their access to services, and 
their chances of making an effective 
transition from education to work, or 
of avoiding under-employment.
5.2. The unemployed 
face multiple dimen-
sions of poverty
On average, some 10 % of the people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in the EU are unemployed(35), while 
the unemployed only represent 5 % 
of the whole population in Europe 
in 2009. The proportion of those at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion 
who are unemployed varies a great 
deal between countries, however, 
ranging from 18 % in Germany, 16 % 
in Belgium, to 5 % or less in the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Poland, 
and Romania. 
(33) Eurostat 2010 study mentions that mate-
rial difficulties are the main obstacle 
facing young people in gaining their 
independence and shows that having 
a job does not always allows a young 
person to leave the parental home.
(34) Eurostat 2010.
(35) Activity status is self-declared in EU SILC. 
Results might therefore slightly differ 
from LFS.
The risk of poverty for unemployed 
persons is  particularly high in Germa-
ny (above 60 %),  Bulgaria, and Latvia 
(see Chart 16). At the other end of 
the scale, however, unemployment is 
much less linked to poverty in Bel-
gium (33 %) and Ireland (28 %) even 
though Ireland and Germany dedicate 
quite similar levels of GDP to address-
ing unemployment, raising issues con-
cerning the design of unemployment 
benefits within countries, and their 
 combination with other benefits. 
The prevalence of severe material 
deprivation among unemployed peo-
ple is also higher than within the 
whole population (see Chart 17). One 
unemployed person in five is severely 
materially deprived in Europe. This 
evidence shows that unemployment 
is more than a temporary loss of 
resources, but has much wider and 
longer lasting consequences. At the 
same time, long term unemployment 
is closely linked to severe material 
deprivation as a result of the cumula-
tive effects of their loss of revenue.
5.3. One in three 
Europeans aged 18+ at 
risk of poverty or social 
exclusion is working
Having a job is commonly seen as 
the best safeguard against poverty 
and exclusion, yet 8 % of employed 
persons live in an at-risk-of-poverty 
household (in-work poverty), and 5 % 
suffer from severe material depriva-
tion. Altogether, employed persons 
represent a significant share of the 
population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, with almost one person in 
three of those aged above 18 and at 
risk of poverty being employed. The 
share of employed persons at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion is particu-
larly high in the new Member States 
but also in southern European coun-
tries such as Portugal, Italy, Greece, 
and Spain. 
A more detailed examination of in-
work poverty can be found in Chap-
ter 4, which addresses issues such as 
Chart 16: Risk of poverty within unemployed  
and within the whole population, 2009
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Chart 17: Severe material deprivation within unemployed  
and within the whole population.
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low labour force attachment, low 
wage jobs, and household composi-
tion, and the way that can affect 
participation on the labour market. 
Gender inequalities are apparent in 
relation to labour market participa-
tion with women aged between 18 
and 59 being more commonly found 
in jobless households in a number 
of countries (Netherlands, France, 
Greece, Romania, Ireland, Austria, 
Italia, Luxembourg, Malta). Moreo-
ver, the labour market participation 
of single mothers is hampered by 
care responsibilities and lack of pub-
lic care facilities. 
5.4. Older persons 
and risk of poverty or 
social exclusion
Poverty and social exclusion in old 
age is a key concern in seeking to 
achieve the EU-2020 targets.  People 
aged 65+ represent 16 % of the pop-
ulation at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion on average in Europe, 
with the share rising to 25 % in Bul-
garia, Latvia, or Cyprus.
Two types of situation can be 
observed across EU countries. On 
the one hand there are the coun-
tries in which the oldest generations 
face lower poverty rates or social 
exclusion rates. This group includes 
Ireland, Hungary, Germany, France, 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg (see 
Chart 19). In contrast, the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion increases 
above the age of 65 in countries such 
as Latvia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Slovenia, and Finland. In Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Slovenia, and Estonia, the rapid 
improvement in living standards due 
to economic growth (until the crisis) 
mainly benefitted the younger age 
groups, while elderly people faced 
serious material deprivation as well 
as monetary poverty. 
Risk of poverty is relatively high 
for the elderly in the new Member 
States, but also in Spain, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Finland, and Belgium. 
However, monetary poverty indica-
tors do not take into account hous-
ing costs(36), and might, in some cases, 
present an overly high estimate of 
the extent of monetary poverty 
among the elderly in so far as they 
own their own housing and do not 
have to devote a part of their rev-
enue to housing expenditures (see 
European Commission 2010). 
The oldest among the elderly tend 
to live on lower incomes and those 
(36) The inclusion or non-inclusion of housing 
cost has sparked off much debate during 
the last several years and will probably 
continue to in the future. The conclusion 
of the SPC Indicator subgroup was not 
to include them. Indeed, imputing rents 
is a difficult exercise, especially at the 
European level. Real estate prices are 
so heterogeneous across geographical 
zones that they could have induced more 
bias than correcting it.
Chart 18: Very low work intensity among age groups in some Member States, 2009
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aged 75 and over tend to have a 
higher risk of poverty (see Chart 20). 
This reflects, in particular, the lower 
levels of payments from pension sys-
tems developed in the 1950s and 
1960s. This can also be attributed 
to lower accrued pension entitle-
ments and incomplete careers (espe-
cially among women, who dominate 
the older age group) (see European 
 Commission 2008).
The gap between men and women 
facing monetary poverty varies with 
age. It is clearly worse for people 
older than 65 (see Chart 21) than it 
is for the younger generations. Dif-
ferences in life expectancy increase 
the number of widows and there-
fore single women. Due to incom-
plete careers, older women often 
receive lower pensions, even if in 
many Member States survivor’s pen-
sions do give a certain protection 
from poverty to widows (European 
Commission 2008).
Beside monetary poverty, women 
aged over 65 face higher severe 
material deprivation rates than men 
in most countries, with a particu-
larly large difference between men 
and women in Bulgaria, Romania, 
the Baltic States, Hungary, Poland, 
Greece, and Portugal.
Chart 19:  Risk of poverty or social exclusion among 65+ and the whole population, 2009
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
LUNLCZFRDEATHUIESESKDKMTITFIBEUKSIPLPTESELEELTROCYLVBGEU-27
All ages
65 years or over 
%
 o
f t
he
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC (ilc_li02)
Chart 20:  Risk of poverty rates among 65+, 75+ and the whole population, 2009 
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Chart 21: Risk of poverty or social exclusion  
by gender in the EU-27, 2009 
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Chart 22: Relative impact of age on poverty and social exclusion  
all things being equal, 2009
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU SILC 
Note: The graph represents the odd ratios for age breakdowns obtained by a logistic regression on the 
probability of being at risk of poverty (respectively, severely materially deprived or living in a low work inten-
sity) when taking into account a wide range of variables, such as country, country of birth, age, education, 
main income source, housing status. See the Annex for more details.
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5.5. Single parents 
are more likely to face 
risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
Single parents with dependent chil-
dren face a high risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. They represent on 
average 6 % of the population at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
while only accounting for 2 % of 
the overall population. All things 
being equal, they are 3 times more 
likely to be at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than a two parent family 
with 2 children. 
The OECD forecasts that the number 
of single parents is likely to increase 
in the next decades(37), which raises 
serious policy concerns regarding 
support for single parents, especially 
in terms of their participation in the 
labour force. Evidence shows that 
children in single-parent households 
are more likely to be living in jobless 
households than children in two-
parent households (see Chart 23 and 
OECD 2010).
Single-parent poverty and social 
exclusion is particularly challenging 
in Ireland, the United Kingdom, the 
Czech Republic, and Belgium (see 
Chart 25). In Ireland, single parents 
and their children represent 15 % 
of the population at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion, against 6 % of 
the whole population. In Belgium, 
Germany, and Czech Republic, single 
parents and their family represent 
10 % of the population at risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion, and 3-5 % of 
the whole population.
Single adults represent 22 % of the 
population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, whereas they represent 
15 % of the rest of the population. 
They also face a higher risk of pov-
erty or social exclusion than other 
households, as one single adult in 
three faces the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion.
(37) See OECD (2010) Doing better for families.
Chart 23: Risk of poverty or social exclusion by type of household in the EU, 2009
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Chart 24: Relative impact of household status on poverty and social exclusion  
all things being equal, 2009
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Note: The graph represents the odds ratios for household types obtained by a logistic regression on the 
probability of being at risk of poverty (respectively, severely materially deprived or living in a very low work 
intensity) when taking in account a wide range of variables, such as country, country of birth, age, educa-
tion, main income source, housing status. The reference situation is for this variable a household of 2 adults 
and 2 children. As an example, an odds of 3, as the odds ratio for single parents for the risk of poverty, 
means that, all things being equal, a single parent household is three times more likely to be at risk of 
poverty than the reference. See the Annex for more details.
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Chart 25: Share of household types within population at risk of poverty or social exclusion and within the rest  
of the population in selected Member States, 2009
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5.6. Larger families 
are strongly exposed 
to the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion 
Overall, households with or without 
children face an equal risk of poverty 
or social exclusion, but the types of pov-
erty they risk differ. Households with 
dependent children are more likely to 
face poverty, while households without 
dependent children are more to be at 
risk of severe material deprivation. 
Among families with children, those 
with 3 or more children are over-
represented in the population that 
is poor or socially excluded in some 
countries. Other things being equal 
(in terms of country, educational 
level…) a family with 3 or more chil-
dren is 40 % more likely to be at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion than a 
family with two dependent children. 
This is particularly the case in the 
Czech Republic (6 % of the population 
the poor or socially excluded, 4 % in 
the whole population), Poland (7 % 
vs. 4 %), Hungary (9 % vs. 5 %), and 
the United Kingdom (8 % vs. 5 %).
5.7. People born 
abroad face higher 
poverty
Non-EU migrants represent 6 % of the 
population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in Europe, while EU migrants 
account for 2.4 %. As migrants gener-
ally achieve lower educational levels(38), 
they are inevitably over-represented 
in low paid jobs or unemployment, 
which puts them at a greater risk 
of poverty (Chart 27). At comparable 
educational level, age, and country of 
residence, a non-EU migrant is twice 
as likely to face the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion as a person born in the 
country of  residence(39) (1.4 times in the 
case of an EU-migrant, see Chart 28). 
(38) See European Commission 2010 “Older, 
more numerous and diverse Europeans” 
Demography Report.
(39) Results of the logistic regression are put 
in Annex 3. 
Chart 27: Share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by country of birth, 2009
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Chart 28: Risk of poverty or social exclusion by country  
of birth all things being equal, 2009
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Note: The graph represents the odds ratios for groups of countries of birth types obtained by a logistic 
regression on the probability of being at risk of poverty (respectively, severely materially deprived or living in 
a low work intensity) when taking into account a wide range of variables, such as country, country of birth, 
age, education, main income source, housing status. The reference situation is for this variable a person 
born in the declaring country. As an example, an odds of 2, as the odds ratio for people born in non-EU 
countries, means that, all things being equal (education level, age), a person born abroad is 2 times more 
likely to be at risk of poverty than the reference. See the Annex for more details.
Chart 26: Relative share of families with 3 children or more within the population 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion and social benefits for families/children
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Migrants experience higher rates of 
poverty than the rest of the popula-
tion and, all things being equal, non-
EU migrants are also more likely to 
be materially deprived. 
However, while the risk of very low 
work intensity is higher for non-EU 
migrants than the rest of the popu-
lation, this difference is due to other 
effects (such as education). On this 
basis non-EU migrants are slightly 
less likely to belong to very low 
work intensity households, i.e. to 
be benefit-dependant, than native 
citizens, and there is no difference 
(all things being equal) between 
EU-migrants and citizens born in the 
declaring country.
5.8. Risk of poverty 
in sparsely populated 
areas of Southern 
Europe and New 
Member States, low 
work intensity in the 
towns of Western 
Europe
Breaking the ‘vicious circle’ of rural 
poverty is seen as a priority in the 
European Commission report ‘Com-
bating poverty in rural areas’ while 
urbanisation also generates different 
forms of poverty and social exclusion. 
The EU faces two trends with respect 
to poverty and social exclusion in 
urban and rural areas. In most new 
Member States, where rural areas 
are more significant in terms of 
population, as well as in Southern 
European countries such as Portu-
gal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, the 
risk of poverty or social exclusion 
is lower in densely populated areas 
than in urban areas (see Chart 29). 
On the contrary, sparsely populated 
areas face higher risks of poverty or 
social exclusion. However, the risk of 
poverty is more concentrated in the 
densely populated areas of Western 
and Northern European countries 
than it is in their rural areas.
Chart 29: Risk of poverty or social exclusion by type of rural or urban areas, 2009
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Note: The graph represents the odds ratios for geographical areas obtained by a logistic regression on the 
probability of being at risk of poverty (respectively, severely materially deprived or living in a low work inten-
sity) when taking into account a wide range of variables, such as country, country of birth, age, education, 
main income source, housing status. The reference situation is for this variable a person living in a sparsely 
populated area. As an example, a person with an odds of 0.5, as the odds ratio for people living in densely 
populated areas are, all things being equal (educational level, age), twice less likely to be at risk of poverty 
than the reference. See the Annex for more details.
Chart 30: Risk of poverty or social exclusion and degree of urbanisation in EU-27, 2009
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Chart 31: Risk of poverty and degree of urbanisation, 2009 
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The risks of poverty and material 
deprivation are higher in sparsely 
populated areas (see Chart 30), with 
the gap between populated and 
sparsely populated areas being par-
ticularly great in the New Member 
States, but also Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, and Greece. 
Controlling for a number of variables 
(country, educational level, house-
hold type…), a person is almost twice 
as likely to be poor or materially 
deprived in a rural area than in a 
densely populated area (see Charts 29, 
30, 31, 32). On the other hand, very 
low work intensity is at its lowest in 
sparsely populated areas, while job-
less households are more numerous 
in most densely populated areas. 
This is especially the case in West-
ern Europe countries, notably Ire-
land, Belgium, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Denmark, Austria, and 
France (Chart 33). 
However, the relationship between 
population density and work inten-
sity is weak on an ‘all things being 
equal’ basis (see Annex 3) indicating 
that differences appear to be due to 
structural factors (education, age…) 
rather than geographical location.
These opposing patterns raise policy 
issues concerning the relative pros-
pects of obtaining well-paid jobs in 
urban as opposed to rural areas. 
This could mean that while people 
in sparsely populated areas do have 
access to the labour market, but 
that access fails to prevent them 
from being at risk of monetary pov-
erty or providing sufficient material 
goods because of the nature of the 
work available. Future research could 
investigate the reasons of in-work 
poverty in rural areas.
Chart 32: Severe material deprivation and degree of urbanisation, 2009
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Chart 33: Low work intensity and degree of urbanisation, 2009
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6. main findings 
The EU committed itself in 2010 to 
reduce by 20 million the number of 
people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion by 2020. This is a major 
milestone in the strengthening of a 
social Europe. First of all, the  target 
reflects a strong commitment of 
Member States to fight poverty and 
social exclusion as part of an  integrated 
strategy for smart, sustainable, and 
inclusive growth. It will support the 
design of coordinated policy initiatives 
and the assessment of their results 
and be accompanied by a regular and 
common monitoring of poverty and 
social exclusion in Member States. 
Secondly, the agreed target enlarges 
the notion of poverty solely based on 
relative monetary terms, as it covers 
every European at risk of poverty or 
severe material deprivation or living 
in a jobless household. The composite 
nature of the target therefore captures 
a mix of relative and absolute aspects of 
poverty quite appropriate to measure 
social inclusion in an enlarged, varied, 
and changing Europe. 
The setting of this target is a break-
through. But as the definition of the 
target was discussed at the highest 
political level, the shortcomings and 
weaknesses of the measurement of 
poverty were brought to light. Areas 
for improvement were also high-
lighted by the Council. For example, 
many Member States are investing in 
the provision of in-kind services, such 
as childcare, as a means to combat 
poverty. The free provision of such 
services has real and direct impacts 
on people’s welfare and labour mar-
ket participation, but this is not ade-
quately reflected in the current meas-
ures of poverty and social exclusion. 
It will also be important, in view of 
the mid-term review of the target in 
2015 to improve the measurement of 
material deprivation, by including for 
example more dimensions, like access 
to services, new technologies, or by 
integrating some variability within 
Member States. Another weakness 
of the available measures of poverty 
is the significant time lag with which 
data becomes available. Identifying 
the policies that work and monitor-
ing the effectiveness of the measures 
taken would require more timely 
data or adequate  simulation tools, 
such as Euromod.
Furthermore, we need to investi-
gate further the characteristics of 
the population identified by the new 
combined indicator. This is impor-
tant from a conceptual point of view 
to ensure that the three combined 
indicators indeed capture situations 
of poverty and social exclusion. Can 
people living in a jobless household 
but with a high income level be 
considered socially excluded? There 
is also a political dimension to the 
debate. For example, should disa-
bled persons be considered as part 
of the target when they are living 
in a household with low work inten-
sity but are not at risk of poverty? 
Should they be reactivated on the 
labour market? And how should stu-
dents be included in a risk of poverty 
and social exclusion target? In some 
countries, students have left parental 
homes and live on very low income, 
but they have access to benefits in 
kind (subsidised housing, free trans-
port, etc.) that might prevent them 
from social exclusion. Specific indica-
tors may be needed to monitor the 
situation of young people.
In 2009, 114 million Europeans were 
at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion, i.e. 23 % of the EU population. 
However, poverty and social exclu-
sion are not uniformly spread among 
the Union. Bulgaria and Romania 
face massive material deprivation. 
In other eastern Member States, 
namely Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia, the different compo-
nents of poverty and social exclusion 
hardly overlap, showing that differ-
ent population groups experience 
different forms of poverty or social 
exclusion, calling for differentiated 
policy response. In some Western 
and Northern Member States, often 
with well-developed welfare states, 
labour market exclusion is the pre-
dominant issue. Lastly, in other Mem-
ber States, an important share of 
the targeted population is at risk of 
poverty, but not necessarily materi-
ally deprived or excluded from the 
labour market. Each of these forms 
requires adapted political answers, 
focusing on labour market inclusion, 
on redistribution or inactivity traps. 
A better knowledge of the people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
also helps to prepare political action. 
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 Evidence shows that 60 % of the 
working age people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion are out of work. 
A significant share of these people is 
unemployed. Another part is less than 
60 years old but is already retired. This 
part should progressively be reduced 
as measures to increase older workers 
employment rates will take effect in 
Member States. Other inactive people 
of working age  and at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion include students, 
disabled persons, and inactive persons 
fulfilling domestic tasks. 
Students represent a significant share 
of the people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. This is especially the 
case in countries where they leave the 
parental home early. In these coun-
tries, students live on low income, 
but they have access to a range of 
services, such as subsidised health-
care, housing and transport, public 
internet access, and other facilities 
that allows them to enjoy a certain 
degree of autonomy and to partici-
pate in society. It is therefore worth 
addressing the question of whether 
they need further support. In other 
countries, students cannot afford to 
leave the parental home and fully 
depend on family resources. The lack 
of access to resources and to support 
services might hamper their mobility 
and capacity to find a job, have train-
ing opportunities, or to form a family. 
Evidence shows that permanently 
disabled people are over-represented 
among people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. This raises issues about 
the adequacy and design of policy 
tools. In countries where the disabled 
are predominantly poor and severe-
ly deprived, this raises the issue of 
the adequacy of disability benefits. In 
countries where the disabled are espe-
cially over-represented in the group 
of people that are living in jobless 
households but are neither poor nor 
severely deprived, it raises the issue 
of whether or not they belong to the 
target. From a monetary point of view, 
they cannot be considered as ‘poor’, 
but they could be considered at risk of 
social exclusion, in the narrow sense 
of labour market exclusion at least. It 
belongs now to the social and political 
debate to decide whether the meas-
ures to encourage and facilitate labour 
market participation should target all 
those who can work, or all those who 
can and want to work. 
Evidence also shows that having a job 
remains a safeguard against poverty 
and exclusion. Yet employed persons 
represent a significant share of the 
population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, with almost one person in 
three of those aged above 18 and 
at risk of poverty being employed. 
In-work poverty will be analysed in 
further detail in Chapter 4.
Older persons also face poverty and 
social exclusion. Two scenarios can 
be observed across EU countries with 
respect to this age group. On the 
one hand there are the countries in 
which the oldest generations face 
lower poverty or social exclusion 
rates. In contrast, the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion increases above 
the age of 65 in other countries. The 
gap between men and women fac-
ing monetary poverty is also clearly 
deeper for people older than 65 than 
it is for the younger generations. 
Single parents with dependent chil-
dren are facing a high risk of poverty 
or social exclusion. They represent on 
average 6 % of the population at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion while 
only accounting for 2 % of the overall 
population. All things being equal, 
they are 3 times more likely to be at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion than 
a two-parent family with 2 children. 
Non-EU Migrants represent 6 % of 
the population at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion in Europe, while EU 
migrants account for 2 %. As migrants 
generally achieve lower educational 
levels, they are inevitably over-repre-
sented in low paid jobs or unemploy-
ment, which puts them at a greater 
risk of poverty. But at comparable 
educational level, age, and country of 
residence, a non-EU migrant is twice 
as likely to face the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion as a person born in 
the country of residence. 
Finally, the EU faces diverse trends 
with respect to poverty and social 
exclusion in urban and rural areas. 
The risk of poverty is more concen-
trated in the densely populated areas, 
especially in Western and Northern 
European countries. On the contrary, 
sparsely populated areas face higher 
risks of poverty or social exclusion. 
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annex 1: esTimaTed disTribuTion of in-kind benefiTs (complemenT To charT 6)
Distribution of in-kind benefits across income quintile (in euros)
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annex 2: composiTion of The populaTion aT risk of poverTy or social exclusion 
Activity status of the population by risk of poverty or social exclusion (complement to Chart 14)  
(% of the national population aged 18-59)
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annex 3: risk of poverTy or social exclusion, all Things being equal
Probability of being at risk of poverty or social exclusion (Logistic regressions)
Risk of poverty or 
social exclusion Risk of poverty
Severe material 
deprivation Low work intensity
Odds 
ratio
Confidence 
interval
Odds 
ratio
Confidence 
interval
Odds 
ratio
Confidence 
interval
Odds 
ratio
Confidence 
interval
Activity status
At work 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
Working part time 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5
Unemployed (ref.)
Student 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.7
Retired 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 2.8 2.7 3.0
Disabled 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Fullfilling domestic tasks 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.0
Other inactives 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.4
Age
18-25 years 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3
25-35 years 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1
35-45 years (ref.)
45-55 years 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
55-65 years 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 14.0 13.3 14.7
65 years or more 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 - - -
Sex Men 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.5
Urban area 
Densely 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2
Inter. 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1
Sparsely (ref.)
Household type 
1 pers 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.6 3.0 4.2 3.8 4.6
2 adults, less than 65 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 3.1 2.9 3.3
2 ad. , one at least > 65 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.9 1.8 2.0 6.8 6.2 7.4
Other no dep chd 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.8
Single parent with children 3.0 2.8 3.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 3.0 2.7 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.6
2 adults 1 chd 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.7
2 adults 2 children (ref.)
2 ad, 3 chd or more 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3
Other with children 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7
Others 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.6 2.5 1.4 1.1 1.9
Household size 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
Main income
From work (ref.)
From pensions 4.7 4.6 4.9 3.8 3.7 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 6.6 6.4 6.8
From other social transfers 11.7 11.3 12.2 8.3 8.0 8.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 9.3 8.9 9.7
Other income 4.7 4.4 5.0 3.9 3.6 4.2 0.8 0.7 0.9 9.6 8.9 10.3
Tenant status 
(ref=tenant reduced 
rate or free)
Outright owner 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
Owner with mortgage 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Tenant market rate 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.1
Tenant market rate
Country of birth
EU country 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1
Non-EU country 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.0
Education level
Primary /lower secondary (ref.)
Secondary education 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
Tertiary education 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
Distance to poverty 
threshold 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.0
Source: EU SILC 2009, DG EMPL’s calculation
Reading note: The odds ratios are obtained by a logistic regression on the probability of being at risk of poverty or social exclusion (respectively at risk of poverty, 
severely materially deprived or living in a low work intensity) when taking into account a wide range of variables, such as sex, age, education, country of birth, main 
income source, housing status. The odds ratio measures the difference between the category and the reference. For example an odds of 11 for income from social 
transfers means that people in this category are 11 times as likely as being at risk of poverty or social exclusion than people from the reference category, whose main 
income comes from work. Country dummies have been integrated to capture national specificities. The distance to the poverty threshold is computed as the ratio 
between the household income and its relative at-risk-of-poverty threshold.
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1. inTroducTion
Job creation has been at the heart 
of the Lisbon Strategy, launched in 
2000, and the follow-up European 
Employment Strategy, with 20 mil-
lion additional jobs being created in 
the decade before the current cri-
sis. However, there is some concern 
about the quality of many of those 
jobs, not least in terms of pay and job 
security, and the need to strengthen 
the links between job creation poli-
cies and those intended to reduce 
poverty.
The issue of in-work poverty has 
gained importance in the policy 
debates in the EU and in the Member 
States. Although it is clear that, while 
employment is the most important 
factor in preventing poverty, it is also 
true that the phenomenon of mon-
etary in-work poverty is nonetheless 
all too real.
In the EU as a whole, the risk of 
working age adults facing monetary 
poverty is twice higher for those 
without work than it is for those in 
work (16 % against 8 %) and this risk 
increases to 43 % for those who are 
unemployed. 
However, a job is no guarantee 
against the risk of being in poverty 
and the chapter on in-work pover-
ty in the OECD (2009) Employment 
 Outlook warns about the  possible 
negative impact of the crisis on 
poverty, calling for action from the 
Member States. Likewise Eurofound 
(2010) has devoted a report to the 
issue, although it is focused on the 
pre-crisis period, and other research 
has been devoted to analyse the role 
and the impact of different policies.
Employment is the best route out 
of poverty. However, in order for 
poverty to be avoided, the job in 
question has to meet certain require-
ments. In fact, in-work poverty is 
known to be linked to the specific 
employment circumstances of indi-
viduals such as low pay, low skills, 
precarious employment, and invol-
untary part-time work, which can 
often result in low yearly earnings. In 
addition, poverty can also be linked 
to the household circumstances of 
the people concerned, such as the 
size and composition of households 
and low work intensity. The latter 
reflect situations where there are 
too few adults in the household who 
are working or, if they are, not work-
ing enough to achieve an adequate 
income (working too few hours or 
only working for part of the year). In 
this respect, single and lone parent 
households, as well as one-earner 
families, are seen to face the highest 
risks of poverty.
Increased labour market segmenta-
tion, reflected in the development 
of temporary work, involuntary part-
time work or self employment, and 
sometimes stagnating wages, has 
increased the number of individuals 
with low earnings and all too often 
these low paid or precarious jobs do 
not serve as stepping stones towards 
better jobs(1). 
This chapter reviews, in the first sec-
tion, overall trends in poverty in 
work, and describes the impact of 
individual and household charac-
teristics, as well as labour market 
attachment, including by econo-
metric analysis. The following sec-
tion assesses the relation between 
in-work poverty and work intensity, 
using the new definition adopted by 
the Social Protection Committee(2). 
The last two sections are devoted to 
the policy instruments and the poli-
cy approaches followed by Member 
States to addressing in-work poverty. 
These policies are classified in three 
broad groups: policies that support 
wages and incomes; policies support-
ing the labour market participation 
of groups at risk of poverty; and 
policies to provide access to enabling 
services.
(1) See special focus on labour market 
segmentation in the EU Employment 
and Social Situation Quarterly Review, 
autumn 2011. 
(2) In June 2010, the SPC adopted a new 
definition of household work intensi-
ty to underpin one the labour market 
exclusion component of the EU 2020 
headline target on poverty and social 
exclusion. See Box 3.5 in Chapter 4.3 for 
full definition.
Is working enough to avoid poverty? 
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2. in-work poverTy in 
The eu 
2.1. In-work poverty 
remained stable at 
the EU level but with 
substantial variation 
between the EU 
countries
Despite periods of employment 
growth in the years before the crisis, 
the proportion of people living in 
poverty has been relatively stable in 
recent years, and this has also been 
the case with respect to in-work 
poverty(3). The overall risk of mon-
etary poverty in the EU in 2009 is 
some 16.1 %, with the average risk of 
in-work monetary poverty being a 
little over half that rate (8.4 %). 
However, there are considerable var-
iations between countries in the EU 
(Table 1): in-work poverty is above 
10 % in Greece, Spain, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Italy, and 
 Latvia, while it is the lowest - under 
5 % - in the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Slovenia, and Belgium. 
On average in the EU, the propor-
tion of working poor has remained 
stable over recent years, including 
in the period of sustained employ-
ment growth before the crisis. It is 
not possible to draw conclusions yet 
concerning the impact of the current 
recession since, for many countries, 
the latest (2009) data refer only to 
2008 income. However, in-work pov-
erty seems to have been fairly stable 
in the lead up to the crisis(4). 
(3) The poverty measure discussed in this 
chapter concerns only the monetary pov-
erty or monetary in-work poverty; thus it 
includes neither the material deprivation 
nor the risk of being socially excluded.
(4) Different reasons might explain this 
apparent stability. First, in-work poverty 
is a relative measure and therefore it 
is affected by variations in the median 
income. Second, the crisis has had a 
lagged impact on the real economy. See 
Chapter 2 for further analysis.
If this is confirmed, it suggests 
that creating jobs is not enough 
to decrease poverty, and that more 
refined and targeted policies are 
needed in order to combat poverty 
and in-work poverty.
In most European countries the 
in-work poverty rate has been rela-
tively stable, but with a slight tendency 
to converge toward the EU average. In 
effect those Member States that had 
been below the EU average – such 
as Denmark, Germany, Malta, and 
 Sweden – saw their in-work poverty 
rate increase between 2005 and 2009 
by some 1pp or more while in Poland 
and Slovakia, where in-work poverty 
were above the EU average in 2005, 
the in-work poverty rate decreased.
Having a job is the best way in seeking 
to avoid poverty since poverty is much 
lower among those who work (8.4 % 
on average) compared with people 
who are inactive (26 % on average) 
or unemployed (45 % on average). 
However, having any type of job is not 
enough. A low labour market attach-
ment in terms of hours worked, or 
poor contractual conditions, can still 
result in poverty.
Crettaz (2001) has identified three 
main sources of in-work poverty: low 
work intensity, family composition, 
and low wages, with the interaction 
of these three factors determining 
the outcome for the individual and 
the household as a whole. 
However, having a low wage job will 
not, of itself, necessarily push some-
one into poverty, any more than 
having only a part time or temporary 
job, since family composition is also a 
major factor affecting the individual 
situation. 
2.2. The number 
of dependants in a 
household is decisive 
for in-work poverty
As indicated earlier, household com-
position has an impact on whether its 
members can be considered poor or 
not, operating through the number 
of people dependent on the total 
income of the household and, more 
indirectly, through the impact on 
the labour market participation of 
household members.
Since the resources are shared 
between the household’s members, 
looking at employment at the house-
hold level provides an indicator of 
the welfare implications of labour 
market status(5). For example, a 
female spouse who works part-time 
and relies on her husband’s earnings 
as the main source of household 
income will probably not be on a 
low (equivalised) income. Similarly, a 
young person who has just entered 
the labour market with a low  starting 
salary may still be living with parents 
and enjoying a relatively high real 
living standard. On the other hand, 
a household in which only one adult 
(5) Eurostat (2005).
Table 1: In-work poverty developments 
in 2005-2009
GEO/
TIME
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EU (s) 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.4
BE 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.6
BG : 5.4 5.8 7.5 7.4
CZ 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.1
DK 4.9 4.5 4.2 5.1 5.9
DE 4.8 5.5 7.5 7.1 6.8
EE 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.3 8.1
IE 6.1 6.2 5.6 6.5 5.4
EL 12.9 13.9 14.3 14.3 13.8
ES 10.4 9.9 10.7 10.7 11.4
FR 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.8 6.7
IT 8.8 9.6 9.8 8.9 10.2
CY 6.5 7.2 6.3 6.4 7.0
LV 9.0 11.2 9.7 11.0 11.1
LT 10.0 9.9 8.0 9.4 10.4
LU 9.8 10.3 9.3 9.4 10.0
HU 8.8 6.8 5.8 5.8 6.2
MT 4.8 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.7
NL 5.8 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0
AT 6.7 6.4 6.1 6.4 5.9
PL 13.9 12.8 11.7 11.5 11.0
PT 11.9 11.3 9.7 11.8 10.3
RO : : 18.5 17.7 17.9
SK 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 4.8
SI 8.9 6.3 4.9 5.8 5.2
FI 3.7 4.5 5.0 5.1 3.7
SE 5.5 7.4 6.5 6.8 6.9
UK 8.3 7.8 8.0 8.5 6.7
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC
Note: EU SILC 2005-2009, income year 2004-
2008, except for UK (income year 2005-2009) 
and IE (moving income periods); (s) Data for EU-27 
2005- 2006 Eurostat estimates; Data for BG 2005 
and RO 2005-2006 not available
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works, even full-time and with aver-
age pay, may be at risk of poverty if 
there are three or more dependants. 
One implication is that gender and 
age differences in poverty rates will 
be biased by the fact that income is 
measured at the level of the house-
hold, and that all household resourc-
es are assumed to be shared equally 
among all household members. 
Chart 1 shows that, in general, work-
ers living in households without chil-
dren face the lowest in-work poverty 
in EU (just above 6 %), in particu-
lar in  households consisting of two 
or more adults (around 5 %), while 
more than 10 % of workers living 
alone are in poverty. Having depend-
ent children increases the incidence 
of poverty among those employed 
to more than 10 %, while the risk 
almost doubles (to 18 %) for single 
parents. As illustrated in Chart 2, 
these patterns broadly apply to all 
Member States, with some variations 
in the relative situation of specific 
households, notably single person 
households.
Chart 1: In-work poverty rate by type of household for the EU-27, 2009
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Box 3.1: In-work at risk of poverty: methodological definitions(1)
In-work at risk of poverty
In defining in-work (monetary) poverty, the income for people who are employed is calculated for households, but the poverty status 
is assigned to the individual. This means that in-work poverty, when measured, is influenced by both the total disposable income 
(including non-wage income) and the household composition. The assumption of equal sharing of resources within households (giving 
the so-called equivalised income) that underlies the definition of monetary income poverty means that the economic well-being of 
individuals depends on the total resources contributed by all members of the households. In this respect some income can move from 
one household member to the other without affecting the actual income of the individual. Hence, measuring attachment to the labour 
market at the level of households provides a better indicator of the welfare implications associated with labour market status than 
individual employment rates.
The risk of in-work poverty measure counts the number of employed people whose disposable income is below 60 % of the median equivalised 
income of their country.
Income/disposable income
Household income comes from different sources. Employment is generally the main source of income but it is not the only one. Individu-
als may receive transfers from the state (e.g. unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.); property income (e.g. dividends from financial 
assets, etc.); and income from other sources (e.g. rental income from property or from the sale of property or goods, etc.). 
Employed(2)
In LFS people are defined as employed if they are aged 15 years or over and if, during the reference week, they performed work (even for just 
one hour a week) for pay, profit, or family gain, or who were not at work but had a job or business from which they were temporarily absent 
because of illness, holidays, industrial dispute, education and training, or other reasons.
In EU SILC, people are defined as employed based on the self-declared economic status.
Working full year/less than full year
Working full year corresponds to working during the total number of months for which information on the activity status has been provided. 
Less than full year corresponds to working for more than half, but less than all, the numbers of the months for which information on activity 
status is provided.
Full-time/part-time working
This variable refers to the main job with the designation of full-time and part-time work as self-reported by the respondent.
(1) Eurostat (2005).
(2) The age-group applied in this chapter is 15+ unless differently stated.
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2.3. In-work poverty 
by labour market 
attachment
While in-work poverty is significantly 
influenced by the household’s charac-
teristics as shown above, work charac-
teristics also have an impact. Indeed, 
working at less than a person’s full 
potential – because they are in a tem-
porary or part time job, for example –
can lead to poverty as indicated below.
2.3.1. In-work poverty is 
highly dependent on the 
duration and the type of 
work contract
Chart 3(6) shows that in-work poverty 
in the EU is highest for people work-
ing less than a full year, followed by 
the people working in temporary con-
tracts or in a part-time job(7). 
People working in permanent con-
tracts face much lower risks of poverty 
than the average person employed 
(5.1 % against 8.1 %). The best, if not 
absolute, safeguard against in-work 
poverty is thus to have a permanent, 
full-time, job. 
2.3.2. Temporary contracts 
increase the odds of in work 
poverty
In terms of attachment to the labour 
market and the development of 
in-work poverty, it is clear that there is, 
in general, a major difference between 
being employed on a temporary 
 contract and being in  permanent work 
as shown in Chart 4. 
(6) Accumulation of risks (temporary work 
and low wage) is mentioned in the Box 3.3 
and analyses of various factors are carried 
out in the econometric model. The com-
bined risk of being temporarily part-time 
employed is in addition to the above but 
will not be separately analysed.
(7) RWI study (2011) shows that people on 
temporary contracts tend to be younger, 
low-skilled, and women and in addition 
(all other things being equal) there is a 
wage penalty in relation to temporary 
work contracts as compared to permanent 
contracts.
All EU countries show higher in-work 
poverty rates for those on temporary 
contracts compared with those on 
permanent ones, with the exception 
of Ireland, Malta, and the UK where 
the share of temporary workers is 
among the lowest in the EU (in 2010 
9.3 % in Ireland, 5.7 % in Malta, and 
6.1 % in the UK compared to the 
14 % EU average)
Chart 3: In-work poverty by job characteristics in EU, 2009
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Chart 4: In-work poverty by type of contract, 2009
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Chart 2: In-work poverty rate by type of household for the EU Member States, 2009
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Temporary contracts are usually prev-
alent in certain labour market groups, 
notably young people, migrants and 
those with low skills. In so far as tem-
porary contracts represent a stepping 
stone towards  permanent jobs this is 
not necessarily a source of concern, 
but this is not always the case (again 
Ireland and the UK represent a good 
example, see Section 2.3.5).
Moreover, temporary contracts are, 
in most cases, involuntary as seen 
in Chart 5. In all Member States for 
which data are available, temporary 
contracts are generally not chosen by 
the workers with the exceptions of 
Denmark and Austria where flexible 
labour markets allow employers to 
respond to changes in demand, and 
their social security systems provide 
high income security regardless of the 
type of contract. In general, however, 
if people are trapped in this kind of 
employment, the odds of being in 
in-work poverty increase significantly. 
2.3.3. Working part-time 
increases the risk of  
in-work poverty, especially 
for the young 
Charts 6 and 7 show that for full-time 
workers the EU in-work poverty rate was 
7.1 % in 2009, whereas 12.6 % of part-
time workers declare that they could not 
find full-time work (hence ‘involuntary 
part-time work’). The Netherlands has 
the greatest share of part-time jobs in 
the EU and mostly voluntary with rates 
of in-work poverty for part-timers not 
much higher than for full-timers. On 
the other hand, the difference is more 
important in many new Member States 
(Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland) as well 
as Portugal, where involuntary part time 
work is often more important despite 
relatively lower overall shares(8). In 2009, 
almost every fourth person in part-time 
employment in the EU indicated that 
they would like to work more hours, 
with those proportions reaching over 
40 % in Latvia, Spain, and Greece (61 %, 
47 %, and 45 % respectively).
(8) This might also be due to regulatory gaps 
of standard full-time open ended con-
tracts and atypical part time contracts.
Chart 8 and Chart 9 show that part-
time work is, to a large extent, invol-
untary for young people in most 
countries. This age group and the 
prime-age group (25-54) would like 
to work more and in some countries 
this share of the employed is highest 
for the young people, indicating a 
substantial underemployment of the 
young generation.
Chart 5: Temporary employment across Member States, 2009(1)
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(1) Involuntary temporary work is defined as the people who in the LFS say the reason for 
working on temporary contracts is that they could not find permanent work.
Chart 6: In-work poverty by working full time vs. part-time, 2009 
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Chart 7: Part-time employment across Member States, 2009(1)
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(1) Involuntary part-time work is defined as the people who in the LFS say the reason for working 
part-time is that they could not find full-time work, despite wanting to.
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2.3.4. During the crisis 
period the permanent full-
time contracts saw a steady 
decline but with a slight 
increase in the temporary 
contracts during 2010 
The number of workers in the EU with 
a permanent and full time contract 
has continued to fall, even when total 
employment increased. On the one 
hand, in 2010, 19 Member States saw 
a fall in the number of permanent 
jobs (with net gains only in Estonia, 
Sweden,  Belgium,  Luxemburg, and 
Cyprus) while those on temporary 
contracts or self-employed began to 
increase from mid 2010.(9) 
Moreover, the general trend with 
respect to new temporary contract 
hirings(10) is of concern, with more 
than 80 % of new work contracts 
(9) Only in early 2011 there has been a 
apparent reversal of this trend in the EU 
(see EU Employment and Social situation 
review, autumn 2011).
(10) Figures are for the share of temporary 
workers among employees with short ten-
ure in their current job, i.e. less than one 
year. Using short tenure employees as a 
proxy for new recruitments, this measure 
provides an indication of the extent to 
which firms use temporary contracts.
signed in Spain during the last decade 
being temporary, and around 70 % in 
Slovenia, Portugal, and Poland. 
Even in Sweden, France, Germany, Fin-
land, the Netherlands, and Italy, some 
50 % or more of hirings have been tem-
porary and, as Chart 10 shows, if these 
trends persist, even countries with a rel-
atively low share of temporary workers 
(such as Italy, Greece,  Belgium, or Lux-
embourg) could soon see their share 
increase steeply as permanent workers 
exit the labour  market and are replaced 
by those on temporary contracts.
If people remain in such contracts, 
this could undermine progress 
towards the inclusive growth objec-
tive of the Europe 2020 strategy by 
only moving towards the target of 
more jobs but not necessarily better, 
risking that more people become 
trapped in  in-work  poverty.
Chart 8: Involuntary part-time by age group and country, 2009
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Chart 9: Employee in part-time wanting to work more by age group and country, 2009
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Chart 10: Change in permanent, temporary, and Total employment (15-64)  
(1 000 employees), 2006-2010
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2.3.5. Transitions from 
temporary contracts into 
permanent contracts are 
comparatively low
In the previous section, having only 
temporary and part time employ-
ment was identified as a potential 
source of in-work poverty. It is there-
fore important to explore whether 
these kinds of employment serve as 
a stepping stone to permanent and 
full-time employment, or if workers 
are likely to be trapped in such poor 
employment conditions.
As shown in Chart 5, most temporary 
contracts are considered as second 
best, and an in-depth analysis of 
labour market transitions especially 
between temporary and permanent 
can shed light on some of these 
issues. 
Analysis carried out by RWI (2011) (11) 
shows that the chances of moving 
from a temporary contract to a per-
manent job are not evenly spread 
across Member States. Between 2004 
and 2008, as Table 2 shows, the 
share of temporary employees who 
moved to a permanent contract was 
less than 30 % in France, the Nether-
lands, and Portugal while it was over 
50 % in Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
 Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Sweden,  Slovakia, and the UK. 
Moreover there seems to be a nega-
tive correlation between the share of 
temporary workers and the transition 
rates(12). These findings mean that, in 
the first group of countries (those 
with lower transition rates), the 
increased use of temporary contracts 
has been accompanied by reduced 
chances of moving from a temporary 
contract to an open-ended one.
(11) Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (2011), “Studies on 
‘flexicurity’ Lot 1: Study on various aspects 
of labour market performance using 
micro data from the European Union Sta-
tistics on Income and Living Conditions”, 
Final Report, Research Project for the 
European Commission – DG Employment, 
social affairs and equal opportunities, 
Contract No VC/2010/0032.
(12) Correlation coefficient -0.64, significant 
at 1 %.
Chart 11: Change in the number of part-time, full-time, and total employment 
(1 000 employees) in the EU, 2006-2010
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Table 2: Share of temporary contracts, transition rates to permanent contracts and 
wage penalty associated with temporary contracts.
Share of temporary 
workers (15-74 y.o.) 
2010 (a)
15-24 25-49 50-74
Transition rate 
from temporary 
to permanent 
contracts (b)
Wage-penalty 
adjusted (c)
EU-27 14.0 42.2 12.1 7.2 34.6 (1) -14.4 (2)
AT 9.3 37 5.3 2.8 59.9 -8.4
BE 8.1 30.4 7.1 3.3 45.4 -3.3 *)
BG 4.5 10.2 4.0 4.4 76.7 -3.9 *)
CY 13.5 20.4 15.1 6.0 32.0 insignif.
CZ 8.9 22.5 6.4 10.8 42.5 -13.7
DE 14.7 57.2 10.7 5.0 36.1 -21.4
DK 8.6 21.6 7.1 3.9 insignif.
EE 3.7 : 3.2 : 79.7 insignif.
ES 24.9 58.6 25.4 11.8 33.2 -13.3
FI 15.5 43.0 14.1 8.0 21.8 -8.9
FR 15.1 55.2 11.8 7.9 17.0 insignif.
EL 12.4 30.4 12.3 7.4 31.9 12.5
HU 9.7 24.9 9.3 6.9 65.2 -9.4
IE 9.3 30.4 7.1 6.0 57.7 insignif.
IT 12.8 46.7 11.9 6.3 36.3 -12.3
LT 2.4 7.5 2.0 2.0 60.9 insignif.
LU 7.1 36.5 6.0 3.0 49.5 -7.6
LV 6.8 12.7 6.1 6.4 71.0 insignif.
MT 5.7 14.8 3.9 : insignif.
NL 18.5 48.3 14.3 8.1 27.6 -11.6
PL 27.3 64.6 24.8 18.9 33.9 -27.8
PT 23.0 55.6 22.8 11.0 24.6 -13
RO 1.1 3.9 1.0 0.7 62.2 insignif.
SE 15.8 57.1 11.9 7.5 65.2 n.a.
SI 17.3 69.6 13.6 7.8 64.1 -15.7
SK 5.8 17.1 4.7 5.3 45.1 -11.5
UK 6.1 13.7 4.8 5.1 62.3 -10.3
(1) EUSILC (without DK, MT but including NO)
(2) Without SE
*) Significant only at more than 1 % (but less than 10 %)
n.a.: not available
insignif.: not significantly different from 0, i.e. no wage penalty.
Notes:
(a) Source: Eurostat, EU LFS 2010; 
(b) Source: RWI, Study on various aspects of labour market performance using micro data from EUSILC: 
Share of workers changing from temporary into permanent employment within 1 year. Average figures are 
computed for 2004-2008 (to give more stability and less variability due to the economic cycle); 
(c) Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) 2006 on the basis of a regres-
sion: Logarithm of median hourly wages as a function of a set of categorised variables: gender, occupation 
(ISCO), education (ISCED), age group, type of contract (permanent, temporary). - the wage penalty cor-
responds to the multiplier before the dummy indicating temporary employment (as contrast estimate). Note 
that the regression involves a total of N=8 461 observations, with the country-specific results based on no 
more than around 300 in most cases. As a reference see Employment in Europe 2010, Chapter 3, p. 133f.
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As can also be seen from the table, 
there are wage penalties related 
to being employed in temporary 
jobs. Further analysis carried out 
by RWI show that, at the average 
EU level, a person being tempo-
rarily employed working full-time 
receives 17 % less in hourly wage 
compared to the equivalent person 
who is permanent and full-time 
employed. Moreover, part-time 
employed persons, whether per-
manent or temporarily employed, 
receives lower hourly wage (4.7 % 
and 16.9 % respectively).
In other words, in some Member 
States segment of the labour mar-
ket suffer from certain rigidities 
and, despite increasing labour flows 
(see European Commission, 2009 
and OECD 2010), job opportunities 
are not equally available to all. This 
segmentation of the labour market 
has a number of negative labour 
market consequences (see Europe-
an Commission, 2010a) but it is also 
a factor behind the  persistence of 
in-work poverty.
2.4. In-work 
poverty by individual 
characteristics
Analysis of the labour market have 
shown that various groups, like 
women, young people, older work-
er, migrants, and the low-skilled 
more often experience difficulties 
at the labour market. These groups 
are more often than others unem-
ployed, discouraged ‘workers’(13), 
or otherwise inactive although the 
reasons for their inactivity varies 
between groups.
(13) ‘Discouraged’ are those inactive who 
want to work but believe that no work 
is available. 
Additionally, the intensity and qual-
ity of employment varies across 
population groups. Women, young 
people, migrants, and the low-
skilled more often face the risk of 
 underemployment, of working part-
time – voluntarily or not – or of 
being in precarious employment, 
although the reasons for part-time 
or  temporary  employment differ.
Despite the generally poorer posi-
tion of women on the labour market 
(evidenced by the gender pay gap 
and higher incidence of part time 
and temporary work), the in-work 
poverty risk for men is higher than 
for women(14) at the EU level and in 
most countries. This can partly be 
explained by the family status of 
employed women in each country. 
On the one hand, where employed 
women are predominantly living 
in couples they are more likely to 
be second earners, and therefore 
better protected from the risk of 
poverty. On the other hand, where 
single women and lone mothers are 
obliged to work, even part time in 
low wage job, they risk higher odds 
of in-work poverty. 
(14) See Chapter 3 on poverty.
2.4.1. With the exception 
of young people, age is not 
a strong driver of in-work 
poverty 
In-work poverty also varies across 
age groups (see also Chapter 2). 
Viewed across the EU as a whole, 
it tends to decreases with age 
as Chart 12 shows, although dif-
ferences are quite small and the 
rate of decline is modest. Again 
household circumstances matter. 
When young people live on their 
own and just hold student jobs 
or ‘ mini-jobs’(15), in-work poverty 
rates tend to be higher in these 
cohorts (such as in Denmark and 
Sweden). In some countries (nota-
bly Italy and Spain) young people 
tend to stay longer with their par-
ents even when in a proper job 
(see European  Commission, 2010) 
and therefore face lower poverty 
rates, which is why comparisons of 
the risk of  poverty by age may be 
misleading.
(15) “Mini-jobs” refer to a specific category 
of supported employment aimed 
at inserting people with low work 
experience in the labour market. The 
jobs are characterised either by short 
duration or working time, or low 
wage (which at the same time may 
be exempted from heavy payroll taxes, 
social contributions and minimum 
wages). See also Chapter 2.
Chart 12: In-work poverty and age by Member States, 2009
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2.4.2. Education has a 
significant influence on in-
work poverty, especially low 
education bears substantially 
higher risk of in-work poverty
Education is an important driver 
of personal and societal growth. 
Returns to education are positive, 
and usually quite important, in 
all Member States. As a result, as 
Chart 13 shows, in-work poverty is 
negatively correlated with educa-
tion levels for the employed: the 
higher the level of qualification 
obtained, the lower the incidence 
of in-work poverty. 
However, the ‘returns to education’ 
in terms of the effect of education on 
poverty reduction is quite  different 
across countries. In  Bulgaria, Greece, 
Poland, and  Romania - and to some 
extent in Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, and Hungary - education 
markedly reduces the odds of expe-
riencing in-work poverty. Low-skilled 
people are generally experiencing 
higher inactivity and unemployment 
rates than higher skilled. But in coun-
tries like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
and the Netherlands, that have safety 
nets that cover all people regardless 
of their former attachment to the 
labour market, low-skilled  individuals 
are at a lesser risk of in-work poverty 
than in countries with other types of 
social safety nets. Thereby, the ‘return 
on  education’ is smaller in these coun-
tries: the difference between in-work 
poverty rates for the low-skilled and 
those for the higher skilled is small.
People with low educational attain-
ment generally have an employment 
rate significantly lower than that 
of high-skilled persons, mainly due 
to high inactivity, even among the 
adult population aged 25-64(16). Lack 
of opportunities to obtain a perma-
nent or full-time job is a significantly 
greater reason for the high inci-
dence of temporary and part-time 
work among the low-skilled, which 
is higher than for other skill groups. 
Data from the LFS show that 13.5 % 
of low-skilled employees hold a tem-
porary contract and almost 80 % 
of them cannot find a permanent 
job, while one in five low-skilled 
employees work part-time, includ-
ing a third who want, but cannot 
find, a  full-time job. 
2.5. Factors such as 
low wage impacts on 
in-work poverty rates 
In-work poverty is dependent, not 
only on the labour market attach-
ment as analysed earlier, but also 
on the income of both the house-
hold and the individual. In particu-
lar, having a low-wage job - even 
permanent and full-time - can lead 
to in-work poverty. This is especially 
the case when weak labour market 
performances accumulate: indeed, as 
already implicit in Table 2 (Section 
(16) Analysis by skills is restricted to the 
population aged 25-64, in order 
to control for the high incidence of 
education among 15-24-year-olds.
2.3.5), temporary contracts involve a 
higher percentage of low-wage earn-
ers(17). According to the Structure of 
Earnings Survey (hereinafter “SES”), 
30.5 % of temporary workers were 
low wage earners in the EU in 2006 
and these were usually low skilled 
employees working in services. 
Gautié and Schmitt (2010) argue 
that the intensification of competi-
tion that has led businesses to pur-
sue active and urgent cost reduc-
tions has translated directly into 
pressure on the wages and working 
conditions of the low-paid, because 
workers in outsourced jobs gener-
ally have little firm-specific human 
capital, are easily replaced if they 
quit their jobs, and often lack union 
representation. 
Low-wage is also linked to different 
labour market institutions as Keese 
et al. (1998) show, with low wage 
workers tending to do better in 
countries with strong union move-
ments, especially in countries where 
governments have the capacity and 
the willingness to extend collective 
bargaining agreements beyond the 
actual participants. In these coun-
tries, the coverage of collective bar-
gaining agreements may extend to 
workers who might otherwise have 
low-wage, low-quality jobs. On the 
contrary, where unions are strong 
but cover only certain categories of 
workers they might contribute to 
stronger segmentation.
Another important example is the 
role of a statutory or informal mini-
mum wage. In France, for instance, 
the high legal minimum wage is 
very close to the low-wage thresh-
old, and hence seems to support it, 
while mini-jobs, as in Germany and 
Slovenia, tend to increases the pro-
portion of low wage earners. More-
over, unemployment benefits also 
help combat low wage employment, 
although this may be because they 
provide a disincentive effect to take 
(17) Low wage earners among full-time 
employees are defined as those earning 
less than two-thirds of the national 
median wage per year. See Eurostat, 2010. 
Chart 13: In-work poverty by education level, 2009
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Box 3.2: In-work poverty for the self-employed
90 % of all firms in the EU are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Overall, self-employment, including those self employed who 
themselves employ staff, accounted for nearly 15 % of total employment (more than 1 job in 7) in the EU-27 in 2010, and this is seen as an 
essential component of EU’s economic dynamism. 
The economic crisis triggered a loss of more than 6 million jobs between mid-2008 and the last quarter of 2010 in the EU, and self-employment 
was no exception, with more than 600 000 self-employed losing their job in the same period. Yet the self-employed sector has shown above 
average resilience, with a lower rate of employment decline than in dependent work. However, it is likely that much of the adjustment to the 
crisis occurred through reduced earnings rather than reduced employment.
It is not easy to assess the income of the self-employed in practice. All surveys, and the EU SILC is no exception, are subject to considerably 
higher rates of error issues concerning treatment of negative income and misreporting for the self-employed than for employees. Moreover, 
data on in-work poverty by most frequent activity status in the previous year is not available before 2009, making it impossible to compare 
developments during the crisis.
The EU SILC data available for 2009 shows, however, that the in-work poverty rate for self-employed and family workers (22.3 %) is almost 
four times higher than for employees (6.1 %), and almost three times higher than the overall EU average (8.4 %). Even though the scale of 
the differences varies between EU Member States, the general picture is that self-employed and family workers have a higher risk of in-work 
poverty than do employees (with the exception of Luxembourg which appears to show a similar picture for both).
Little difference is noted between the employee in-work poverty and in-work poverty for the self-employed, in Czech, Austria, Hungary, Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, and Luxembourg. The biggest differences are found in Romania, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Poland. In the latter group, 
the in-work poverty for the self-employed is around 28 % or more, with above 30 % in Lithuania, Latvia, and Spain and some 55 % in Romania. 
Chart 14: Employment and self employment year-on-year change
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Chart 15: In-work poverty for employees and self-employed and family workers, 2009
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up low-paid jobs, but only in so far 
as unemployment benefit rules and 
allowances allow people to remain 
unemployed while looking for a bet-
ter job opportunity.
Low-wage work can represent a first 
stepping stone towards better paid 
employment especially among young 
workers but, as mobility between 
temporary and permanent contracts 
in Europe’s labour markets is not very 
high (see Box 3.3), low-wage work 
can become a persistent feature of a 
person’s working life, whether due to 
lack of opportunity for skill develop-
ment, the inability of the employer 
to pay more, or simple wage discrimi-
nation. Moreover, Grimshaw (2011) 
finds that some people face a higher 
risk of low-wage work simply by vir-
tue of their sex, colour of skin, eth-
nicity, or origin, while others face a 
higher risk because of where their job 
is located, for example in the informal 
sector or agriculture, in a small firm 
or family-owned firm, in a sector fac-
ing intense international competition, 
or in a firm in a weak position in a 
 competitive global value chain. 
Not all low-wage workers live in 
poverty since many can pool their 
income with other household mem-
bers, or benefit from transfers from 
other family members or the State. 
But most low-wage workers can also 
face poor working conditions – a 
higher risk of the employer not pay-
ing for holidays and sick leave, for 
example, or not providing a pension 
plan or a permanent employment 
contract (See Box 3.3). 
Box 3.3: Impact on wages of being in temporary work contracts
As described earlier, the transition between temporary and permanent contracts is relatively slow. Table 3 shows the transitions in earnings 
deciles by Member State. Between 2004 and 2008 the share of workers moving up by two or more deciles ranged from around 14 % in Portugal 
to more than 21 % in Luxembourg.
Around 30 % of workers in Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania and 60 % of workers in Cyprus did not move an earning decile at all. Moreover, from 
3 % of the workers in Luxembourg to 15 % in Austria experienced a downward transition by two or more deciles. 
Table 3: Transitions between earnings deciles by country (in per cent)
Downward transitions Upward transitions
Two or more deciles One decile Same decile Two or more deciles One decile
Austria 14.76 18.7 34.89 16.71 14.95
Belgium 10.88 15.54 41.26 17.85 14.47
Bulgaria 21.6 16.75 23.34 15.27 23.04
Cyprus 3.46 12.61 60.51 17.51 5.9
Czech Republic 11.1 18.49 40.35 16.69 13.37
Germany 6.39 16.52 57.28 14.69 5.12
Denmark 6.45 16.55 52.05 14.97 9.99
Estonia 12.8 24.44 35.39 14.37 13
Spain 12.26 16.1 37.04 17.53 17.07
Finland 3.2 14.11 59.29 16.61 6.78
France 6.26 11.15 55.53 18.88 8.17
Hungary 13.07 19.64 39.64 15.09 12.56
Ireland 5.47 13.7 50.57 18.26 12
Italy 8.15 15.45 48.25 18.69 9.45
Lithuania 10.51 22.48 37.15 16.79 13.07
Luxembourg 3.17 13.06 56.12 21.44 6.2
Latvia 14.6 17.62 32.99 19.42 15.36
Netherlands 2.87 14.43 59.97 17.88 4.85
Norway 7.51 16.2 49.87 16.28 10.14
Poland 8.81 16.93 40.59 18.42 15.25
Portugal 12.68 18.79 42.76 14 11.77
Romania 11.31 25.06 33.04 15.57 15.03
Sweden 7.47 15.34 51.73 16.91 8.55
Slovenia 6.31 15.42 52.95 16.86 8.46
Slovakia 12.56 22.01 33.54 16.32 15.57
United Kingdom 8.6 16.13 48.66 17.76 8.85
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 2004-2008, RWI (2011) calculations
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The correlation between the inci-
dences of in-work poverty and low 
wage in the Member States can indi-
cate the extent of the problem across 
the EU. The data relate to 2007. 
Based on a cross-sectional com-
parison of Member State data, 
Chart 16 shows a positive co-inci-
dence between rates of low wages 
and rates of in-work poverty. How-
ever, while the correlation is sig-
nificant, it is not particularly strong 
(42 %), showing that in-work poverty 
is not just a result of low wages, and 
further econometric analysis confirms 
that low earnings are only a part of 
the problem, with low work intensity 
at the household level usually prov-
ing to be a greater determinant of 
in-work poverty, as also analysed in 
European Commission (2009b).
Box 3.4: The specification of the model
The econometric model is based on a logit regression of the odds of being an in-work poor (iwp)(1) for an individual i, in household h, in 
country c, in year t on a low work intensity dummy at the household level (lowwork)(2), the ratio of children over adult at household level 
and a dummy for low wage earners at individual level (lowwage)(3) and a set of individual characteristics X i (gender, age, education, citi-
zenship, health status, work experience, occupation, firm size, degree of urbanisation, temporary work contract and involuntary part-time).
As shown in the previous sections, these factors appear to play an important role: age and education are usually quite strongly correlated 
with low income while the type of occupation, the size of the firm, and the work experience can affect the income. The health status and the 
degree of urbanisation, on the other hand, can affect the job opportunities. However, these factors are also likely to be correlated with the 
three main mechanisms of in-work poverty. Therefore, in order to rule possible problems of collinearity, the model needs to be run both with 
and without controls(4). 
The regression also has time fixed effects (t) to take into account yearly common developments such as the economic cycle, and at the EU 
level, the regression is estimated using also country fixed effects (c) to rule out time-invariant country specificities. In the case of binary 
outcomes, i.e. outcomes that only take two values (0, 1) as for poverty, the Logit Model (or the Probit model) is the first choice (Wooldridge, 
2002) in order to take into account the non linearity(5). Unfortunately the coefficients of Logit (or Probit) estimation are not directly interpret-
able and, therefore, we compute and show in the table the odd ratios which allow us to indicate that, when there is a one-unit increase in an 
independent variable, the odds of being a working poor increase by x unit change.
The model was run both at the EU level and the MS level using the EU-SILC data (see Box 1 in Chapter 3) for the years 2007, 2008, 2009. 
The results help understand which is the most important channel of in-work poverty in order to be able to formulate policy proposals to fight 
in-work poverty tailored to country specificities (see Section 5). These findings should be interpreted with caution, however, remembering that 
they represent correlations and not necessarily causation.
(1) Here an in-work poor is defined as a person employed at least six months and the hours worked in a main job are not missing and whose 
equivalised family income is below 60 % of median equivalised income. 
(2) The EU SILC 2009 does not contain yet the revised definition of low work intensity (see Section 3). Therefore, here low work intensity at the 
household level is defined as a household whose members work less than half of their capacity, e.g. in a couple, one works and the other not.
(3) See Footnote 1 of Chart 16.
(4) However, we can test collinearity using the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and we found encouraging results at the EU level. A common rule 
of thumb is that if VIF is above 10 (others refer to 5) then multi-collinearity is high. All our variables show a VIF around 1 and only age and 
work experience exceed the value of 4. When dropping the variable age, VIF estimates are all around 1 (for further discussion on collinearity, 
see Greene, 2011).
(5) Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that even if the dependent variable is binary the linear probability model can be used.
Chart 16: In-work poverty and the incidence of employed on low wage(1), 2007
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(1) Low wage earners are defined as those earning less than two-thirds of the national median 
wage per hour. In order to obtain hourly wages, we use the yearly cash employee income and 
we divide by the number of hours usually worked per week in main job time the numbers of 
months of work.
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2.6. Econometric 
analysis of the 
determinants of  
in-work poverty
The other sections have identified 
mechanisms of in-work poverty in 
the EU which work beyond indi-
vidual characteristics: namely house-
hold composition, low wage work, 
and work intensity(18). The descrip-
tive  statistics provide a first picture 
of these aspects. However, in order 
to take into account the interplay 
of these mechanisms and to exam-
ine more formally the characteristics 
associated with working poverty and 
how this varies across countries, an 
econometric analysis was carried out 
on the determinants of in-work pov-
erty at the individual level, building 
on Crettaz and Bonoli (2011) and 
Lohmann (2008). 
2.6.1. The results
The baseline model (the one with-
out controls) shows that, at the EU 
level, the three mechanisms all play 
a significant role in determining in-
work poverty. However, at the EU 
level, a low work intensity and low 
wage seem to be key determinants 
of poverty. In particular, as Chart 17 
shows, the estimations at the EU 
level show that working less than 
half of the potential of a household 
level (often in the context of part 
time or temporary employment) has 
more than 5 times higher risk of 
being in in-work poverty. Having a 
low wage is also a significant deter-
minant of in-work poverty: being a 
low wage earner increases the odd 
of in-work poverty by 5 times. The 
impact of low work intensity seems 
similar to the one of earning a low 
wage once other control variables 
and country and time fixed effects 
are taken into account. These results 
are supported by research carried 
out in Marx et al. (2011) where it is 
equally found that both work inten-
sity and low wage are significant 
(18) Work intensity is analysed in depth in 
the following Section 3.
but that increasing work intensity 
decreases poverty more than 
 increasing low wages.
The family composition also plays a 
role in increasing the odds of poverty 
when the number of children over 
the adults increases, though rela-
tively less than the two other factors: 
for instance, a single mother with 
a single child increases her odds of 
in-work poverty by roughly 2.4 times 
when having a second child. 
Individual characteristics all play 
a significant role as expected, but 
much lower than the three main 
channels identified: in particular 
higher education and work experi-
ence both reduce the odds of being 
in-work poor, as do living in a city 
and working in a relatively larger 
firm. Age, taken in isolation, does 
not seem to have much effect on the 
odds of in-work poverty(19). 
Involuntary part-time increases the 
risk of in-work poverty by 2.7 times 
compared to workers who are not 
in involuntary part-time. Thus invol-
untary part-time seems to be a deci-
sive factor for the in-work poverty. 
(19) Again, there may be a non-negligible 
multi-collinearity problem: as discussed 
above, age is the only variable with a 
Variance Inflation Factor above 4. How-
ever, even estimating the regression (1) 
without the age variable the results do 
not change much. On the other hand, a 
bad general health status increases the 
odds of in-work poverty. There might 
also be an endogeneity problem for 
the low-wage variable, which is mainly 
determined by age, education and work 
experience. Nevertheless the consistency 
of the different specifications allows us 
to draw some preliminary conclusions.
Chart 17: Determinants of in-work poverty, EU level, 2007-2009
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Inv
olu
nta
ry
par
t-ti
me
Tem
por
ary
wo
rk c
ont
rac
t
Urb
ani
sat
ion
Firm
 siz
e
Wo
rk e
xpe
rien
ce
Bad
 he
alth
con
diti
onsExt
ra e
uMa
le
Yea
rs o
f ed
uca
tionAge
Low
 wa
ge 
ear
ner
Chi
ld/
adu
lt ra
tio
Low
 wo
rk 
inte
nsi
ty
O
dd
 ra
tio
Dependent variable
Note: Odd ratios of Logit estimates of the impact on in-work poverty (see Box for the specification). 
The estimation includes country, time and occupation dummies. See Annex for detailed results.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU SILC anonymised dataset 2007-2009
Chart 18: Determinants of in-work poverty by Member States, 2007-2009
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Having a temporary work contract 
increases the risk of getting into 
in-work poverty by 1.5 times in 
comparison with people who have 
permanent work contracts. These 
results confirm the findings in the 
former sections.
Analysing the results at Member 
State level as in Chart 18 helps 
demonstrate the different impact, 
and relative importance, of the 
three channels across countries in 
Europe, where differences are quite 
 substantial.
Low work intensity is a key factor of 
poverty everywhere in Europe, but it is 
particularly marked in Lithuania where 
it increases the odds of in-work pover-
ty almost twelve times, and in Bulgaria 
and Denmark where it increases the 
odds ten times. 
On the contrary, low work intensity 
seems a relatively less important factor 
behind in-work poverty in Romania 
(where the problem is low wages) 
and Ireland and partly in Sweden and 
Poland. 
On the other hand, family composi-
tion is relatively more important 
in the southern European countries 
(Italy, Spain, and Malta in particu-
lar) but also in Slovenia. In Malta, 
for example, having one extra child 
for a single parent with one child 
already more than quadruples the 
odds of in-work poverty. On the 
contrary, family composition seems 
to count for very little in the Nordic 
countries (see for instance Sweden, 
Finland, partly in Denmark, but also 
Germany) where family allowances 
and services are stronger. In Sweden 
and Finland, for instance, an addi-
tional child for a single parent with 
one child has very little impact on 
the odds of in-work poverty after 
 controlling for other factors.
Low wages seems to be a significant 
determinant of in-work poverty in 
all Member States, but appear to be 
a particularly important  channel of 
in-work poverty in Romania,  Austria, 
and Latvia, but also in countries such 
as Denmark,  Finland, and Sweden 
where there is no national statutory 
minimum wage, but wage bargaining 
systems that cover most of the labour 
market. In this case, the in-work poor 
might be those who are not covered 
by such bargaining arrangements, 
or who work in industries without 
sector level minimum wages (and/or 
they might be young people who are 
working while studying). 
However, Crettaz (2011) and Nolan 
et al. (2010) show that most low-
wage workers are not poor thanks 
to their household context, which 
allows them to draw on the income 
of other household members. Indeed 
most low paid individuals are not in 
income related poverty, and fewer 
than one in six low paid employees 
are in poor households. 
The three mechanisms have the 
strongest explanatory power in 
 Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, Belgium 
and Luxembourg while they have the 
lowest explanatory power in the UK, 
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus(20).
Looking at individual characteristics, 
it can be noted that age plays only 
a limited role in all Member States 
after controlling for work experi-
ence and low wages, although the 
importance of the age factor varies 
strongly from one country to anoth-
er. In some countries, the working 
poor are young (most are in their 
twenties in Denmark and Sweden) 
while in other countries the median 
working poor is in the prime age 
cohort (25-54), or even aged over 
55 (Portugal most notably but also 
partly in Ireland). 
(20) Based on the pseudo-R², see Tables in the 
Annex.
Moreover, in some Member States, 
working poverty decreases regu-
larly with age, while in others it 
is  higher among middle-age work-
ers than among young workers. 
Indeed, it is not so much the fact 
of being young per se that matters: 
youth is associated with a lower 
human capital due to the lack of 
work experience, and, hence, with 
a higher likelihood to receiving 
only a low wage. This is consistent 
with the findings by Mosthaf (2011) 
which show that low wage jobs may 
provide stepping stones for the low 
qualified, but may represent a bad 
signal in the case of more highly 
educated workers. 
Education, on the other hand, has 
a significant positive impact on the 
probability of being out of in-work 
poverty, but it is still quite lim-
ited in size. Being a man generally 
increases the odds of in-work pov-
erty as has already been shown in 
the descriptive analysis. This is likely 
to be due to a composition effect 
of the workforce (women often 
enter as second earners and are 
therefore less likely to be poor even 
though they accept a low paid, 
low hours job). Nolan et al. (2010), 
indeed, shows that among the low 
paid, income poverty is  generally 
more widespread among men than 
among women. 
Being a foreigner (non EU) increas-
es the probability of being in-work 
poor but not in several of the new 
Member States which are mainly 
emigration countries. Living in a city 
usually reduces the odds of in-work 
poverty, but this seems not to be the 
case in Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Italy, and most 
notably Luxembourg.
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3. poverTy in The lighT 
of household work 
inTensiTy 
In looking at poverty among work-
ers the previous section identified 
the main individual explanatory fac-
tors, namely their personal and job 
profile, and the composition of the 
household to which they belong. 
Their involvement in the labour mar-
ket (expressed as being in part-time 
rather than full-time employment, 
working for less than a full year as 
opposed to working a full year, or 
whether they held temporary or per-
manent contracts) were found to be 
the major determinant factors.
Thus, in order to better understand 
why people can be at risk of pov-
erty despite being employed, a more 
complex measurement of the ‘volume’ 
of their employment is called for. A 
straightforward way of addressing this 
is to refer to the amount of time 
worked, both in terms of (weekly) 
working hours (accounting for part-
time work) and in terms of weeks 
spent in employment over a year (tak-
ing account of any spells of unemploy-
ment and intermittent spells of inactiv-
ity possibly associated with temporary 
contracts). In other words, there is a 
need to address work intensity at the 
personal level since it is evident that 
a 10-hour per week seasonal job, for 
example, cannot be expected to con-
stitute a safeguard against poverty.
However, what matters concerning 
the poverty of an individual is not only 
his/her own involvement in the labour 
market and their own working time, 
but the employment involvement and 
pattern of work of all the adults who 
belong to the same household. Obvi-
ously, a full-time earner who lives with 
non-employed people in the same 
household will be closer to, or even 
below, the poverty threshold than one 
whose income is combined with other 
earners in the household. 
In order to address this issue more 
precisely, the Indicators’ Sub-
Group (ISG) of the Social Protection 
 Committee (SPC) has defined a varia-
ble entitled ‘work intensity at house-
hold level’ which basically measures 
how much of the potentially avail-
able annual working time of all the 
adults in the household is actually 
spent in employment (see Box 3.5 for 
definition and further explanations). 
The group of ‘people living in house-
holds with very low work intensity’ 
has then become a component of 
the Europe 2020 headline indicator 
‘population at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion’ (see Box 3.6 for fur-
ther explanations) and is used in the 
following analysis for deepening our 
understanding of poverty. 
Since work intensity can range any-
where from 0 % to 100 %, the total 
absence of employment is just one 
extreme case and this section – 
while focusing on in-work poverty 
– addresses poverty of all adults, not 
Box 3.5: Definition of work intensity 
The household work intensity variable was adopted in 2004 by the ISG of the SPC to be used 
in the breakdown of the social inclusion secondary indicator ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate by work 
intensity’. It was calculated as a ratio of the sum of all months actually worked in the past 
year (without any distinction between full-time or part-time) by adults (aged 16-64, exclud-
ing dependent inactive youth aged 16-24) to the sum of workable months in the household. 
The ‘new’ household work intensity variable was developed in 2010, in the framework of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. It is defined as the ratio of the number of all months that adults (aged 
18-59, not being a student aged 18-24) worked to the total number of months that could, in 
theory, have been worked by adults in the same household. For persons who declared hav-
ing worked part-time, an estimate of the number of months in terms of full time-equivalent 
is computed on the basis of the number of usually worked hours at the time of the interview.
In both definitions, households composed solely of children, of students aged less than 25, 
and of people aged 65/60 or more (respectively in the previous and ‘new’ definition) are 
entirely excluded from the indicator computation. 
This ‘new’ specification of work intensity thus differs from the ‘old’ specification with respect 
to the age bracket considered and on account of the adjustment of part-time work to full-
time equivalents, resulting in a more appropriate measurement of work intensity (given that 
the proportion of part-time workers differs significantly between Member States, as well as 
between groups on the labour market). Only the new specification is used in this analysis. 
Box 3.6: Very low work intensity as a measure of social exclusion
Among the primary aims of the ‘Europe 2020 strategy’ for smart, sustainable, and inclusive 
growth that was endorsed by the European Council in June 2010 were the objectives of 
helping the EU recover from the crisis and increasing social cohesion between its citizens. 
People living in households with zero, or very low work intensity have been recognised as one 
of the most challenging groups in terms of social cohesion, due to their dependency on social 
transfers and their difficulty in accessing basic goods and services. Therefore, ‘people living in 
households with very low work intensity’ have become a component of the Europe 2020 headline 
indicator ‘population at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, next to the ‘at risk of poverty rate after 
social transfers’ and the ‘severe material deprivation rate’ (see Chapter 2).
People living in households with very low work intensity are defined as people of all ages 
(from 0-59 years) living in households where the adults (those aged 18-59, but excluding 
student aged 18-24) worked less than 20 % of their total combined work-time potential dur-
ing the previous 12 months. These people are identified using the data from the EU Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) and to some extent correspond to the concept 
of ‘people living in jobless households’ as defined using the EU Labour Force Survey (EU 
LFS), where no member is in employment according to the ILO definition. The choice of the 
20 % threshold reflects the fact that, below that level of work intensity, household members 
experience very high rates of poverty and material deprivation. 
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only of those employed(21), as in the 
previous section. In order to simpli-
fy the presentation, however, work 
intensity of households will be cate-
gorised as follows: ‘very low’ [0-20 %] 
including jobless households; ‘low’ 
(20-40 %]; ‘medium’ (40-60 %]; ‘high’ 
(60-80 %]; and ‘very high’ (80-100 %].
After addressing poverty in relation to 
the work intensity of the household, 
the second part of this section differ-
entiates the risk of poverty(22) by two 
types of households – those with, and 
those without, dependent children. 
This issue of household composition is 
crucial: firstly, because the presence of 
children influences decisions on work 
intensity, and secondly because the 
presence of children directly affects 
the income of all household members 
and hence their position relative to 
national poverty thresholds. 
3.1. Household 
work intensity as 
a determinant of 
individual’s poverty
3.1.1. Where do adults 
concentrate along the 
household work intensity? 
Chart 19 shows the distribution of 
adults in the EU by work intensity of 
the household to which they belong.
According to the estimate for 2009, 
9.4 % of adults in the 18-59 age group 
lived in households with very low work 
intensity up to the level of 20 %, which 
corresponds to the 26.7 million adults 
classified as living in very low work 
intensity households in the framework 
of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
(21) This first part of this section will cover 
the risk of poverty among all adults aged 
18-59 (except students) – employed, 
unemployed, inactive, because it relates 
to combined working intensity of the 
household not of the individual.
(22) This second part of this section will cover 
the risk of poverty among persons aged 
0-59, because it reports on the poverty 
faces by the type of the household – with 
or without dependent children.
As Chart 19 shows, low work inten-
sity - between 20 % and 40 % - is 
the least frequently found situation, 
with only 5.6 % of adults in this 
group. This rare configuration cor-
responds, for example, to households 
with only one person employed, and 
that part-time, or to households with 
one full-time earner but who was 
only at work for part of the year. 
Belonging to a household with 
medium work intensity is a second 
most frequently found situation, 
with nearly 20 % of adults in such 
a household, which often contains 
only part-time workers, just one 
full-time earner (‘one breadwinner 
model’), or adults employed for 
only part of the year. Temporary 
workers are often found in this 
group since they may be less likely 
to work full years since they face 
a higher risk of moving in and 
out of periods of unemployment 
and inactivity than employees with 
 permanent contracts.
A significant share of adults in the 
EU (17 %) live in households with 
high work intensity, namely 60-80 %. 
This intensity corresponds, for exam-
ple, to households with one full-time 
earner and some part-time workers 
(or workers who are at work for only 
part of the year). 
Chart 19: Distribution of adults by household work intensity for the EU, 2009 
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Chart 20: Distribution of adults by household work intensity for the EU Member 
States, 2009
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Very high work intensity - between 
80 % and 100 % - is the most fre-
quently found households, with near-
ly 50 % of adults in the EU belonging 
to that group. However, it should 
be noted that this group includes a 
large number of full-time employed 
persons living alone - in other words, 
one-person households with 100 % 
work intensity. 
Of course, the average results for EU-27 
as a whole, as presented in Chart 19, 
mask substantial variations between 
Member States, as shown in Chart 50 
in an annex which provides equivalent 
data for each Member State sepa-
rately. Chart 20 shows the distribution 
of work intensity in the EU Member 
States, with countries ordered by the 
share of adults living in very high work 
intensity households. 
The southern Member States (Greece, 
Italy, Malta, and Spain), where the 
traditional family model with a low 
participation of women remains 
common, are examples of countries 
with 25 % or more of adults in house-
holds with medium work intensity 
(although this group also includes 
Luxembourg). In contrast, in Den-
mark only 10 % of adults belong to 
this group. 
In countries with widespread 
 part-time work supporting a high 
participation of women, namely 
in  Germany, the Netherlands, and 
 Sweden, 20 % or more of adults live 
in a high work intensity household. 
In all Member States, however, the 
majority of adults belong to very high 
work intensity households. In some 
of the new Member States (the Baltic 
States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia) as well as in Denmark, 
more than 60 % of adults belong to 
very high work intensity households, 
which may reflect both the role of 
wages (low hourly wages encourag-
ing those concerned to work longer 
hours) in formulating decisions on 
the extent of labour market par-
ticipation in the first group, and the 
high participation of women in the 
labour market in Denmark. 
3.1.2. How much does a 
household need to work to 
ward off the risk of poverty?
Chart 21 shows the distribution of 
household work intensity already pre-
sented in Chart 19, together with the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate of adults for 
each level of work intensity. For ori-
entation, the total at-risk-of- poverty 
rate for adults (which serves as the 
reference poverty rate for very low 
and low intensity households) and 
the total in-work poverty rate (which 
differs from the former by exclud-
ing persons not in employment) are 
 indicated by horizontal lines.
The evidence suggests that, when 
household work intensity increases 
beyond the 20 % level, the risk of 
poverty begins to drop significantly. 
For the EU as a whole, the poverty 
rate falls from 50-55 % in the 0-20 % 
work intensity household bracket to 
40 % for adults in the households with 
a work intensity of 20-30 % (which 
helps to explain the choice of the 20 % 
threshold in defining the concept of 
very low work intensity). Given the 
rate of more than 50 %, around 14 mil-
lion (out of 26.7 million) adult persons 
from very low work intensity house-
holds are at risk of poverty in the EU. 
Moving further up the scale of work 
intensity, the change in the risk of pov-
erty rate is more gradual.  However, 
even though the poverty rate is 
reduced nearly three times for adults 
who belong to medium work inten-
sity households compared to very low 
intensity ones, 20 % of adults in this 
group still live below the national 
poverty threshold. Only when work 
intensity exceeds 50 % does the risk of 
poverty come down to the same level 
of total ‘at risk of poverty rate’ for 
adults, namely 15 %. Household work 
intensity at the level of 60-70 % brings 
adults below the average ‘in work 
poverty rate’ of around 8 %, and work 
intensity of 70-80 % brings the rate 
down to around 7.5 %. 
Very high work intensity in house-
holds brings down the risk of poverty 
among adults very significantly - to 
5.4 % in the 80-90 % work intensity 
bracket and to 4.5 % in households 
with a work intensity of 90-100 %. 
In other words, higher work inten-
sity clearly, if predictably, indicates a 
much higher protection of household 
members against the risk of poverty. 
The relationship between work 
intensity and poverty rates for all EU 
Member States is given in detail in 
Chart 50 in the annex.
In some Member States (Denmark, 
 Ireland) medium work intensity 
 (40-60 %) is already sufficient to reduce 
the risk of poverty rate for adults to 
a level similar to that for the total 
employed. This may reflect flexible and 
well functioning labour markets and 
Chart 21: Poverty rate and share of adults versus household work intensity  
for the EU, 2009 
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well developed institutional support, 
including good income support for 
those not employed full-time or during 
interrupting periods over the year. 
On the other hand, in a few coun-
tries, a rate of very high work intensi-
ty exceeding 80 % is needed in order 
to reduce steeply the risk of poverty 
rate below the respective one char-
acteristic for total employed, includ-
ing in France, Greece, Italy,  Latvia, 
 Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Romania, 
Spain, Slovakia, and  Slovenia 
(Chart 50 in the Annex). 
In terms of its impact on poverty, 
the evidence suggests that low and 
medium work intensity is insuffi-
cient to protect household members 
against the risk of poverty in the EU. 
The combined intensity of household 
members needs to be high or very 
high if it is to increase the chances 
of warding off poverty by more than 
90 %. In terms of policy, this suggests 
that increasing the labour market 
participation of the adults belong-
ing to households with work inten-
sity below 60 % is particularly impor-
tant in the fight to reduce poverty. 
 Policies that can be mobilised to that 
end are reviewed in the last section 
of this chapter.
3.1.3. What if all household 
members work as much as 
they can?
A high combined work intensity of 
household members brings the risk 
of poverty among adults to below 
10 %, while very high household 
work intensity ensures that the risk 
of poverty among adults drops to 
5 % from the 20 % estimated for 
adults belonging to the households 
with medium work intensity (the 
40-50 % bracket) (Chart 21). 
However, poverty linked to very high 
work intensity does vary across Mem-
ber States. Notably, 13 % of adults from 
households with very high work inten-
sity live at risk of poverty in Romania, 
and this share is also high in Greece 
(8.0 %), Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Spain (around 7 %). This leads to the 
question of the quality of full-time 
work, including the issue of low wage/
earning jobs, or the situation of full-
time workers on temporary contracts 
who face higher risks of transitions to 
unemployment and inactivity. 
On the other hand, the risk of pover-
ty for adults living in very high work 
intensity households is the lowest in 
the Czech Republic, Malta, and the 
UK (less than 2.5 %) (Chart 22). 
Wages, which are generally the most 
important component of income 
(including for in-work poor, as it is 
shown in the last section), might still 
be too low to fight poverty. Therefore, 
policies that provide adequate income 
support to the employed, such as mini-
mum wages, as well as supplementary 
income from social security and tax 
systems (see the last section) play a role 
in fighting in-work poverty.
Chart 23 shows that in countries with 
a high incidence of low wages(23) 
( Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania) 
households reduce their risk of poverty 
significantly only while moving from a 
medium to a very high level of work 
intensity, or work full time. 
At the EU level, while the 15 percent-
age point reduction (of nearly 80 %) in 
the poverty risk compared to  medium 
work intensity is very significant, it 
still leaves 6.5 million adults at risk of 
poverty despite the very high work 
intensity of the household members. 
(23) Low wage earners among full-time 
employees are defined as those earning 
less than two-thirds of the national 
median wage per year. The previous 
section discussed the issue of low wages 
in more details.
Chart 22: Poverty rate and share of adults living in very high work intensity 
households across EU Member States, 2009 
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Chart 23: Impact of low wage on change in poverty rate while passing from medium  
to very high work intensity of household across EU Member States 
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3.2. Impact of 
presence of children 
in the household on 
individual’s poverty
The further analysis focuses on the 
impact of the household composition 
on household work intensity, which 
results from the participation of adult 
household members in employment 
and from the presence of children, 
and (through that) on the poverty risk. 
It is expanded to the population aged 
0-59(24), and addresses the issue of pov-
erty of people in this age bracket with 
respect to their type of household: 
with or without dependent children, 
and conditional on work intensity. 
The presence of the children in the 
household impacts the risk of poverty 
in two ways. First, it affects decisions 
about participation in the labour 
market including about part-time 
work of household members, espe-
cially women, and thus  influences 
the work intensity level. Secondly, 
since households with children are 
larger, the total income is distributed 
among more persons, reducing the 
equalised income of all members.
3.2.1. To what extent 
does presence of children 
determine the household 
work intensity?
This section looks at how the house-
hold composition (i.e. whether they 
include children) impacts on work 
intensity and, indirectly, on poverty.
Chart 24 shows the distribution of 
people by household work intensity 
(24) This part will cover the risk of 
poverty among persons aged 0-59, 
because it reports on the poverty 
faces by the type of the household 
– with or without dependent chil-
dren as already discussed in Chart 19, 
but with the additional distinction of 
households with and  without depend-
(24) This part will cover the risk of poverty 
among persons aged 0-59, because it 
reports on the poverty faces by the type 
of the household – with or without 
dependent children. 
ent children. Two distinct patterns 
emerge. Households with dependent 
children are present comparably more 
often in the medium and high work 
intensity group, while households 
without dependent children are more 
often found in both very low and very 
high work  intensity households.
On this basis it seems that belong-
ing to a household with dependent 
children (or simply having children) 
is an important factor limiting job-
lessness of at least of one parent, 
with the share of people in very low 
work intensity households dropping 
to 7 % where dependent children 
are present, while the proportion is 
higher, at 13 %, in households with-
out children. 
Moreover, people with children are 
more often present in medium and 
high work intensity households, with 
a share of more than 40 % as against 
30 % for those without children. This 
work intensity is typical if there is 
only one breadwinner and/or the 
other members do not have a job, 
work part-time, or are not in employ-
ment for some time of the year, 
often because of care duties. 
At the same time, the absence of 
dependent children does allow all 
household members to work full-time 
(with shares in very high work inten-
sity of 53 % without children against 
45 % with children) and, in any case, 
very high work intensity involves the 
most significant share of population 
for both types of household.
Chart 51 in the Annex gives details 
for each Member State. 
Some different patterns emerge 
across Member States. In most Mem-
ber States medium work intensity 
is relatively more common among 
households with dependent children, 
while very high work intensity is 
relatively more widespread among 
households without dependent chil-
dren. This pattern is most prominent 
in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and the UK, where 
part-time work is most common. 
In contrast, in several Member States 
very high work intensity is rela-
tively more common among house-
holds with dependent children, 
while medium work intensity is not 
less common among the household 
without dependent children. This 
is the situation for some of the 
new Member States, but also for 
 Denmark and Portugal, reflecting 
the high participation rates of par-
ents in the labour market (argu-
ably for somewhat  different reasons 
– low wages in one case, gender 
equality in the other). 
Chart 24: Distribution of population by household work intensity for the EU, for 
households with and without dependent children, 2009
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Overall, the presence of children 
provokes different decisions about 
involvement in work and, in conse-
quence, shapes the work intensity 
of the household level. Hence the 
income from employment (wages) 
and the level of work intensity of 
households influences the total 
household income and ultimately the 
relative poverty. 
3.2.2. What is the impact of 
presence of children on the 
poverty rate along the work 
intensity?
The following part looks at the extent 
to which having children impacts 
directly on the risk of poverty in the 
EU and in the Member States. 
The most direct impact of the pres-
ence of children on household pov-
erty reflects the need to share the 
total income among more house-
hold members, which diminishes the 
equivalised income. In the EU as 
a whole, the overall poverty rate 
is nearly 18 % for people living in 
households with dependent chil-
dren (affecting 45 million people), 
and 15 % for people living in house-
holds without dependent children 
( affecting 35 million).
In Chart 25 the impact of having 
children on the risk of poverty can 
be seen by the gap between the 
risk of poverty of households, with 
and without children. The gap varies 
along the work intensity scale, and 
different poverty rates are faced by 
members of households with and 
without dependent children, for 
each level of work intensity. At the 
EU level, the gap is widest for very 
low work intensity households, but 
reduces to a negligible size at very 
high work intensity. 
The at-risk-of-poverty rate for people 
in very low work intensity house-
holds is nearly 70 % for households 
with dependent children, and around 
45 % for households without - a size-
able gap of 25 percentage points. 
The risk falls to, respectively, just 
around 25 % and 15 % for medium 
(40-50 %) work intensity households 
- as predicted - due to the impact of 
income from employment, and the 
gap narrows to 10 percentage points. 
Subsequently, with increasing com-
bined working time, the difference 
drops in the EU and in most of 
the Member States, and largely 
disappears at very high intensity. 
At work intensity in the 80-100 % 
bracket, the risk of poverty rate 
falls to 4 % and 6 % for people 
living in households without and 
with children respectively - a gap of 
2 percentage points. 
This evidence of a narrowing gap 
suggests the potential benefits of 
policies aimed at moving people 
to higher work intensity, although, 
since the gap still persists at medium 
intensity (at EU level), policies to 
provide income support could also 
contribute. Therefore, it may be 
important to target specific family 
policies at low intensity households 
through active inclusion or policies to 
remove obstacles to employment and 
through the provision of  services, like 
childcare. 
The relationship between work inten-
sity and poverty rates for all EU Mem-
ber States is given in detail in Chart 51 
in the annex, pointing to the differ-
ences across  Member States. Chart 26 
summarises this  information. 
In some Member States the differ-
ence in the risk of poverty for peo-
ple in households with and without 
dependent children is very striking 
at very low work intensity, name-
ly in Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. 
On the other hand, in some coun-
tries,  namely the Baltic States of 
 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
 Germany, and the UK, the difference 
between the two groups at very low 
work  intensity is rather small. 
The gap in the risk of poverty for peo-
ple in households with and without 
dependent children already starts to 
narrow significantly at medium inten-
sity (40-60 %) in some other Member 
States, including the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Austria, Hungary,  Ireland, 
and Sweden. It results from the fact 
that in these Member States the poli-
cies supporting families appear to 
be strong, providing appropriate 
compensation for the cost of raising 
children. On the other hand, differ-
ences remain significant in France and 
Romania, and are also high in Greece, 
Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
and Slovenia. 
At very high work intensity, the 
presence of children in the house-
hold does not increase significantly 
the risk of poverty in most Mem-
ber States, with the exception of 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, and Spain. This may be 
Chart 25: Poverty rate and share of population versus household work intensity  
for the EU, for households with and without dependent children, 2009 
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explained by the  weakness of child 
benefits for the employed in these 
countries, as well as wage levels that 
are insufficient to remove the risk of 
poverty from families. 
The different pictures in Chart 51 
in the annex should be read as fol-
lows. In Denmark, for example, peo-
ple with children tend to live more 
often in very high work intensity 
households than do people without 
dependent children. A different situ-
ation exists in Germany where fami-
lies tend to form medium intensity 
households. In both Denmark and 
Germany, however, the poverty lines 
lie close to each other, which indicate 
the presence of good family support 
at each level of work intensity.
On the contrary, in Spain or Italy - as 
in Germany - medium work intensity 
is more common among families. In 
both cases, though, the poverty rate 
gap is greatest at the lower end of 
the work intensity scale and converg-
es only at the very high work intensi-
ty end, further underlining the point 
that wages are an important factor 
influencing household income and 
shaping the risk of poverty. 
In some Member States, a narrow 
gap between the poverty risk faced 
by households with children and 
those without, at all intensity levels 
(the poverty curves lie close to each 
other) reflects the effectiveness of 
policies to support families in some 
Member States, either through the 
provision of adequate income sup-
port linked to having children (Aus-
tria, Germany), or by encouraging 
higher labour market participation 
through the support provided by 
access to services, notably childcare 
(Denmark, Hungary). 
Implementing such policies in other 
Member States could help reduce 
the population living in poverty in 
households with or without depend-
ent children, especially in those 
where the gap is evident at medium 
work intensity. 
Chart 26: Poverty rates by type of households and household work intensity across 
EU Member States, 2009
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4. policy responses
The analyses presented in the previ-
ous part of the chapter have revealed 
three factors that can lead to in-work 
poverty: inadequate hourly/monthly 
earnings; low work intensity; and the 
 household structure. 
In most countries, preventing and 
tackling in-work poverty has not 
been seen as a specific objective of 
labour market and social policies. 
Nevertheless, many Member States 
have put in place a range of instru-
ments in the framework of their 
labour market policies and tax and 
social protection systems that effec-
tively contribute to reducing in-work 
poverty with, for example, policies 
on minimum wages and systems 
of social and fiscal benefits having 
a direct impact on net disposable 
income. Furthermore, policies aimed 
at increasing labour market par-
ticipation, such as vocational train-
ing, life-long learning, employment-
subsidised schemes, etc., all have an 
indirect impact by promoting mobil-
ity and increasing the employability 
of people at risk. Depending on the 
extent to which these policies are 
well-designed and targeted, they 
can be very efficient in reaching the 
groups of people most likely to be 
affected by in-work poverty.
This part of the chapter reviews the 
policy instruments used by Mem-
ber States to address in-work pov-
erty. They are grouped into three 
 categories: 
•	 policies that contribute to ensuring 
adequate income (e.g. minimum 
wages, social benefits, and fiscal 
benefits)
•	 policies encouraging the labour 
market participation of groups 
most affected by in-work poverty
•	 policies that provide access to 
appropriate enabling and support 
services.
4.1. Policies for 
ensuring adequate 
earnings
Policies that aim to ensure an ade-
quate level of earnings include a 
combination of instruments such as 
minimum wages, social and fiscal 
benefits, and wage subsidies. These 
are reviewed below, grouped under 
three sub-headings. 
4.1.1. Minimum wages 
and collective bargaining 
structure
Minimum wages play an important 
role in limiting the incidence of low 
pay by providing a wage floor for 
income from employment, whether 
set by law or by collective agree-
ments. Twenty Member States have a 
national statutory minimum wage set 
by governments, in many cases after 
consultation with the social partners 
and a number of other Member States 
( Austria, Denmark,  Finland, Germany, 
Italy, and  Sweden), have minimum 
pay rates regulated through collec-
tive agreements with sector, occu-
pation, branch, or regions-specific 
wage floors(25). 
Minimum wages have long been 
a focus of academic research 
and policy debate and they are 
seen to provide gains for certain 
population groups by ensuring 
a wage floor. The effectiveness 
of  minimum wages in supporting 
(25) On collective bargaining structure, see 
European Commission (2011).
Box 3.7: Is tackling in-work poverty a specific aim of national labour market 
and social policies? A few examples:
Belgian experts(1) comment that “in-work poverty has not been the subject of explicit policy 
intervention in recent years (since 2008). Nonetheless, we found a number of measures in the 
federal and regional employment plans, as well as in the federal poverty relief plan, that could 
directly or indirectly influence the incidence of in-work poverty. These are measures on income 
protection, job stability, activation policies, and training in order to promote mobility.” 
The Danish experts note that “there are no policies that directly address the issue of in-work 
poverty in Denmark. However, there are policies that indirectly affect the issue. For instance, 
policies and legislations regarding social benefits, taxation, health, and family, help to avoid 
in-work poverty, although none of these policies are originally initiated as a counteraction 
towards this specific issue. These policies focus on the basis of income, irrespective of an 
individual’s labour market status.” 
The Finnish experts note that “poverty is seldom discussed in Finnish policies in relation 
to work”. However, they go on to point out that “the policy tools for fighting poverty in 
general and poverty among those active on the labour market have been many”. In France, 
the Active Solidarity Income (Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA) has clear components that 
address in-work poverty.
On the other hand, in some countries (e.g. Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Bulgaria, and 
Romania) specific policy attention has been paid to in-work poverty, with trade unions 
providing explicit proposals on how to reduce the number of working poor in some cases(2). 
In Germany, for example, the Second report on poverty and wealth of the federal government 
(2. Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesregierung), published in 2005, identified the high 
unemployment rate as the real challenge for policies aiming to combat poverty, with unem-
ployment being concentrated in specific groups, such as the low-skilled and older workers. 
Thus in formulating its aims in the Second report on poverty and wealth the government 
announced that the envisaged reform would, in particular, help avoid the so-called “careers 
in poverty” (Armutskarrieren). In Bulgaria the working poor became a policy priority of 
the government in 2005, when the issue was included in  planning, strategy, and other 
 documents related to poverty and social inclusion. 
(1) This box is based on the EU Network of Independent Experts (2010), p. 39-40 and 
corresponding country reports. The synthesis and country reports are found on the 
following link: http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independent-
experts/2010/second-semester-2010.
(2) A review is provided in Eurofound (2010), p. 14-20 and EU Network of Independent 
Experts (2010), p. 39-41.
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adequate earnings varies signifi-
cantly across Member States and 
depends on various factors such 
as the level, coverage, differentia-
tion, indexation, and so on, of the 
arrangements. Their effect may, 
in some cases, be complemented 
by wage support systems (wage 
subsidies) where employers receive 
support for the share of wage paid 
to an employee above a certain 
threshold. 
According to Eurostat data, there 
are significant variations in the level 
of minimum wages in the EU-27. 
Charts 27 and 28 present the statutory 
minimum wages in absolute value, 
and as a proportion of the mean value 
of the average gross monthly earnings, 
in the EU Member States which have a 
statutory minimum wage.
In 2009, the monthly minimum wages 
varied from € 123 in Bulgaria to almost 
€1 700 in Luxembourg(26) while the 
highest values for the minimum wage 
(as a percentage of average gross 
monthly earnings) were reported for 
France, followed by  Luxembourg, 
Malta, and Greece. In these four 
countries the minimum wage is above 
45 % of gross monthly earnings. At 
the lower end of the scale are the 
Czech Republic and Romania with 
minimum wages below 35 % of aver-
age gross monthly earnings.
(26) When adjusted for differences in 
purchasing power, the disparities 
between the Member States are reduced 
from a range of one to fourteen (in EUR) 
to a range of one to six in purchasing 
power standard (PPS). At the opposite 
ends of the scale are again Luxembourg 
(slightly below 1 400 PPS per month) and 
Bulgaria and Romania (around 245 PPS). 
Eurostat (2011a).
Charts 29 and 30 illustrate the rela-
tionship between minimum wages 
and the in-work poverty rates in 
EU-27 and EU-15(27). 
In the first graph, it is possible to dis-
tinguish two clusters of EU Member 
States, with EU-15 Member States 
which have statutory minimum wages 
to the right of the graph, and the 
cluster of the new Member States to 
the left. There is a clear negative rela-
tionship between the presence of a 
minimum wage and in-work poverty 
rate in the EU-15. The countries in the 
lower right corner (the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, the UK, Ireland) 
are characterised by high minimum 
wages and low in-work poverty rates, 
while the three Mediterranean coun-
tries, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 
which have minimum wage levels sig-
nificantly lower than the rest of EU-15 
countries, exhibit much higher levels 
of in-work poverty rates(28). 
Minimum wages in the new Mem-
ber States are generally lower 
and are set at rather similar lev-
els, but the relationship between 
the minimum wage and the in-
work poverty rate varies a great 
deal. As highlighted in previous 
sections, differences in household 
composition and work intensity 
may explain part of the differenc-
es in in-work poverty outcomes. 
Variations in the availability of 
other forms of income support 
for workers (in-work benefits) and 
(27) The minimum wage is expressed in 
purchasing power standard, monthly 
rate. Figures for both in-work poverty 
rates and minimum wages refer to 
2009. Those six countries to which no 
statutory minimum wage applies are 
not included (Sweden, Finland, Austria, 
Italy, Germany, Denmark). The in-work 
poverty rate is for employed people, 
aged 18-64 years of age. 
(28) Luxembourg is an outlier because of 
sectoral peculiarities. In particular, the 
strong financial sector, which has been 
the country’s growth engine since 1980s 
and represents almost 30 % of total value 
added, contributes to very high median 
and average wages with the share of 
people with income below the 60 % of 
the median threshold being considerably 
higher than in other countries. The 
minimum wage, the highest in the EU 
(€1 758), is just enough to cover the 
poverty threshold (see Chart 31). 
Chart 29: Minimum wage and in-work 
poverty, EU-27, 2009
Chart 30: Minimum wage and in-work 
poverty, EU-15, 2009
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Chart 27: Monthly minimum wages, 2009 
Chart 28: Minimum wages as proportion 
of average gross monthly earnings, 2009
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(1)  Minimum wages as proportion of the mean value of average gross monthly earnings (Nace 
Rev.2, B-S). Data for France is for 2008 and data for Greece is 45.2 following Eurostat (2011a), 
Minimum wage statistics, Figure 3. Data for Cyprus is missing. Countries with no statutory 
minimum wage not included.
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their families (housing and fam-
ily benefits) may also contribute 
to the explanation (see below). 
In addition, minimum wages in 
the new Member States tend to 
be set below the national pov-
erty threshold, and hence do not 
provide enough income to pull 
a significant number of people 
out of in-work poverty. Chart 31 
illustrates this point by comparing 
the level of the minimum wage 
to the national poverty threshold 
in the EU-27, with the countries 
ranked according to the differ-
ence between the two variables(29). 
To the left we find the new Mem-
ber States (Czech  Republic, Bul-
garia,  Estonia,  Slovenia,  Lithuania, 
Latvia,  Slovakia) and to the right 
the EU-15 Member States (the UK, 
France, Ireland, the  Netherlands, 
Belgium). 
Charts 32 and 33, based on the OECD 
tax-benefit model, give a picture of 
the net income of full-time minimum 
wage earners as percentage of the 
equivalised median income for two 
household types: a single person, and 
a lone parent with two children. 
As can be seen from the charts, even 
if account is taken of social transfers 
received by the households depend-
ing on minimum wages, the average 
net income in a number of countries 
remains under 60 % of the equiv-
alised median income(30): Slovenia, 
Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, and 
Spain for single-person households, 
and additionally, in Portugal, Greece, 
France, and Belgium for lone-parent 
households. 
(29) Data is on an annual basis, expressed in 
purchasing power standard.
(30) An assumption made by the OECD in 
the calculation of the median income 
is the “square root of household size” 
equivalence scale, i.e. the population 
median is used for the single person 
households and the population median 
multiplied by the square root of three is 
used for households of lone parents with 
two children.
The effectiveness of minimum wages 
in providing a wage floor also 
depends on the collective bargaining 
level, structure and coverage, and 
on the laws relating to the exten-
sion of collective agreements. The 
incidence of low pay is generally 
higher in countries where bargaining 
takes place predominantly at a com-
pany level, for example in Bulgaria, 
 Estonia,  Lithuania, and Latvia, which 
are also the countries with the lowest 
level of bargaining coverage(31). Some 
(31) European Commission (2011), Sections 
1.4.3, 4.2, and Chart 1.9 on bargaining 
coverage rates, 2007-2009. 
 examples illustrate the importance 
of the collective bargaining struc-
ture. These include Cyprus, where 
the minimum wages exceed 50 % of 
the national median wage, but only 
covers 8 specific occupations(32), with 
a similar situation in Malta. In Austria, 
on the other hand, high minimum 
pay rates are coupled to an almost 
universal coverage rate (98-99 %) that 
is valid for almost all employees(33). 
(32) Pashardes (2010).
(33) European Commission (2011), Chart 1.9, 
Section 1.4.1
Chart 32: Net income of full-time 
minimum wage earners,  
single person, 2009
Chart 33: Net income of full-time 
minimum wage earners, lone parent with 
two children, 2009
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Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit model(1) Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit model
(1)     Source: OECD Tax-Benefit model. Net incomes are gross earnings plus cash benefits minus income 
taxes and own social security contributions. The assumptions underlying calculations of net 
income: only cash incomes are considered; benefits in consideration include any social assistance 
and family and housing benefits the household is eligible to receive. Childcare costs, housing 
costs or any other forms of “committed expenditure” are not deducted when computing the net 
incomes. Furthermore only benefits payable to able-bodied working age people are included. As 
such, among the benefits which are excluded are old-age benefits, survivor benefits, disability 
benefits, occupational injury benefits, sickness benefits, and childcare benefits. With respect to 
taxation only personal income tax and employees’ social security contributions are included. 
Incomes are determined in a particular month but presented on an annualized basis, i.e. multi-
plied by 12, assuming unchanged income throughout the year. More details on the methodology 
are available in OECD (2007), Annex 1. Net incomes refer to 2009; median income is that of the 
total population for the latest year available (generally 2008) in the OECD database on Income 
Distribution and Poverty (www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality) uprated to 2009 values using the 
CPI. Data on income distribution is missing for Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania.
Chart 31: Minimum wage in relation to poverty threshold, EU-27, 2009
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Another important factor is the 
extent of the differentiation of the 
national minimum wage or mini-
mum pay rates according to the 
level of worker’s qualifications and 
work experience, age, occupation, 
and region, with countries commonly 
applying lower minimum wage rates 
to younger, low-qualified, or less 
experienced workers. 
In conclusion, the minimum wage 
provides a wage floor for the income 
from employment of some workers, 
but it cannot offer adequate sup-
port to a large number of working 
poor who, for example, cannot find 
a full-time job, and who are often 
outside the minimum wage/pay 
coverage scope. For this reason, in 
seeking to address poverty concerns, 
policies such as minimum wages 
are often coupled with other policy 
instruments such as in-work benefit 
schemes or activation policies. 
4.1.2. Social and fiscal 
benefits for low-income 
workers
In contrast to minimum wages, ben-
efits granted through the tax and 
social security system can make it eas-
ier to target specific groups of peo-
ple and family types.  Chart 34 illus-
trates the impact of social  transfers 
on in-work poverty.
It can be seen from the chart that 
countries like Finland, the Nether-
lands, and Belgium have low  levels 
of in-work poverty both before and 
after transfers. Thus, it can be argued 
that, in such countries, the policies 
are designed so that they manage to 
achieve a low level of in-work pov-
erty without having to redistribute 
among people. In other countries, 
the reduction of in-work poverty is 
achieved through higher redistribu-
tion. For example, social transfers 
have an important effect in reduc-
ing the level of in-work poverty in 
Hungary (almost 18 pps), in Ireland 
(14 pps), and in Luxembourg (14 pps). 
In relative terms, i.e. the percent-
age change in the in-work poverty 
rate before and after transfers, the 
impact of social transfers on reducing 
in-work poverty rate is the highest 
in Czech Republic (75 %), Hungary 
(74 %), and Slovenia (72 %), and the 
lowest in Greece (36 %), Romania 
(38 %) and Spain (39 %). 
Chart 35 maps out the expenditure 
on social protection and the rela-
tive change in in-work poverty rate 
before and after social transfers, 
with the point of intersection being 
the EU average. While social security 
and tax systems have to deal with 
many other issues, most countries 
have made use of them in order to 
put in place measures that directly or 
indirectly affect in-work poverty. 
The general picture is that countries 
that spend more on social protection 
manage to achieve a greater reduc-
tion in poverty (e.g. the countries 
in the right upper corner, which 
are old Member States, have the 
highest spending on social protec-
tion and a strong impact in terms of 
poverty  reduction). Data on the level 
of spending, does not, however, tell 
the full story. In particular, a well 
performing labour market combined 
with a social security system that 
provides well designed benefits to 
facilitate labour market participation 
(e.g. childcare), reduces disincentives 
and provides targeted support to the 
in-work poor that is efficient in fight-
ing in-work poverty. 
As the chart illustrates, countries like 
Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slove-
nia spend similar amounts on social 
Chart 34: In-work poverty before and after social transfers, EU-27, 2009
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Source: Eurostat, EU SILC the following footnote is missing, please add:
(1) EU SILC 2009, income year 2008, except for UK (income year 2009) and Ireland (moving 
income period 2008-2009). Both values for in-work poverty rate, before and after transfers, 
are based on disposable household income. Old-age and survivor’s benefits are part of dispos-
able income. In order to obtain the disposable income before social transfers, the disposable 
income after social transfers is reduced by the amount of total transfers (at individual and 
household level) except for old-age and survivor’s benefits (s. Eurostat 2011b, description of 
EU SILC target variables HY020 and HY022). The reasoning is that pensions are considered 
as primary income since their role is not only to redistribute across income groups but also, 
and primarily, to ensure an income of individuals over the life cycle. The indicator of in-work 
poverty rate before transfers should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. 
First, it takes no account of transfers in kind (e.g. housing, health, education), tax credits, and 
tax allowances, which affect the disposable income. Second, there is an implicit assumption 
in its calculation that people do not change their consumption pattern and labour market 
decisions in the presence and absence of social transfers. Third, social assistance for the 
older people is not classified in the same way across countries; therefore, the impact of such 
schemes is unequally reflected in the calculation.
Chart 35: Effectiveness of social transfers, 
EU-27, 2008(1)
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protection as do Spain and Greece, 
but they manage to achieve a much 
higher reduction in in-work poverty 
rate. In effect Hungary, Czech Repub-
lic, and Slovenia have more redistrib-
utive welfare systems with significant 
net transfers to low-income groups 
as well as incentives for second earn-
ers, helping them to be among the 
countries with the lowest levels of 
inequality in the EU(34). 
The table below presents the evi-
dence on the relationship between 
the various types of social benefits 
and in-work poverty rates, based 
on correlation coefficients(35). As can 
be seen from the table, all types of 
benefits are associated with lower 
in-work poverty rates, and are sig-
nificant at the 5 % level. The correla-
tion between the monthly minimum 
wage and the in-work poverty rate is 
also negative (-0.28)(36).
(34) Eurostat (2011c): Statistics in focus.
(35) Social benefits are expressed as 
percentage of GDP. Old-age pensions 
and anticipatory pensions are excluded. 
See European Commission (2011a), 
p. 27-28. The results are similar if we 
express social benefits in euro per 
inhabitant or purchasing power standard 
per inhabitant.
(36) In this calculation only the countries with 
a statutory minimum wage are included. 
Minimum wages are expressed in 
purchasing power standard. Expressing 
minimum wages in euro does not much 
change the results; the correlation 
coefficient is minus 0.25.
Table 4: In-work poverty and social 
benefits by function, EU-27, 2008
iwp 2008
Sickness Benefits -0.39**
Old-age Benefits -0.27**
Family Benefits -0.35**
Unemployment Benefits -0.19**
Disability Benefits -0.26**
Housing Benefits -0.23**
Social exclusion Benefits -0.30**
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC and ESSPROS (1)
(1) EU SILC 2008, income year 2007, except 
for UK (income year 2008) and Ireland 
(moving income period 2007-2008). The 
figures give the Pearson’s estimated 
correlation coefficients. They are all 
significant at the 5 % significance level. 
Data for social benefits represents 
percentage of GDP. Old-age pensions 
and anticipatory old-age pensions are 
excluded from old-age benefits.
Chart 36: Income composition of the in-work poor, 2009 (1)
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(1) EU SILC 2009, income year 2008, except for UK (income year 2009) and Ireland (moving 
income period 2008-2009). The two charts present the percentage of each component in the 
net household income for the whole population (Chart 37) and of that of the in-work poor 
(Chart 36). For both samples only the aged 18-64 are considered. Outlier observations with 
shares for employee earnings, income from self-employment, capital, or rental of property 
in the total household gross income above 2 000 % are dropped. The shares of income are 
computed at the household level. Each member of the household has the same income com-
position. In computing the country average for the chart for the in-work poor, we consider 
only those individuals who are both employed (using the SILC employment status indicator) 
and in a poor household (using the EU SILC poverty indicator). Income from employment 
includes wages and salaries, and other types of supplementary payments paid by employers 
(bonuses, thirteenth month payment, productivity-based payments, etc.). Benefits that are 
received both at individual and household levels are included; except for housing benefits, 
benefits are restricted to cash benefits. Unemployment benefits are included as an income 
component because some of the in-work poor receive these benefits because they do not 
work full-time, full-year. Old-age benefits include old-age and partial retirement pensions, 
care allowances, etc. Taxes on income include taxes on individual and family level and social 
security contributions paid by employees or the self-employed. For detailed description of 
income components, see Eurostat (2011b).
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A number of countries have recently 
focused on ‘in-work’ (or ‘employ-
ment-conditional’) benefits, which, 
in effect, represent features of both 
social benefit support for low-income 
workers at risk of in-work poverty, 
and an incentive payment designed 
to increase the  financial return from 
work(37). As such, they accentuate 
the gap between incomes in and out 
of work. An illustrative  example is 
(37) Low-income earners and second earners 
are facing lower participation rates, 
partly related to the failure to make 
work attractive for these groups. Given 
the regressive pattern of social security 
contributions, labour costs are relatively 
higher at the lower end of the wage 
scale, which particularly harms labour 
demand for and the employability of 
the people in these groups. On the 
labour supply side, second earners 
often face the problem of inactivity 
or unemployment trap. More details in 
European Commission (2011e), chapter 5.
the French Active Solidarity Income 
(Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA), 
which consists of two components, 
basic RSA and in-work RSA. The first 
is similar to a minimum income, and 
the second is income support for 
people who work(38). Other exam-
ples include ‘prime pour l’emploi’ in 
France, the UK ‘Working tax  credit’, 
and the Finnish ‘earned income 
allowance’, etc.(39) 
(38) A person who does not work, for 
example, receives only the basic RSA; a 
worker with low earned income received 
both RSA; and a worker whose income is 
higher than a threshold receives only the 
“in-work” RSA. Thus, although this is a 
general scheme, it has a clear component 
to address in-work poverty: it covers 
the whole spectrum from providing 
incentives to the unemployed to enter 
into work and a secure income to those 
in work at various income levels.
(39) Immervoll, H. and M. Pearson (2009).
Charts 36 and 37 present data on 
the sources of income for the in-
work poor and compare them with 
those for the whole population.
The main source of income for the 
in-work poor in almost all coun-
tries is employment earnings. Nev-
ertheless, self-employment is also 
important for the in-work poor in 
some Member States (e.g. Romania, 
Greece, Poland, and Italy). As shown 
in Chart 36, in Italy and Poland, for 
example, the share of income from 
self-employment is slightly above 
40 %. In Greece it reaches almost 
70 % and in Romania the correspond-
ing figure is 50 %, which means that 
in the latter countries self-employ-
ment is the primary source of income 
for the in-work poor. Furthermore, 
self-employment is relatively more 
important as a source of income for 
the in-work than for the population 
on average: the respective shares of 
income from self-employment for 
the whole population are consider-
ably lower (Chart 37). For example, 
in Greece it is 30 %, Romania – 14 %, 
and Poland – 16 %.
Furthermore, the share of income 
from capital and rental of property 
is lower in the household budget of 
the in-work poor than for the whole 
population in most Member States. 
Some exceptions to this pattern 
include Greece, Spain, and  Finland, 
where the income from rental of 
property has a much higher share in 
the budget of the in-work poor. 
Another source of income for the 
in-work poor is social benefits. Their 
share in the net household income 
of the in-work poor is the high-
est in Ireland, France, and the UK, 
and lowest in Greece, Spain, Italy, 
and Bulgaria. Moreover, in the for-
mer countries, social benefits are a 
relatively more important source of 
income for the in-work poor than 
for the whole population, while the 
situation is exactly the reverse in 
the latter countries. This reflects the 
fact that in Spain, Greece, Italy, and 
Bulgaria the social security system is 
much less redistributive towards the 
Chart 37: Income composition of the whole working age population, 2009 
taxes on income and social insurance contributions
interhousehold cash transfers paid
tax on wealth
interhousehold cash transfers
social exclusion/ housing benefits
family/ education-related benefits
sickness and disability benefits
unemployment benefits
old-age benefits, pensions from individual pension plans, 
survivor's benefits
income from capital/ rental of property
income from self-employment
employee earnings, company car, 
income of people aged under 16 
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
DKNLSEDELVEELUSIFIATBEUKLTPTSKPLESFRBGCZROHUCYMTITELIEEU
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU SILC 
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
168
low-income groups, while in Ireland, 
France, Hungary, and the UK there 
are considerable in-work benefits 
targeted at the in-work poor. 
Family and education-related ben-
efits make up the highest share in 
the net income of the in-work poor, 
and they are more important as a 
source of income for the in-work 
poor than for the whole population 
in most Member States. As it can be 
seen from the  first chart, their share 
in the household budget of the in-
work poor is the highest in Ireland, 
 Hungary,  Luxembourg, and Slovenia, 
and lowest in Spain, Greece, Italy, and 
Bulgaria. Indeed, the former countries 
provide more targeted support in 
the form of tax credits, allowances, 
etc. for (working) families, including 
support for particular family composi-
tions such as lone parents or families 
exposed to higher risk of poverty. An 
important component of family sup-
port is support for non-parental child-
care (in the form of grants, subsidies, 
tax rebates, etc.) in order to reduce 
the budget burden of school fees 
and to increase work incentives for 
second earners of the lower-income 
households. Without addressing this 
issue, too high level of family ben-
efits risks to create work disincentives 
for second earners. In countries like 
Spain, Greece, and Italy, the social 
security system does not provide high 
enough family support and incentives 
for  second earners. 
Old-age benefits, pensions from indi-
vidual pension plans, and survivor’s 
benefits make up a lower share in 
the household income of the in-work 
poor than for the whole population. 
This is due to the fact that a larger 
part of these benefits are received 
by older people who are already 
outside the labour market and as 
such are not considered as in-work 
poor. Nevertheless, as it is seen from 
Chart 36, in a few countries such as 
Poland, Romania, Cyprus, and the 
Netherlands old-age benefits make 
up a relatively high share also in 
the net income of the in-work poor. 
This can be accounted for by higher 
number of working old people who 
 experience in-work poverty or by the 
presence of pensioners in the house-
hold. Indeed, in some of these coun-
tries complex households with three 
and more adults are more common.
The relative burden of income taxes 
and social contributions on the house-
hold budget of the in-work poor is 
in most countries lower than for the 
whole population. For example, as it 
can be seen from  Chart 37 for the 
whole population, among the coun-
tries with the highest share of taxes 
are the Netherlands (49 %), Denmark 
(48 %), Sweden (32 %), and Austria 
(33 %). However, in these countries 
the taxation burden in the household 
budget of the in-work poor is consid-
erably lower: the Netherlands (20 %), 
Denmark (35 %), Sweden (19 %), 
and Austria (25 %). This is achieved 
through tax rebates, tax credits, 
reductions in the social security con-
tributions paid by workers, progres-
sive taxation system, etc. Neverthe-
less, in some Member States such as 
Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Portugal, 
Greece, and Estonia, the relative bur-
den of taxes is higher for the in-work 
poor than for the whole population.
4.1.3. Reducing the tax 
wedge and social contributions 
for employers can support job 
creation for the low skilled and 
the youth but may reinforce 
low wage traps
Reducing the tax wedge on labour 
costs (e.g. exemptions/reductions 
in compulsory social contributions 
borne by employers for low wages, 
taxes on fringe benefits, etc.) is one 
way of trying to encourage business-
es to hire more people with low qual-
ifications. While such policies favour 
the creation of lower paid jobs, there 
is concern that this may increase the 
risk of a ‘low-wage trap’ by discour-
aging employers from implementing 
‘high-road’ policies like training or 
increasing wages. In this context, 
increasing wages above a certain 
amount might involve employers in 
losing entitlement to exemptions 
from tax and social contributions. 
In conclusion, in-work benefits 
provided by social security and 
tax systems to workers at risk of 
poverty are important elements in 
‘ making-work-pay’ policies. They are 
attractive because they redistribute 
towards low-income groups at the 
same time as they create additional 
work incentives for those out of 
work, thereby addressing the twin 
problem of in-work poverty and the 
persistent labour market difficulties 
faced by the low-skilled. However, 
in-work benefits can also create dis-
incentives for low wage earners to 
take up more work or move to  higher 
pay levels, as well as for employers to 
offer better paying jobs.
4.2. Policies for 
increasing labour 
market participation
The previous sections have shown 
that increasing the employment par-
ticipation of household members 
has had a crucial impact on in-work 
poverty through its effect on fam-
ily income. Important obstacles to 
higher labour market participation 
are low education/skills, precarious 
employment or involuntary part-time 
work, financial disincentives, and 
inadequate access to enabling servic-
es such as childcare. These obstacles 
are reviewed in the following para-
graphs together with the policies 
that Member States have put in place 
to address them.
4.2.1. Low education and 
low skills
Educational performance, and the 
closely related skills level, strongly 
affects individual employment oppor-
tunities, poverty, and social exclusion. 
Chart 13 has shown that people with 
low educational levels have around 
a 4 times higher risk of in-work pov-
erty than those with high education, 
although the proportions vary sig-
nificantly between Member States. In 
many countries the low-skilled face 
much greater difficulty to enter the 
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labour market, and are often found 
trapped in low paid or precarious 
jobs(40). Furthermore, the educational 
and skills level affects the lifetime earn-
ings and well-being, not only of the 
individual concerned, but also of his 
or her dependents, especially children, 
thus perpetuating the negative impact 
of low education and low skills. 
Beyond efforts to improve access to 
high-quality education and combat 
early school leaving, improving access 
for the low-skilled to life-long learning 
is also crucial. Eurostat data shows that 
people with lower levels of education, 
and the low-skilled generally, have 
more limited access to lifelong learn-
ing. Charts 38 and 39 illustrate this by 
 depicting the participation rate in life-
long learning (LLL) by levels of educa-
tional attainment and by occupation.
As it can be seen from the charts, peo-
ple with lower qualifications have sig-
nificantly lower rates of  participation 
in education and training. The biggest 
(40) The German national experts note: 
“In Germany, the formal educational 
attainment is extraordinarily important 
for the entrance into working life. For 
this reason, particularly those social 
groups have big problems on the labour 
market, which have only low graduations 
or no training qualifications”, Huster, 
Bourcarde and Schutte (2010), p. 30. For 
illustration, the in-work poverty rate in 
Germany for people with pre-primary, 
primary and lower secondary education 
(levels 0-2, ISCED 1997) was 15,2 % in 
2008 against  6,7 % for those with an 
upper-secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary  education (levels 3-4), and 4 % for 
those with a tertiary education (levels 5-6). 
Source Eurostat, EU SILC (ilc_iw04)
differences in relative terms between 
participation rates of tertiary grad-
uates and people with primary to 
lower secondary education are found 
in Poland, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
the Czech Republic (more than 10 
times higher participation in LLL for 
tertiary graduates) (41). At the other 
end of the spectrum are Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK 
where the differences in participa-
tion in LLL are the smallest, ranging 
between 75 % and 200 %. 
Participation in LLL by occupation 
exhibits a similar trend: those engaged 
in elementary occupations (mostly low-
skilled workers) have a much lower 
participation rate in LLL than high-
skilled workers occupying managerial 
or other professional positions. 
These trends suggest a potential 
problem of ‘training the already 
trained’ despite considerable 
efforts at EU level to encourage 
higher participation and equi-
ty in education and training(42). 
(41) However, as data for participation in LLL 
of people with pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education are missing 
for four countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovak Republic), these 
countries have been excluded. Looking at 
relative differences between participation 
rates of those with secondary and tertiary 
education, including those four countries, 
the MS with the highest differences are 
only new Member States: Slovak Republic, 
Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Cyprus respectively.
(42) European Commission (2011b) and 
(2011c), Council recommendations on 
policies to reduce early school leaving.
 Furthermore, the accumulation of 
multiple disadvantages among spe-
cific groups (people with a migrant 
background, minority groups, peo-
ple with disabilities, or other special 
needs, etc.) calls for specific policy 
mixes(43). Particular attention has 
been devoted in recent time on the 
role and impact of digital skills and 
competences, and the usage of ICT 
based services for social inclusion 
and employment of groups at risk 
of social exclusion(44).
4.2.2. High incidence of 
temporary jobs, mini-jobs, 
involuntary part-time work
As shown in Chart 10 and Chart 11, 
since mid-2010 there has been an 
increase in the creation of temporary 
jobs, intermittent jobs, etc., which has 
contributed to increased hiring and 
(43) Socially vulnerable groups are often 
forced to leave education much earlier, 
tend to suffer from weaker family 
support to continue education, face 
discrimination within the education 
system and have more limited access 
to non-formal learning opportunities 
outside compulsory schooling. Policies 
focus on provision of language courses, 
desegregation policies to improve the 
social and ethnic mix at schools, support 
to schools in disadvantaged areas, etc.
(44) See 2011 factsheet of the Joint Research 
Centre/ Institute for Prospective Techno-
logical Studies (IPTS) presenting research 
results on ‘ICT for cultural diversity and 
socio-economic inclusion’ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/
jrc_20110120_eusja_ict_inclusion_
factsheet.pdf.
Chart 38: Participation in LLL by educational attainment, 2010(1) Chart 39: Participation in LLL by occupation, 2010(2)
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employment creation. Less clear, how-
ever, is the extent to which these jobs 
are able to offer adequate income 
and living conditions for the job-hold-
er, or how resilient they are to cycli-
cal variations in employment, as for 
example during economic downturns. 
A further issue is the limited employ-
ment security given that they are not 
usually covered by the employment 
protection legislation and the social 
security system. 
Table 2 has also shown that there 
is considerable variation between 
Member States in the transition rates 
from temporary to permanent con-
tracts. Low transition rates (e.g. Por-
tugal, Spain, France), a high share 
of involuntary temporary or part-
time work, and the existence of a 
wage penalty for work in temporary 
employment (e.g. Poland,  Germany, 
Slovenia) point to labour market seg-
mentation where chances to escape 
in-work poverty are reduced. 
Flexicurity policies, as promoted by 
the EU(45), can play a role in reduc-
ing in-work poverty among people 
with intermittent jobs, on temporary 
contracts, or involuntarily working 
part-time. This is true in so far as there 
is a combination of more flexible 
labour markets that enable employ-
ers to respond more easily to changes 
in labour demand alongside welfare 
systems that provide adequate lev-
els of income security, irrespective of 
the type of contract during periods 
when the employees concerned are 
between jobs, involuntarily working 
fewer hours than they would like, etc.
A high incidence of precarious or 
intermittent jobs can be closely con-
nected to low education/skills. A 
much larger share of the low-skilled 
or low-educated people are trapped 
in low-paid jobs than are high-skilled 
workers, and they have fewer oppor-
tunities to obtain a permanent or 
full-time job. 
(45) See European Commission (2007).
Furthermore, the share of temporary 
workers among the young is very high 
in the EU, above 40 %, and above 55 % 
in some Member States (Germany, 
Spain, France, Sweden, Poland, Por-
tugal, and Slovenia)(46). Many young 
qualified people accept temporary 
contracts as a stepping stone to enter 
the labour market. The figures on low 
transitions and high rates of involun-
tary temporary work suggest, how-
ever, that such jobs cannot always 
be regarded as a stepping stone, but 
rather can often serve as a way for 
firms to reduce labour costs and evade 
employment protection legislation 
covering  permanent jobs(47). 
In order to help facilitate the transition 
from education into work, many coun-
tries promote a dual education system 
that combines study with work experi-
ence, complemented by various types 
of vocational trainings in real working 
environment, as well as loans and 
grants that encourage young people 
to finish their education faster. This is 
backed, too, by support for job search 
and subsidised employment schemes, 
as well as the promotion of entrepre-
neurship among young people. How-
ever, any shift away from the creation 
of mini-jobs to more sustainable ones 
has been seriously impeded by the 
economic downturn. 
4.2.3. Financial disincentives 
The design of the tax and benefit sys-
tem may create financial incentives 
or disincentives to take up work or to 
work more. An important question is 
how to design the benefits and taxes 
so that an individual who wants 
to increase his or her employment 
participation does not end up losing 
out: i.e. ensuring that the increased 
employment earnings from more 
work outweigh the foregone income 
from benefits/tax alleviations associ-
ated with a transition to a higher 
income category. 
(46) Table 2.
(47) European Commission (2010a), p. 151.
Furthermore, ‘active’ income support 
and measures that stimulate ‘self-
sufficiency’, such as income-support 
schemes coupled with broadened 
incentives to participate in training 
and employment, have an impor-
tant role to play. For example, the 
revision of disability and sickness 
benefits targeted at those who are 
capable of at least some degree of 
activation are intended, in part, to 
promote higher participation(48). Pen-
sion system reforms include meas-
ures that create incentives for older 
workers to remain longer in employ-
ment (limiting the financial attrac-
tiveness of early retirement schemes, 
introducing enhanced increments for 
late retirement, and reviewing ele-
ments such as ceilings on pension-
able  earnings and taxes on pensions). 
Also important are measures that 
provide support to families in order 
to encourage and facilitate the par-
ticipation of second earners: childcare 
cost policies to support non-parental 
child care and make it more afforda-
ble for parents on low incomes, rebal-
ancing tax and benefit policies more 
generally to improve work incentives 
for second earners or lone parents. 
A recent OECD study has shown that, 
in a number of countries ( Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Ireland,  Latvia, 
 Lithuania, Malta, and  Slovenia), 
childcare costs create inactivity traps 
among low-earning households 
because they reduce net income 
gains from taking up employment 
to such an extent that individuals are 
better off caring for them themselves 
and obtaining benefits(49). Childcare 
costs can be a particularly powerful 
determinant of net income gains in 
the case of second earners at low 
wage levels(50). Providing subsidies to 
(48) A more detailed analysis of active 
labour market policies for people with 
disabilities and other specific needs is 
available in Eurofound (2010a).
(49) OECD (2011), p. 25. Figures A2.1 and A2.2 
present results for separate countries. 
Results are based on OECD tax-benefit 
models. Methodology is presented in 
Annex 1, p. 42.
(50) This result is based on the OECD 
assumption of the first earner being 
employed full-time at the average wage. 
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reduce the effective cost of childcare 
provision, and direct more invest-
ment in childcare facilities where 
there is a shortage, can markedly 
improve work incentives. In some 
countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Latvia, Slove-
nia), however, supporting childcare 
costs is not enough as payoff from 
employment is very low even with-
out childcare (e.g. due to low wage 
incidence, high out-of-work benefits, 
etc.), which means that other policy 
mixes are needed to increase the 
incentives for second earners. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are 
Denmark, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Estonia where relatively low out-of-
work incomes are combined with low 
cost of childcare (public provision, 
targeted childcare subsidies, etc.) 
so that ‘work pays’ for low-income 
(lone) parents, even after taking 
account of childcare costs(51). 
The most effective financial incen-
tives are often those that are coupled 
with flexicurity measures and fam-
ily-friendly working arrangements 
intended to allow a better balance 
between family and working life: 
voluntary part-time work, job shar-
ing/rotating employment, telework, 
annualised hours, reduced working 
hours after parental leave, etc. 
(51) OECD (2011), p. 25 and Figures A2.1 and 
A2.2. 
4.2.4. Limited access to 
enabling services
General access to services such as 
affordable transport, child-care, 
healthcare, education, and housing 
can increase the incentives for higher 
employment participation and reduce 
the burden on the household budg-
et(52). Countries have implemented var-
ious policies to increase the amount of 
day care available, supporting alterna-
tive forms of care (mini-kindergarten, 
company nurseries/preschools), creat-
ing child care facilities at work places, 
and introducing mandatory pre-school 
education in order to liberate care tak-
ers from care responsibilities and allow 
them to participate more actively in 
employment. Childcare services are in 
some countries integrated with sup-
port services like transport to nursery/
school at the neighbourhood level. 
In particular, charts 40 and 41 show 
that the percentage of people with 
unmet needs for medical and dental 
examination (because they are too 
expensive) is much higher among the 
people in the poorer quintiles than 
in the richer quintiles(53). The highest 
(52) Chapter 2, In-kind benefits discussed 
the effects of government spending on 
childcare, healthcare, education, and 
elderly care on income distribution and 
inequality.
(53) The only exception to this pattern is 
Cyprus and Ireland, where the percentage 
of people with unmet healthcare needs 
in the second quintile is higher than in 
the first one for both indicators. Data 
for 2008, however (Cyprus: 4.3 % and 
6.4 %, and Ireland: 0.7 % and 2 % for 
medical and dental care respectively) 
seem to corroborate the general pattern. 
Eurostat, EU SILC. 
percentages of people in the poorest 
quintile with unmet needs for the 
both types of examination are to be 
found in Bulgaria, Latvia, and Roma-
nia. The ratio of people with unmet 
needs for medical examination in the 
lowest to the richest quintile shows, 
however, that the highest inequal-
ity in terms of access to medical 
examination is found in Germany, 
Slovakia, and Luxembourg, and for 
dental examination in Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium(54). 
Overall, Member States have imple-
mented a number of labour market 
and social policy measures that directly 
or indirectly help reduce in-work pov-
erty. These measures are wide ranging 
and include actions to raise the incomes 
of the in-work poor by introducing 
wage floors and providing targeted 
or more general support through the 
social security and tax system; job sta-
bility and activation policies to pro-
mote  higher labour participation of 
various groups at risk of poverty; and 
last but not least enabling services like 
transport, education, and care facilities 
that both increase labour market par-
ticipation and provide income support. 
Combining these measures in an inte-
grated way is the main thrust of active 
inclusion strategies that the European 
Commission has recommended and 
promoted (Commission’s Recommen-
dations on active inclusion).(55)
(54) Data should be interpreted with care 
when comparing across countries due 
to a problem in the translation of the 
questionnaire. European Commission 
(2010c), Table 8a, p. 180.
(55) European Commission (2008).
Chart 40: Unmet need for medical examination, 2009 Chart 41: Unmet need for dental examination, 2009
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5. counTry analysis
5.1. Germany
The in-work poverty rate in Germany, 
at 6.8 %, is below the EU average; 
however, the rate has been on an 
upward trend and has surged by a 
significant 2 percentage points from 
4.8 % in 2005. This may be explained in 
part by an increase of part-time work 
and the creation of many mini-jobs(56). 
The employment rate of 74.9 % for 
persons aged 20-64 years is one 
of the highest in the EU-27, with 
part-time work now being relatively 
 wide-spread in Germany. It accounts 
for slightly above 25 % of total 
employment and the transition rate 
from part-time work to full-time is, 
at 8.1 %, the second lowest in the 
EU, after the Netherlands (7.9 %)(57). 
However, those working part-time 
voluntarily outnumber those doing 
so involuntarily by 5 to 1. 
Part-time work is most common 
among women, and it is usually the 
result of care responsibilities for 
dependent children. This reflects 
traditional family patterns (single-
breadwinner household type) cou-
pled with a relative shortage of 
early child care facilities, especially 
for children of up to 3 years of 
age. As the second chart shows 
people who live in households with 
dependent children are equally 
spread across medium, high, and 
very high work intensity (around 
25-30 % in each interval), while 
more than 50 % of people with-
out children belong to the house-
holds that work at full intensity. 
However, despite such distribution, 
there is no difference in the poverty 
levels for households with children 
and without children at all levels of 
work intensity. This reflects that the 
social security targeted income sup-
port policies take account of family 
composition.
(56) See Section 2.4.1.
(57) RWI (2011), Table 4.1 p. 80+81.
Nevertheless, some groups remain 
more challenging than others. The 
in-work poverty rate for temporary 
workers and for single parents, how-
ever, are above the respective EU 
averages (Chart a). As was shown in 
Chapter 2, inequality is increasing in 
Germany amongst others as a result 
of more single households and more 
people in temporary contracts. 
The in-work poverty rate for tempo-
rary workers is almost three times 
higher than for permanent workers, 
and the share of temporary workers 
is almost 15 %, slightly above the 
EU average of 14 %. The transition 
rate from permanent to temporary 
work is around 36 %, which is slightly 
above the EU average of 34.6 %. The 
relative unattractiveness of tempo-
rary work in Germany is due to high 
level of employment protection that 
permanent workers enjoy relative to 
temporary workers and the very high 
wage penalty associated with tempo-
rary work, the second highest in the 
EU after Poland (Table 2). 
Also for very low work intensity the 
poverty rate of adults is extremely 
high (around 70 %), one of the high-
est in the EU, and drops progressively 
to around 3.5 % at very high inten-
sity. Despite the large gain in terms 
of reducing the risk of poverty at 
very high work intensity, only about 
a third of adults live in households 
with 90-100 % work intensity, one of 
the lowest rates in the EU, reflecting 
high wages and the possibility of a 
household to live on the income of a 
single earner, as well as weak incen-
tives for second earners to increase 
employment participation.
It should be noted in respect of 
the above that Germany has concen-
trated recently on increasing incen-
tives to second earners for higher 
employment participation: provision 
for more childcare facilities, flexible 
working arrangements allowing for 
better reconciliation between family 
life and work, a first tax reform that 
allows for the individual monthly 
tax burden to reflect the personal 
income of each individual, etc.
5.2. Denmark
Having a job, even if only part-time 
or for part of the year, offers a good 
protection against the risk of poverty 
in Denmark, as the poverty rate starts 
declining sharply already at work 
intensities of 50-60 %. 
This reflects the ease of transitions, 
the high wages, and the adequate 
levels of income support for those 
who are partially employed or in 
non-working spells. Despite good 
income protection for part-time 
workers and a highly progressive tax 
system, more than 70 % of adults live 
in households with very high work 
Chart 42: Poverty rates in Germany, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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intensity (80-100 %), i.e. both adults 
in the household work full year, full-
time jobs, which must reflect tradi-
tional and cultural attitudes to work. 
This is true for households with and 
without children, reflecting the high 
participation of women due to exist-
ence of employment incentives for 
second earners, pro-family policies, 
well-developed childcare network, 
etc. Finally, the poverty rates move 
closely in line with respect to house-
holds with and without children 
at various levels of work intensity 
reflecting the fact that the Dan-
ish social security system provides 
targeted income support that take 
account of the family composition.
Denmark has a total in-work poverty 
rate of 5.9 %, which is well below the 
EU-27 average. The in-work poverty 
rate has been on a decreasing trend 
up to 2007 (4.8 % down to 4.1 %) 
but increased in 2008 and 2009 
up to 5.9 % when also the income 
inequality increased though still 
being at a low level (see Chapter 2). 
Similarly, the in-work poverty rates 
for all groups along the three job 
characteristics are below or around 
the respective EU averages (Chart a). 
Moreover, in 2010 Denmark has the 
second highest employment rate in 
the EU-27, 76.1 % for persons aged 
20-64 years after the Netherlands 
(76.8 %). 
This favourable labour market out-
come has been ascribed to the Dan-
ish flexicurity model, often put for-
ward as a textbook example of the 
effective combination of labour mar-
ket flexibility and social security sup-
port. In particular, there is high level 
of flexibility in employment relations 
due to the low level labour market 
regulation and employment protec-
tion legislation: it is easy to hire and 
dismiss workers, leading to high rates 
of job mobility, job creation, and 
job destruction. There is no statu-
tory minimum wage with minimum 
pay rates negotiated between the 
social partners and set out in gen-
eral agreements. High levels of union 
density (a little below 70 % second 
only to Sweden) and bargaining cov-
erage (above 80 %) generally leads to 
high minimum pay rates(58). Median 
and mean equivalised net incomes in 
Denmark are the second highest in 
the EU-27, after Luxembourg. 
At the same time, Denmark focus-
es strongly on activation policies 
and life-long learning: an empha-
sis on active labour market policies 
rather than passive benefits linking 
entitlement to economic support 
to active job training, educational 
programmes, etc. This is combined 
with a universal and generous social 
security system and effective public 
(58) European Commission (2011), Charts 1.3 
and 1.9.
services that guarantee an adequate 
level of income support irrespective 
of whether the work contract is per-
manent or temporary, part-time or 
full-time. 
The transition rate from part-time 
to full time employment is around 
35 %(59), which is higher than the 
EU average, and the largest share 
of part-time work is voluntary. The 
wage penalty associated with being 
on a temporary contract is insig-
nificant, and more than half of the 
employees who work on temporary 
contracts do so voluntarily. Tempo-
rary work accounts for almost 9 % 
of total employment, while around 
26 % of employees work part-time. 
5.3. France
The transition rate from temporary 
to permanent employment is 17 %, 
the lowest in the EU, reflecting the 
degree of labour market segmenta-
tion where temporary workers enjoy 
generally lower employment protec-
tion and are more vulnerable to 
unemployment spells between jobs, 
which contributes to the higher pov-
erty rates for this group. 
The risk of in-work poverty is three 
time higher for employees on tempo-
rary contracts than it is for those on 
permanent contracts, but their share 
is around 15 %, slightly below the EU 
average.
The wage penalty for being in tem-
porary employment is, however, 
insignificant, which suggests that the 
higher in-work poverty rate for tem-
porary workers is rather a problem of 
insufficient income from other sources 
than wages (such as supplementary 
income support from the social and 
tax system) and possibly lower aver-
age employment participation due to 
unemployment spells between jobs. 
Indeed, France stands out as having a 
longstanding system of employee pro-
tection (including a generous social 
security system,  minimum  guarantee 
(59) RWI (2011), RWI calculations Table 4.1, p. 
80+81.
Chart 43: Poverty rates in Denmark, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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system, social and trade union rights), 
which is mostly tied to previous labour 
market experience. This is supported 
by the analysis in Chapter 2 where 
the inequality is growing in the 2000s 
and where it is seen that the lowest 
deciles, where many unemployed peo-
ple can be found, were most affected 
by this increase.
France has a total in-work poverty 
rate of 6.7 %, which is below the EU 
average. The in-work poverty rate 
has a slightly increasing trend from 
6.1 % to 6.7 %. Similarly, the in-work 
poverty rates for all groups along the 
three job characteristics are below 
the respective EU averages with the 
exception of temporary workers, 
where the poverty rate is around the 
EU average (Chart a). France had an 
employment rate of around the EU 
average at 69.1 % for persons aged 
20-64 years in 2010. 
At very low work intensity (up to 
20 %) the poverty rate is around 
50 %, it halves at work intensity of 
medium work intensity, and then 
drops to a low of around 3.5 % at 
very high intensity (Chart b). In line 
with the important reduction in the 
risk of poverty at very high work 
intensity, a fair share of about half 
of adults live in households with 
80-100 % work intensity (compared 
to an EU average of just above 50 %). 
The share of people in very-high-
intensity households is similar for 
adults with and without children, 
reflecting relatively good incentives 
for employment participation of sec-
ond earners, well developed network 
of childcare facilities, and flexible 
working time arrangements. Nev-
ertheless, a significant number of 
mothers make a career interruption 
to care for their children: the share 
of people in medium (40-60 %) work 
intensity households is below 20 %, 
and it is higher for households with 
children. This partly reflects tradi-
tional family stereotypes, large fami-
lies and the availability of targeted 
social support at household level 
depending on family composition.
Nevertheless, at this intensity level 
the gap between the poverty rate 
of people living in households with 
and without children is still large; 
in fact, it only starts converging to 
zero only at work intensity of around 
70 %, which stresses the importance 
of second earners’ employment par-
ticipation in order to overcome pov-
erty. France has targeted policies to 
support low-income groups, which 
explains the relatively low overall 
and in-work poverty rates (e.g. Prime 
pour l’emploi, which is a tax credit to 
employed persons with low income, 
reduced social contributions for spe-
cific groups, the RSA, etc.). 
5.4. Ireland
The main driving factor behind the 
in-work poverty in Ireland is not so 
much low wage incidence but the 
low rate of employment participa-
tion of specific groups. 
The share of people who live in 
households with very high intensity 
is only one-third (one of the low-
est in the EU), while the share of 
people who live in a household with 
work intensity of 40-60 % (i.e. where 
often only one adult is employed) is 
relatively high (Chart b). As a result, 
the share of people in medium-work-
intensity households with children is 
twice as high as that of people with-
out dependent children. This reflects 
the traditionally low participation 
rates of women in employment with 
limited access to childcare and its 
high cost - estimated to be around 
45 % of the average wage, compared 
to the 16 % EU  average(60). 
However, the selective nature of the 
Irish social protection and tax systems 
allows for adequate income support 
for families, which is reflected in that 
poverty rates for people in house-
holds with and without children 
 follow each other relatively closely 
at all work intensities except at the 
very lowest. At very low work inten-
sity, the poverty rate of adults is low 
 (30-40 %) compared to the EU aver-
age, and drops to a low of 2-3 % at 
work intensity of 70 %.
Ireland in-work poverty rate has 
been fluctuating between 5.4 % 
and 6.5 % ending up at 5.4 % in 
2009, which is among the lowest 
rates in the EU. Similarly, the in-
work poverty rates for all groups 
along the three job characteristics 
are below the respective EU aver-
ages (Chart a). Ireland only has 
an employment rate of 64.9 % for 
persons aged 20-64 years, which is 
below the EU average (68.6 %). The 
in-work poverty rate for part-time 
workers is more than twice that 
for full-time workers. Moreover, 
at 22 % the share of part-time 
(60) Daly (2010).
Chart 44: Poverty rates in France, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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employment is higher than the EU 
average of around 19 %. A large 
share of part-time employment 
is involuntary, and the  transition 
to full-time employment is lower 
than the EU average (18 % against 
almost 20 %(61)). 
In Ireland, the main cause for poverty 
is not so much low hourly earnings: 
the median and mean equivalised 
net incomes in Ireland are the third 
highest in the EU after Denmark and 
Luxembourg(62), with minimum wage 
levels being second only to those in 
Luxembourg. Furthermore, there is 
supplementary income support pro-
vided through the social and tax 
system with full tax exemption for 
those earning the statutory minimum 
wage, and a well developed system 
of selective tax credits, including tar-
geted support at the working poor. 
Although the recent financial crisis 
has resulted in cuts in public spend-
ing, including a cut in the minimum 
wage and welfare payments, these 
rates remain at relatively high levels. 
Hence, the main policy response to 
addressing the crisis has been to 
focus on employment creation and 
work incentives. 
(61) RWI (2011) calculations, Table 4.1, p. 
80+81.
(62) Eurostat statistics on income and living 
conditions, 2009.
5.5. Greece
The Greek poverty rate is the lowest 
in the EU at very low work inten-
sity (up to 20 %), but remains rela-
tively high, around 8 %, at very high 
intensity. This reflects the relative 
importance of sources of income 
other than wages at low intensity 
levels, (e.g. income from property, 
self-employment, and from capi-
tal, unemployment, or other social 
assistance benefits(63)) as well as the 
relative importance of low wage inci-
dence at high work intensity levels. 
(63) Reference Chart 36 on the income 
composition of the in-work poor.
The share of people in very-high-
intensity households is slightly higher 
in those with dependent children 
than it is in households without chil-
dren, reflecting the importance of 
full-time work of both parents to 
support an adequate family income. 
Greece’s overall in-work poverty rate 
was on a constantly increasing trend 
up to 2008 (from 12.9 % up to 14.3 %) 
with a slight descent to 13.8 % in 2009, 
which is the second highest in the EU, 
after Romania. Similarly, the in-work 
poverty rates for all groups along the 
three job characteristics are above 
the  respective EU averages except for 
permanent workers. Greece has an 
employment rate of 64 % for persons 
aged 20-64 years, which is below the 
EU average (68.6 %). 
Greece has the third lowest minimum 
wage in the EU-15, after Portugal 
and Spain, though its minimum wage 
is above those in the new Member 
States. The social and tax system does 
not ensure an adequate supplemen-
tary support to low-income workers, 
although the latter pay  relatively high 
taxes and contributions. In particu-
lar, tax credits/rebates for low-income 
workers are not common and taxes 
and social contributions make up  a 
high share of disposable income of 
Chart 45: Poverty rates in Ireland, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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Chart 46: Poverty rates in Greece, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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the in-work poor(64). This leads to 
a relatively low disposable income 
for low-income workers, and hence 
relatively higher poverty rates even 
at high work intensities, compared 
to other Member States. According 
to the analysis in Chapter 2, Greece is 
the country in the EU with the highest 
inequality rates where the main fea-
ture is exactly the incapability of the 
social protection to reduce poverty.
While just around 45 % of adults live 
in households with 80-100 % work 
intensity, around 25 % of adults live in 
households with medium work inten-
sity (40-60 %), which is one of the 
highest shares in the EU. Part-time 
work is not wide-spread in Greece 
(the share of part-time workers is 
6.4 %), and share of those employed 
on temporary contracts is below the 
EU average (12.4 % against 14 %). 
The most common explanation of low 
work intensity is the low participation 
of women, usually the result of car-
ing for dependent children. Indeed, 
at medium work intensity, the share 
of households with children is twice 
as high for households without chil-
dren. This is the result of traditional 
role stereotypes coupled with lim-
ited creation of incentives for second 
earners to increase their employment 
participation, including for example, 
limited access to childcare and flexible 
working arrangements, and financial 
support (grants, subsidies, tax rebates, 
etc.) for non-parental child care. 
5.6. Spain
Temporary workers in Spain have 
an in-work poverty rate that is more 
than double that of permanent 
workers (Chart a). This is important 
given that temporary employment 
accounts for 25 % of total employ-
ment, the second largest in the EU 
after Poland. 
An important characteristic of the 
Spanish labour market is its duality 
with two-tier employment protec-
tion legislation: the labour market for 
(64) Ziomas, Bouzas and Spyropoulou (2010). 
See also results in Chart 36. 
workers on permanent contracts is 
highly regulated, while that for work-
ers on temporary or other atypical 
contracts is very flexible. Furthermore, 
being on a temporary contract is in 
most cases involuntary and it is associ-
ated with a rather large wage penalty. 
There is also a strong segmentation 
between permanent and temporary 
workers, with transition rate from 
temporary to permanent employment 
being somewhat below the EU aver-
age (33 % versus 34.6 %). Those work-
ing on atypical contracts have borne 
the brunt of the cyclical downturn. 
Spain has an in-work poverty rate of 
11.4 %, which has increased stead-
ily since 2005 (from 10.4 % up to 
11.4 %). This is the third highest in 
the EU, after Greece and Romania. 
Similarly, the in-work poverty rates 
are above the respective EU averages 
irrespective of household type and 
working time, but around the EU 
average with respect to permanent 
and temporary workers (Chart a). 
Spain has the fifth lowest employ-
ment rate in the EU, at 62.5 % for 
persons aged 20-64 years in 2010. In 
addition, Spain also experiences an 
increasing inequality on the income. 
The statutory minimum wage is the 
second lowest in EU-15 countries and 
the third lowest in the EU-27 when 
compared to average earnings. Fur-
thermore, the minimum wage really 
only benefits permanent workers 
because of the duality of the labour 
market and the employment protec-
tion legislation, which explains why 
their in-work poverty rate is lower. A 
complex bargaining system influenc-
es adaptation of wages to economic 
and labour market conditions. 
The poverty rate of people living in 
households with dependent children 
is significantly higher than that in 
households without children with a 
big gap at all levels except at the very 
highest work intensity of 80-100 % 
(Chart b). One factor explaining this 
gap is the peculiarities of the Span-
ish social security system: the social 
transfers to the in-work poor account 
for a very small part of their budget, 
with a very limited share of household 
level support taking account of family 
type and composition(65). In response 
to the crisis the Spanish government 
accelerated and expanded its fiscal 
consolidation efforts in order to halt 
the rapid increase in the government 
debt and tackle deficit. As part of its 
measures it  foresees the withdrawal 
of €400 personal income tax credit and 
the phasing out of child related tax 
deductions, which will have a dispro-
portionate effect on the low-income 
people(66). Thus, work at full capacity 
(65)  Cabrero (2010). Reference Chart 36.
(66)  European Commission (2011d).
Chart 47: Poverty rates in Spain, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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remains the best protection against 
poverty when having dependent chil-
dren. Indeed, the share of people in 
very-high-intensity households is the 
same if living with dependent children 
than without (just below 45 %). 
Around 30 % of adults live in house-
holds with medium work intensity 
(40-50 %), one of the highest shares 
in the EU. At this work intensity, the 
gap between the poverty rates of 
those living in households with and 
without children is around 15 pps, 
i.e. much higher than at higher 
intensities. At medium work inten-
sity, the share of households with 
children is twice as high as that of 
households without children reflect-
ing the low participation of women 
who take care of dependent children 
as a result of the prevalence of the 
traditional single breadwinner cou-
pled with limited provision of child-
care facilities and flexible working 
arrangements, and limited creation 
of employment incentives for second 
earners, including limited financial 
support for non-parental care. 
5.7. Poland
An important challenge in Poland 
is temporary work with the in-work 
poverty rate for temporary work-
ers being twice as high as that for 
 permanent ones (Chart a). 
The full-time contract is still the stand-
ard type of contract. In addition, the 
share of temporary workers in total 
employees is the highest in the EU 
(27.2 % against an EU average of 
14 %). Around 20 % of those on tem-
porary contracts do it involuntarily (see 
Chart 5) and the wage penalty associat-
ed with temporary work is the highest 
in the EU (Table 2). However, the transi-
tion rate from temporary to permanent 
employment at 34 % is close to the EU 
average (34.6 %).
Poland has a total in-work poverty 
rate of 11 %, which decreased through-
out the whole period (from 13.8 % to 
11.1 %) but is well above the EU-27 aver-
age. Similarly, the in-work poverty rates 
for all groups along the three job char-
acteristics are above the respective EU 
averages except for temporary workers 
and for single parents (Chart a). Poland 
has an employment rate of below 65 % 
in 2010 for persons aged 20-64, well 
below the EU average. Poland’s poverty 
rate is relatively high at low work inten-
sities, partly reflecting the lack of social 
assistance for casual work. It decreases 
gradually and remains at around 6.5 % 
at very high intensities (Chart b). The 
relatively high poverty rate at high 
intensities reflects to a large extent low 
wage incidence. The shares of people 
in very-high-intensity households with 
and without children are almost the 
same, reflecting the importance of full-
time work of both parents in order 
to ensure an adequate family income. 
In addition to the decreasing in-work 
poverty rates, Poland also is experienc-
ing falling inequality even though the 
inequality is one of the highest in EU 
(see Chapter 2).
Indeed Poland is among the L9 EU 
countries(67), namely the nine EU coun-
tries with the lowest real household 
income per capita, and its statutory 
minimum wage is among the lowest in 
the EU. Collective bargaining coverage 
is generally low (less than 40 % as com-
(67) In 2009, the real adjusted disposable 
income of Polish households was around 
40 % less than the EU average. Eurostat 
(2011c), Figure 1.
pared to an EU-27 average of around 
60 %, and an EU-15 average of almost 
80 %), as is union density (15 % as com-
pared to the EU average of around 
30 %), while the fact that bargaining 
takes place at a very decentralised level 
leads to very wide differences in rates 
of pay. Relatively low wage incomes 
are coupled with low net transfers 
to low-income groups and generally 
high inequality: minor in-work benefits 
are targeted to low-wage earners but 
these are off-set by the Polish tax sys-
tem which is not progressive (which 
penalises low income workers) and 
high social contributions(68). 
On the other hand, around 20 % 
of adults live in households with 
medium work intensity (40-60 %), 
one of the highest shares in the EU 
(Chart b). As part-time work is not 
wide-spread in Poland (the share 
of part-time workers is 7.5 %), the 
high share of people at this level of 
work intensity mostly captures the 
effect of only one adult working or 
temporary unemployment spells for 
example between temporary jobs. 
At medium work intensity, the share 
of households with children is higher 
than is the case for households with-
out children reflecting the predomi-
nantly low participation of women 
who commonly quit work in order 
to take care of dependent children. 
(68) See also Chart 36 on income composition.
Chart 48: Poverty rates in Poland, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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This reflects not only traditional ste-
reotypes but also the limited access 
to childcare, especially in early age 
(up to 3 years of age), the general 
lack of access to flexible work, and 
the lack of financial support (grants, 
subsidies, tax rebates, etc.) for non-
parental child care to increase work 
incentives for second earners. Only 
2 % of children aged under two and 
27 % of those aged 3-5 benefit from 
childcare institutions. 
5.8. Czech Republic
The Czech Republic has a total in-
work poverty rate of 3.2 %, which 
has been stable during the whole 
period. This is the lowest rate in the 
EU and the in-work poverty rates for 
all groups along the three job charac-
teristics are below the respective EU 
averages (Chart a). 
The in-work poverty rate for tem-
porary workers is, however, more 
than twice that for permanent work-
ers, although temporary employ-
ment is not widespread in compari-
son to other Member States (tem-
porary workers make up only 9 % 
of employees against an EU aver-
age of 14 %). The poverty risk for 
part-time workers is almost twice 
that for full-time workers but, again, 
part-time employment makes up 
only a small share of total employ-
ment (6 % against an EU average of 
above 19 %). The full-time, perma-
nent contract is still the norm in the 
Czech Republic, and workers on such 
contracts, which are the majority, 
benefit from high levels of employ-
ment protection and income security, 
while protection for those on part-
time or temporary contracts is low.
At household level, the poverty rate 
of adults is relatively high at low 
work intensities of up to 40 %, partly 
reflecting the lack of social assistance 
for casual work, but then it drops 
sharply to below 10 % at medium 
intensity and to just 2 % at very high 
intensity, which is the lowest value 
in the EU (Chart b). Despite the low 
poverty rate already at medium work 
intensity, moreover, nearly 60 % of 
adults live in households with very 
high work intensity, one of the high-
est rates in the EU. One of the rea-
sons, as mentioned above, is that the 
standard contract in the Czech Repub-
lic is for full-time work. Another is the 
need for both adults in the household 
to work because of generally low 
wages: Czech Republic is in the L9 
group of EU countries, i.e. among the 
nine countries with the lowest real 
household income per capita in the 
EU(69). The statutory minimum wage is 
lower than in EU-15 Member States, 
but it is among the highest in the new 
Member States. This helps explain 
why the share of adults in very-high-
intensity households with children is 
only slightly below that of adults 
without children. 
On the other hand, around 20 % of 
adults live in households with medi-
um (40-60 %) work intensity, where 
the proportion of those with children 
is more than twice that of those with-
out children. The insufficient devel-
opment of child (and elderly) care 
facilities and the high cost for private 
care institutions coupled with tradi-
tional stereotypes and the peculiar-
ity of family benefits, make caring at 
home the common practice especially 
(69) In particular, in 2009, the real adjusted 
disposable income of Czech households 
was around 37 % lower than the EU 
average. Eurostat (2011c).
for children of up to 3 years of age. 
EU SILC data show that in the Czech 
Republic, as well as in some other 
new Member States like Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Poland, Cyprus 
and Southern countries like Greece, 
Portugal, and Italy, households with 
children rely heavily on child care pro-
vided by relatives other than parents, 
which enables both parents to work 
full time in spite of the general insuf-
ficiency of early childcare network. 
Recent policy measures have been put 
in place, or are envisaged in order to 
provide support for the establishment 
of childcare facilities, for more flex-
ible working time arrangements, and 
increased support for non-parental 
childcare, etc.(70). 
The low in-work poverty rate is to 
a large extent due to high redis-
tributive effects of the Czech wel-
fare state which has resulted in very 
low rates of inequality in the Czech 
Republic: in fact, the Czech Republic 
is among the countries with the low-
est income inequality in the EU(71). 
Thus, even though the median equiv-
alised net income in the country 
is not high (slightly above €7 000, 
which is the third highest among 
(70) Czech national reform programme, 2011 
and Eurofound (2010), Czech Republic.
(71) The Gini coefficient in 2009 shows that 
CZ is the country with the fifth lowest 
inequality in the EU after SI, HU, SK, 
and SE (Eurostat statistics on income and 
living conditions). 
Chart 49: Poverty rates in Czech Republic, 2009
a: In-work poverty rate by type of work and 
household composition
b: At-risk-of poverty rate by household type 
versus work intensity
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the new Member States, but still 
well below the EU average of over 
€14 500(72)), the income distribution 
is relatively compressed so that the 
number of households with incomes 
below the 60 % threshold are rela-
tively few. In fact, this low rate of 
inequality in the Czech Republic has 
been achieved by an effective target-
ing of social transfers towards low 
earners, consisting of a combination 
of progressive income tax and tar-
geted income-tested benefits which 
supplement low earnings, mainly for 
working families with children. Since 
the early 1990s such targeted policies 
have been put in place during the 
transition to a market economy to 
compensate for the increased living 
costs of low-income groups. 
6. conclusion
Combating poverty and social exclu-
sion is a key objective of the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable, 
and inclusive growth. The European 
Platform against poverty and social 
exclusion sets out actions to reach 
the EU target of reducing poverty 
and social exclusion by at least 20 
million by 2020.
114 million people in the EU were at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion in 
2009, which represents 23 % of the 
EU population. Having a job remains 
the best safeguard against poverty 
and social exclusion, but it is no 
guarantee: above 8 % of the work-
ing population lives in households 
with an income below the national 
poverty threshold. This percentage 
has remained largely stable on the 
EU level, and even increased in some 
countries, despite recent trends in 
employment growth. 
The analysis in this chapter has iden-
tified three main mechanisms that 
lead to in-work poverty: inadequate 
hourly/monthly earnings, low labour 
force attachment, and household 
structure. 
(72) Eurostat statistics on income and living 
conditions, 2009.
One of the main findings of the 
analysis is that low wages are an 
important determinant of in-work 
poverty through its decisive impact 
on household income, namely, the 
lower the wage, the higher the 
rate of in-work poverty. The effect 
is especially pronounced in coun-
tries where decentralised collective 
bargaining and low collective bar-
gaining coverage lead to high earn-
ings dispersion and low minimum 
wages. In some countries, raising 
low wages, especially where they 
lag significantly behind produc-
tivity developments, and facilitat-
ing upward transitions, could help 
overcome the low-wage trap and 
motivate more people to increase 
their employment participation.
Higher minimum wages are associ-
ated with lower levels of in-work 
poverty. However, their effectiveness 
can in some cases be limited as they 
cannot be easily targeted, and in par-
ticular they do not provide support to 
a large majority of in-work poor who 
fall outside their scope (e.g. those in 
self-employment, or casual or part-
time jobs). They can also hamper job 
creation for the low skilled. 
Second, working on a temporary con-
tract is an important factor of in-work 
poverty. The in-work poverty rate is 
on average almost two times higher 
for people working on temporary 
contracts or part-time. Furthermore, 
temporary contracts are often associ-
ated with lower wages. On average, 
temporary workers are paid 14 % less 
than permanent workers after con-
trolling for age, gender, education, 
and experience. This is especially a 
concern in countries where the per-
centage of involuntary temporary 
or part-time work is high and where 
the transition rates towards better 
paid or permanent contracts are low. 
The current labour market trends 
showing that the increase in the 
overall employment since mid-2010 
was mainly borne by more temporary 
jobs and to a very little extent from 
permanent jobs point to a risk of see-
ing an increase in in-work poverty in 
the coming years.
Another finding that has emerged 
from the analysis is that self-employ-
ment is a very important factor of 
in-work poverty in some Member 
States. This result should be interpret-
ed with care because of  difficulties in 
measuring self-employment. Never-
theless, it raises a number of impor-
tant policy questions. The particular 
effects of policies on the income, 
labour market, and social situation 
of the self-employed is an emerging 
topic for further research and policy 
discussions. This dimension should be 
taken into account when assessing 
the effectiveness of measures that 
promote job creation through entre-
preneurship and self-employment. 
Furthermore, household composition 
and the combined employment par-
ticipation of all adults in the house-
hold are of particular importance. The 
empirical evidence shows that in most 
countries the one breadwinner family 
model does not really protect from 
poverty. The higher the combined 
employment participation of the fam-
ily is, the lower the risk of poverty. 
In most Member States, the risk of 
poverty for individuals in households 
with low to medium work intensity 
(typically represented by the one-
breadwinner family model) ranges 
between 15 % and 50 %. 
Lone parents and their children are 
particularly exposed to a higher risk 
of in-work poverty and represent clear 
targets for focused action. Further-
more, the presence of children is a 
factor impacting the poverty rate, and 
this impact is much more pronounced 
at low work intensities. In particular, 
people living in low-intensity house-
holds with children face twice as high 
a risk of poverty as compared with 
those in childless households. The 
gap in the poverty rates of people in 
households with and without children 
gradually diminishes with the increase 
in work intensity, and it is practically 
non-existent at very high intensity. 
Policies that have been identified that 
support these groups at risk include 
in-work benefits accounting for the 
household structure and  composition 
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(e.g. benefits for lone parents or 
big families, childcare benefits, etc.), 
and creation of incentives for second 
earners to increase their employment 
participation, including for example, 
access to affordable childcare and 
care for the elderly, flexible working 
arrangements, financial support for 
non-parental care, lifelong learning 
and up-skilling, etc. 
The chapter also shows that there 
is room for raising the quality and 
 efficiency of social spending, and 
better exploiting the role of in-kind 
benefits in mitigating inequalities 
and decreasing poverty. Thus the 
analysis shows that although on 
average higher government spend-
ing on social protection is associated 
with higher reduction in in-work 
poverty rate, some Member States 
manage to achieve similar reduc-
tions in poverty rates with lower 
rates of spending by combining a 
well performing labour market with 
a social security system that supports 
better work incentives. 
Analysis of certain personal charac-
teristics such as the level of education 
and skills, shows that people with 
low educational levels and experi-
ence have a 4 times higher risk of 
poverty than those with high edu-
cation. Unfortunately, the analysis 
also shows that the low-skilled have 
lower participation rates in LLL than 
the high-skilled. Improving access to 
LLL for the low-skilled is therefore 
essential to facilitate upward transi-
tions and combat in-work poverty.
In conclusion, the recent crisis, devel-
opments in the financial markets and 
their repercussions on the real econ-
omy, including the level and char-
acteristics of job creation, increased 
share of temporary employment, 
etc., make the situation of the in-
work poor much more apparent. 
Therefore, it is paramount to moni-
tor the situation of the in-work poor 
in the near future, and to assess the 
effectiveness of policies in support-
ing labour market participation of 
all adults in the household, in provid-
ing a living wage, and in facilitating 
upward transitions for those trapped 
in low-paid or precarious jobs.
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Determinants of in-work poverty: odd-ratios (Logit estimates)
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annex 2
Chart 50: Poverty rate and share of adults versus household work intensity, 2009 
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Chart 50: Poverty rate and share of adults versus household work intensity, 2009 (continued)
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Chart 50: Poverty rate and share of adults versus household work intensity, 2009 (continued)
Source: EU SILC 2009. Note: Results for intensity (0-20%]: CZ, CY unreliable/uncertain, DK extremely unreliable, EU Eurostat estimate. Intervals at very low intensity 
join into (0-20%] for DK.
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Chart 51: Poverty rate and share of population versus household work intensity by type of households, 2009
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Chart 51: Poverty rate and share of population versus household work intensity by type of households, 2009
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Chart 51: Poverty rate and share of population versus household work intensity by type of households, 2009
Source: Eurostat, EU SILC 2009.
Note: EU SILC 2009, income year 2008, except for UK (income year 2009) and IE (moving income period 2008-2009).
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Europe will undergo a major trans-
formation of its age structure in the 
coming decades. It is projected that 
the working age population will age 
significantly, with the share of 55-64 
years old people rising from 18 per 
cent in 2010 to 21 per cent in 2020 
and 22 per cent by 2050, and with 
the old age-dependency ratio(1) rising 
sharply over this period, from 0.26 in 
2010, to 0.3 in 2020, and 0.5 in 2050. 
See Chart 1.a and 1.b.
In view of these projections it became 
clear in the early 2000s that labour 
markets had to meet the challenge 
of an ageing work force and increas-
ing old-age dependency ratio by 
increasing the employment of older 
workers and delaying their exit from 
the labour market, which led to the 
so-called Stockholm and Barcelona 
targets(2).
(1) i.e. the number of people older than 65 
years compared to the number of people 
aged 15 to 64. Wöss and Türk (2011) make 
a distinction between the age-dependency 
(“demographic dependency”) ratio and 
the economic-dependency ratio, i.e. the 
ratio of the pensioners and unemployed 
relative to the economically active per-
sons, and argue to use the latter indicator 
to assess (financial) dependency, as such 
an indicator gives a more explicit indica-
tion than raising employment rates, with 
quality jobs, could help considerably in 
the reduction of future increase in the 
economic dependency ratio.
(2) The Stockholm European Council 
of March 2001 agreed “to set an EU 
target for increasing the average EU 
employment rate among older women 
and men (55-64) to 50 % by 2010”, the 
so-called ‘Stockholm target’. In the same 
vein the Barcelona European Council of 
March 2002 concluded that “a progres-
sive increase of about 5 years in the 
effective average age at which people 
stop working in the European Union 
should be sought by 2010”, the so-called 
‘Barcelona target’.
Active ageing
Chapter 5
Chart 1.a: Age groups distribution of the projected working-age population  
(15-64) in EU-27
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Chart 1.b: Old–age dependency ratio in EU-27
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, Europop2010 ( proj_10c2150p) 
Note: ratio of 65+ aged persons to 15-64 years aged persons.
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This chapter focuses on policies that 
aim to encourage older people to 
remain active by working longer and 
retiring later. Other dimensions of 
active ageing, such as engaging older 
people in volunteering, or encourag-
ing them to lead healthy and inde-
pendent lives, are not discussed, 
although they are addressed else-
where at the EU level, for example 
in the work of the European Founda-
tion (2011 a., b. and c.), the European 
Year of Volunteering (2011), and the 
European Innovation Partnership on 
Active and Healthy Ageing(3).
This chapter begins with a brief review of 
the main statistical facts about the age-
ing work force in the European Union. 
Next, the labour market behaviour of 
older workers is analysed on the basis 
of micro-economic data that describes 
the personal and household character-
istics of older workers, followed by an 
analysis of the impact of labour market 
institutions on active ageing - using 
DG Employment’s general equilibrium 
Labour Market Model (LMM). The chap-
ter concludes with an assessment of the 
policy implications of the findings. 
Briefly summarised, the findings of 
this chapter underline that retire-
ment is not the sole outcome of 
the interplay between institutional 
and financial factors, and that much 
deeper pull and push factors are at 
play. Comprehensive policy respons-
es to promote active ageing should 
therefore combine the removal of 
financial disincentives with meas-
ures targeted towards older workers 
and be designed to discourage early 
retirement, stimulating learning to 
avoid skills obsolescence, adapting 
working conditions to the specific 
characteristics of older people, main-
taining the overall health of older 
workers, and providing elderly care. 
Effective social dialogue and involve-
ment of all stakeholders as well as 
exchanging information and good 
practices across borders will be cru-
cial for implementing such policies 
in a way that is both economically 
efficient and socially acceptable.
(3) See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/
active-healthy-ageing.
Finally, it should be noted that this 
chapter also aims to underpin with 
sound analysis the initiatives in the 
context of the upcoming European 
Year of Active Ageing and Solidarity 
between Generations (in 2012)(4).
1. older workers in 
The european union: 
some basic facTs
1.1. The Stockholm 
target
The Stockholm target was to achieve, 
by 2010, that at least 50 % of the 
EU population aged 55–64 should 
be in employment, as monitored by 
(4) For more on the European Year of Active 
Ageing and Solidarity between Generations 
see http://www.active-ageing-2012.eu 
the structural indicator ‘employment 
rate of older workers’(5).
Chart 2 shows that, for the EU as a 
whole, the employment rate of older 
workers increased from just under 
37 % in 2000 to over 46 % in 2010. 
Although all Member States, except 
Romania and Portugal, recorded an 
increase in the employment rate of 
older workers, the rate of develop-
ment varied across Member States.
Sweden, Denmark, and the UK, which 
already had employment rates over 
50 % in 2000, strengthened their per-
formance. In Portugal, on the other 
hand, the employment rate of older 
workers declined somewhat, i.e. from 
nearly 51 % in 2000 to 49 % in 2010, 
and in Romania the employment rate 
fell sharply from 49.5 % to 41 %. In 
(5) Indicator available as variable ‘tsdde100’ 
in the Eurostat database.
Chart 2: Employment rates for persons aged 55–64, 2000 and 2010
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Chart 3: Employment rate of older workers: difference between men and women
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Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Finland, and 
Germany the employment rate of 
older workers was higher than 50 % 
in 2010 – a significant increase over 
the rates recorded in 2000. 
Malta recorded the lowest employ-
ment rate at 30 %, followed by Italy 
at 36.6 %. However, Italy recorded an 
increase in 2010 of nearly 9 percent-
age points (pps) compared with the 
rate recorded in 2000. Bulgaria and 
Slovakia recorded noticeable increas-
es - 23 pps and 19 pps respectively 
- but still remained below the 50 % 
target. In the remaining Member 
States the participation rate of older 
workers increased but, as they start-
ed from a relatively low level in 2000, 
they fell short of the 50 % target.
Chart 3 shows noticeable changes in 
the relative employment rate of older 
male and female workers, with the 
gender gap in the EU decreasing by 
3.5 pps to 16 %. The highest gaps were 
found in Malta, Cyprus, and Greece in 
2010 - as had been recorded in 2000. In 
Ireland the gap between the employ-
ment rate of older men and women 
more than halved over the 2001-2010 
period, followed by Estonia and Spain 
where it decreased by over 17 and 14.5 
pps. In Latvia, Finland, and Estonia the 
participation rate of older women was 
higher than that of older men in 2010.
Charts 4.a to 4.f provide a more 
detailed picture of the evolution of 
the employment rates of older male 
and female workers over the last 2 
decades. This shows that, in most 
Member States, the employment rate 
increased for both men and women. 
However, the strong upward trend in 
the employment rate of older female 
workers contrasts with the modest 
upward trend in the employment of 
the older male workers. Neverthe-
less, the difference between the two 
remains significant, with an average 
EU employment rate of older female 
workers of 38.6 % in 2010, compared 
to 54.6 % for older male workers. 
Among the larger Member States, the 
steady increase of the male employ-
ment rate in Germany as of 2004 is 
the most noticeable development, 
approaching the high employment 
rate recorded by the UK. A similar 
pattern is found with respect to older 
female workers, where Germany also 
recorded a significant increase. 
In almost all the small EU-15 Member 
States the participation rate of older 
female workers increased during the 
decade 2000-2010. Strong increases 
are recorded for the Netherlands and 
Ireland, where the participation rate 
of older workers rose from 26 % in 
2000 to 42 % in 2010. Austria showed 
a noticeable increase in the participa-
tion of older workers in 2006 and 
2007. However, the Member States 
that already had a participation rate 
of 40 % or more for older workers in 
2000, i.e. Denmark, Portugal, Finland, 
and Sweden, showed only a modest 
increase in the period to 2010.
Among the new Member States, the 
sharp increase in Bulgaria for both 
male and female older workers is 
remarkable (up from 10 % in 2000 to 
nearly 38 % in 2010 for older female 
workers, and up from 33 % to 50 % 
for older male workers), while the 
employment rate of older workers in 
Romania showed a sharp fall (down 
from 56 % in 2000 to 50 % in 2010 for 
males, and down from 44 % to 33 % 
for females).
1.2. The Barcelona 
targets
The Barcelona target is monitored by 
the structural indicator “the average 
exit age from the labour force”, i.e. 
the average age at which workers 
withdraw from the labour force and 
become permanently inactive(6). 
(6) The average exit age from the labour 
force gives the most probable age at 
which people (who are at least 49 years 
old) leave the labour force. The indi-
cator itself is built on probabilities for 
individuals in each age cohort to stay 
active in period t. The probability rate is 
calculated on the basis of activity rates 
per age and year from the EU quarterly 
Labour Force Survey. The activity rates 
taken into consideration are the average 
over four quarterly observed rates in the 
year considered. The probability distribu-
tion ranges between 50 (equal or above 50 
Chart 5 compares the value of this indica-
tor in 2001 with its value in 2009 for the 
different Member States, where data 
is available. On balance, the increase 
in the average exit age from the total 
labour force has been well below the 
initial objective of a 5 year rise, as the 
exit age only rose in the EU-27 from just 
under 60 years in 2001 to over 61 years 
in 2009, and in EU-15 from over to 60 to 
well over 61 years. 
The highest average exit age is seen 
in Sweden at over 64 years, while 
the lowest is in Slovakia at under 
59 years, with increases of more than 
(or equal to) 2 years are found in 
Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Spain. Increases less than (or equal 
to) 0.5 years are found in Finland, 
Italy, and Cyprus.
The average exit age of female work-
ers increased from 59.4 years in 2001 
to 61 years in 2009 in EU-27, while it 
increased from almost 60 to over 61 
years in EU-15. The highest average 
exit age of female workers is in Swe-
den at 64 years, while the lowest is in 
Slovakia at 57.5 years. 
The average exit age of male workers 
rose from 60.4 years in 2001 to close 
to 62 years in 2009 in EU-27, while it 
increased from 60.4 years to nearly 
62 years in EU-15. In 2009, the high-
est average exit age of male workers 
is in Sweden at approaching 65 years, 
while the lowest is in Hungary at just 
over 60 years.
years of age), below which the probability 
of staying active is 100 %, and 70 (equal 
or higher than 70 years of age) where the 
probability of remaining active is assumed 
to be 0 %. Here, it should also be noted 
that the data quality (sample sizes) for 
higher ages in some countries makes it 
necessary to smooth artificially the decline 
of activity rates linearly from age 65 to age 
70 so that at age 70 the active population 
in terms of the model becomes zero. The 
estimate is of the average exit age from 
the labour force for an active person aged 
between 50 and 70, regardless of wheth-
er he/she is receiving a pension or not. 
Therefore, the average exit age from the 
labour force may be higher than the aver-
age age of effective retirement into pen-
sion. For more technical details, see http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/
portal/product_details/dataset?p_prod-
uct_code=TSDDE420. See also Economix 
(2008) for an assessment of the scope and 
limitations of this indicator. 
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Chart 5: Average exit age from the labour force in 2009 
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Chart 4.a: Employment rate of older workers (men) in large EU 
Member States
Chart 4.d: Employment rate of older workers (women) in large 
EU Member States
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Chart 4.b: Employment rate of older workers (men) in small 
EU-15 Member States
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Chart 4.c: Employment rate of older workers (men) in  
small new Member States
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Chart 6: Average exit rate from the labour force: difference between men and women
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (tsdde420) and  OECD 
Note: Member States with a * indicate 2009 data from OECD source.
Chart 7.a: Average effective retirement age in the large EU 
Member States – Men
Chart 7.d: Average effective retirement age in the large EU 
Member States - Women
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Chart 7.b: Average effective retirement age in the small EU-15 
Member States – Men
Chart 7.e: Average effective retirement age in the small EU-15 
Member States – Women
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Chart 7.c: Average effective retirement age in small new 
Member States – Men
Chart 7.f: Average effective retirement age in small new  
Member States – Women
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Chart 6(7) compares differences in 
average exit age by gender and Mem-
ber State (where available) for 2001 
and 2009. While the average exit 
age of male workers in 2001 was 
higher than the average exit age of 
female workers in all Member States, 
by 2009 four Member States recorded 
a higher average exit age for women 
than for men, namely Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and Spain. 
Charts 7.a to 7.f place recent devel-
opments in a longer term perspec-
tive by showing the evolution of 
the average effective exit age over 
the 1970-2009 period(8). These Charts 
show that in most Member States, 
for which data is available, the exit 
age declined significantly from the 
early seventies until the mid-eight-
ies, after which there was a fur-
ther steady decline in most Member 
States. At the beginning of the cur-
rent century the average exit age 
levelled off, but with an increase 
for both men and women in some 
Member States (including the U.K., 
Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, and  Estonia).
Chart 8.a and 8.b show a cross section 
of the average exit age, the statutory 
retirement age, and the expected life 
duration at the level of the Member 
States in 2009.
In most Member States the statu-
tory retirement age for men in 2009 
was 65 years, with the exception of 
Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and France. For 
women, the statutory retirement age 
was the same, i.e. 65 years, in only 14 
Member States, with the rest having 
a lower statutory retirement age.
(7) In Chart 6 and following charts the 
data reference OECD refers to 
OECD data available at http://www.
o e c d . o r g / d o c u m e n t / 4 7 / 0 , 3 3 4 3 ,
en_2649_34291_39371887_1_1_1_1,00.
html
(8) OECD data and description of the 
methodology available at http://
www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,
en_2649_34291_39371887_1_1_1_1,00.
html. The exit age is measured here by 
taking the average age of exit from the 
labour force over a five-year period in 
order to mitigate the impact of cyclical 
variations.
Chart 8.a: Exit age and life expectancy at 65 - Men 2009
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Chart 8.b: Exit age and life expectancy at 65 - Women 2009
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Box 1: The average effective retirement age
Table 1.1 shows the results of a cross-sectional regression of the average effective exit 
age for men and women (not necessarily the age at which one starts to receive a pension 
income) relative to the official statutory retirement age, life expectancy, gross pension 
wealth, and a constant, based on data for 21 Member States for 20081. 
When the statutory retirement age increases by 1 %, the effective retirement age increases by 
0.5 % for men, and 0.6 % for women. The pension wealth does not show a significant correla-
tion2, while the expected life duration at 65 years shows a significant negative correlation for 
men, which suggests that a third cause, i.e. economic wealth, is driving both life expectancy and 
retirement age. In other words, when people get wealthier they live longer and retire earlier. 
Table 1.1: The effective retirement age in 2008 
Statutory  
retirement age Life expectancy Pension Wealth Constant R-squared
Men
0.5 -0.2 0.0 2.8 0.81
(2.8) (-7.2) (-0.4) (3.8)
Women
0.6 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.41
(2.9) (0.8) (-1.1) (1.4)
Note: t-values between brackets. Values larger than 1.96 (2.58)  indicate significance at 5(1) % confidence level.
(1)  The dependent and explanatory variables are in logarithm so that the point estimates can be 
interpreted as elasticity, i.e. the point estimate associated with a particular variable indicates the 
% change in the effective average exit age when the explanatory variable increase by 1 %.
(2) This insignificance was found whether net or gross pension wealth, or the net or gross 
replacement ratio was included in the regression (source Eurostat). A variable measuring 
the gain in gross pension wealth for working an extra year between the age of 60 and 
65 years was also included (source OECD (2011) .
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Box 1 shows some statistical evi-
dence on the correlation between 
the effective retirement age and the 
statutory retirement age, life expec-
tancy, and pension wealth. Notable 
findings are that the effective retire-
ment age is driven by the statu-
tory retirement age for both men 
and women, whereas the statistics 
show that when the life expectancy 
increases the average effective retire-
ment age decreases. No significant 
correlation could be found between 
effective retirement age and pension 
wealth either.(9)
1.3. Employment of 
older workers during 
the recession
In the first quarter of 2006, over 12 
per cent of employed male persons 
were older workers, compared to 
nearly 11 per cent of older female 
workers while in the first quarter of 
2011, these shares had risen to 14 
and 13 per cent respectively.
Chart 9 shows the evolution (in per-
centage point change) in the share of 
older workers in total employment, 
from the first quarter of 2006 until 
the first quarter of 2011 (period for 
which data is available). All observa-
tions reported are positive confirm-
ing that the share of older workers in 
total employment is increasing. 
With regard to the period from the 
fourth quarter of 2008 until the sec-
ond quarter of 2009, i.e. the period 
that the recent crisis gained momen-
tum, the share of older male workers 
showed a notable increase, of almost 
0.2 per cent points. For older female 
workers a similar pattern is found. 
However, from the third quarter of 
2009 onwards the patterns of male 
(9) Gross pension wealth to which a person 
is entitled assuming a career from age 
20 until age 60 is the present value of 
the future pensions to which workers 
and retirees are entitled - see Brugiavini 
et al. (2005) and OECD (2011). The null-
hypothesis is that pension wealth should 
show a significant negative correlation 
with the effective retirement age.
and female older workers diverged 
somewhat. For older male workers 
the share declined until the second 
quarter of 2010, when it picked up 
slightly. For older women, on the 
other hand (and with the exception 
of the second quarter of 2010), the 
share in total female employment 
remained high. 
Fluctuations in the share of older 
male workers reflect the typical 
contra-cyclical behaviour attributed 
to the relatively high hiring and 
firing costs of older workers com-
pared with other age groups, with 
older workers being hoarded more 
in downturns and recruited less in 
upswings. Explanations for develop-
ments in the share of older women 
are less evident, and may lie in 
a combination of age cohort and 
cyclical effects, and that women are 
over-represented in sectors that are 
less sensitive to the business cycle, 
such as care and education. 
2. ageing condiTions 
in The eu: main  
dimensions and a  
Typology
As interest in Active Ageing policies 
has increased, so have policy assess-
ments at the EU level on the basis of 
harmonised indicators. The Stockholm 
(2001) and Barcelona (2002) targets 
first used the employment rate of 
older workers, and the average effec-
tive exit age of workers as quantitative 
indicators to measure the extent to 
which Member States were progress-
ing towards the common targets.(10) 
Meanwhile, a comprehensive list of 
commonly agreed indicators was 
developed to supplement the Euro-
pean Employment Guidelines, which 
stipulate common priorities and tar-
gets for the Member States’  national 
employment policies.(11) 
Analysts in Europe have been able to 
use a broad array of harmonised indi-
cators on various dimensions of older 
people’s labour market performance 
and their social integration to iden-
tify shortcomings and formulate poli-
cy requirements. However, questions 
have been raised about what is actually 
being measured. Are certain policy and 
institutional mixes particularly influenc-
ing older people’s labour market and 
social inclusion? Can the strategies and 
conditions prevailing in the different 
Member States, with respect to Active 
Ageing, be categorised by a ‘typol-
ogy of ageing conditions’ similar to the 
different ‘Worlds of Welfare’ devised 
by Esping-Andersen(12) to describe 
 different Welfare State systems? 
(10) See sub-sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this 
chapter for details.
(11) For the list see Employment Committee 
(2009).
(12) “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capital-
ism” by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990).
Chart 9: Percentage point change in share of employed older workers  
in total employment
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This sub-chapter is devoted to the 
analysis of existing indicators, in 
order to find evidence of core poli-
cies and institutional mixes in the EU 
determining ageing conditions. The 
analysis may be seen as an update, 
using data from a labour market in 
recession, of the one undertaken 
for the Commission’s Employment in 
Europe report of 2007(13) which pre-
sented a Principal Component and 
Cluster Analysis on Active Ageing 
in the EU Member States. However, 
the set of input indicators used here 
is different from those employed 
earlier. It has an input of 15 differ-
ent indicators encompassing older 
people’s labour market performance, 
institutional details, and indicators 
of social inclusion (relative income, 
inequality, poverty, wage  relation).
The analysis is split in two parts:
1. A Principal Component Analysis to 
identify the broad structure of a 
data set comprising 15 quantita-
tive indicators on Active Ageing
(13) European Commission (2007), Sec-
tion 2.6.
2. A Cluster Analysis to identify similar-
ities and differences between Mem-
ber States, based on the principal 
components of ageing conditions
2.1. The main 
dimensions of Active 
Ageing: A Principal 
Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or 
“explorative Factor Analysis” is a mul-
tivariate technique designed to identi-
fy a core structure in a broader dataset 
by shaping groups of variables that are 
correlated, and separating them from 
non-correlated groups.(14) If there are 
stronger correlations between indica-
tors on employment and social inclu-
sion, one could conclude that there are 
common driving forces or some “com-
mon origins” to these variables so that 
merging them into “factors” would 
make sense. Ideally, the analysis would 
reduce a multivariate data set of partly 
correlated indicators to a few orthogo-
(14) Backhaus et al. (2008), Section 7.1 and 
European Commission (2006), especially 
Box 1 on p. 109.
nal (statistically independent or uncor-
related) factors which - despite the 
“squeeze” - still explain a significant 
part of the original indicator’s variabil-
ity (the variance across countries).(15) 
The original list of indicators in the 
PCA is as follows:
The original data matrix for the anal-
ysis consists of 28 observations (coun-
tries) for each of the 15 variables. The 
first six indicators capture the labour 
market situation of older people, 
while the share of part-time (indi-
cator 5) and temporary workers (6) 
provides some relevant information 
on their institutional circumstances. 
Analysis showed that the inclusion of 
the OECD’s Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) indicator did not 
add much explanatory power to the 
model. The Duration of Working Life 
index (4) measures the duration of 
working life at the age of 20 years.(16) 
Variables covering the notion of 
“knowledge-based economy” are 
included, taking account of the 
(15) Factor analysis is often used before run-
ning multivariate regressions: the inde-
pendent variables in such regressions are 
often correlated – violating one of the 
core assumptions of Ordinary-Least-Square 
Regressions, namely uncorrelated explana-
tory variables. Using (ideally uncorrelated) 
factors instead of a large number of cor-
related variables will hence reduce the 
problem of multi-collinearity.
(16) See Economix (2008).
Table 1: Indicators included in the PCA (2009/10 or most recent) for 27 Member States plus Norway
Indicator No Mnemonic Description of Indicator Data Source
1  ER Older people’s employment rate (55-64) EU-LFS 2010
2 AvExitAge Average Age of Exit from the Labour Force
based on EU-LFS 2010, 
see Subsection 1.2 of this chapter on the Barcelona targets
3 UR Unemployment rate (55-64) EU-LFS 2010
4 DWL Duration of Working Life indicator .. measuring DWL at the age of 20, see Economix (2008)
5 Par-time5564 Part-time as % of total employment (55-64) EU-LFS 2010
6 Temp1564 Temporary employment as % of total employment (15-64) EU-LFS 2010
7 LLL Life Long Learning indicator EU-LFS 2010
8 EDUC12
Education: Share of people holding at least upper secondary 
degree (among 55-64), i.e., ISCED 3-6
EU-LFS 2010
9 PensExp Age related government expenditure: Pensions as % of GDP
2009 Ageing Report, p. 29
 (Ageing Working Group)
10 ImpTax
Implicit Tax Rate on Labour. Taxes and social contribution 
levied on employed labour divided by total compensation  
2008 National Accounts
11 PovR At-risk-of-poverty rate of older people EU-SILC 2009
12 RelInc Median relative income of elderly people (60+ relative to 0-59) EU-SILC 2009
13 Ineq
Inequality: S80/S20 (mean equivalised) income ratio among 
older people 
EU-SILC 2009
14 Seniority
Wage seniority: average mean hourly wage per employee 50+ 
relative to all employees 
Calculated from 2006 
Structural Earnings Survey
15 DDR_10 2010 demographic dependency ratio (65+ / 15-64)
2008 Europop convergence 
Scenario, Eurostat
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 indicators on Life Long Learning (7) 
and educational attainment (8). The 
pension expenditure variable (9) and 
the implicit tax rate on labour (10) pro-
vide some indication of the generosity 
of pension systems and the cost that 
the welfare state imposes, in terms of 
the general tax burden on labour. 
Variables 11 to 13 cover the dimen-
sions of poverty, inequality, and 
income position of the elderly while 
‘seniority’ (14) is an index for the 
wage premium paid for age. Current 
demographic dependency is also con-
sidered (15). All variables except DWL 
(for logical reasons) and Temp1564 
(for data availability reasons) refer to 
older people. 
Starting from the vector of indica-
tors, displayed in Table 1, the extrac-
tion of principal components is done 
in a way that reduces the relations 
between the original indicators 
(measured in terms of the correlation 
between them), in order to arrive at a 
low number of principal components 
(factors). The technique is therefore 
called “reduction of dimensions”. 
The factors are extracted in such 
a way as to maximise the sum of 
their correlations with the original 
 variables. This correlation is called 
factor loading (of original indicator x 
to factor y). Annex 3 briefly describes 
the procedure.
Table 2 shows the resulting com-
ponent matrix. Four factors (com-
ponents) were extracted from the 
original 15-indicator dataset with the 
matrix showing the factor loadings of 
each resulting factor to each of the 
15 initial indicators. Loadings move in 
a logical range from -1 (perfect nega-
tive correlation of indicator x with 
factor y) to +1 (perfect positive corre-
lation). Very weak loadings between 
-.1 to +.1 will be suppressed. Stronger 
correlations are highlighted. 
On top of the loadings of variable x 
(row) on factor y (column), Table 2 
shows the variables’ communalities in 
its last column as well as the factors’ 
Eigenvalue in its last row. To some 
extent, these measure the  quality of 
the extraction. The Eigenvalue pro-
vides important information when it 
comes to determining the number of 
factors to be extracted (see Box 2). 
With one being the standardised 
variance of each of the 15 variables, 
this would result in 15 being the sum 
of the original indicators’ standard-
ised overall variation. The sum over 
all 15 communalities (equalling the 
sum over all four Eigenvalues) is 
only 11.5. That is, using the extrac-
tion result displayed in Table 2, 
the four factors manage to explain 
11.5/15 (77 %) of the 15 original 
indicator’s cross-country variability. 
Hence, the reduction of dimensions 
from 15 indicators to only four fac-
tors involves a loss of 23 % of the 
explanatory power of all 15 indica-
tors. This is an acceptable albeit 
not optimal outcome – an issue 
discussed more in depth in Annex 4. 
A key issue is to find a reasonable 
interpretation of the four principal 
components of ageing conditions 
extracted from the dataset. We use the 
factor loadings displayed in Table 2: 
where there is a strong positive (neg-
ative) loading of indicator x to factor 
y, there is evidence that a high (low) 
Table 2: Factor loadings in the range [-1,+1] for four principal components, extracted 
from 15 indicators on 27 Member States plus Norway
Indicator
Rotated Component Matrix
Extracted factor
Indicator’s  
Communality
1 2 3 4
ER .929  -.198  0.91
AvExitAge .813 .212 .235 -.191 0.80
DWL .884 .298   0.88
UR  .770 -.228  0.65
Part-
time5564
.586 -.566   0.67
Temp1564  -.172 .527 .323 0.42
LLL .663 -.349 -.203 .188 0.64
EDUC12   -.849 .124 0.74
PensExp -.290 -.320 .340 .783 0.92
ImplTax  -.347 -.257 .832 0.88
PovR .177 .866 .113 -.145 0.82
RelInc -.231 -.749 .242 .234 0.73
Ineq  .548 .695  0.80
Seniority -.119 -.427 .796 .124 0.85
DDR_10 .144 .165 .151 .861 0.81
Factors’ 
Eigenvalue
3.32 3.25 2.58 2.35 Sum:11.5
Box 2: Communality and Eigenvalue 
The communality of variable x is the sum of the squared loadings over all four factors (sum 
over the row in Table 2). It tells us to what extent the total of all four factors contribute 
to explaining indicator x’s observed variation across countries. Communality equal to one 
would mean full explanation. For example, the four factors explain 91 % of cross-country dif-
ferences in employment rates, but only 42 % of the share of temporary workers’ variability.
The Eigenvalue of a factor y is the sum of the squared loadings over all 15 variables to 
factor y (sum over the column in Table 2). It measures to what extent factor y contributes 
to explaining the observed variability (country differences) of all 15 indicators. Given that 
the standardised variance of an indicator is equal to one, an Eigenvalue equal to one would 
mean that the respective factor extracted from the set of variables would not explain more 
variance than one original variable itself. Hence, according to the Kaiser-criterion, the 
extraction would continue only as long as the marginal factor’s Eigenvalue is still greater 
than one (Backhaus et al. (2008), p. 353). This is still the case for the fourth extracted factor, 
but not for the fifth - hence extraction stops after four factors. Vis-à-vis their Eigenvalues, 
factors 1 and 2 explain more of the overall variability than factors 3 and 4.
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score for factor y goes in line with a 
high score for indicator x. 
•	 Factor 1 shows strong positive cor-
relation between the employment 
rate of older workers, the Aver-
age Labour Market Exit Age, the 
 duration-of-working-life indicator 
and loads (fairly) strongly to the 
share of part-time work amongst 
older workers and the Life-Long-
Learning intensity. One could con-
clude that this factor reflects the 
extent to which Member States 
manage to achieve the activation 
of older people on the labour mar-
ket through a flexible working 
 environment (including opportuni-
ties to work part-time) and life-long 
employability. Hence, one could 
label this dimension a “supportive 
active system” consistent with the 
classification used in the Employ-
ment in Europe 2007 report.
•	 Factor 2 is strongly positive on older 
people’s unemployment and corre-
lates well with increasing poverty 
risk, low elderly income (relative to 
people younger than 60) and high 
income inequality amongst older 
people. Moreover, it correlates 
negatively with activity through 
part-time work, suggesting that 
full time work is needed to make a 
living. This combination of factors 
suggests a social security system 
with “low safety nets”.
•	 Factor 3 could suggest that labour 
markets are segmented, to a cer-
tain extent, from older people’s 
perspective. There is quite a high 
correlation between the share of 
temporary workers and a high level 
of older people having less than 
upper secondary educational quali-
fications. On top of that, the insid-
er-outsider phenomenon shows 
strongly in terms of high income 
inequality among the elderly and 
a strong seniority wage premium. 
This factor is being labelled “Labour 
market segmentation”.
•	 Factor 4 responds highly to the 
labour tax burden, pension 
expenditure and demographic 
dependency, with permissive exit 
rules. It suggests a social security 
system based on income transfers 
and high social security contribu-
tions. We call this, as in the 2007 
report, “Tax distortions”.
2.2. Member State 
taxonomy of ageing 
conditions: A Cluster 
Analysis
This section seeks to find evidence for 
a typology of ageing conditions by try-
ing to group 27 Member States (and 
Norway) into clusters, based on the 
countries’ performance with respect to 
these four core ageing conditions. For 
our Cluster Analysis (CA) we use hier-
archical clustering which (referring to 
our exercise) seeks to build a hierarchy 
of groups (clusters, partitions) of coun-
tries based on the degree of similar-
ity with reference to specified ageing 
characteristics. See Annex 5 for a short 
explanation of the procedure.(17) 
The analysis leaves us with a range 
of possible solutions for the cluster-
ing. Only the five-cluster solution is 
displayed below. It results in the fol-
lowing typology:
Cluster 1 [High Active Ageing] includes 
the Nordic states, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, and the UK. They tend to 
score favourably on activity (1st fac-
(17) Backhaus et al. (2008), Chapter 8. 
tor) and to some extent on inclusion 
(2nd factor) though only Norway and 
the Netherlands deviate significantly 
from the overall average low safe-
ty net factor. Countries in Cluster 1 
are characterised by a relatively low 
degree of labour market segmen-
tation (3rd factor) - though all of 
them are relatively close to the overall 
 average in terms of  segmentation. 
Cluster 2 [Intermediate Welfare 
States] includes Belgium, Austria, 
and Luxembourg, but also some 
EU-10 countries: Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slove-
nia, and Malta. They are character-
ised by below-average scores with 
respect to the low safety net factor 
(2nd factor, with LU and AT the 
lowest scores, i.e., most favourable). 
This may be surprising for some 
EU-10 countries but it is due to the 
fact that countries like HU, SK, or 
CZ are above average in terms of 
(lower) elderly poverty rates and 
inequality, while countries like SL, 
CZ, MT, and PL have below-average 
unemployment rates for older peo-
ple. On the other hand, Cluster-
2-countries perform less favourably 
in terms of knowledge-based acti-
vation (1st factor, particularly the 
 EU-10-countries). 
Cluster 3 [Mediterranean] includes 
France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Por-
tugal. Their labour markets tend to 
be segmented from older people’s 
perspective (3rd factor); these coun-
Table 3: A five-cluster typology of Member States based on the principal 
components of ageing conditions
Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: Factor 4:
Supportive 
Active 
System
Low safety nets  
("-" means 
favourable)
Labour Market 
segmentation     
("-" means 
favourable)
Tax
Distortions
Cluster 1: 
DE, FI, SE, DK, NO, NL, UK + (-) (-) +/-
(High Active Ageing)
Cluster 2:
BE, AT, LU, SK, CZ, HU, PL, 
SL, MT (Intermediate)
- - +/- +/-
Cluster 3: 
FR, IT, EL, ES, PT 
(Mediterranean)
(-) (+) + +
Cluster 4: 
BG, LT, LV, EE 
(Developing welfare states)
+/- + - 0
Cluster 5:
IE, RO, CY 
(Low dependendcy)
+ +/- + -
“+” or “-” denote above (below) average value in the respective factor. Brackets indicate that 
the majority of country values are above or below, resp. “+/-” stands for an uneven distribution 
of values within the group and “0” is the label for all country values being close around the 
28-average.
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tries are characterised by high reli-
ance on pension expenditure, com-
bined with high taxes and strong 
dependency (4th factor). The low 
safety net (2nd factor) is about aver-
age except for ES and PT which 
 perform less favourably.
Cluster 4 [Developing Welfare States] 
includes the Baltic States and Bulgar-
ia which tend to have less segmented 
labour markets for older workers 
(3rd factor) but definitely have prob-
lems in terms of their “safety net” 
score (2nd factor).
Cluster 5 [Low dependency] includes 
only Ireland, Romania, and Cyprus. 
They have particularly low dependen-
cy and (pensions) expenditure scores, 
partly driven by a (still) favourable 
demographic structure (4th factor) 
combined with above-average labour 
market segmentation (3rd factor) 
for older people. With  average exit 
age above the EU-27 average, these 
countries also perform favourably in 
terms of activation (1st factor, with 
RO being only average). 
Charts 10 and 11 show how the 
Member States position themselves 
within the portfolio defined by the 
four principal components (factors) 
of ageing conditions. A standard-
ised factor value of zero indicates 
 sample average. 
The charts show that the defini-
tion of groups is relatively precise 
for the first two factors (which 
explains most of the overall  original 
 indicator’s  variability following 
their Eigenvalue as shown in Table 
2 above), but less so for factors 3 
and 4 where the frontiers are more 
blurred, especially for dependency 
factor 4 with respect to Cluster 1 
(BE, LU, AT, plus some EU-10) and 
Cluster 2 (Nordic States plus UK, DE, 
and NL) where the grouping was less 
successful. However, apart from the 
mixed Cluster 2, all clusters show a 
clear pattern which is in line with 
 expectation.
Following the analysis, the following 
policy-relevant conclusions could be 
drawn:
A certain backlog in building an 
inclusive society for older people 
seems to be the main problem in the 
Baltic States plus Bulgaria. Old-age 
poverty and inequality rates are far 
above EU average. Older people’s 
relative income position is very low 
due to low replacement rates. Hence, 
old-age poverty reduction, tackling 
inequalities, and fighting unemploy-
ment should be of particular policy 
concern in this cluster. 
Activating older people for the 
labour market should be a focus for 
the mixed cluster countries (the big-
gest EU-10 countries plus MT, AT, 
LU, and BE) which tend to show low 
older peoples’ employment rates and 
low exit ages. 
The Mediterranean Member States 
also show a certain activation back-
log. One of the major obstacles to 
a more favourable labour market 
performance of older people in this 
cluster is labour market segmenta-
tion. It is favoured by a high share 
of low-educated older people, who 
may not bring the necessary skills, 
but could also be a result of high 
seniority wage premiums excluding 
older people on the cost-side. For 
ES and PT, most importantly, dual 
labour markets result from a far-
above-average share of (loosely pro-
tected) temporary workers which 
feeds into high unemployment. 
On top of that, the Mediterranean 
cluster is characterised by a cer-
tain over-reliance on cost-intensive 
social security feeding into high 
 participation taxes. This may also 
keep, relatively, many older people 
from being active. 
The Activation cluster (including the 
Nordic States, DE, NL, and UK) all per-
form favourably in terms of activat-
ing older people. Unlike the UK and 
NL, the Nordic States and DE com-
bine successful activation with higher 
social security expenditure levels (fac-
tor 4). In the NL, on the other hand, 
it could be the work  organisation 
strongly favouring part-time work 
which may contribute to high older 
peoples’ labour market participation 
Chart 10: Plotting factor 1 “Supportive Active System” against factor 2 “Low Safety Nets”
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Chart 11: Plotting factor 3 “Labour Market Segmentation” against factor 4 “Tax Distortion”
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(part-time share for older people in 
the NL is more than double the EU 
average). In the UK, a high degree of 
supply-side labour market flexibility 
with by far the loosest employment 
protection would help to pull older 
people onto the labour market (see 
Section 5.1.5 above). 
The combined PCA/CA analysis is use-
ful to identify the main dimensions, in 
terms of the living and working con-
ditions of older people, and to help 
identify positive policy results as well 
as policy needs or deficits relative to 
other countries. In terms of the analy-
sis in this sub-chapter, however, it 
should be noted that all variables rep-
resent a snapshot in time, with most 
of the observations made in 2009 and 
2010, and it is probable that the crisis 
has aggravated negative scores in a 
number of countries. Hence it will be 
interesting to update the analysis at 
a later stage to see whether the main 
dimensions of Active Ageing have to 
be re-defined, and what would be 
the typology of ageing conditions 
with respect to these new principal 
dimensions. 
3. personal and 
household characTer-
isTics are imporTanT 
deTerminanTs of  
reTiremenT 
The previous section presented styl-
ised facts regarding the labour mar-
ket behaviour of older workers in the 
EU. In this and subsequent sections 
these facts will be analysed and the 
policy implications of encouraging 
older people to remain active by 
Box 3: Voluntary and involuntary retirement
Voluntary retirement can be formally defined as the outcome of an inter-temporal utility maximisation problem by the older worker who max-
imises his/her inter-temporal flow of labour income and pension benefits, conditional upon other factors that influence the retirement decision 
such as job quality, health, leisure, household commitments, etc. Retirement is then chosen voluntarily when leisure is deemed to be more 
attractive than work. For instance, Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) and Duval (2003) find cross-country evidence that supports the hypothesis 
that more generous early retirement regulations are a significant pull factor to early retirement. 
Involuntary retirement refers to early retirement beyond the choice of the older worker, i.e. it is forced upon older workers, as in the case of restructur-
ing of an enterprise (at the sectoral level such events occurred, e.g. in the coal and steel sector in some Member States, in the past; at the national 
level such events occurred, e.g. in some New Member States that made the transition to a market economy, in the past.) See Desmet et al. (2005).
The distinction between voluntary (pull) and involuntary (push) is not always easy to make. For instance, Hutchens (1999) argues that favour-
able early retirement provisions can pull workers to earlier retirement. But they can also give enterprises an incentive to push older workers 
into early retirement, in order to meet restructuring needs in what they would see as a cost-efficient way. 
Box 4: A micro-econometric analysis
The empirical results in this section are obtained from studies ISG and RWI (2010) and RWI (2011) which were carried out on behalf of the European 
Commission under the PROGRESS programme.
The estimates show the responses of individuals towards labour market participation, hours worked, employment type, labour market transi-
tions (status and wage), unemployment, job search, and training. 
The behavioural equations are specified and estimated in terms of individual characteristics (including gender, age, education), household 
characteristics (including, marital state, number of children and older persons), and country- (and time-) specific conditions (including labour 
market institutions and the business cycle). 
The former characteristics are captured by the EU-SILC (covering the 2004-2008 period) and EU-LFS (covering the 1998-2008 period) micro 
data; the latter are captured by country and time fixed effects, i.e. a dummy that is equal to 1 if data from a particular country is considered, 
and equal to zero if another country is considered. 
The country-fixed effects indicate that otherwise equal individuals in terms of age, education, gender, and household composition will be more 
likely to supply labour in one country than in another due to country-specific determinants of labour supply. The interpretation of the country-fixed 
effects can be further refined by correlating them to indicators measuring labour market institutions and the macro-economic environment (e.g. 
the unemployment rate).
Appropriate econometric techniques (including probit, tobit, multi-nominal logit, ordered multi-nominal logit…) have been used to obtain 
consistent and efficient point estimates. 
The reported point estimates indicate values relative to a reference group, e.g. men relative to women, high skilled relative to low skilled.
Annex 1 shows how the point estimates in the following tables have to be interpreted.
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working longer and retiring later will 
be addressed. The guiding principle 
of this analysis is the question of 
whether older workers are pushed 
(involuntarily) or pulled (voluntarily) 
towards early retirement. See Box 3.
This section provides a quantitative 
assessment of the behaviour of older 
workers(18) with respect to labour 
market participation, hours worked, 
employment contract type, labour 
market transitions (status and wage), 
unemployment duration, job search, 
training, and health status and job 
satisfaction, with a particular focus 
on the impact of the personal and 
household characteristics of older 
workers on their decision to retire(19). 
Box 4 provides more technical details 
about the applied methodology and 
data sources.
The next section enters into a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of 
labour market institutions on retire-
ment decisions, including statu-
tory retirement age, employment 
(18) In this analysis “older workers” are 
workers aged 55 to 65 years, “young 
workers” are aged 15 to 24, and “prime-
aged workers” are aged 25 to 54 years.
(19) With a brief discussion of country-fixed 
effects.
 protection legislation, firm-spon-
sored training for older workers, and 
unemployment benefits. 
With ageing, labour market 
participation decreases ….
On average, the probability of older 
women participating in the labour 
market is 32 percentage points lower 
than the probability for prime aged 
women, while the equivalent figure 
for older men is 38 percentage points 
less. See Table 4 – first panel.
Individual characteristics also have an 
important impact on the labour mar-
ket participation of older workers. 
Men and women with high skills are 
likely to participate more than less 
skilled persons (even more so in the 
case of women than men) – a finding 
that may be explained by the fact 
that high-educated workers perform 
less stringent physical effort in their 
work. Similar results are reported by, 
for instance, Kalwij and Vermeulen 
(2005), Mosca and Barett (2010), and 
de Nederlandse Bank (2008). 
Regarding the composition of the 
household, having an employed 
spouse increases the probability of 
both women and men continuing 
to work. However, while having an 
unemployed or inactive spouse, as 
well as having someone older than 
65 years in the household, lowers 
the probability of continuing to 
work for older women, it increases 
it for men.
Labour market participation is also 
affected by the macro-economic con-
ditions and labour market institu-
tions(20), with a higher unemployment 
rate tending to decrease the prob-
ability of participation, because it dis-
courages workers from entering the 
labour market, while the availability 
of early retirement options also tends 
to lower the participation rates of 
older workers.
(20) i.e. these effects are captured by the coun-
try-fixed effects. Correlating the country-
fixed effects with some variable measuring 
the economic conditions and the labour 
market institutions shows that Member 
States’ provisions for early retirement and 
the unemployment rate show a significant 
negative correlation with the participation 
rate of both genders.
Table 4: Labour market behaviour of older workers: participation, hours worked, Part-time employment
Participation Hours worked Part-time employment
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Individual characteristics
Age 15-24 -0.31 -0.30 -20.35 -21.25 0.03 0.07
Age 25-54 Reference category Reference category Reference category
Age 55-64 -0.32 -0.38 -21.68 -20.76 0.15 0.07
ISCED 0-2 Reference category Reference category Reference category
ISCED 3-4 0.20 0.11 13.41 7.02 -0.06 -0.01
ISCED 5-6 0.32 0.16 20.83 9.76 -0.14 -0.01
Household chracteristics
Number of elderly persons -0.06 0.03 -5.34 0.91 -0.02 0.00
No spouse in household Reference category Reference category Reference category
Inactive/unemployed spouse in household -0.10 0.07 -6.55 5.17 0.03 -0.03
Employed spouse in household 0.10 0.21 4.68 12.02 0.05 -0.04
Country-fixed effects
Unemployment rate -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Pensions as share of GDP -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Mean retirement age 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Employment protection 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02
Source : Table A.2.15 and A.2.17 of RWI (2010).
Note: Participation and parttime employment: Probit estimation; Hours worked: Tobit estimation. Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent 
level) are in bold figures. See Annex 1 for an interpretation of the coefficients.
Note: The point estimates listed under the “country-fixed effects” heading measure the correlation between the respective variables and the country-
fixed effects. As such, they can not be interpreted in quantitative terms of changes in probability, they only give a qualitative indication of the direc-
tion in which the probabilities are affected (i.e. higher or lower probability).
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... and working hours decline ….
On average, older women work 
some 21.7 fewer hours per month 
than prime aged women, while older 
men work 20.8 hours per month less 
than prime aged men. See Table 4 – 
second panel.
The presence of elderly persons in a 
household can influence the number 
of hours worked in opposing direc-
tions: they can do some of the house-
work and provide the opportunity to 
increase labour supply, but they can 
also be in need of care. On balance 
the relationship between labour 
supply and the presence of elder-
ly household members is, a  priori, 
undetermined. Table 4 shows that 
employed older women decrease 
their labour supply by more than five 
hours for each elderly person living 
in the household, implying that, for 
instance, where a couple includes a 
retired spouse the employed spouse 
will adjust her hours worked accord-
ingly. For older men, the presence 
of elderly persons in the household 
does not have a significant impact on 
their hours worked.
The presence of an unemployed or 
inactive spouse has a significantly dif-
ferent impact on the hours worked 
by men and women: women decrease 
their hours, while men increase their 
hours. The presence of an employed 
spouse increases the hours worked 
by both women and men. 
… but the attractiveness of work-
ing part-time increases.
Older age women have a signifi-
cantly higher probability of working 
part-time compared to middle-aged 
women (15.2 %) while the equiva-
lent probability for older men is 
much lower (6.5 %). The presence of 
a spouse, either inactive or unem-
ployed, has a significantly differ-
ent effect for men and women: for 
women the probability of taking up 
a part-time job increases, while for 
men it decreases. See Table 4 – third 
panel.
Table 4 – third panel shows that 
women experience a higher probabili-
ty of part-time employment than men, 
while Table 4 – first panel shows that 
women’s probability of participation 
does not decrease with age as much as 
that of men. This finding may indicate 
that flexible hours and part-time work 
may promote a more gradual move 
into retirement; see also Gielen (2009). 
Nevertheless, Graf et al. (2009) find 
that most older workers substitute 
part-time work for full-time work if 
they are given the opportunity, and 
that the overall effect of promoting 
part-time work on the total labour 
supply of older workers is negative. 
No significant effect of older age 
on the use of temporary contracts 
is found, when compared with the 
middle-aged group.  
Not surprisingly, older workers 
have the highest probability to 
become inactive.
Older workers are less likely to remain 
in the labour force than workers 
of the other age groups, and they 
have a considerably higher prob-
ability of moving from employment 
and unemployment into inactivity. 
See Table 5.
Table 5: Labour market transitions
EE ES EU EI
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 2.21 0.00 -1.46 -0.52
Age 55-65 -1.44 -0.04 -1.32 2.86
UU UE US UI
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 4.03 -3.92 0.82 -0.03
Age 55-65 23.92 -30.88 -0.68 8.50
II IE IS IU
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 0.43 -0.40 0.14 -0.11
Age 55-65 8.14 -6.01 -0.48 -1.46
Source: RWI (2011).
Note: Multi-nominal logit. Labour market statuses are employment (E), self-employment (S), unemployment 
(U), and inactivity (I). Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent level) are in bold figures. See Annex1 
for an interpretation of the coefficients. 
Table 6: Search intensity by age
Women
Odds ratio
Men
Odds ratio
Individual characteristics
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 0.90 1.09
Age 55-64 0.49 0.64
ISCED 0-2 Reference category
ISCED 3-4 1.68 1.63
ISCED 5-6 2.17 2.14
Unemployment duration < 6 months Reference category
Unemployment duration 6-11 months 1.07 1.06
Unemployment duration > 11 months 0.92 0.86
Unemployment rate 1.00 1.03
Household characteristics
Number of elderly  (>= 65 years) in 
household
0.94 0.93
No spouse in household Reference category
Inactive/unemployed spouse in household 0.76 0.88
Employed spouse in household 0.86 1.17
Source: Table A.3.19 of ISG and RWI (2010).
Note: Search intensity is computed as the number of search methods used by an unemployed individual. 
Seven search methods are considered: “Contacting the public employment office to find work”, “Con-
tacting a private employment agency to find work”, “Direct applications to employers”, “Asking friends, 
relatives, and trade unions, etc.”, “Answering or inserting advertisements in newspapers or journals”, 
“Studying advertisements in newspapers or journals”, and “Taking a test, interview or examination”. 
Note: Ordered logit estimation. Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent level) are in bold figures. 
See Annex 1 for an interpretation of the coefficients.
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Older workers also have the lowest 
probability of transiting from inac-
tivity to employment or unemploy-
ment, with inactivity usually leading to 
retirement. They also have the lowest 
probability of moving from unemploy-
ment or inactivity to self-employment.
Older workers experience longer 
unemployment spells …
Older workers are relatively unlikely 
to move from employment to unem-
ployment but, compared to young 
and middle-aged workers, they are 
more likely to stay unemployed, once 
unemployed. Indeed, the probability 
of older workers moving from unem-
ployment to employment is, on aver-
age, 31 % lower than the probability 
of young workers, and 27 % lower 
than the probability of the middle-
aged workers. In other words, the 
duration of unemployment is on aver-
age the longest for older workers(21). 
Longer unemployment spells for older 
workers may have several causes.
… either because they search 
less intensively for work ….
Older unemployed individuals search 
significantly less intensively than 
workers in the other age groups, and 
older women have a lower search 
intensity than men. See Table 6. Sev-
eral factors may explain this. Firstly, 
towards the end of their careers, 
older workers may be less inclined 
to become mobile (geographically 
and occupationally), thereby reduc-
ing their employment opportunities. 
Secondly, in some Member States, 
few incentives are given to older 
workers to search for a job, with lim-
ited provision for career counselling 
and job-search assistance. Thirdly, 
Bettendorf and Broer (2003) show 
that ‘search frictions’ - which require 
effort to overcome - distort the par-
ticipation decisions of older workers 
to a much larger extent than those 
of young workers because the util-
ity value of a job reduces as retire-
ment approaches. As such, a low job 
(21) This will be discussed in more detail in 
the next sub-section.
value leads to a low return to search 
and consequently a reduced search 
effort, and a low search effort leads 
to prolonged unemployment.
… because they are trapped in 
dead-end routes ….. 
In some Member States, long-term 
unemployed can be considered as a 
step on the road to early retirement; 
see for instance Lindeboom (1998). 
However, long-term unemployment 
is not the only route to early 
retirement. For instance, Lindeboom 
(1998) shows, using a micro-
econometric model, that in the case of 
the Netherlands in the 1990s several 
exit routes for older workers were 
available, including unemployment 
benefit programmes and disability 
insurance. Bloemen et al. (2011) find, 
also in the case of the Netherlands, 
that stricter search requirements 
significantly increase the entry rate 
of older workers into employment. 
However, they also present evidence 
of a higher outflow to  sickness-
disability  insurance schemes.
…. or because they may face stigmas
Employers may hesitate to hire 
older workers due to outdated skills 
unsuited to modern workplaces (see 
Machin and Manning (1999)) or a 
perception that they may be reluc-
tant to accept organisational change 
or new types of work; see Taylor 
and Walker (2003). Nevertheless, 
‘age discrimination’ laws that coun-
teract these trends may reinforce 
the employment protection of older 
workers while reducing hiring oppor-
tunities if their firing costs increase; 
see Heywood and Siebert (2009). 
Health status affects the 
retirement decision …
Declining health affects the retire-
ment decision in several ways; see 
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). First-
ly, poor health amongst older work-
ers has an effect on employability 
and earnings potential because it 
leads to lower productivity, greater 
absenteeism, and fewer opportuni-
ties to update skills and knowledge, 
and may be an incentive to retire 
early. Secondly, poor health may 
change workers’ preferences, and 
result in a higher priority for leisure 
and early retirement. Thirdly, in a 
family context, the poor health of a 
partner may induce people to take 
more time for care. Given the age-
profile of health this is especially 
relevant for older workers. 
Alavinia and Burdorf (2008), Barnay 
and Debrand (2006), Boersch-Supan 
et al. (2005), and Kalwij and Ver-
meulen (2005) provide some empiri-
cal evidence, using SHARE data(22), 
that health accounts for a consider-
able part of the decline in participa-
tion rates with age (citizens in good 
health retire about two years later 
than workers in poor health. 
Brugiavini et al. (2008) also found that 
health is an important determinant of 
early retirement, as poor health is 
a powerful predictor of people not 
being able to continue working until 
official retirement age. However, they 
point out that cross-national variation 
in welfare systems affect retirement 
significantly. For instance, in Mem-
ber States where other exit routes 
exist as a form of early retirement 
(disability pensions, sickness, and 
unemployment benefits) the reported 
 retirement will be lower. 
In recent years, a shift from physi-
cal health problems to mental health 
problems among workers has been 
identified, see for instance OECD 
(2010). This has been linked to an 
increase of psychosocial risk factors 
at workplaces, for instance through 
higher stress levels, an intensification 
and changing nature of work, and 
more restructuring operations. The 
large and increasing number of mild 
and moderate mental health problems 
has become one of the biggest chal-
lenges for workplaces today. Regard-
ing disability at workplaces, mental 
(22) I.e. the ‘Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe’ (SHARE) database. 
More details about SHARE are available 
at http://www.share-project.org/. Data 
available for a selected group of Euro-
pean countries.
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disorders are leading causes in Euro-
pean Member States. In some high-
income countries, as much as 40% of 
disability can be attributed to mental 
disorders. As a consequence, mental 
health problems have become one of 
the leading causes for absenteeism 
from work and early retirement all 
over the European Union. Chart 12 
shows an overall trend of increasing 
benefit claims by older workers due to 
mental health conditions in the period 
between 1995 and 2008, as observed 
in a selected group of Member States. 
According to WHO 2004 figures from 
14 EU-Member States, mental health 
is the leading factor of disability ben-
efits, accounting for 28% of the ben-
efit claims, followed by diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system and connective 
tissue with 21.7%. On the other hand, 
re-integrating people with mental ill-
ness into the labour market is difficult 
in the sense that employment rates of 
people with mental illness are particu-
larly low: By and large, only about one 
in four individuals reporting a mental 
health problem is in employment.
Finally, it should be noted that the 
link between health and retire-
ment is not always a direct one 
and often evolves in phases, start-
ing with reducing working hours, 
switching jobs, and ultimately 
retiring early; see for instance 
 Boersch-Supan (2008).
… so does job quality.
Job quality(23) is an important 
 determinant affecting older workers’ 
 decision to retire early.
(23) Job quality is a multi-dimensional con-
cept covering a very broad range of 
indicators. The European Commission 
(2001b) states that a safe and healthy 
working environment, together with a 
modern work organisation, is essential 
for quality in work and identifies 10 
dimensions of quality in work: compo-
sition of jobs and their qualification 
requirements; profile of workers, their 
inclusion and access to the labour mar-
ket, their skills and career development 
as well as their subjective job satisfac-
tion; aims and operating practices of 
employers; working environment and 
health and safety at work in particular; 
gender equality and non-discrimination; 
and direction and priorities of employ-
ment and social policies. 
It is beyond the scope of the current 
analysis to consider the effects of 
all dimensions of job quality on the 
labour market behaviour of older 
workers, so the following analysis 
is limited to a selected set of qual-
ity-dimensions; i.e. workplace con-
ditions, job satisfaction, training, 
wages, and gender balance. It should 
be noted that the EU list of indicators 
Table 7: Participation in formal and/or non-formal training      
Outcome: Participation in
Any kind of training
Marg. Effect
Formal training
Marg. Effect
Non-formal training 
Marg. Effect
Male 0.002 0.004 -0.007
Age 17-21 0.365 0.178 0.039
Age 22-26 0.075 0.031 0.000
Age 27-31 0.008 0.005 -0.003
Age 32-36 Reference category
Age 37-41 0.002 -0.002 0.004
Age 42-46 0.001 -0.003 0.005
Age 47-51 -0.001 -0.004 0.005
Age 52-56 -0.006 -0.008 0.003
Age 57-61 -0.022 -0.012 -0.008
Age 62+ -0.037 -0.014 -0.015
ISCED 1 -0.053 -0.006 -0.041
ISCED 2 -0.013 0.018 -0.033
ISCED 3 -0.015 0.007 -0.022
ISCED 4 -0.008 0.006 -0.007
ISCED 5-6 Reference category
Source: A.6.1 of ISG and RWI (2010).
Note: Probit model. Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent level) are in bold figures. See Annex 
1 for an interpretation of the coefficients.
Table 8: Estimation results: hourly wage and monthly income
Hourly wage
Coefficient
Monthly wage
Coefficient
Male 0.158 0.216
Female Reference category
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 0.174 0.192
Age 55-65 0.223 0.237
Single Reference category
Married living with partner 0.158 0.094
Not married living with partner 0.046 0.069
Low skilled (ISCED 0-2) -0.103 -0.103
Medium skilled (ISCED 3-4) Reference category
High skilled (ISCED 5) 0.164 0.158
Number of elderly (>=65) in household -0.039 -0.049
Full-time employed partner in household -0.013 -0.026
Part-time employed partner in household 0.008 0.018
Inactive/unemployed partner in household Reference category
Full-time. permanent Reference category
Full-time. temporary -0.196 -0.185
Part-time. permanent -0.048 -0.615
Part-time. temporary -0.185 -0.834
Unemployed -1.695
Legislators. senior officials and managers Reference category
Professionals 0.009 -0.106
Technicians and associate professionals -0.180 -0.255
Clerks -0.292 -0.378
Service workers and shop and market sales workers -0.491 -0.565
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers -0.600 -0.661
Craft and related trades workers -0.425 -0.491
Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.383 -0.438
Elementary occupations -0.532 -0.636
Source: Table A.5.23 in RWI (2011).
Note: Generally. the coefficients can be interpreted as percentages using the following transformation: 
[exp(Coefficient)-1]*100. Furthermore. for small numbers the coefficient itself is a good approximation for 
the percentage change. Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent level) are in bold figures. See 
Annex 1 for an interpretation of the coefficients.
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does not include this, even though 
it is the main, or sometimes sole, 
indicator used in many other major 
economies, notably the US.
Workplace conditions can be an 
important push factor towards 
retirement …
Siegrist et al. (2006) and Schnalzen-
berger et al. (2008), using SHARE data, 
find that there is significant evidence 
that a poor psychosocial quality of 
work, such as working in a post that 
does not correspond with the level 
of qualification, or physical capabili-
ties, can lead to premature resigna-
tion. Conversely, De Nederlandse Bank 
(2008) reports that, in its survey of 
Dutch older workers, a significant pro-
portion of older workers delay retire-
ment if they enjoy their work.
All in all, Blekesuane and Solem 
(2002) find that older workers who 
do hard physical work retire earlier 
than those with little physical strain 
in their jobs, and that they typically 
retire via a disability pension. 
In these respects it should be noted 
that working conditions of older work-
ers are of particular relevance in the 
New Member States, which are still 
undergoing a major restructuring of 
their economies. In such an environ-
ment, employees may be subject to 
intense changes in work conditions, 
which may have an adverse impact on 
retirement decisions; see for instance 
Warwick and Economix (2006).
... whereas adequate education 
and training can help to 
postpone retirement  
Continued technological progress, 
globalisation, and the transition to 
a greener economy all require con-
stant adaptation of the work force, 
through education and training, 
to prevent skills becoming obso-
lete and, inter alia, older workers 
taking early retirement. Neverthe-
less, it should also be noted that 
such developments (including for 
instance technological advances in 
teleworking) may create job oppor-
tunities for (disabled) older workers 
who would otherwise be excluded 
from the labour market.
Table 7 shows that older workers display 
the lowest predisposition to participate 
in training compared with the other 
age groups, particularly with respect 
to formal, as opposed to  informal, 
 training.  Participation in training is also 
significantly linked to prior educational 
level, with higher educated older work-
ers showing the highest  propensity to 
undergo training. 
The analysis does not allow us to 
determine whether this lower par-
ticipation is caused by supply or 
demand factors. Employers may be 
less inclined to pay for the training 
of older workers as the return on 
these investments in human capital 
is limited by the retirement decision 
of the employee. As such, Picchio 
and van Ours (2011), using data from 
the Netherlands, find that age-spe-
cific subsidies for job training may 
make an important contribution to 
retaining older workers as it makes 
it more attractive for employers to 
train older workers. 
Nevertheless, the implications of 
this finding should be well bal-
anced with Montizaan et al. (2008) 
who report that workers who par-
ticipated in firm-specific training 
in their early careers retire earlier 
than workers with a general train-
ing background, because employ-
ees with firm-specific skills are more 
likely to be covered by employ-
er-sponsored pension schemes 
than workers with general skills, 
which gives these employees the 
 opportunity to retire earlier. 
On average, older workers enjoy 
relatively high wages 
Table 8 shows estimates for regres-
sions of the logarithm of hourly 
wages and the logarithm of monthly 
wages on personal and household 
variables, including schooling, as well 
as labour market status – which is an 
important determinant of wages, (i.e. 
the so-called Mincerian equation). 
The results indicate that, on average, 
older people have higher hourly and 
monthly incomes than those aged 15 
to 54. Conditional upon other indi-
vidual and household characteristics, 
there is also a difference to be noted 
among older workers. For instance, 
married workers and workers liv-
ing with a partner earn more than 
singles, high skilled workers earn 
more than lower-skilled workers and, 
not surprisingly senior officials and 
managers earn most. Having elderly 
people in the household is associated 
with lower income.
The observed wage premium for 
older age raises the question of 
whether, and to what extent, this 
reflects measureable differences in 
Chart 12: Inflows by older workers into disability benefit because of mental health 
conditions - Selected group of EU Member States-  1995-2008
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labour productivity(24). However, as 
the age profile of productivity is 
difficult to measure, it is difficult 
to determine empirically the exact 
nature of the interaction between 
wage and productivity for the older 
workers at a particular point in time. 
Nevertheless, economic theory may 
suggest reasons why a gap between 
productivity and wage of older work-
ers may arise, including implicit long-
term contracts, trade union behav-
iour, human capital formation, and 
statistical artefacts(25). 
Firstly, if one assumes that the 
employee-employer relation is deter-
mined by implicit long-term contracts 
whereby workers have the prospect 
of a higher wage if they remain 
with their  employer, the wage will 
initially be below productivity, but 
subsequently rise above productiv-
ity so that on balance, wages and 
productivity will be in balance over 
the working life. As such, older work-
ers will receive a “wage premium”. 
However, it should be noted that in 
times requiring greater geographical 
and occupational mobility, implicit 
contracts motivated by loyalty are 
becoming less applicable.  Moreover, 
as the population ages, the relative 
supply of experienced older workers 
increases relative to the inexperi-
enced young workers. As such, the 
wage premium of the experienced 
older workers may decrease. These 
cohort effects may then strengthen 
the incentive for older workers to 
retire earlier; see Sapozhnikov and 
Triest (2007)(26). 
(24) By contrast, Van Ours and Stoeldraijer 
(2010) find little evidence of an age relat-
ed pay-productivity gap (in the Nether-
lands). Hek and Vuuren (2010) point out 
that apart from a relatively high wage dur-
ing the final periods prior to retirement, 
such wage premium can take different 
forms, e.g. occupational pension schemes, 
early retirement schemes.
(25) In their survey of the literature on the 
empirical evidence regarding the wages 
of older workers Hek and Vuuren (2010) 
conclude that “it is unlikely that just one 
theory explains the wage-productivity 
gap for all older workers.”
(26) At least, to the extent that this loss of 
wage premium does not translate into a 
loss the pension wealth which makes it 
necessary to work longer to compensate 
for the income loss.
Secondly, some economists would 
argue that trade unions may be 
more inclined to support the wage 
demands of the older workers (insid-
ers) than those of younger, newly 
hired workers (outsiders), and 
thus create a wage premium for 
the older workers. See for instance 
Weiss (1985). To the extent that this 
hypothesis is supported by the data, 
it follows that, as a consequence of 
the loss of insider influence on wage 
bargaining, the wage premium of 
older workers may decrease and thus 
strengthen the incentive for older 
workers to retire earlier.
Thirdly, older workers may enjoy a 
wage premium because firm-specific 
human capital is accumulated, with 
tenure and/or experience with an 
employer, and employers recoup the 
costs of general training later on in 
the workers’ tenure. The market wage 
is lower than the worker’s productiv-
ity in the firm, as the market does not 
take into account the acquired firm 
specific skills. See for instance Acemo-
glu and Pischke (1999). This may then 
imply that when older workers are 
reallocated to new jobs, where the 
acquired firm-specific human capital 
is not required, the wage premium 
of older workers may decrease and 
thus strengthen the incentive for older 
workers to retire earlier.
Finally, the estimated wage pre-
mium may also be a statistical arte-
fact in the sense that part of it 
may be due to the fact that “more 
 productive” (and high earning) 
workers are retained in employ-
ment as they age, while the “less 
productive” retire earlier.
Finally, it should also be taken into 
account that there is likely to be 
considerable heterogeneity among 
older workers, as the loss of pro-
ductivity with age will be more 
pronounced in jobs where perfor-
mance depends more on physical 
strength than experience; see for 
instance Skirbekk (2003). Moreover, 
productivity development of older 
workers may differ significantly 
between the new Member States 
and the EU-15 Member States in 
the sense that, in the new Member 
States where the economies are 
catching up with the technologies 
of the rest of the world, the skills 
of older workers will become out-
dated sooner – despite their already 
high levels of education; see for 
instance Walewski (2008).
Although older workers have a high-
er probability of enjoying a wage 
premium, older workers have the 
lowest probability of increasing their 
wage levels. See Table 9.
Female older workers are 
 expected to become the main 
driving force behind employ-
ment growth of older workers
The previous analysis showed that, at 
the present date, there are still noticea-
ble differences in active ageing between 
men and women. Nevertheless, the 
analysis also identified drivers that may 
point in the direction of further catch-
ing-up. See also Dahl et al. (2002). 
Firstly, as women become better edu-
cated in comparison with previous 
generations, and as higher education 
correlates with higher labour market 
Table 9: Wage transitions
Downward transition
Marg. Effect
Same decile
Marg. Effect
Upward transition
Marg. Effect
Male -0.01 0.00 0.01
Female Reference category
Age 15-24 Reference category
Age 25-54 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Age 55-65 0.02 0.03 -0.05
Low skilled 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Medium skilled Reference category
High skilled -0.05 0.08 -0.03
Source: Table A.6.8 in RWI (2011).
Note: Multinomial logit model; Statistically significant point estimates (5 per cent level) are in bold figures.
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participation and later retirements, 
it can be expected that the participa-
tion rate and exit age of older female 
workers will continue to catch up in 
the coming years. 
Secondly, as female workers are 
more likely to be employed in sec-
tors that have a lower incidence of 
disability and unemployment, and 
require less intense physical effort 
than sectors where men are usu-
ally employed(27), and as working 
conditions are strongly correlated 
with retirement, it is to be expected 
that the participation rate and exit 
age of older female workers will 
increase at a relatively stronger pace 
than that of men. 
Thirdly, as the number of single-per-
son households increases, and given 
that the labour market participa-
tion probability of single women is 
higher than the participation prob-
ability of someone with a partner 
who is inactive or unemployed, the 
participation rate and exit age of 
older female workers may increase 
through this channel.
Nevertheless, it should also be 
noted that primed aged women 
belong to the so-called “sandwich 
generation” often caring for grand-
children and frail parents. This 
could become a negative driver 
with ageing populations.
4. model-based  
assessmenT of acTive 
ageing measures
Over the last two decades, policies 
on Active Ageing have become part 
of the core priority for policy mak-
ers across Europe. At the European 
level, the 2000 Lisbon strategy, with 
explicit targets for older workers’ 
labour market performance, has led 
to considerable progress in almost 
all Member States, and schemes that 
encouraged early retirement, or pro-
vided incentives to withdraw from 
(27) Such as manufacturing and construction.
the labour market, have come to an 
end or been made more restrictive in 
most countries. 
Many countries have either increased 
statutory retirement ages or are in 
the process of doing so and have put 
in place a range of targeted activa-
tion policies aimed at using the huge 
potential of older people, who are 
now seen as a necessary part of the 
labour force, that is necessary to 
achieve high and sustainable growth 
in an ever changing economic and 
societal environment.
The subsections above outline recent 
evidence on older people’s labour 
market performance and behaviour, 
in the light of socio-demographic 
characteristics and policy action taken 
by Member States. This section seeks 
to deliver a model-based assessment 
of stylised measures tailored particu-
larly to older workers on the basis 
of DG EMPL’s Labour Market Model 
(LMM) which had been developed for 
the European Commission, DG EMPL, 
by the Institute for Advanced Studies 
(Vienna) and the University of St. Gal-
len.(28) LMM is a dynamic, computable, 
general equilibrium model providing 
an in-depth description of the labour 
market. At the time of simulation, it 
covered six countries, namely Den-
mark, Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, 
and the UK, in order to capture a wide 
range of welfare state and labour 
market models. 
LMM distinguishes three skills groups 
and eight age categories, so that mod-
elling of policy measures designed to 
promote older people’s employment 
becomes possible. Among the eight 
age categories, five are of working 
age, with the oldest age bracket (55 
to 69 years) representing a mixed 
group which has access to some form 
of retirement. That is, people in this 
age group constantly weigh up the 
(28) For a technical model description, see 
Berger et al. (2009), particularly Section 
2 of the final report. A non-technical 
outline can be found in the 2010 edition 
of the European Commission’s Employ-
ment in Europe report; see Annex 2 to 
Chapter 2. Other countries are currently 
being included in a follow-up project.
advantages of staying in the labour 
market against the merits of retire-
ment (balancing the benefits against 
the costs of staying). 
The model assumes that those con-
cerned continue working as long as 
the marginal advantage of doing 
so is, for them, higher than the 
marginal cost, taking account of the 
fact that working longer not only 
increases current income, but may 
also increase entitlements to future 
benefits such as pensions, unemploy-
ment benefits, severance pay, etc. 
On the other hand, a generous pen-
sion, high labour taxes or the ‘disu-
tility’ of having to go to work may 
discourage workers from prolonging 
their career. 
All these incentives or disincentives 
for individuals to work are captured 
in the “implicit participation tax for 
older workers” which “summarises 
all the disincentives [or incentives] 
for postponing retirement that are 
inherent in the system”(29). For exam-
ple, speeding up pension indexation 
would shift older workers’ implicit tax 
on participation by making it more 
attractive to retire, all other things 
being equal. Conversely, granting 
an in-work subsidy or a reduction in 
labour taxes would encourage peo-
ple to continue working. 
Likewise, firms are presumed to base 
their decision to recruit (older) work-
ers, to retain them, or to offer firm-
sponsored training on the basis of the 
specific individual firm-worker rela-
tionship, which may be influenced by 
the institutional setting. For example, 
employment protection instruments 
such as severance payments would in 
fact increase the cost of a future separa-
tion from a worker, which may discour-
age firms to lay off staff to some extent. 
However, it might also discourage firms 
from hiring people if possible future fir-
ing costs are taken into account.(30) 
(29) Berger et al. (2009), 2nd part of the final 
report, p. 25. See also the 2010 Employ-
ment in Europe report by the European 
Commission, Box 9 on p. 98.
(30) See Berger et al. (2009), 3rd part of the 
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Firing costs also impact on a firm’s 
willingness to invest in firm-sponsored 
training. The LMM takes account of 
the possibility that training taken by 
workers will yield higher individual 
productivity that would generate an 
additional job surplus to both employ-
ers and employees. However, any 
increase in potential firing costs in the 
future could discourage firms from 
such an investment, in addition to 
bearing the cost of training.
4.1. The potential 
impact of five Active 
Ageing measures:  
a simulation
The above considerations are taken 
into account by the LMM and the 
following sections contain simula-
tions of five popular measures taken 
or envisaged by Member States to 
strengthen older workers’ employ-
ment rates, namely:
1. To increase the statutory retire-
ment reference age for access to a 
state pension by two years
2. To reduce income taxes on paid 
work by older workers, by an 
equivalent of 0.1 % of GDP
3. To grant a subsidy to firms in order 
to encourage them to provide or 
sponsor training for older workers, 
by an equivalent of 0.1 % of GDP
4. To reduce unemployment benefits 
by a wage-independent lump sum, 
for an overall amount correspond-
ing to 0.1 % of GDP 
5. To increase the layoff cost of older 
workers by imposing administra-
tive costs and increasing severance 
payments by 20 %.
All measures were first simulated for 
Germany. In the second step, a labour 
tax reduction for older workers 
(measure 1) is shown for all six coun-
tries covered by the model, in order 
to illustrate how the magnitude of 
final report, p. 9.
the impact may vary across countries.
It should be noted that only steady 
state results are shown, i.e., the 
model assumes a stable long-term 
equilibrium at the initial state, with 
policy measures seen as shocks that 
cause the system to adjust over a 
number of periods until it reaches a 
new steady state equilibrium. 
In other words, although the LMM can 
take account of temporary equilibria 
and follow the adaptation process,(31) 
the analysis remains comparatively 
static with the new long-term equi-
librium (after adjustments) plotted 
against the initial equilibrium, and 
distinguishes the impact on the main 
economic variables, namely employ-
ment, unemployment, the number of 
working hours, labour productivity, 
wages, and output.
4.1.1. Shift statutory 
retirement reference age for 
drawing on a state pension
The European Commission’s 2010 
Green Paper on pensions indicated 
that many European Member States 
have already changed, or are in the 
course of changing, the age thresh-
olds for pension eligibility.(32) 
In Germany there was already, from 
1997 to 2005, a gradual shift of the 
(31) The 2010 Employment in Europe Report 
by the European Commission contains 
the simulation of a temporary in-work 
subsidy in a comparative-dynamic analy-
sis; see European Commission (2010a), 
Chapter 2(6).
(32) See COM(2010)365 final, Chart 6 in the 
Statistical Annex.
upper age threshold from 60 to 65 
years for anticipated old-age pen-
sions, and a shift for invalidity pen-
sions (minimum age thresholds were 
shifted in line). In parallel to the 
shift, actuarial deductions (and sup-
plements) were introduced in case a 
person retires before (after) the offi-
cial retirement age. These changes 
drove the increase in the employ-
ment rates of older people observed 
over that period.(33)
For regular pensions a further shift 
was agreed in 2007, which will grad-
ually increase the retirement age by 
a further two years to 67 years. This 
will start in 2012 and be fully phased 
in for pensioners retiring from 2029. 
The measure is expected to increase 
the labour force by approximately 
2.6m people.(34) After 2029, people 
will be able to draw on an old-age 
pension before the age of 67 only 
if severely handicapped or if certain 
conditions referring to the length of 
their insurance record are met.
In the light of the above, a retire-
ment age shift of two years has been 
simulated for the German labour 
market using the LMM. In the mod-
el’s terms, the ‘statutory retirement 
age’ is the reference to calculate 
actuarial deductions or supplements 
in case of retirement before or after 
this official age. At any given age 
of retirement the shift will lower 
the individual pension by increas-
(33) See German National Strategy Report 
on Social Protection and Social Inclu-
sion 2008-2010, Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales (2008), Chapter III.
(34) See German National Reform Pro-
gramme 2011, Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales (2011), p. 22.
Chart 13: Shifting statutory pension reference age by two years
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ing actuarial deductions or decreas-
ing supplements. The fact that some 
groups will not be eligible any longer 
to retire before the age of 67 can 
not be taken on board. Hence, LMM 
assumes the only impact on older 
people’s labour market participation 
behaviour to come from the lower-
ing of pension levels as a result of the 
reference age shift. 
Chart 13 depicts the impact of such 
a measure taking account of the fact 
that it is possible to retire before 
the official age, but with a reduced 
pension. 
Higher statutory retirement ages 
will lead to higher deductions 
from pensions if workers decide to 
retire before reaching the official 
retirement age. Pension levels will 
decrease. On top of that, to the 
extent that the financial relief on 
the pension scheme(35) would be 
used to lower contribution rates, 
workers’ take-home pay would be 
boosted. As a result, the implicit 
tax on older workers’ participation 
decreases and deciding to draw a 
pension early becomes more costly, 
so more older workers will decide 
to postpone retirement, adding to 
labour supply, potentially increasing 
employment and reducing unem-
ployment. 
Firms accelerate their demand for 
labour as they benefit from lower 
gross wage rates and lower non-
wage labour costs. Gross wages tend 
to decline because of the additional 
labour supply and higher take-home 
wages make workers more concil-
iatory when bargaining on higher 
gross wages. Non-wage labour costs 
decrease in line with the lower pen-
sion contribution rate.
Together with (moderate) produc-
tivity increases, production will rise 
considerably, further triggering par-
ticipation and employment, reducing 
unemployment and stepping up the 
(35) Those who stay on the labour market 
continue to pay contributions instead of 
receiving a benefit. Those leaving prema-
turely would accept higher deductions. 
average number of hours worked 
across all age groups. 
By nature, this measure affects older 
workers first, but the employment 
shift will benefit all age groups and 
hence the reduction in the unem-
ployment rate of older workers is 
less pronounced. This is because the 
retirement decision is about whether 
or not to participate in the labour 
market at all rather than whether or 
not to be employed or unemployed 
once participating. Thus, the positive 
employment impact on older  workers 
follows from inactivity  rather than 
from unemployment. 
The LMM suggests that shifting offi-
cial retirement ages will have benefi-
cial effects on the entire labour mar-
ket. However, LMM cannot depict 
the measure in detail. For exam-
ple, as mentioned above, the impact 
outlined here on participation and 
employment is a result of the lower 
pension level as the reference age 
for deductions increases. Unlike what 
happened in Germany, no one will 
be “forced” to actually postpone the 
drawing on her/his pension. There-
fore, the gains in terms of participa-
tion and employment obtained here 
will be moderate compared to what 
could be expected as an outcome of 
the German reform. Moreover, fluc-
tuations in the economic cycle can-
not be taken on board by LMM even 
though they determine to a large 
extent older people’s perspective on 
the labour market. 
4.1.2. Reduce labour cost for 
older workers
‘Making work pay’ policies and tar-
geted reforms of the tax-benefit sys-
tem, to address the particular situ-
ation of older workers, are key to 
reducing disincentives to both labour 
supply and demand(36). 
From the perspective of workers, 
wage taxes and social security con-
tributions impact on their take-home 
pay and constitute an implicit tax 
on participation. Also wage-based 
employer social security contribu-
tions tend to increase the labour cost 
and to distort the balance between 
productivity and labour cost. There-
fore, if wage taxes and social secu-
rity contributions are excessive, this 
might constitute an impediment to 
employment. This is particularly true 
for older workers because once they 
are eligible to retire they have the 
option to withdraw from the labour 
market if they feel that the pension 
replacement rates and/or low net 
(36) In this context, the Annual Growth Sur-
vey 2010 made the case for a revenue 
neutral shift from labour taxation to 
consumption.
Table 10: Average tax rate of a single 
average earner without children, % of 
gross wage (2009)
Denmark 39.5
Germany 41.3
Italy 29.8
Austria 32.6
Poland 24.4
United Kingdom 25.3
EU-27 29.5
United States 22.9
Source: Eurostat/OECD.
Chart 14: Lowering wage taxes, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP
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wages no longer justify postpone-
ment. Conversely, tax and contribu-
tion reductions targeted at older 
workers, whether or not temporary 
or in combination with hiring subsi-
dies, are deemed to influence their 
employment rates.
Average tax rates(37) on wages across 
the EU as a whole are around 30 % and 
have not declined over the last decade. 
This average is far higher than in the US, 
although there is considerable disparity 
between EU Member States.
In order to test the hypothesis that 
a lowering of the tax rates for older 
workers might be a way of stimulat-
ing their labour market participation, 
a simulation of such wage tax rate 
reduction was carried out for Ger-
many. It is assumed that the measure is 
funded by raising VAT, i.e. shifting the 
balance of the overall tax burden from 
direct to indirect taxation.
The brighter bars in Chart 14 indicate 
the impact of such measure, i.e. if 
one concentrates the wage tax reduc-
tion to older workers (concentration 
scenario). This situation is plotted 
against a non-concentrated imple-
mentation in darker bars: an income 
tax reduction spread across all age 
groups. For both policies a magni-
tude of 0.1 % of GDP is assumed 
(a medium-sized package equivalent 
to some €2.5 bn per year in Germany). 
For the sake of simplicity it is further 
assumed that the income tax rate on 
wages be proportionally decreased, 
the proportion being just sufficient 
to reduce tax volume by 0.1 % of 
GDP and equal for all workers irre-
spective of age and skills group. That 
is, if individual wage taxes were 
, TW being the wage 
taxes for agent i, t the tax rate, 
l the number of hours worked, 
and w the gross hourly wage rate, 
the lowering would result in 
(37) The tax rate is defined as the income 
tax on gross wage earnings plus the 
employee’s social security contributions 
less universal cash benefits, expressed 
as a percentage of gross wage earnings. 
See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/earn_net_esms.htm
, r being the 
unique proportional reduction with 
 
N being the number of individuals in 
the economy. I.e., r relates the tar-
geted volume of reduction to entire 
ex-ante tax base.
Lower wage taxes for older work-
ers reduces the implicit tax on their 
labour market participation, and 
leads to significantly higher employ-
ment and lower unemployment, by 
both encouraging more people who 
are eligible to retire to continue par-
ticipating in the labour market, but 
also by strengthening the job search 
effort of unemployed older workers. 
For those that are already employed, 
higher net wages would encourage 
workers to work longer hours. Given 
the shift in the employment rate 
of older workers their productivi-
ty increases, because it is assumed 
that individual productivity develops 
when they are active and depreciates 
otherwise(38) - an ‘endogenous pro-
ductivity effect’ with higher produc-
tivity and higher employment lead-
ing to higher production and GDP. 
The overall employment effect is 
slightly stronger in the concentra-
tion than in the non-concentra-
tion scenario. This is because older 
workers’ elasticity of labour market 
participation with respect to (net) 
wage changes is higher than for 
prime-agers, because the former are 
assumed to have the option to retire 
at any time. Hence, the additional 
employment recruits from inactiv-
ity rather than unemployment when 
focussing the measure on older 
workers – which explains why the 
impact on the unemployment rate is 
relatively small compared to the non-
concentration scenario. 
Given the exogenous supplement in 
the form of a tax subsidy to shift 
their take-home pay, this would cause 
their market wages to decline because 
their fallback position in the wage 
(38) See Berger et al. (2009), 2rd part of the 
final report, p. 17.
 bargaining process would improve, 
other things being equal. In other 
words the wage tax relief would shift 
their take-home pay, easing to some 
extent their pressure to bargain for 
higher wages. 
However, wages decrease only in 
the non-concentration scenario and 
remain stable if the policy measures 
concentrates on older workers. 
•	 There is an age composition effect 
in that older workers tend to have 
higher hourly wages compared 
to other age groups. In so far as 
the employment of older workers 
shifts pronouncedly, this would slow 
down the average wage decrease, 
other things being equal. 
•	 Even in the concentration scenario, 
the (gross) wages of older work-
ers clearly decline. However, the 
impact of the stimulus on produc-
tion and GDP is some 20 % higher in 
the concentration scenario. Higher 
production would (slightly) pull up 
wages for the non-old age groups, 
so that the overall gross wage levels 
in the concentration scenario would 
remain roughly stable. 
•	 As the overall employment effect is 
stronger in the concentration sce-
nario, so is the impact on individual 
productivity following the endog-
enous productivity effect. Higher 
productivity would push up wages, 
other things remaining equal.
These effects partly offset the down-
ward pressure on gross wages in the 
concentration scenario. The overall 
impact of an income tax reduction 
for older workers appears favour-
able, augmenting employment and 
take-home pay and shifting produc-
tivity and production. 
The way the measure is designed, 
with a fixed proportional tax reduc-
tion factor (r) has some interesting 
distributional side-effects. As the 
tax reduction factor is the same for 
all age and skill groups, it leads 
to a reduction in the progressivity 
of direct (income) taxation. Hence, 
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with or without concentration on 
older workers, the tax relief would 
be relatively more substantial for 
higher income earners, due to the 
correlation between wage and skills 
level. At the same time, through the 
higher labour supply elasticity with 
respect to income changes for the 
low skilled,(39) the wage-induced shift 
of labour supply favours employ-
ment increases with skills levels.(40) 
Hence, a less progressive scheme 
of direct taxation would encourage 
a more favourable distribution of 
skills. However, it would also contrib-
ute to the employment gains because 
the LMM takes account of the fact 
that employment rates increase with 
higher educational attainment levels. 
(39) See Berger et al. (2009), final report, 2nd 
part, Section 9.2.5.
(40) The same phenomenon can be observed 
with respect to age in the scenario which 
grants the tax reduction to all age groups: 
given a certain seniority premium in age-
dependent wage rates, the rate by which 
older workers’ employment is being shifted 
is some 60 % above the average increase
4.1.3. Grant a subsidy 
to firms for staff training 
offered to older workers
The ‘Employment in Europe’ report of 
2007 underlined the increasing impor-
tance of developing Continuous Voca-
tional Training (CVT) in the EU as the 
rapidly changing structure of the econ-
omy defines new needs in terms of 
updated working and generic skills.(41) 
There is little doubt that European 
economies will experience a further 
shift towards knowledge and skills 
intensive occupations.(42) The report 
concluded that fast transitions away 
from manufacturing dominated econ-
(41) European Commission (2007), ‘Employ-
ment in Europe’, Chapter 4.
(42) Cedefop (2010a), Chapter 6.1
omies towards a service-based society 
leads to an increasing importance in 
the supply of training services and in 
raising incentives for workers to enrol 
in them. The challenge of employabil-
ity of older workers is enhanced by the 
context of the economic and financial 
crisis which has intensified the restruc-
turing and reallocation of labour. 
This sub-chapter seeks to throw some 
light on the possible transmission 
path of a subsidy granted to firms in 
order to offer firm-sponsored train-
ing to older workers, given that their 
inclination to enrol into CVT is seen 
to be particularly low; see also the 
analysis of Section 3. Once again, Ger-
many will be the reference case for 
which an additional training subsidy 
is simulated, amounting to 0.1 % of 
GDP. The measure is assumed to be 
funded via lump-sum taxes which, in 
contrast to wage taxes, are assumed 
to be incentive neutral since they 
“have no incentive effects other than 
shifting income from the private to 
the public sector”(43).
The results obtained from the simu-
lation are in line with expectations. 
The subsidy will induce firms to offer 
more training to their staff because, 
for a given yield of training in the 
form of increased labour produc-
tivity, the effective cost is reduced 
due to the subsidy. So, in line with 
standard micro optimisation behav-
iour, firms will speed up their train-
ing sponsorship until marginal return 
from doing so is equal to or below 
the (lowered) marginal cost.
(43) Berger et al. (2009), 3rd part of the final 
report, p. 9.
Table 11: Workers’ participation in continuous vocational training
Participation in % by age group
Total <25 years 25-54 years >54 years
Belgium 51 49 52 37
Bulgaria 39 34 41 27
Czech Republic 67 63 69 60
Denmark 37 32 38 38
Germany 39 34 41 27
Estonia 32 33 35 19
Greece 28 29 29 15
Spain 51 46 53 36
Italy 49 43 51 38
Cyprus 43 40 41 20
Latvia 27 30 28 14
Lithuania 28 32 29 16
Luxemburg 60 54 61 39
Hungary 23 18 25 13
Malta 52 55 53 39
Netherlands 39 31 43 27
Austria 38 42 39 25
Poland 36 32 37 23
Portugal 46 44 48 31
Romania 31 33 31 21
Slovenia 58 57 60 37
Slovakia 56 50 58 48
Finland 46 32 49 38
Sweden 51 44 54 41
UK 39 40 41 30
Source: Eurostat (Continuous Vocational training Survey 2005)
Chart 15: Subsidy to firms for older workers’ training, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP
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The additional training will improve 
older workers’ productivity. The 
increased workforce productivity will 
improve their employment, leading to 
higher wages and longer hours. A pro-
found shift of market wages will encour-
age more older workers to remain active 
instead of retiring. As older workers’ 
participation behaviour is more elas-
tic with respect to wage changes than 
in the other groups, a profound shift 
of both participation (+0.19 %-pts) and 
employment rate will be the result. 
A smaller part of the additional older 
workers’ employment corresponds to a 
re-employment of older unemployed.
These results may provide encour-
agement for government support 
of firm-sponsored training. Howev-
er, the role of governments in skills 
development is not easy to define, 
bearing in mind possible market 
failures concerning the quality of 
the training, or the likelihood of 
a worker staying in the firm once 
trained. These tend to cause under-
investment of firms in training 
which is hard to anticipate from 
the governments’ perspective. Sub-
sidies, on the other hand, may lead 
to displacement or deadweight 
effects in a way that less efficient 
activities may be subsidised or the 
subsidies may be tapped for train-
ing activities which may have been 
carried out anyway. In a stylised 
simulation these problems cannot 
be taken account of properly. The 
‘Employment in Europe’ report of 
2007 discusses them at length.  
4.1.4.  Lower wage 
independent unemployment 
benefits
Member State unemployment bene-
fit systems vary in concept and opera-
tion. Roughly, one can distinguish 
between wage dependent and wage 
independent benefits. Since 2005, 
this distinction has become more evi-
dent in Germany where the so called 
“Hartz-IV-Reform”(44) came into 
effect. The former “Arbeitslosenhilfe” 
was a tax financed social assistance 
scheme for unemployed persons, 
with payments dependent on for-
mer wage income. This system was 
merged with the general social assis-
tance scheme to constitute the so-
called “Arbeitslosengeld II” (Grund-
sicherung für Arbeitsuchende). This 
new basic tax-financed  providence 
scheme is means-tested which means 
that (in contrast to the former 
Arbeits losenhilfe) payments are inde-
pendent of former wage income. 
(44) Viertes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleis-
tungen am Arbeitsmarkt, see http://
www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Gesetze/vier-
tes-gesetz-fuer-moderne-dienstleistun-
gen-am-arbeitsmarkt.html
It is complementary to the contribu-
tion based unemployment insurance 
scheme “Arbeitslosengeld” as people 
would receive “Arbeitslosengeld II” 
once their insurance benefit has run 
out (after a maximum of two years 
for people aged 58 years or older).
German labour market performance 
since 2005 suggests that the approach 
to strengthen people’s own responsi-
bility, supporting stronger incentives 
to search for jobs and to remain in 
employment, appears to have been 
successful. Nevertheless, while Ger-
many has achieved a major reduc-
tion in overall unemployment since 
2005, the proportion of the long-
term unemployed (one year or more) 
is still among the highest in the EU, 
particularly for older workers, see 
Chart 17. 
These findings raise the issue of 
the likely impact on older peo-
ple’s labour market performance 
Chart 16: Lower wage independent unemployment benefits for all workers, 
magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP
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Chart 17: Unemployment and long-term unemployment of older people
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of changing the level of unemploy-
ment benefits. In the simulation, 
applied to the German reference 
case, the measure will not be con-
centrated on older workers because 
income independent benefits are 
means-tested in most countries, so 
that a change in their level for 
one particular age group would not 
be realistic. The magnitude of the 
measure would be 0.1 % of GDP or 
some 2.5 bn per year (total expendi-
ture for “Grundsicherung für Arbeit-
s uchende” 2010: 36 bn). For model-
ling purposes, it is assumed that the 
financing would come from the levy 
of lump-sum taxes.
Lowering unemployment benefits 
would tend to worsen a worker’s 
fallback position in the case of unem-
ployment in that it would make 
“being employed” relatively more 
attractive to “being unemployed”, 
and would reduce the desire to bar-
gain hard for higher wages in a 
negotiating process. Given the distri-
bution of bargaining power between 
firms and workers, this would result 
in lower market wages. The wage 
decline would trigger firms’ demand 
for workers, resulting in a shift in 
aggregate employment and produc-
tion. Moreover, from a worker’s per-
spective, the wage rate reduction is a 
disincentive to working longer hours 
and hence causes the average num-
ber of hours worked to decline.
In contrast to the aggregate impact, 
older workers’ employment would 
decrease. The reason lies in LMM’s 
assumption that the older workers’ 
situation is characterised by the option 
to retire rather than by staying unem-
ployed. In other words the effect of 
lower unemployment benefits and 
market wages on encouraging older 
people (whether employed or unem-
ployed) to withdraw from the labour 
market is stronger than the incentive 
to seek employment, bearing in mind 
that it is more difficult for older indi-
viduals to find a new job than it is for 
young or prime-age workers. Thus, 
given their search intensity, the reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate would 
be less pronounced.
In the context of actions in pursuit 
of fiscal balancing in the aftermath 
of the crisis, a number of Mem-
ber States have envisaged or have 
already taken action to tighten eligi-
bility criteria for social security ben-
efits or to lower their levels, and 
some of these austerity measures 
concern the level of unemployment 
benefits.(45) The model simulation 
shows that cutting these benefits or 
limiting their duration might help, in 
the long run, sustain public budgets, 
but it might also be detrimental in 
terms of reducing the incentives for 
older people to retain or take up 
employment.
4.1.5. Shift the cost of 
separations from older 
workers
The strictness of a country’s Employ-
ment Protection Legislation (EPL) is 
usually measured using the synthetic 
indicator created by OECD, which 
captures the procedures and costs 
involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures 
involved in hiring workers on fixed-
term contracts, regular contracts, or 
temporary work agency contracts.(46) 
For the countries taken into account 
by LMM it appears that, on the 
basisof the overall index, Germany 
(45) European Commission (2010b), “The 
choice of effective employment policies 
to mitigate a jobless recovery in times of 
fiscal austerity”, Annex.
(46) See OECD on http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/11/0,3746 en_264_37457_426952
43_1_1_1_37457,00.html
has the strongest protection in place, 
and that it has the second strong-
est protection against collective dis-
missal - a fact which has long fuelled 
political debate about the impact of 
EPL, particularly dismissal protection, 
on employment performance.
We consider the effects of an increase 
of EPL. It is assumed that the adminis-
trative cost of separations from older 
workers will be increased by 20 %, as 
will severance payments where a firm 
dismisses an older worker.(47) Table 12 
shows the consequences for the core 
variables after such an intervention.
If dismissals become more expensive, 
this obviously constitutes a  negative 
incentive for firms to proceed with 
layoffs, as a result of which the 
(frictional) unemployment of older 
 workers would decrease. However, 
the employment of older workers 
(47) A similar simulation was carried out 
by Berger et al. (2009), 3rd part of the 
final report, on the basis of LMM in the 
context of Flexicurity, i.e. they consider 
lowering German EPL back to Danish 
levels; see p. 7ff.
Table 12: Employment Protection 
Legislation, strictness according to 
OECD indicator
Overall
Collective 
dismissals
Denmark 1.50 3.13
Germany 2.12 3.75
Italy 1.89 4.88
Austria 1.93 3.25
Poland 1.90 3.63
United Kingdom 0.75 2.88
OECD Countries 1.94 2.96
Source: OECD.
Chart 18: More EPL - increase cost of separations for older workers (55-69) by 20 %
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would also decrease for a number 
of reasons. When posting vacancies, 
firms take the potential additional 
firing costs into account. If the costs 
rise in the event of a separation, this 
would make it less attractive for firms 
to recruit older staff, all other things 
being equal, which would result in 
lower demand for older workers and 
hence lower employment. Both high-
er dismissals and firing costs, as well as 
the shrinking labour demand, would 
pull down wages which would tend, 
in turn, to encourage workers to work 
fewer hours and further reduces their 
labour market  participation. 
Labour productivity of older workers 
would edge up slightly given the sig-
nificant loss of older workers in employ-
ment but it is remarkable that overall 
labour productivity drops (though to 
a negligible extent) despite a signifi-
cant loss of overall employment and a 
lower number of working hours. The 
LMM takes into account the fact that 
individual productivity depreciates in 
periods when workers stay away from 
the labour market and improves only 
when they are employed. These results 
are rather sobering in that they sug-
gest that increasing the protection of 
older workers could, to some extent, 
be at the expense of their employment. 
However, as outlined in Section 3, there 
are many quality-of-work related or 
individual aspects that are particularly 
relevant to older workers that are not 
taken account of by the LMM and 
which have strong implications regard-
ing individual labour productivity, nota-
bly health at work, work satisfaction, 
future prospects or individual career 
considerations, and the family context.
4.2. Lowering labour 
cost for older people: 
A simulation for six 
Member States 
Section 4.1.2 above shows the labour 
market impact of lowering labour 
cost through the income tax rate, 
using Germany as a reference case. 
However, the model supports at 
present six Member States, covering 
the widest possible range of welfare 
state models in Europe (with further 
extensions currently under prepara-
tion). This subsection provides a cross-
country simulation of an income tax 
 reduction for older workers.
It should be recalled that the tax relief 
corresponds to 0.1 % of GDP. It is 
financed through VAT and modelled 
as a proportional reduction of the 
tax rate where the rate of reduction 
is equal for all age and skill groups. 
As demonstrated above, a constant 
reduction rate reduces tax progres-
sivity, but favours the employment 
of high skilled people in particular. 
The impact on  employment is shown 
in Chart 19.
In line with expectation, since the 
measure is concentrated on older 
workers, the impact of the income 
tax relief on older people’s par-
ticipation and employment is a 
multiple of the aggregate effect. 
However, as Chart 21 reveals, the 
impact varies greatly across coun-
tries. These differences depend on 
a number of factors:
1. The impact is more significant 
the lower the number of older 
people in employment (tar-
get group). Given the scale of 
the subsidy (0.1 % of GDP), the 
impact per person targeted is 
greater if the number of targeted 
persons (older people in employ-
ment) is lower. Hence low rates 
of employment of older people 
should lead to a more significant 
tax relief per person, and favour 
stronger employment gains, all 
other things being equal.
2. The impact on the employment of 
older people should be greater the 
higher the tax rate is on labour(48), 
for two reasons. Firstly, as the tax 
rate reduction is modelled as a 
fixed  proportion r of the ex-ante 
(48) The implicit tax rate on labour displayed in 
the chart is defined as the sum of all direct 
and indirect taxes and employees’ and 
employers’ social contributions levied on 
employed labour income divided by the 
total compensation of employees work-
ing in the economic territory increased 
by taxes on wage bill and payroll. See 
Eurostat on http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin
=1&language=en&pcode=tsiem070
Chart 19: Lowering wage taxes for older workers, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP,  
cross-country comparison of labour market performance
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Chart 20: Factors contributing to strong employment gain following a lowering of 
wage taxes for older workers
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wage tax rate t, there is a leverage 
effect since, given r, the higher 
the initial tax rate ta, the higher 
the extent of the lowering r · t. 
Secondly, lowering the taxes on 
labour by a given amount would 
induce more people to search for 
employment where labour taxes 
had previously been (too) high.
Combining the two by assuming 
high labour taxation and low older 
person’s employment would hint 
towards a higher sensitivity of labour 
supply and demand with respect 
to labour taxation. This would be 
particularly true in Italy; the given 
change in taxation would result in 
a profound change of employment. 
Bearing in mind the skills distribution 
effect described in Section 4.1.2 for 
Germany (higher skills, higher employ-
ment effect), the breakdown of the 
(overall) employment yield by skill lev-
els for all six countries is of interest: 
All countries follow the general 
skills distribution pattern of employ-
ment, with the exception of Poland 
which has one of the most signifi-
cant shares, in the EU, of low-skilled 
unemployed amongst its older peo-
ple. Shifting net wages by lowering 
wage taxes would induce a relatively 
high number of low-skilled unem-
ployed to search for a job, and there-
fore, unemployment among the low-
skilled decreases most in Poland.
The skills distribution effect is most 
visible in Italy where employment 
yields amongst the medium and high-
skilled is by far the strongest. One rea-
son is the distribution effect described 
in Section 4.1.2 above: the tax sub-
sidy shifts net wages of the medium- 
and high-skilled by the most in Italy 
which, all other things being equal, 
would encourage the largest number 
of workers to search for employment.
The extent of the employment 
yield amongst the medium- and 
high-skilled has implications for 
 investment and hence capital inten-
sity as well as GDP since, in the LMM, 
there is a complementarity between 
skills and capital such that high-skill 
employment is a stronger comple-
ment to investment in capital than 
low-skilled employment.
As a consequence, the impact of the 
measure on capital intensity would be 
greatest in Italy; see Chart 23 which 
also shows the highest overall rela-
tive increase in VAT tax revenue. The 
employment, investment, and output 
gains in Italy would even result in a pos-
itive change to the budget balance, i.e. 
the measure would be more than self-
financing. Viewed across countries, the 
change in the budget balance would 
largely reflect the overall impact on 
these core macro magnitudes. 
It is doubtful, however, that an over-
all budgetary impact, as depicted for 
Italy in the LMM, could actually be 
expected from a tax cut, even if the 
employment and investment elastic-
ity with respect to such a measure 
were considerable, since there is 
little empirical evidence for self-
financing tax cuts. However, model 
simulations such as the one present-
ed here do, at least, demonstrate 
that identical measures can pro-
duce different labour market and 
economy outcomes, depending on 
the institutional framework in the 
respective countries – factors that 
labour market models can only take 
into account to a limited extent.
Chart 21: Lowering wage taxes for older workers, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP,  
impact on overall employment by skill level
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Chart 22: Lowering wage taxes for older workers, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP,  
impact on net wage rates
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Chart 23: Lowering wage taxes for older workers, magnitude: 0.1 % of GDP,  
impact on investment, output, VAT rate
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5. main findings and 
policy implicaTions
Active ageing strategies seem to 
have worked in the last decade
•	 Since 2000, and following the adop-
tion of the Stockholm and Barcelona 
targets, there has been a general 
improvement in the participation of 
older workers in the labour market, 
which has withstood the adverse con-
sequences of the 2008-2009 economic 
recession. Apart from cohort effects 
driving the female component, a key 
element in the improvement was 
the general increase in the statu-
tory retirement age. However, the 
transition to retirement may follow a 
variety of paths: through unemploy-
ment, sickness or disability insurance; 
through early-retirement; through 
partial retirement and private pen-
sion schemes. In so far as limiting 
the exit via one route may induce a 
higher exit rate via other routes, pol-
icy makers should take into account 
these substitution effects when con-
sidering how best to increase the 
employment of older workers.
•	 A principal component analysis of 
indicators representing the variety 
of national labour market institu-
tions and social systems suggests 
that there is a mutually reinforcing 
interaction between labour market 
systems and social security systems. 
The recent crisis has revealed that 
segmented labour markets may be 
a driver of early withdrawal from 
the labour market, whereas flex-
ible working conditions and lifelong 
learning help to keep older workers 
in employment.
•	Beyond the retirement age, poli-
cies should address a number of 
factors comprehensively, recog-
nising the many contextual ele-
ments which influence individu-
al participation and retirement 
 decisions.(49)
(49) For a review of national policies see 
Annex 2.
Individual and household 
characteristics matter
The evidence in Section 3 shows 
that individual and household char-
acteristics are important determi-
nants of the labour market behav-
iour of older workers, showing that 
there are potential benefits from 
targeted policies designed to encour-
age older people to remain active 
longer, and retire later. The follow-
ing policy implications are specifically 
 supported by the analysis: 
•	 On average, the drop in working 
hours for older women compared 
to prime aged women is somewhat 
smaller than the corresponding 
drop for older men. Moreover, older 
women have a significant higher 
probability (14.3 %) of working 
part-time compared to prime aged 
women, while the corresponding 
gap for men is only modest (6.7 %). 
At the same time the participation 
rate of older women decreases at a 
slower pace, compared with young-
er women, than the participation 
rate of older men. This may indicate 
that flexible working time may be 
conducive to higher labour market 
participation at an older age. 
•	 Rates of labour market participa-
tion correlate highly with levels of 
skill, i.e. the more highly skilled have 
higher participation rates. However, 
the propensity of older workers to 
participate in formal training is sig-
nificantly lower than for younger 
age groups, although the difference 
is less pronounced with regard to 
non-formal training. This suggests a 
need to remove barriers to learning 
and training and provide incentives 
and special programmes focussed 
on updating older workers’ skills 
through, for example, training sub-
sidies for older workers – especially 
the unemployed. 
•	 Older workers are less likely to 
transit from employment to unem-
ployment than younger work-
ers, but are more likely to stay 
 unemployed for longer. At the 
same time, job search activity by 
the older  unemployed is signifi-
cantly less intensive than in other 
age groups. This indicates that 
there is a need to prevent the 
unemployment of older workers 
(e.g. through outplacement ser-
vices in case of restructuring) and 
to enhance the search intensity of 
unemployed older workers, par-
ticularly in Member States where 
there are fewer obligations on 
older people to search for a job 
when unemployed.
•	 A longer duration of unemploy-
ment among older workers may 
also indicate reluctance by employ-
ers to hire older workers due to 
prejudice of one sort or another. 
If this is the case then fostering 
a change of employers’ attitudes 
towards older workers is a neces-
sary step in improving the poten-
tial of older workers and fighting 
discrimination and perceptions of 
stereotypes(50).
•	 Declining health, both of the worker 
and his/her spouse, is an important 
determinant in the decision of older 
workers to retire early. Promoting 
healthy working conditions, and 
child care and eldercare facilities is 
therefore a priority in helping to 
break down labour market barriers 
for older workers with fragile health 
and/or care  responsibilities.
•	 An employed spouse has a sig-
nificantly different impact on the 
hours worked by men and women, 
with women decreasing their hours 
worked, while men increase their 
hours worked. Older workers are 
more likely to exit the labour force 
if their spouse is not active. Acti-
vation policies should therefore 
explicitly recognise the household 
dimension of active ageing.
•	 Older workers have, on aver-
age, higher hourly and monthly 
incomes than younger workers, 
but they have the lowest prob-
ability of moving up to a higher 
(50) See Department of Labour of New Zea-
land (s.a.) for literature review on age-
discrimination.
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wage level. Some would argue that 
the automatic link between senior-
ity and wage increases should be 
removed to avoid pricing ageing 
workers out of the market(51).
Simulations demonstrate the 
potential for revenue neutral 
targeted measures 
Some of the above recommendations 
have been tested using DG EMPL’s 
Labour Market Model (LMM) which 
indicates the significance of labour 
market institutions and policies on 
Member State’s employment perfor-
mance. The analysis shows that the 
application of instruments targeted 
towards particular groups, such as 
older people, can be successful in 
raising the employment rate and 
reducing unemployment. Structural 
policy actions – such as those that 
alter the tax-benefit schemes, tackle 
the issue of training deficits, or change 
retirement eligibility conditions – all 
have the potential to produce positive 
results in a budget neutral way. 
6. conclusions
The working population in the EU 
is projected to age significantly 
in the coming decades while the 
age-dependency ratio will increase 
(51) See for instance Cotis (2005). 
sharply. In combination with falling 
fertility rates, this trend will pose a 
major risk to the sustainability of the 
European Social Model. 
The Stockholm Council in 2001, and 
further on confirmed by the Europe 
2020 Strategy, recognised that 
addressing these challenges required 
a global strategy that covers the 
need for Member States to reduce 
their public debt at a fast pace, to 
raise employment rates and produc-
tivity, and to reform their pensions, 
healthcare, and long-term care sys-
tems in a sustainable way.
This chapter explored further how older 
people can be encouraged and assisted 
to remain active longer. The main find-
ing of this chapter, as well as the results 
of other studies, indicate that retire-
ment decisions are influenced by many 
factors – from individual and house-
hold characteristics to macro-economic 
and institutional circumstances - and 
that interactions between these various 
drivers should be taken into account 
when policies are being formulated 
and implemented. 
In this context, labour market policies 
aimed at increasing the employment 
of older people should be based on a 
balanced and integrated mix of poli-
cies that improve  flexibility to acquire 
new skills and transit between occu-
pations, and that increase security 
through supporting the adaptation 
to a longer  working life.
These various considerations indi-
cate, then, inter alia, that more 
intensive personalised services - 
such as guidance, counselling or 
outplacement - to retain and rein-
tegrate older workers back into 
employment are needed to reduce 
the duration unemployment of 
older workers; that policies aimed 
at reducing early retirement along 
one pathway, e.g. long-term 
unemployment, should be comple-
mented by polices that focus on 
the other available pathways, e.g. 
disability pensions; that develop-
ing elderly care systems can help to 
mainstream the gender perspective 
of active ageing; that the promo-
tion of job mobility can prevent 
early exits for health reasons by 
allowing tasks to be adjusted to 
people’s capabilities; that labour 
market policies can contribute 
indirectly to the strengthening of 
active ageing through work organ-
isation tailored towards the needs 
of older workers; and that struc-
tural policy actions – such as those 
that alter the tax-benefit schemes, 
change retirement eligibility con-
ditions – all have the potential 
to produce positive results in a 
budget neutral way.
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annex 1: on The 
inTerpreTaTion of The 
poinT esTimaTes reporTed 
in The Tables
In the notes on the tables the esti-
mation technique used is specified. 
Given the estimation technique, the 
point estimates have to be inter-
preted as follows: 
The Tobit model 
The Tobit model is an econometric 
model which can be used to analyse 
the relationship between a non-neg-
ative variable and a set of explana-
tory variables. An example of such 
a variable is the number of hours 
worked in the economy, which takes 
on positive values for someone work-
ing, but is zero for someone who is 
not working.
The reported coefficient β1 can be 
interpreted in the following way: an 
increase of input variable x1 leads to 
an increase in the outcome variable 
by β1 units. In the case of hours that 
are included as log variables, the 
coefficients can be interpreted such 
that an increase of variable x1 by one 
unit leads to an increase in the out-
come variable by β1 per cent. If x1 is 
a dummy/indicator variable, it means 
that if x1 changes from 0 to 1 that 
leads to an increase of β1 units/per 
cent of the outcome variable.
The Logit and Probit Models 
The logit and probit models are obvi-
ous choices in the case of binary 
outcomes, i.e. outcomes that can 
only exhibit two values, 0 and 1. This 
is the case for, e.g. the participation 
decision (participation: 1, nonpartici-
pation: 0), the distinction between 
full-time and part-time employment, 
and between temporary and perma-
nent employment.
The reported marginal effects mfx1 
can be interpreted in the following 
way: an increase in variable x1 by 
one unit leads to an increase of the 
dependent variable by mfx1 units. 
If x1 is a dummy/indicator variable, 
then if x1 changes from 0 to 1, this 
leads to an increase of mfx1 units of 
the outcome variable. The marginal 
effect is not constant but varies with 
the observation. The marginal effects 
shown in the tables are derived from 
the means of all variables.
In this paper the values of the esti-
mated coefficients have to be inter-
preted as change in the probability 
that an event occurs (e.g. the transi-
tion from employment to unemploy-
ment) for a particular characteristic 
of the individual (e.g. male).
The Multinomial Logit Model
Outcomes which follow no natu-
ral order are called nominal, e.g. 
Employment, Unemployment and 
Inactive, do not follow a specific 
order and are therefore nominal 
 outcomes. 
To model transitions between these 
outcomes econometrically, the multi-
nomial logit model (MNLM) is used. 
Essentially the MNLM estimates a sepa-
rate binary logit model for each pair 
of outcome categories, but takes into 
account the fact that the realisations 
of the outcomes are interrelated.
The interpretation of the parameters 
of the equations is the same as in the 
logit model. However, note that, for 
example in the case of Table A.2.6 on 
page 185, the parameters associated 
with a specific characteristic add up 
to 0 across the four types of transi-
tion (i.e. EE, ES, EU, EI)
The Ordered Regression Model
The ordered regression model (ORM) 
is an appropriate econometric tool 
for the case of ordinal outcomes. 
Such outcomes can be ordered, but 
the distances between the outcomes 
are not necessarily meaningful, arbi-
trary, or changing. This is for example 
the case for the anonymised variable 
of unemployment duration. Intui-
tively, an ORM measures the baseline 
hazard (in the example of unemploy-
ment duration, the probability of 
belonging to a certain duration class) 
as a series of dummies with no prior 
assumptions about the distribution 
and parametric form of the underly-
ing hazard function. 
The exponentiated coefficient in the 
tables denotes the effect of a unit 
increase or decrease in a variable 
on the odds ratio. Say, for example, 
that the exponentiated coefficient 
of a particular variable is 1.20. Then, 
holding everything else constant, a 
unit increase in this variable increases 
the odds of observing an outcome in 
a category greater than m versus less 
than or equal to m by 20 per cent. 
Accordingly, exponentiated coeffi-
cients lower than one mean that an 
increase in the respective variable is 
associated with a reduction in the 
odds ratio. Using this interpretation 
we can gain insight into which fac-
tors are important in the determina-
tion of unemployment duration and 
how they compare to each other 
size-wise.
See ISG and RWI (2010) and RWI 
(2011) for more details.
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annex 2: a selecTion 
of acTive ageing 
policies in The member 
sTaTes: naTional 
reform programmes(52)
This annex provides an update of 
the review of active ageing policies 
that were discussed at length in the 
2007 Employment in Europe Report, 
using information from the National 
Reform Programmes (NRP)(53).
In their 2011 National Reform 
Programmes, the Member States 
outlined their strategies to rein-
force active ageing in the future. 
Although the proposed reforms 
reflect to a large extent national 
traditions and social practices, some 
important common developments 
can be distinguished. 
Several Member States are planning 
to take initiatives to adjust the retire-
ment age in order to take better 
account of increased life expectancy, 
even though this may not be made 
very explicit. For instance, in the 
Netherlands the government pro-
poses to increase the retirement age 
by one year (from 65 to 66) by 2020. 
However, automatically linking the 
pension age to life expectancy after 
2020 is not envisaged at this stage. 
Moreover, it should also be noted 
that most Member States have cho-
sen to postpone the actual imple-
mentation of these measures far into 
the future, which may compromise 
their implementation and limit their 
impact on the sustainability of pen-
sion systems. For instance, in the 
Czech Republic the rise in the statu-
tory retirement age only will become 
uniform at 67 years by 2041 for both 
men and women.
(52) The National Reform Programmes 
are available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/sgp/convergence/pro-
grammes/2011_en.htm
(53) These National Reform Programmes 
are available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/sgp/convergence/pro-
grammes/2011_en.htm
Some Member States will raise the 
official retirement age, but con-
tinue to maintain differences in 
statutory retirement ages between 
men and women. For instance, in 
Bulgaria the statutory retirement 
age for women and men will be 
increased only after 2021 by six 
months each year until reaching 63 
years of age for women (2026) and 
65 years of age for men (2024).
This selective review is limited to the 
measures which have a direct impact 
on employment of the older workers 
while ensuring the adequacy of pen-
sions. A discussion of the effects on, 
for instance, growth potential and 
budgetary stance can be found else-
where(54). Nevertheless, it should be 
recognised that there exists an indi-
rect link between, for instance, fiscal 
sustainability and active ageing, as 
in an unstable macro-economic envi-
ronment caused by loss of confidence 
due to unsustainable fiscal balances, 
enterprises may be forced to contract 
their production and reduce their 
production costs. 
Setting older employees on early 
retirement may be seen as the most 
efficient way to reduce labour cost 
(from the perspective of the employ-
er) in so far as firing costs for older 
workers may be high. Nevertheless, 
the relation between active ageing 
and fiscal stance may also run in 
the opposite direction: when increas-
ing numbers of older workers who 
remain in employment and retire 
later, the tax base expands, expendi-
tures on pensions decrease, and the 
overall fiscal balance improves.
In Belgium, the federal government 
will focus on increasing the effective 
retirement age - while maintaining 
an appropriate pension system - by 
(54) See for instance Martins et al. (2005) and 
European Commission (2009).
restricting early retirement (e.g. pre-
pensions) and encouraging retention 
of older workers in employment.
In Bulgaria the pension reform 
includes an increase in the statutory 
retirement age for women and men 
only after 2021 by six months each 
year until reaching 63 years of age 
for women (2026) and 65 years of 
age for men (2024). 
In the Czech Republic the rise in 
the statutory retirement age will be 
accelerated at a faster pace so as to 
make it a uniform 67 years in 2041 for 
men and women, irrespective of the 
number of children. The increase in 
the retirement age will continue after 
2041 by two months a year without 
a pre-determined limit. The govern-
ment will not be allowed to increase 
pensions beyond what is possible on 
the basis of the current indexation 
rule(55). The degree of redistribution 
in the pension system will be low-
ered by increasing the pensions of 
high wage earners and lowering the 
medium-range pensions; A voluntary 
second private pension pillar will be 
introduced in 2013.
The Danish National Reform Pro-
gramme envisages a shift in the pen-
sion age from 65 to 67 years in 
the period 2019-2022. The voluntary 
early retirement pension (VERP) age 
will increase from 60 to 62 years in 
the period 2014-2017, and the VERP 
benefit period will be shortened 
from 5 to 3 years during 2018-2023. 
Parliament will vote every five years 
on raising the statutory retirement 
age by up to one year in line with 
increased life-expectancy.
In Germany, already in 2007 it was 
decided to gradually shift the stand-
ard retirement age for the statutory 
(55) I.e. the minimum growth in pensions is 
determined according to a formula that 
takes into account price growth (fully) 
and a third of real wage growth.
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pension insurance to 67, starting in 
2012, fully phased in for workers 
retiring as from 2029. Initiatives will 
be taken to strengthen the integra-
tion of women into the labour mar-
ket, by inter alia tackling discrimina-
tion on grounds of gender over the 
life cycle.
In Estonia the government aims to 
further address the sustainability and 
adequacy of the pension system by 
modifying access to special pensions 
and pensions under favourable con-
ditions, and it will decide by 2019 
whether to link the retirement age 
to life expectancy. 
In Ireland the age at which indi-
viduals qualify for the State Pension 
will increase to 66 years in 2014; 67 
years in 2021 and 68 years in 2028. 
A new supplementary pension using 
an “auto-enrolment” system will be 
introduced to provide additional 
retirement income for employees. 
The Government and private sector 
employers will support the savings of 
workers by providing matching con-
tributions, conditional on economic 
conditions in 2014. 
In Greece several measures were 
implemented to reduce the public 
deficit, including nominal pension 
cuts (13th and 14th monthly pay-
ment). The pension reform bills 
adopted by the Parliament in July 
2010 provide for very short phase-
in periods for increasing retirement 
ages and contributory periods, and 
parametric changes that should 
significantly improve the long-
term sustainability of the pension 
system. 
In Spain, the planned pension 
reform includes the extension of 
the retirement age from 65 to 67 
phased in over 15 years, the intro-
duction of a sustainability factor 
thereafter linked to changes in life 
expectancy, an increase in the num-
ber of working years for the calcula-
tions of pensions from 15 to 25, and 
tougher early retirement conditions. 
The level of minimum pensions has 
been increased.
In France the National Reform Pro-
gramme foresees a raise in the 
statutory retirement age by two 
years at a rate of four months a 
year, starting with the 1951 gen-
eration. The minimum retirement 
age will be 62 for people born in 
1956 (age reached in 2018) and the 
age that qualifies for a full pension 
(whatever the contribution length) 
will be 67 for people born in 1956 
(who would reach retirement age 
in 2023). The contribution period 
will be increased to 41.5 years by 
2020 and continue to rise there-
after in line with life expectancy. 
Some workers with long careers 
will still be able to retire before 
the minimum retirement age of 
between 58 and 61 (under spe-
cific conditions). This opportunity 
will be extended to people who 
started to work before the age of 
18. People who are disabled will 
be able to retire before the mini-
mum pensionable age, at 60 (under 
specific conditions). Adequacy will 
be strengthened by increasing the 
compensation period (for the num-
ber of contributory years) for youth 
unemployment periods from 1 to 
1.5 years. Women’s pensions will 
be improved slightly by including 
maternity leave benefits in the 
reference wage for the pension 
 calculation.
In Italy measures affecting active age-
ing include linking the retirement 
age to life expectancy as of 2015, and 
the postponement of access to retire-
ment by 12 to 18 months for workers 
who become eligible.
In Cyprus, the government is involved 
in a dialogue with unions for the 
restructuring of the public pension 
system, which is to be concluded by 
the end of 2011.
In Latvia the various regimes and 
retirement ages will be reviewed, 
with a view to preserve future sus-
tainability and adequacy of the three 
pillars of the system. 
In Lithuania the government envis-
ages to gradually increase the retire-
ment age to 65 by 2026, to review 
early retirement schemes (by adding 
financial disincentives for early retire-
ment and rewarding late retirement), 
to integrate state pensions into the 
general scheme of social insurance, 
and to improve older worker partici-
pation in lifelong learning. 
In Luxembourg the government 
plans reforms to discourage early 
retirement and introduce measures 
that link the statutory retirement 
age to life expectancy. However, this 
mechanism would only concern new 
pensioners and only apply to the 
part of the career situated after the 
entry into force of the reform, so it 
would only produce its full effect in 
40 years. 
In Hungary the National Reform Pro-
gramme aims for a significant reduc-
tion in early retirement and disabil-
ity pension schemes. Other pension 
reforms are primarily focussed on the 
budgetary implications of the pen-
sion system.
In Malta several changes in pension 
legislation were introduced in recent 
years, including allowing persons of 
pensionable age to continue working 
without losing their pension entitle-
ments and a stricter medical assess-
ment to qualify for invalidity pension. 
The Dutch government proposed to 
increase the retirement age by one 
year (from 65 to 66) by 2020. Howev-
er, automatically linking the pension 
age to life expectancy after 2020 is 
not envisaged at this stage.
In Austria, the National Reform Pro-
gramme foresees to increase retire-
ment age from 60 to 62 years in the 
framework of the early retirement 
scheme for people with long insur-
ance records, starting in 2014; and 
to reform the invalidity pension law.
In Poland, the National Reform 
Programme makes no reference to 
further policy initiatives affecting 
active ageing apart from a general 
statement to increase the effective 
 retirement age by 2015.
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In Portugal the National Reform Pro-
gramme stipulates primarily measures 
which will affect the fiscal stance, 
including the convergence of per-
sonal income tax deductions applied 
to pensions and labour income. 
In Romania the National Reform 
Programme does not foresee major 
new adjustments with respect to 
active ageing, as comprehensive pen-
sion reform measures were already 
 decided in 2010.
In Slovenia, the parliament has 
adopted a pension reform under 
which the statutory retirement age 
rises gradually from the current 63 
years for men and 61 for women to 
65 years, and the contribution peri-
od increases, while preserving the 
adequacy of pensions. However, the 
pension reform adopted by the par-
liament was subsequently rejected in 
a referendum. Therefore the reform 
will not be  implemented. 
In Slovakia the National Reform Pro-
gramme envisages several adjust-
ments to the pension system that 
would address its current shortcom-
ings including the lack of linking the 
pensionable age to life expectancy.
In Finland, the Government and 
labour market organisations agreed 
in 2009 to raise the effective retire-
ment age by a minimum of three 
years from the 2008 level by 2025, 
but measures to increase the effec-
tive retirement age still need to be 
put in practice. 
In Sweden, in addition to earlier 
reforms to encourage labour force 
participation by older people and to 
improve the opportunities for older 
unemployed people to stay in the 
labour market, the qualifying time 
for a new start job has been tempo-
rarily shortened from twelve to six 
months in 2010 for people who have 
turned 55. A new start job is a form 
of subsidised employment aimed 
at facilitating the employment of 
people who have been absent from 
working life for a long time.
In the United Kingdom the Govern-
ment aims to provide greater oppor-
tunities for people to participate in 
the labour market at age 65 and 
beyond. The Government is phasing 
out the default retirement age from 
April 2011 and ensuring that older 
workers are incentivised to continue 
working through reduced National 
Insurance contributions and high-
er tax allowances. Employers will 
not be able to compulsorily retire 
employees who turn 65 from 1 Octo-
ber 2011, unless the retirement can 
be objectively justified. The current 
State Pension age for women will 
increase from 60 to 65 more quickly 
between April 2016 and November 
2018, and thereafter the State Pen-
sion age for both men and women 
will be raised to 66 by April 2020.
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annex 3: facTor 
exTracTion and 
roTaTion in The 
principal componenT 
analysis 
The factors are extracted by max-
imising the sum of the squared fac-
tor loadings of each variable on the 
respective factor. Once a number of 
factors were extracted, it often hap-
pens that a ‘rotation’ will facilitate 
the interpretation of the factors vis-à-
vis their correlation with the original 
variables. That is, the initial extraction 
will result in factors which make the 
sum of the squared loadings reach its 
maximum. This, for example, could 
result in some weaker correlation of 
factor 1 both with variable x and 
variable y, which would make inter-
pretation of factor 1 difficult. Hence, 
after the initial extraction of fac-
tors, further improvements can often 
be achieved by “shifting” factor 1 
away from a certain correlation with 
variable x toward a strong corre-
lation with variable y. Technically, 
the coordinate cross describing the 
logical room in which the factors are 
implemented would be rotated so as 
to maximise the loading of factor 1 
with some strongly correlated varia-
bles while minimising its loading with 
other variables. Hence, the structure 
of a factor’s loadings to the original 
variables will be changed by rota-
tion. The sum of the (squared) factor 
loading over all variables will not be 
changed by the rotation procedure. 
The procedure is known as ‘varimax 
rotation’. For a technical description 
see Backhaus et al. (2008), Chapter 
7.2. The methodology of PCA is also 
described in European Commission 
(2006), Chapter 2.
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annex 4: some 
qualiTy aspecTs wiTh 
respecT To The facTor 
exTracTion (principal 
componenT analysis)
Some original indicators do correlate 
the same way for more than one fac-
tor which normally would complicate 
factor interpretation. For example: 
there is a considerable positive cor-
relation immanent in the inequality 
variable to both factor 2 (low safety 
net) and 3 (segmentation). The reader 
would identify more similar examples 
from Table 2. However, one must take 
account of the fact that the analysis is 
based on a limited number of obser-
vations (28 countries, 15 indicators), 
including partly using aggregate data 
from different sources which might 
be subject to some measurement vari-
ability or other data quality problems. 
Hence, the 23 % loss of information 
on the original indicator’s variability 
is a reasonable, albeit sub-optimal, 
result from a purely technical point 
of view. However, straightforward 
interpretation of the factors was pos-
sible anyway. 
A set of data comprising up to 25 var-
iables was tried out in order to shift 
the explanatory power. However, 
the explanatory power could either 
not be improved or the improvement 
went at the expense of another fac-
tor (the fifth) to be extracted follow-
ing the Kaiser-criterion. However, 
more factors would water down the 
reduction of dimensions. Interpreta-
tion of the results would be even less 
feasible.
The same-direction correlations dis-
closed in Table 2 of Section 3.2 fit 
well into the interpretation delivered 
above. For example: inequality is one 
dimension of both segmented labour 
markets and social inclusion. 
Moreover, a number of statistical 
tests resulted in the 15-variable 
matrix being an adequate base for 
a principal component analysis. 
Those test the hypothesis of the 
original variables to be correlated. 
Otherwise, a factor analysis would 
not make sense. The Bartlett-test 
of sphericity will deliver a close-
to-100 % significance to reject the 
hypothesis of uncorrelated variables 
based on a Chi-square. The Gutt-
mann analysis of the Anti-Image 
covariance matrix resulted in only 
18 elements out of 210 non-diag-
onal elements being significantly 
different from zero (>.09 or <-.09). 
This is much less than the 25 % one 
could still accept following Dziuban 
and Shirkey. Meyer-Ohlin criterion 
would deliver MSA (measure of 
sampling adequacy) of 0.55 which is 
still acceptable albeit not optimal. 
These tests are described in Back-
haus et al. (2008), p. 335.
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annex 5: fusing 
counTries To groups 
in a clusTer analysis 
(ca)
The procedure can be described as fol-
lows (Backhaus et al. (2008), p. 420): 
starting out from the smallest pos-
sible partition, i.e. one country, coun-
tries will be fused into groups so that 
the degree of heterogeneity within 
a group with respect to the factors 
would be increased the least (Ward’s 
procedure of merging groups). Hence, 
the objective is to fuse those objects 
which shift the variance within the 
group as little as possible. As a result, 
within the groups, homogeneity 
among countries with reference to the 
factors would be high as heterogene-
ity across classes. This Cluster Analysis 
(CA) could result in a typology of 
Member States, based on the relevant 
dimensions of ageing conditions.
Technically, the Ward procedure 
foresees  to 
be the variance used as a criterion 
whether or not to merge object k 
with group g. The score of object k 
with respect to variable j is  and 
the average across all Kg objects in 
group g is . Object k is merged to 
group g if there is no other object 
which would increase the squared 
sum of mean deviations Vg by less.. 
The objects in our exercise are the 
countries and the variables  are 
the scores they have with respect to 
a factor. Starting from one country as 
the smallest possible group, another 
country would be merged to that 
group if it shifts the group’s variance 
by less than any other country not 
yet merged. 
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1. inTroducTion
The free movement of persons 
is one of the four fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by EU law; 
along with the free movement 
of goods, services, and capital. It 
includes the right of EU nationals 
to move freely to another Member 
State, to take up employment, and 
to reside there with their family 
members. Despite this, geographi-
cal labour mobility between EU 
Member States has, until recently, 
remained at a low level, nota-
bly in comparison with the United 
States. Even so, in 2010, while only 
2.8 % of the working-age (15-64) 
European citizens lived in another 
EU Member State than their own, 
this is notably higher than in 2004 
(2.0 %) as a result of the increased 
intra-EU mobility that followed the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements.
Before the two latest enlarge-
ments of the EU, the issue of free 
movements of workers was the 
subject of many concerns, notably 
the impact of enlargement and 
increased inflows of workers upon 
the economic and social situation 
in both the receiving and sending 
countries. Therefore, the Acces-
sion Treaties provided the possibil-
ity for Member States to maintain 
restrictions on free movement of 
workers for a maximum period of 
seven years. 
These transitional arrangements 
were discussed in the Commis-
sion’s publication ‘Employment in 
Europe’ in 2008 (European Commis-
sion, 2008a). Since the transitional 
arrangements for the 2004 accession 
countries ended on 1 May 2011, it is 
time to take stock of the experience 
of labour mobility from these coun-
tries. Moreover, some restrictions are 
still in place as for the Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers and the Member 
States still applying them will have to 
decide whether or not they are keep-
ing them in the last two-year phase 
(starting on 1 January 2012). 
The current chapter revisits the issue 
of geographical labour mobility in 
the context of the two latest EU 
enlargements, with a particular focus 
on the situation of Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers. It also examines 
the impact of the economic reces-
sion on labour mobility flows and 
the employment situation of recent 
intra-EU movers.
In Section 2 of the chapter, the extent 
and evolution of intra-EU mobility 
of citizens and workers is analysed 
in detail, with particular emphasis 
on mobility from EU-10 and EU-2 
Member States(1) to the EU-15 Mem-
ber States. The role of enlargement 
and the transitional arrangements is 
examined, and the impact of the eco-
nomic recession that started in 2008 
is also discussed. Section 3 covers the 
reasons for mobility and the evolu-
tion of push and pull factors, while 
Section 4 analyses in detail the char-
acteristics of recent intra-EU mov-
ers, in particular their employment 
situation. The economic impact of 
post-enlargement mobility is exam-
ined in Section 5 while Section 6 
summarises the main findings of the 
whole  chapter.
(1) In this chapter, the following acronyms 
are used: EU-15 refers to the 15 Member 
States that formed the EU before 2004 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany,  Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria,  Portugal, 
 Finland, Sweden, United  Kingdom); 
EU-10 refers to the 10 countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, Czech 
Republic,  Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia,  Slovakia) 
and EU-8 to those to which  transitional 
arrangements applied (all of them 
except Malta and Cyprus); EU-2 refers 
to the 2 countries that joined the EU 
in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania); finally, 
EU-12 refers to the addition of EU-10 
and EU-2 countries (therefore all the 
recently accessed Member States) while 
EU-8+2 refers to the addition of EU-8 and 
EU-2 countries (therefore all the recently 
accessed Member States except Malta 
and Cyprus).
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2. inTra-eu mobiliTy: 
evoluTion since 2004, 
role of enlargemenT 
and impacT of The 
recession
2.1. Free movement 
and transitional 
arrangements: 
the legal context 
Free movement of workers was intro-
duced with the aim of removing 
barriers to the functioning of a fully 
integrated European market econo-
my and improving the matching of 
labour supply and demand. However, 
concerns about the consequences of 
the sudden shock effect of opening 
up the labour markets of the existing 
member countries have been an issue 
in all the enlargements where a sig-
nificant income gap existed between 
new and old member states (1981, 
1986, 2004, and 2007). 
As for the two latest enlargements, 
concerns in the receiving countries 
were linked to the size of the coun-
tries that were joining the EU (more 
than 100 million inhabitants, increas-
ing the total EU population by a 
quarter) and the large gap with the 
existing Member States in terms of 
wages or GDP per capita. Geographi-
cal proximity also played a role, nota-
bly in Germany and Austria which 
attracted most of the inflows of 
workers from the EU-12 countries 
in the pre-accession period. There-
fore, the Accession Treaties provided 
the possibility for Member States to 
maintain restrictions to free move-
ment of workers for a maximum of 
seven years (see Box 1). 
In this chapter, the evolution of the 
number of EU mobile citizens from 
the EU-12 countries will be analysed, 
notably against the background of 
the transitional arrangements that 
have been applied to EU-8 and EU-2 
workers. Tables 1 and 2 show the 
gradual opening of the labour mar-
ket of the ‘old Member States’ to 
the acceding countries. It is clear 
that more EU-15 countries have kept 
restrictions to free movement of 
EU-2 workers until the third phase, 
compared with EU-8 workers. This 
difference may be linked to the fact 
that the income gap with EU-2 coun-
tries (compared to EU-15) was much 
larger than for EU-8 countries – but 
also to the timing of the decisions by 
the Member States in relation to the 
economic crisis that affected the EU 
from 2008. 
The case of the UK and Ireland 
is outstanding: while they opened 
their labour market to EU-8 work-
ers from the accession date (1 May 
2004), for the EU-2 workers they 
kept restrictions during the two 
first phases. According to Wright 
(2010) this is explained by the sig-
nificant and unexpected inflows 
of EU-8 workers into these coun-
tries during 2004-2006 as a result 
of the early opening of their labour 
markets, and the wish to avoid, 
once again, being almost the only 
EU-15  Member States to do so.
It should, however, be noted that 
the labour market of most Member 
States not yet applying EU law on 
free movement of workers to EU-2 
nationals (last category in Table 2) 
are not fully closed. Those Member 
States that maintain restrictions on 
labour market access apply a variety 
of national measures that result in 
legally different regimes for access 
to the labour markets. Some apply 
full work permit schemes while oth-
ers have simplified procedures or 
eased conditions, e.g. by not requir-
ing work permits for occupations 
in certain sectors or by exemptions 
from labour market tests(2). A note-
worthy example is Italy which no 
longer requires work permits for 
employment in several key sectors 
such as: agriculture, hotel and tour-
ism, domestic work, care services, 
construction, engineering, manage-
rial and highly skilled work, as well 
as seasonal work.  
(2) More information on individual national 
measures available at http://ec.europa.
eu/eures. 
Table 1: Date of granting access to the labour market to EU-8 workers
Date EU-15 Member States
May 2004 IE, SE, UK*
May 2006 EL, ES, PT, FI
July 2006 IT
May 2007 NL
November 2007 LU
July 2008 FR
May 2009 BE, DK
May 2011 AT**, DE**
Source: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Note: As far as the EU-8 Member States were concerned, the three phases of the transitional arrangements 
were as follows: 1st phase from 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2006; second phase from 1 May 2006 to 30 April 
2009; third phase from 1 May 2009 to 30 April 2011. *UK: access but with mandatory worker registration 
scheme; **DE and AT: with restrictions also on the posting of workers in certain sectors.
Table 2: Date of granting access to the labour market to EU-2 workers
Date EU-25 Member States
January 2007  CZ*, EE, CY, LV, LT, PL, SI, SK, FI, SE
January 2009 EL, HU, PT, ES**
May 2009 DK
Still applying restrictions  
as of November 2011…
BE, DE***, FR, IE, IT, LU,  
MT, NL, AT***, UK
Source: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Note: As far as the EU-2 Member States were concerned, the three phases of the transitional arrangements 
were as follows: 1st phase from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2008; second phase from 1 January 2009 
to 31 December 2011; third phase from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013.* CZ: still under national 
law; **ES: restrictions for workers from Romania (from July 2011); ***DE and AT: with restrictions also on 
the posting of workers in certain sectors. 
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While the main focus of this chap-
ter is the extent and impact of 
increased labour mobility resulting 
from the 2004 and 2007 enlarge-
ments on both sending and receiv-
ing countries, data on mobile citi-
zens from EU-15 countries (and 
sometimes third-country nationals) 
is also presented to provide a glob-
al picture of all labour mobility 
flows, and to allow comparisons to 
be made.
2.2. The receiving 
countries’ perspective
2.2.1. Overall stocks of EU 
foreigners resident in the EU 
Member States
From the data point of view, moni-
toring intra-EU mobility is difficult 
(see details in Annex 1). However, it 
is possible to draw estimates, based 
on migration and population statis-
tics (and the EU-Labour force sur-
vey where necessary) concerning the 
stock of foreign nationals resident in 
each of the 27 EU Member States (see 
Tables 3 and 4(3)), and the share they 
represent of the total  population in 
the receiving country.
(3) Tables 3 and 4 depict the evolution of the 
number of all foreign nationals, with or 
without attachment to the labour market, 
including young people (aged less than 15) 
as well as older ones (65 and over).
Box 1: Transitional arrangements on the free movement of workers
EU law on free movement of workers guarantees the right of EU nationals to move freely to another Member State, to take up employment, 
and to reside there with their family members. This freedom precludes Member States from directly or indirectly discriminating against EU 
workers and their families, on the basis of nationality, in employment related matters such as conditions of work and employment, remunera-
tion and dismissal. It also ensures equal treatment as regards public housing, tax advantages, and social advantages.
The Accession Treaty of Bulgaria and Romania does, however, allow Member States to temporarily restrict the free movement of Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers. Such ‘transitional arrangements’ for the free movement of workers have applied in most of the EU’s enlargements. The cur-
rent transitional arrangements cover three distinct phases according to a 2+3+2 formula, with different conditions applying during each phase:
•	 For an initial two-year period, the national law of the other Member States regulates the access of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to their labour 
markets. At the end of this first phase, the Council reviews the functioning of this first phase on the basis of a report from the Commission.
•	 Member States can extend their national measures for a second phase of three years by notifying the Commission before the end of the 
first phase; otherwise EU law granting free movement of workers applies.
•	 A Member State can maintain restrictions for a final third phase of two additional years only after notifying the Commission of a serious 
disturbance of its labour market or threat thereof.
The transitional arrangements end irrevocably seven years after accession - that is on 31 December 2013. These restrictions can only be applied 
to workers but not to the self-employed and other categories of EU citizens. They only apply to obtaining access to the labour market in a 
particular Member State. Once a worker has been admitted to the labour market of a particular Member State, EU law on equal treatment 
applies as regards remuneration, other employment-related matters, and access to social and tax advantages. This means that no discrimina-
tion on the grounds of nationality in these matters is allowed between legally employed workers, regardless of the EU Member State from 
which they come. Moreover, and notwithstanding these restrictions, a Member State must always give preference to Bulgarian and Romanian 
workers over those who are nationals of a non-EU country with respect to access to the labour market. As no transitional arrangements are 
in place for the application of EU law on the coordination of social security schemes, Bulgarian and Romanian workers also benefit fully from 
equal treatment in this regard.
Ten Member States opened their labour markets for workers from Bulgaria and Romania from the date of accession: Czech Republic(1), Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden (see also Table 2 below). After the end of the first two-year period 
and the Commission’s 2008 report on the functioning of the first phase of the transitional arrangements(2), four more Member States (Greece, 
Spain, Hungary, and Portugal) opened their labour markets as of 1 January 2009, followed by Denmark on 1 May 2009. Presently, ten Member 
States (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, and UK) maintain their work permits system for 
Bulgarian and Romanian workers, albeit in some cases with modifications to the conditions and procedures that applied to them prior to EU 
accession. Those Member States that still apply restrictions by the end of December 2011 may maintain them for 2 more years only if they 
notify the Commission by then of a serious disturbance of the labour market, or threat thereof.
In addition, a safeguard clause allows a Member State that has stopped using national measures and applies EU law on the free movement of 
workers, before the end of the overall transitional period, to re-introduce restrictions if there are serious disturbances of the labour market, or 
threat thereof. At the end of July 2011, Spain requested a temporary suspension of free movement of workers for Romanian workers, arguing 
that the country was affected by strong labour market disturbances (strong decline in employment and unemployment rate over 20 %) and a 
slow economic recovery. The Commission authorised this suspension through a decision of 11 August 2011(3). 
(1) Different from the other Member States that have been applying EU law on free movement of workers from 1 January 2009, the Czech 
Republic is still opening its labour market under national law
(2) COM(2008)765 (European Commission, 2008b).
(3) Commission Decision 2011/503/EU of 11 August 2011, OJ L 207, 12 August 2011, p. 22. 
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The number of nationals from EU-10 
Member States living in EU-15 Mem-
ber States has increased from around 
930 000 at the end of 2003 to 2.5 mil-
lion in 2010, with the fastest growth 
occurring between the end of 2004 
and the end of 2007 (average net 
inflow around 350 000 per year).
As far as nationals from EU-2 Mem-
ber States are concerned, their total 
number in the EU-15 Member States 
increased from around 700 000 at the 
end of 2003 to a little over 2.7 mil-
lion in 2010(4). In this case the largest 
net inflows took place in the first 
two years of accession (a rise close to 
one million between the end of 2006 
and the end of 2008), though some 
part of this increase is accounted for 
by persons who had been living for 
some years in the destination coun-
try, and only declared themselves 
later (see Chart 4 and Section 2.4). 
While those figures appear signifi-
cant in absolute terms, in relative 
terms EU-10 nationals only repre-
sented around 0.6 % of the total 
(4) As for the impact of enlargement on the 
mobility of EU-2 citizens, the receiving 
countries to be considered are the other 
25 EU Member States. However, as more 
than 95 % of the net inflows of EU-2 
citizens (in the period 2003-2010) have 
been towards EU-15 countries and in 
order to simplify the text, it is often only 
the EU-15 aggregate that will be used as 
the main receiving zone of EU-2 mobile 
citizens (rather than EU-25).
population of EU-15 countries in 2010 
(compared to 0.2 % in 2003) with a 
similar evolution for EU-2 nationals 
(from 0.2 % to 0.7 % in 2010). These 
shares are well below those from the 
EU-15 mobile citizens (1.8 % of total 
population in 2010) and from third-
country nationals (4.7 %).
Concerning individual Member 
States, the countries with most EU-10 
foreigners are: the UK (945 000) and 
Germany (605 000, among which a 
significant proportion was already 
there before 2004), followed by Ire-
land, Italy, Spain, and Austria. EU-2 
foreigners are highly concentrated 
in two countries, Italy and Spain 
(around one million each), followed 
by Germany (around 200 000), and 
the UK (almost 125 000).
In relative terms, Ireland is the 
country with the highest share of 
EU-10 nationals in the total popu-
lation: 4 % in 2010 (though down 
from 4.7% in 2008), followed by 
the UK (1.5 %), and Austria (1.3 %). 
EU-2 nationals represent 2.2 % of 
the total population in Spain (up 
from 0.6 % in 2003), and 1.8 % in 
Italy (up from 0.3 % in 2003) but 
their share is highest in Cyprus at 
4.1 % - a significant increase from 
0.7 % at end 2006. Finally, EU-15 
nationals represent a large part 
of the population in Luxembourg 
(around 38 %), but also in Cyprus 
(6.3 %), and Belgium (5.1 %).
As far as EU-10 countries are con-
cerned, they have not recorded a 
significant increase in the number 
of EU foreigners since their acces-
sion and the share of third-country-
nationals within the total popula-
tion, despite being relatively low 
(1.6 % on average) largely exceeds 
the share of all EU foreigners (0.6 %). 
In addition to Cyprus, the EU-10 
Member States recording a signifi-
cant number of EU foreigners are 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia. Finally, Hungary is the only 
Central and Eastern European coun-
try to include a significant number 
of EU-2 nationals (80 000 in 2010), 
mostly Romanians.
Chapter 6  Intra-EU labour mobility and the impact of enlargement
249
Ta
bl
e 
3:
 S
ha
re
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n 
na
ti
on
al
s 
re
si
de
nt
 in
 t
he
 E
U
-2
7 
by
 b
ro
ad
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
ci
ti
ze
ns
hi
p,
 2
00
3-
20
10
 (%
 o
f 
to
ta
l p
op
ul
at
io
n)
Ho
st
 
co
un
tr
y
Re
si
de
nt
 fo
re
ig
n 
na
tio
na
ls
 fr
om
…
EU
-1
5 
M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
EU
-1
0 
M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
EU
-2
 M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
N
on
-E
U
-2
7 
co
un
tr
ie
s
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
%
 o
f t
ot
al
 re
si
de
nt
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
BE
 1
)
4.
8
5.
2
5.
2
4.
9
5.
0
5.
2
5.
2
5.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
4
0.
4
0.
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
2.
1
2.
5
2.
4
2.
4
2.
8
2.
9
2.
8
2.
6
DK
 
1.
0
1.
1
1.
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
3
1.
5
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
5
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
3
3.
8
3.
7
3.
6
3.
6
3.
7
3.
8
3.
9
4.
3
DE
 
2.
2
2.
0
2.
0
2.
2
2.
2
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
0.
6
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
7
0.
7
0.
8
0.
7
0.
2
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
5.
9
6.
2
6.
1
5.
8
5.
8
5.
7
5.
6
5.
6
IE
 2
)
3.
3
3.
2
3.
6
3.
6
3.
6
3.
8
3.
3
2.
7
0.
8
1.
2
2.
4
3.
7
4.
8
4.
7
4.
1
4.
0
-
-
-
0.
3
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
3
2.
7
2.
9
2.
8
3.
1
3.
3
3.
4
3.
1
2.
8
EL
 1
)
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
2
0.
3
0.
2
0.
3
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
6
0.
8
0.
7
3.
7
4.
1
4.
2
4.
3
4.
9
5.
5
6.
4
6.
2
ES
 
1.
3
1.
5
1.
7
2.
2
2.
4
2.
6
2.
6
2.
9
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
6
0.
9
1.
1
1.
5
2.
0
2.
1
2.
2
2.
2
4.
6
5.
3
6.
1
6.
4
7.
0
7.
4
7.
3
6.
9
FR
 1
)
1.
8
1.
8
1.
6
1.
8
1.
9
1.
8
1.
8
1.
9
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
2.
8
2.
9
2.
9
2.
8
3.
2
3.
1
3.
3
3.
4
 IT
 
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
5
0.
5
0.
6
1.
1
1.
4
1.
5
1.
8
2.
8
3.
3
3.
6
3.
9
4.
2
4.
6
5.
0
5.
6
LU
 1
)
34
.7
34
.7
36
.2
35
.6
37
.3
37
.5
38
.3
37
.9
0.
3
0.
2
0.
2
0.
6
0.
8
0.
6
1.
0
0.
8
-
0.
2
-
-
-
0.
2
-
0.
6
3.
4
3.
8
3.
0
3.
3
3.
4
3.
6
4.
2
3.
6
N
L 
 
1.
3
1.
3
1.
3
1.
3
1.
3
1.
4
1.
4
1.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
2.
3
2.
3
2.
2
2.
2
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
AT
 
1.
5
1.
6
1.
7
1.
9
2.
0
2.
2
2.
2
2.
3
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
1.
0
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
6.
7
6.
7
6.
7
6.
5
6.
6
6.
6
6.
5
6.
6
PT
 1
)
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
3
0.
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
3
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
1.
8
2.
0
2.
3
2.
2
2.
7
2.
7
2.
9
2.
8
FI
 
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
4
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
1.
4
1.
4
1.
4
1.
5
1.
6
1.
7
1.
8
1.
9
SE
 
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
1
2.
0
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
6
0.
6
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
3.
0
3.
0
2.
9
2.
9
3.
1
3.
2
3.
5
4.
1
U
K 
1)
1.
6
1.
6
1.
7
1.
6
1.
6
1.
7
1.
7
1.
7
0.
2
0.
3
0.
5
0.
8
1.
2
1.
2
1.
2
1.
5
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
3.
0
3.
2
3.
4
3.
7
3.
9
4.
2
4.
0
3.
7
EU
-1
5 
1.
5
1.
5
1.
6
1.
7
1.
7
1.
7
1.
7
1.
8
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
6
0.
6
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
5
0.
6
0.
6
0.
7
3.
7
4.
0
4.
1
4.
2
4.
4
4.
5
4.
6
4.
7
CZ
 
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
3
0.
3
0.
5
0.
5
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
0.
9
0.
9
0.
8
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
1.
2
1.
2
1.
6
1.
8
2.
1
2.
5
2.
7
2.
6
EE
 1
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
18
.3
18
.1
16
.2
15
.6
16
.1
16
.3
16
.0
15
.0
CY
 1
)
:
5.
8
5.
6
5.
9
5.
4
6.
4
5.
8
6.
3
:
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
3
0.
5
0.
5
0.
7
:
0.
5
0.
7
0.
7
1.
6
2.
0
3.
2
4.
1
:
4.
8
4.
7
4.
8
5.
7
6.
2
6.
0
6.
5
LV
 
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
22
.0
20
.9
19
.7
18
.7
17
.9
17
.5
17
.0
16
.0
LT
 
:
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
:
:
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
:
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
9
0.
9
1.
1
1.
2
1.
2
1.
0
0.
8
HU
 
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
6
0.
7
0.
7
0.
7
0.
7
0.
7
0.
7
0.
8
0.
6
0.
6
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
8
0.
8
1.
2
M
T 
1)
1.
5
1.
3
0.
9
0.
9
1.
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
4
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
8
1.
3
1.
5
1.
4
0.
9
1.
2
1.
9
1.
6
PL
 1
)
:
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
:
-
-
-
-
-
0.
0
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
SI
 
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
3
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
:
2.
2
2.
1
2.
3
2.
5
3.
2
3.
3
3.
8
5.
0
SK
 
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
2
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
3
0.
4
0.
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
3
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
4
0.
6
EU
-1
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
4
1.
5
1.
5
1.
6
1.
6
1.
6
BG
 1
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
1
RO
 1
)
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
0.
0
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
0
-
-
EU
-2
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
:
:
EU
-2
7
1.
2
1.
2
1.
3
1.
3
1.
4
1.
4
1.
4
1.
4
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
5
0.
2
0.
2
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
5
0.
6
3.
1
3.
4
3.
5
3.
5
3.
7
3.
8
3.
9
3.
9
So
u
rc
es
: E
ur
os
ta
t 
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
st
at
is
tic
s 
(m
ig
r_
po
p1
ct
z)
, 
su
pp
le
m
en
te
d 
by
 E
ur
os
ta
t 
EU
 L
FS
, 
na
tio
na
l d
at
a 
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
D
G
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
es
tim
at
es
 (
se
e 
no
te
s 
be
lo
w
).
 “
:”
 f
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
 “
-”
 f
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 r
el
ia
bl
e.
 N
ot
e:
 C
ho
ic
e 
of
 d
at
a 
so
ur
ce
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
fo
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
 —
 F
or
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
st
oc
k 
da
ta
 f
ro
m
 m
ig
ra
tio
n 
st
at
is
tic
s:
 e
nd
 o
f 
ye
ar
 d
at
a 
(1
 J
an
ua
ry
 o
f 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
ye
ar
), 
fo
r 
LF
S:
 4
th
 q
ua
rt
er
 d
at
a.
 —
 F
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 f
ul
ly
 c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
em
be
r 
St
at
es
 d
ue
 t
o 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t 
so
ur
ce
s.
 F
or
 t
hi
s 
re
as
on
 E
U
 t
ot
al
s 
an
d 
su
b-
to
ta
ls
 (w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e 
es
tim
at
es
 a
ls
o 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 s
ho
w
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
) 
ar
e 
on
ly
 o
f 
an
 in
di
ca
tiv
e 
na
tu
re
—
 D
at
a 
fr
om
 t
he
 L
FS
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 t
re
at
ed
 w
ith
 s
om
e 
ca
ut
io
n 
du
e 
to
 li
m
ita
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
su
rv
ey
 w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 f
or
ei
gn
 p
op
ul
at
io
ns
, 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
ve
ry
 r
ec
en
t 
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
an
d 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
, 
re
la
tiv
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
no
n-
re
sp
on
se
 a
nd
 s
m
al
l s
am
pl
e 
si
ze
s.
 —
 F
ig
ur
es
 f
or
 2
01
0 
ar
e 
D
G
 E
M
PL
 e
st
im
at
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
EU
 L
FS
. 
1)
 E
U
 L
FS
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 d
at
a,
 4
th
 q
ua
rt
er
. 
2)
 E
U
 L
FS
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 d
at
a 
(4
th
 q
ua
rt
er
) 
ex
ce
pt
 f
or
 
20
03
-2
00
5:
 L
FS
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 C
SO
. 
EmploymEnt and Social dEvElopmEntS in EuropE 2011
250
Ta
bl
e 
4:
 N
um
be
r 
of
 f
or
ei
gn
 n
at
io
na
ls
 r
es
id
en
t 
in
 t
he
 E
U
-2
7 
by
 b
ro
ad
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
ci
ti
ze
ns
hi
p,
 2
00
3-
20
10
 (i
n 
1 
00
0)
Ho
st
 
co
un
tr
y
Re
si
de
nt
 fo
re
ig
n 
na
tio
na
ls
 fr
om
…
EU
-1
5 
M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
EU
-1
0 
M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
EU
-2
 M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
N
on
-E
U
-2
7 
co
un
tr
ie
s
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
1 
00
0 
pe
rs
on
s
BE
 1
)
49
4
53
9
54
5
52
3
53
3
56
2
56
7
56
2
13
15
17
19
23
40
49
55
4
6
10
16
19
19
27
41
22
0
26
0
25
0
25
4
30
3
30
8
30
6
28
9
DK
 
56
57
59
63
68
73
75
85
10
11
13
16
22
30
33
30
2
2
2
2
3
5
7
14
20
3
19
8
19
6
19
7
20
5
21
1
21
4
23
9
DE
 
1 
85
0
1 
66
0
1 
65
4
1 
78
3
1 
77
9
1 
76
1
1 
74
6
1 
74
2
48
2
44
0
48
3
56
4
59
6
60
5
61
6
60
5
13
3
11
3
11
2
12
0
14
1
15
8
17
8
20
6
4 
86
1
5 
07
6
5 
03
2
4 
78
9
4 
74
0
4 
65
5
4 
58
5
4 
54
0
IE
 2
)
12
9
13
0
14
8
15
3
15
9
16
9
14
9
12
3
33
47
10
0
16
1
21
1
21
1
18
3
18
0
-
-
-
13
18
18
19
14
10
9
11
7
11
7
13
2
14
6
15
1
13
7
12
4
EL
 1
)
19
24
27
28
26
27
27
29
25
32
29
29
34
37
27
23
32
41
47
48
56
70
88
82
39
6
43
6
45
0
46
1
52
2
59
7
69
5
67
3
ES
 
53
8
64
4
76
5
98
2
1 
09
6
1 
17
3
1 
19
7
1 
36
1
43
56
71
10
3
12
7
13
7
14
0
13
7
25
4
37
1
49
0
66
4
89
0
96
4
99
1
1 
00
6
1 
93
7
2 
30
1
2 
67
6
2 
85
7
3 
14
9
3 
37
7
3 
33
6
3 
20
5
FR
 1
)
1 
03
4
1 
07
6
96
0
1 
06
2
1 
12
8
1 
10
2
1 
12
2
1 
14
7
40
45
39
42
42
41
46
77
21
14
14
30
38
61
39
87
1 
67
3
1 
70
2
1 
74
7
1 
71
1
1 
91
2
1 
86
7
1 
99
7
2 
10
8
 IT
 
13
4
13
8
14
3
14
9
15
8
16
5
16
9
18
3
56
69
81
95
11
8
13
0
13
8
15
3
18
9
26
4
31
5
36
2
65
9
83
7
93
4
1 
06
9
1 
61
1
1 
93
1
2 
13
2
2 
33
3
2 
49
8
2 
76
0
2 
99
4
3 
36
6
LU
 1
)
15
4
15
5
16
3
16
3
17
3
17
5
18
5
18
6
1
1
1
3
4
3
5
4
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
3
15
17
14
15
16
17
20
18
N
L 
 
21
1
21
0
21
0
21
1
21
5
22
6
23
3
18
5
13
18
23
29
37
48
59
81
4
5
5
5
11
16
19
20
37
1
36
9
36
1
35
3
34
4
34
7
34
1
35
8
AT
 
12
2
13
2
14
3
15
4
16
7
18
1
18
7
19
7
60
68
75
81
87
94
97
10
5
26
28
28
28
35
41
45
46
54
6
54
7
54
9
54
2
54
5
54
7
54
8
55
7
PT
 1
)
38
45
37
40
41
43
37
31
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10
8
13
14
27
15
25
20
18
5
21
3
24
1
23
6
28
3
28
8
30
8
29
6
FI
 
19
19
20
21
22
23
23
22
16
17
18
21
24
28
31
39
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
72
72
75
79
86
90
99
10
1
SE
 
18
6
18
6
18
6
18
8
19
2
19
6
19
7
18
7
21
23
27
34
43
51
58
61
3
3
3
3
6
9
11
17
26
6
26
9
26
4
26
7
28
4
29
2
32
5
38
5
U
K 
1)
95
1
92
9
1 
00
2
96
2
95
7
1 
00
7
1 
04
4
1 
01
6
11
5
17
1
29
3
50
3
69
1
72
8
72
0
94
5
13
21
29
35
40
74
90
12
4
1 
74
4
1 
91
4
2 
01
4
2 
19
1
2 
35
8
2 
52
1
2 
45
8
2 
26
2
EU
-1
5 
5 
93
6
5 
94
3
6 
06
1
6 
48
1
6 
71
4
6 
88
1
6 
95
8
7 
05
6
92
9
1 
01
2
1 
27
2
1 
70
1
2 
06
1
2 
18
5
2 
20
3
2 
49
8
69
3
87
7
1 
07
0
1 
34
4
1 
94
5
2 
29
0
2 
47
6
2 
74
9
14
 2
08
15
 4
22
16
 1
17
16
 4
14
17
 3
91
18
 0
28
18
 3
61
18
 5
21
CZ
 
13
15
19
24
33
37
32
31
50
51
68
78
90
99
94
81
6
6
7
7
8
10
10
6
12
6
12
2
16
4
18
6
21
6
26
2
28
7
26
9
EE
 1
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
24
6
24
4
21
7
20
9
21
6
21
8
21
4
20
1
CY
 1
)
:
42
41
44
41
49
45
48
:
1
2
3
2
4
4
6
:
4
5
5
13
15
25
31
:
35
35
35
43
47
46
50
LV
 
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
51
1
48
2
45
1
42
7
40
8
39
5
38
2
35
7
LT
 
:
1
1
1
1
1
1
:
:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
:
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
:
31
31
37
40
39
35
28
HU
 
12
10
18
25
25
31
34
42
5
4
7
8
8
12
11
19
57
69
67
68
67
68
74
80
56
62
64
67
76
77
81
11
5
M
T 
1)
6
5
4
4
4
5
5
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
5
6
6
4
5
8
7
PL
 1
)
:
10
17
12
10
7
10
11
:
-
-
-
-
-
6
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
16
20
49
37
24
21
31
SI
 
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
5
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
:
43
43
46
51
65
66
78
10
3
SK
 
3
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
9
8
9
11
13
15
19
23
3
1
1
1
4
6
7
7
15
10
11
13
15
20
24
35
EU
-1
0
37
88
10
9
12
1
13
0
14
6
14
5
16
0
68
68
93
10
9
12
2
14
1
14
1
13
8
66
81
81
82
93
10
1
11
8
12
5
1 
00
0
1 
05
0
1 
04
6
1 
08
0
1 
11
9
1 
15
2
1 
17
6
1 
19
5
BG
 1
)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10
9
10
8
9
10
13
6
RO
 1
)
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
:
10
15
24
25
11
-
-
EU
-2
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
19
25
32
34
21
:
:
EU
-2
7
5 
97
3
6 
03
0
6 
17
0
6 
60
2
6 
84
3
7 
02
7
7 
10
3
7 
21
7
99
7
1 
08
1
1 
36
5
1 
81
0
2 
18
3
2 
32
6
2 
34
4
2 
63
6
75
9
95
8
1 
15
0
1 
42
6
2 
03
9
2 
39
2
2 
59
4
2 
87
4
15
 2
18
16
 4
91
17
 1
87
17
 5
26
18
 5
44
19
 2
00
19
 5
54
19
 7
18
So
u
rc
es
: E
ur
os
ta
t 
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
st
at
is
tic
s 
(m
ig
r_
po
p1
ct
z)
, 
su
pp
le
m
en
te
d 
by
 E
ur
os
ta
t 
EU
 L
FS
, 
na
tio
na
l d
at
a 
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
D
G
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
es
tim
at
es
 (
se
e 
no
te
s 
be
lo
w
).
 “
:”
 f
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
 “
-”
 f
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 r
el
ia
bl
e.
 N
ot
e:
 C
ho
ic
e 
of
 d
at
a 
so
ur
ce
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
fo
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
 —
 F
or
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
st
oc
k 
da
ta
 f
ro
m
 m
ig
ra
tio
n 
st
at
is
tic
s:
 e
nd
 o
f 
ye
ar
 d
at
a 
(1
 J
an
ua
ry
 o
f 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 y
ea
r)
, f
or
 L
FS
: 
4t
h 
qu
ar
te
r 
da
ta
. 
—
 F
ig
ur
es
 n
ot
 f
ul
ly
 c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
em
be
r 
St
at
es
 d
ue
 t
o 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t 
so
ur
ce
s.
 F
or
 t
hi
s 
re
as
on
 E
U
 t
ot
al
s 
an
d 
su
b-
to
ta
ls
 (
w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e 
es
tim
at
es
 a
ls
o 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 s
ho
w
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
) 
ar
e 
on
ly
 
of
 a
n 
in
di
ca
tiv
e 
na
tu
re
—
 D
at
a 
fr
om
 t
he
 L
FS
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 t
re
at
ed
 w
ith
 s
om
e 
ca
ut
io
n 
du
e 
to
 li
m
ita
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
su
rv
ey
 w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 f
or
ei
gn
 p
op
ul
at
io
ns
, i
n 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
ve
ry
 r
ec
en
t 
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
an
d 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
, r
el
at
iv
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
no
n-
re
sp
on
se
 a
nd
 s
m
al
l s
am
pl
e 
si
ze
s.
 —
 F
ig
ur
es
 f
or
 2
01
0 
ar
e 
D
G
 E
M
PL
 e
st
im
at
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
EU
 L
FS
. 1
) E
U
 L
FS
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 d
at
a,
 4
th
 q
ua
rt
er
. 2
) E
U
 L
FS
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 d
at
a 
(4
th
 q
ua
rt
er
) e
xc
ep
t 
fo
r 
20
03
-2
00
5:
 L
FS
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 C
SO
. 
Chapter 6  Intra-EU labour mobility and the impact of enlargement
251
2.2.2. Recently arrived 
working-age movers
As well as looking at the overall 
‘stocks’ of foreign citizens it is also 
interesting, in order to measure the 
impact of recent enlargements, to 
analyse the share of recently arrived 
persons in the total working-age 
population(5). This has been done 
with respect to foreign nationals 
who arrived within the past seven 
years, i.e. since the 2004 enlarge-
ment(6) (see Chart 1). Those individu-
als are referred as ‘recent intra-EU 
movers’ in this chapter. 
(5) From a labour market perspective, it is 
indeed more relevant to focus on the 
working-age population (15-64) and EU 
LFS data allow for such breakdown; 
whereas Eurostat migration statistics, 
the main source in Table 3 and 4, are not 
broken down by age class for all Member 
States (see also Annex 1). 
(6) In order to fully cover EU movers hav-
ing arrived since the accession of EU-10 
Member States took place (on 1 May 
2004), it is safer to consider, for the 
reference year 2010, a duration of resi-
dence of ‘seven years and less’ rather 
than ‘six years and less’ (which would run 
the risk to exclude part of the flows that 
took place during 2004).
The following observations can be 
made:
•	 Recently arrived foreign nationals 
represent more than 10 % of the 
working-age population in Cyprus 
and Luxembourg, between 5-10 % 
in Ireland, Spain, and the UK and 
around 4 % in Austria, Belgium, 
and Sweden.
•	 In a majority of Member States, the 
number of recent arrivals from non-
EU countries exceeds the  number 
Chart 1: Working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less by Member State,  
2010 (in % of total resident working-age population)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
SKHULVEESICZNLFIFRPTDEELDKITSEBEATUKESIELUCY
Non-EU-27
EU-2
EU-10
EU-15
7.1 1.8 2.1 4.9 2.7 2.2 1.8 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.1 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
4.3 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.8 0.9 4.8 0.1 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
2.6 10.0 1.4 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2
%
 o
f r
es
id
en
t w
or
ki
ng
-a
ge
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS, annual data.
Note: Numbers for missing data and countries too small to be reliable. Limited reliability for EU-15 results for EL and EE; EU-2 results for LU; and non-EU-27 results 
for EE and SK.
Table 5: Breakdown by citizenship of recent intra-EU movers in the EU Member 
States receiving the highest inflows, 2010 (%)
UK ES IT DE FR IE BE AT EU-27
1 PL 40 RO 54 RO 81 PL 32 PT 23 PL 46 FR 26 DE 43 RO 27
2 LT 7 UK 10 PL 7 NL 8 UK 14 LT 13 NL 17 RO 15 PL 21
3 RO 6 BG 9 BG 4 RO 8 RO 14 UK 12 PL 12 PL 12 DE 5
4 FR 5 IT 7 DE 1 FR 7 BE 11 LV 6 IT 10 SK 8 BG 5
5 PT 4 PT 6 FR 1 AT 7 PL 8 SK 4 RO 9 HU 5 FR 5
6 DE 4 DE 4 UK 1 IT 6 DE 8 RO 3 DE 5 IT 4 UK 5
7 IE 4 PL 3 ES 1 BG 6 NL 7 DE 2 BG 4 BG 3 PT 4
8 LV 4 FR 3 NL 1 HU 3 ES 4 FR 2 ES 3 NL 2 IT 4
9 IT 4 NL 2 CZ 0 UK 3 IT 4 HU 2 UK 3 UK 2 NL 3
10 HU 3 BE 1 SK 0 EL 3 BG 2 ES 2 PT 3 CZ 1 LT 3
Other EU 19 3 2 19 5 7 8 5 18
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS, annual data.
Table 6: Main receiving countries of largest groups of recent intra-EU movers, 2010 (%)
Citizenship of recent 
intra-EU movers By main EU destination country (%) 
RO IT 41 ES 37 UK 6
PL UK 51 DE 18 IE 11
DE AT 26 UK 21 ES 13
BG ES 32 UK 15 DE 13
FR UK 27 BE 27 DE 16
UK ES 38 FR 18 IE 14
PT FR 32 UK 27 ES 25
IT ES 31 UK 24 DE 17
NL DE 29 BE 24 UK 15
LT UK 59 IE 22 DE 6
Other EU citizens UK 40 DE 19 FR 7
All recent intra-EU movers UK 27 ES 18 IT 13
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS, annual data
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of newcomers from other Mem-
ber States, with the exception of 
Luxembourg and Belgium (due to 
inflows of EU-15 nationals),  Ireland 
(a large receiver of EU-10 citizens), 
and Cyprus (where the number of 
EU-2 nationals increased rapidly in 
the last few years).
•	Recently arrived working-age 
citizens from EU-10 countries 
represent a significant share of 
the working-age population in 
 Ireland (close to 5 %), followed by 
UK (1.5 %), and between 0.5-1 % 
in Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Aus-
tria. In the other countries, the 
share represented by recent-
ly arrived EU-10  working-age 
nationals is small.
•	Recently arrived EU-2 nation-
als represent a significant share 
of the working-age population 
only in Cyprus (4.3 %) and to a 
certain extent in Spain (1.4 %) 
and Italy (1.1 %) – though the 
shares of recently arrived non-
EU nationals are much high-
er (respectively 7.1 %, 4.9 %, 
and 1.8 %).
At the aggregate level, Romani-
ans (27 %) and Poles (21 %) consti-
tute almost half of all recent intra-
EU movers, followed by German, 
 Bulgarian, French and UK citizens, 
each accounting for around 5 % of 
the total (see Table 5, last column). 
Portuguese, Italian, Dutch, and 
 Lithuanian citizens represent around 
3-4 % of the total. This breakdown 
varies considerably between receiv-
ing countries, Poles constituting the 
largest group in the UK, Germany, 
and Ireland, while Romanians are 
by far the most important in Spain 
(54 %) and Italy (81 %).
The three main receiving countries 
of recent intra-EU movers have been 
the UK (27 %), Spain (18 %), and Italy 
(13 %); see Table 6 (last row). The UK 
has also been the main destination 
for Polish, French, and Lithuanian 
recent working-age movers, and the 
second one for German, Bulgarian, 
Portuguese, and Italian. Italy and 
Spain have mainly been the major 
destinations for Romanian working-
age movers (almost 80 % of them 
choosing one of these two countries).
2.3. The sending 
countries’ perspective
The issue of intra-EU labour mobil-
ity also needs to be considered 
from the point of view of the send-
ing countries. In the case of the 
EU-10 and EU-2 Member States, 
the population outflows since 
accession (and even in the period 
before) constitute an important loss 
of population which has sparked 
concern about their growth poten-
tial, demographic balance, public 
finances, and the risk of a brain 
drain (discussed in Section 5).
Using the population stock estimates 
presented in Table 4, it appears that 
the net outflows(7) from EU-10 coun-
tries to the EU-15 were close to 1.6 
million over the period 2003-2010, 
representing 2.1 % of the popula-
tion of EU-10 countries (measured in 
2003). The situation of EU-2 countries 
is far more striking, with net outflows 
to the EU-25 around 2.1 million over 
the same period, and  representing 
over 7 % of their population.
Holland et al., 2011, have estimat-
ed cumulated net outflows for each 
individual EU-8 and EU-2 countries 
(see Table 7) for the period 2004-09. 
The largest rate of net outflows are 
found in Romania (7.3 %), followed 
by Lithuania (4.2 %), and Bulgaria 
(3.4 %). Latvia, Poland, and Esto-
nia also registered significant out-
flows relative to their population. 
There is a clear correlation between 
these ‘mobility rates’ of the sending 
countries and their relative income 
level which is discussed in Section 3 
( drivers of mobility). 
From a labour market perspective, 
it is useful to focus on mobility 
rates calculated among the work-
ing-age population (15-64) using 
the Labour force survey data. 
Mobility rates by sending coun-
try (defined as the working-age 
persons living in another Member 
State as a share of the population 
of country of citizenship) show 
important differences with high-
mobility countries and low-mobil-
ity countries (see Chart 2).  Putting 
(7) The figures presented here correspond 
to the net growth of the stock of EU-10 
and EU-2 nationals living in EU-15 Mem-
ber States. They are not strictly speaking 
‘net outflows’ since they include natural 
evolution (births, deaths) of the popula-
tion of EU-10 and EU-2 nationals living in 
EU-15 Member States. However, they are 
referred as ‘net outflows’ in this chap-
ter for sake of simplification. Since the 
share of individuals below 15 or above 
64 in the population of EU-10 and EU-2 
nationals living in EU-15 Member States 
is limited, the net growth of the stock of 
EU-10 and EU-2 nationals living in EU-15 
Member States can be considered as a 
good proxy of the ‘net outflows’ from 
EU-10 and EU-2 Member States to EU-15. 
The same reasoning holds for so-called 
‘net inflows’ to the EU-15.
Table 7: Population net outflows to the EU-15, 2004-2009 and share in domestic 
population (in %)
Countries Net outflows in thousand Share in 2004 domestic population (in %)
CZ 31 0.3
EE 31 2.3
LV 58 2.5
LT 143 4.2
HU 60 0.6
PL 917 2.4
SI 7 0.3
SK 100 1.9
EU-8 1 346 1.8
BG 266 3.4
RO 1 587 7.3
EU-2 1 852 6.3
Source: Holland et al. (2011). Note: In this study, the estimates are based on Eurostat migration statistics 
completed with other sources when necessary. 
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aside the Portuguese and Irish 
migration (which occurred towards 
other EU-15 countries and, for the 
most part, a long time ago), the 
most mobile citizens come from 
EU-2 and EU-10 countries:
•	 Romanians have by far the highest 
mobility rate (more than 11 %), 
even when considering only the 
last seven years (more than 6 %);
•	 Lithuania, Latvia, and Bulgaria 
have also seen more than 5 % 
of their working-age population 
move to another EU Member State;
•	 Poland’s mobility rate is lower 
(4.4 %) but remarkable considering 
its large population and compared 
to the other large EU countries 
which have some of the lowest 
rates of mobility.
The mobility rates of working age 
persons presented here generally 
match the picture drawn from popu-
lation statistics, which includes all 
age groups.
Finally, as far as EU-2 intra-EU mov-
ers are concerned, it should be noted 
that 80 % of them are Romanians 
and 20 % Bulgarians, reflecting the 
differences in the population size 
of the origin countries but also the 
greater tendency for Romanians 
(than Bulgarians) to move to other 
countries. 
2.4. Impact of 
enlargement on 
mobility flows
As shown above, the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements have led to signifi-
cant increases in geographical labour 
mobility within the EU. It is easy to 
assume that these flows are essentially 
due to the accession of the EU-10 and 
EU-2 countries to the EU and the 
resulting employment opportunities in 
the EU-15 countries (depending on the 
transitional arrangements in place). 
However, it is worth noting that there 
was a pre-existing stock of EU-10 and 
EU-2 citizens in each of the EU-15 
economies prior to the enlargements; 
that those stocks had been rising over 
time; and that part of the inflows since 
2004 would have happened even in 
the absence of freer access to EU-15 
labour  markets following accession.
In order to quantify the macro-economic 
impact of the population movements 
directly related to the EU enlargements, 
Holland et al. (2011) estimated the pop-
ulation flows that might have occurred 
in the absence of the enlargements. This 
‘counter-factual scenario’ is based on the 
assumption that the emigration from 
the EU-8/EU-2 would have continued at 
the same rate as in the preceding years(8). 
(8) For more details on the methodology used 
and the results by individual country, see 
Holland et al. (2011), Section 3.5 “Quanti-
fying the impact of the EU enlargements”. 
The same method had been used 
before for the counter-factual analy-
sis reported by Baas, Brucker, Haupt-
mann, and Jahn (2007) and also by 
Barrell et al. (2009). Assuming that 
any additional migration since acces-
sion (over and above the average 
emigration rate in the five years prior 
to accession) is attributable to the 
accession process itself, the results 
suggest that about 75 % of the popu-
lation flows from the EU-8 since 2004 
and 50 % of the flows since 2007 in 
the case of EU-2 can be attributed to 
accession to the EU. 
The impacts calculated by Holland et 
al. (2011) across both sending and 
receiving countries show major differ-
ences between countries: for instance, 
only 10 % of the population flows 
from EU-10 countries to Germany in 
the period 2004-2009 can be attrib-
uted to the enlargement, compared to 
close to 90 % in the UK, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands. As for EU-2 nationals, 
Holland et al. (2011) concluded that 
there was no impact of the 2007 acces-
sion on population flows to France 
or Germany while more than 75 % 
of flows from the EU-2 to Sweden, 
the Netherlands, and Denmark in the 
period 2007-2009 can be attributed 
to the 2007 enlargement. These vari-
ations are partly explained by dif-
ferences in the degree of ‘openness’ 
of their labour markets to workers 
from EU-10 and EU-2 countries (see 
Box 2 on the impact of the  transitional 
 arrangements on mobility flows). 
In addition to the fact that the 
impact of enlargement on mobility 
flows has been less substantial that 
one would expect, the data source 
used to monitor post-accession 
mobility (i.e. mainly: population sta-
tistics) can give a somewhat biased 
picture of the situation, notably in 
terms of the timing of the ‘migra-
tion’. Indeed, it appears, for sev-
eral countries that the enlargement 
(or the end of restrictions regard-
ing employment) led to a regularisa-
tion of foreign citizens from EU-10 
or EU-2 citizens already living in 
the country before, and therefore a 
delayed inclusion in the population 
Chart 2: Mobility rates by sending country – mobile EU citizens living in another 
EU Member State, by years of residence (age group 15-64, 2010, in %  
of working-age population of country of citizenship)
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS, annual data 
Note: figures do not include citizens who were born in another Member State and continue living there. 
Figures for LU, MT, and SI are too small to be reliable.
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statistics. For instance, an analysis of 
recent data concerning EU-2 nation-
als living in Spain (Holland et al., 
2011(9)) indicates that the apparent 
migration wave of 2007 did not cor-
respond entirely to ‘new’ inflows and 
reflected, at least partly, a regularisa-
tion of migrants already living in the 
country before  accession. 
This seems to be confirmed by EU-LFS 
data concerning duration of residence 
in the country of recent EU movers 
(see Charts 3 and 4), especially for 
EU-2 movers: 
•	 As far as EU-10 nationals living in 
another Member State are con-
cerned, around two-thirds arrived 
in the destination country after 
the 2004 enlargement (i.e. around 
seven years before 2010) with this 
percentage rising to nearly 80 % in 
Sweden and Belgium, and around 
90 % in Ireland and the UK. On 
the other hand, this percentage 
is much lower in Italy, Spain, Ger-
many, Austria, and France where 
a significant share (around 60 %) 
of EU-10 nationals had already 
arrived before the 2004 accession;
•	 The situation of EU-2 nationals liv-
ing abroad is different in that, on 
average, less than 30 % of them 
arrived after the 2007 enlarge-
ment, and more than 40 % were 
already in the destination country 
before 2004. The situation in the 
(9) See in particular the case study on Spain 
by Ana Rincon-Aznar. 
two main receiving countries is 
particularly striking: almost 80 % 
of the working-age EU-2 citizens 
living in Spain and Italy had arrived 
before the 2007 accession.
One should, however, be cautious 
in the interpretation of this data 
since the low proportion of recent 
arrivals among EU movers may also 
reflect the fact that the sample of 
the EU LFS is more likely to cover 
persons who have been living in the 
country for some time (at least one 
year, see Annex 1). 
2.5. Evolution of the 
mobility flows and 
stock in period of 
recession
Significant numbers of foreign citi-
zens entered the EU-15 Member 
States in the period 2004-2007 (end 
Chart 3: Distribution of working-age (15-64) EU-10 citizens by 
duration of residence in main receiving countries, 2010
Chart 4: Distribution of working-age (15-64) EU-2 citizens by 
duration of residence in main receiving countries, 2010
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Table 8: Annual net growth of stock of foreigners in the EU-15 countries, by group 
of citizenship (in thousands)
Citizens from : 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-15 7 118 420 233 167 77 99
EU-10 84 260 429 360 124 18 295
EU-2 184 193 274 601 345 186 273
Non-EU-27 countries 1 214 695 297 977 636 333 160
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat migration statistics and EU LFS. For more details on the 
source, please see Tables 3 and 4.
Table 9: Impact of recession on net population flows to EU-15 countries  
(in the period 2008-2009)
EU-8 and EU-2 Member States Impact on net migration to EU-15 (in thousand) Impact (in %)
Czech Republic -43.6 -125
Estonia -1.8 -12
Hungary -23.1 -52
Lithuania -20.2 -44
Latvia 10.4 85
Poland -395.1 -70
Slovenia -0.5 -18
Slovakia -64.1 -81
EU-8 -538 -67
Bulgaria -23.2 -18
Romania -566.8 -54
EU-2 -590 -50
Source: Holland et al. (2011). 
Note: In this study, the impact of the recession was calculated as the difference between actual net inflows 
that occurred and the net inflows that would have occurred if the average emigration rate observed during 
2007 had maintained during 2008-2009.
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2003 to end 2007), with on average 
an annual net growth of 300 000 
each from EU-10 and EU-2 Member 
States, and close to 800 000 from 
non-EU countries (Table 8). Howev-
er, this trend has changed radically 
since 2008, the year that marked 
the start of the financial economic 
crisis that developed into a global 
recession in 2009. Indeed the lower 
demand for workers has resulted 
in a decrease of intra-EU labour 
mobility but also of international 
migration, as also pointed out by 
the OECD (2011). 
In the face of declining employment 
opportunities, as a result of the eco-
nomic recession, foreign workers had 
two options if they lost their jobs: to 
leave the host country, or to stay (Koe-
hler et al., 2010). This section analyses 
the evolution of labour mobility dur-
ing the recession, while Section 4.2 
analyses outcomes of intra-EU mobile 
workers in the recent period and com-
pares it to 2007, thereby seeking to 
examine the impact of the recession 
on the employment situation of those 
who stayed. 
Using data on the population stock 
living in EU-15 Member States by 
group of citizenship, it appears that 
the net emigration of all groups of 
foreigners slowed sharply in 2008 and 
even more so in 2009 (see Table 8). 
This was particularly true with respect 
to EU-10 nationals: their net annual 
growth declined from 360 000 in 2007 
to 124 000 in 2008 and 18 000 in 2009 
(before recovering in 2010, at close 
to 300 000(10)). This global figure for 
EU-15 countries hides, moreover, a 
very heterogeneous evolution among 
EU-15 countries (see Table 3 and 4) 
with a net decline in the number 
of EU-10 nationals (reflecting higher 
outflows than inflows) in the UK, 
Ireland, and Greece in 2009, contrast-
ing with constant growth in 2008 and 
2009 in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Sweden, and Germany. 
As far as EU-2 nationals are con-
cerned, mobility has been more 
resilient, with the annual average 
net growth declining from around 
600 000 in 2007 to 345 000 in 2008 
and staying at a relatively high level 
in 2009 (close to 190 000) before 
recovering in 2010 (273 000). 
The reduction in intra-EU labour 
mobility in the years 2008-2009 com-
pared to previous years (and espe-
cially 2007), may reflect the end of a 
pent-up demand for migration, espe-
cially from EU-8 Member States, after 
4-5 years of EU membership (Holland 
et al. (2011)). However, there is clear 
evidence that the slowdown is at 
least partly explained by the severity 
of the crisis and its impact on EU-15 
labour markets: 
•	 the recovery in the net inflows of 
EU foreigners during 2010 sug-
gests that the improvement of the 
(10) As far as EU-10 nationals are concerned, 
75 % of the net growth recorded in 2010 
was accounted for by entries to the UK, 
with negative trends in several other 
Member States (Greece, Denmark, Ire-
land, Germany).
economic conditions has led to 
renewed inflows from both EU-10 
and EU-2 countries;
•	 the receiving countries where the 
evolution of the number of EU-12 
nationals has been less favour-
able are generally those where 
the labour market has been 
strongly affected by the economic 
 recession(11);
•	 finally, the negative effect of 
the economic recession was not 
restricted to intra-EU mobility and 
seems to have also been strong 
on migration from third country 
nationals, with annual net growth 
to the EU-15 Member States falling 
from around 800 000 on average 
in 2004-2007 to less than 500 000 
in 2008-09, and around 160 000 
 during 2010(12). 
(11) Holland et al. (2011) have estimated 
the impact of developments of GDP 
per capita and unemployment rates in 
the different EU-15 economies on the 
distribution of mobile workers from the 
EU-8 and EU-2 economies. For instance, 
the particularly serious worsening of 
the Spanish economy and labour mar-
ket is seen to account for about half of 
the decline in that country’s share of 
EU-8 and EU-2 foreign nationals living in 
EU-15 between 2007 and 2009. For more 
details on the methodology used and the 
results by individual country, see Holland 
et al. (2011), Section 3.6 “Estimates of 
the impact of transitional arrangements 
on migration”. 
(12) This overall evolution hides differences 
between EU-15 countries, however, with 
a decline of the stock of third-country 
nationals since 2008 (reflecting high lev-
els of outflows and declining inflows) in 
Spain, UK, and Ireland, contrasting with 
sustained growth in Italy.
Chart 5: Yearly evolution of the global stock  
of EU-10 working-age (15-64) nationals, in the main receiving 
countries (in thousands)
Chart 6: Yearly evolution of the global stock  
of EU-2 working-age (15-64) nationals, in the main receiving 
countries (in thousands)
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Comparing the migration rates in 2008-
2009 to 2007, Holland et al. (2011) 
estimated that net inflows from the 
EU-8 to the EU-15 Member States in 
2008 and 2009 were 67 per cent lower 
than they might have been in the 
absence of the global recession, while 
flows from the EU-2 were reduced by 
about 50 per cent (see Table 9). Latvia 
is an exception, however, since out-
flows appear to have been higher than 
would otherwise have been expected 
- which may be a reflection of the very 
sharp downturn in that country, where 
GDP declined by 18 per cent in 2009 
leading to an unemployment rate of 
nearly 20 % at the end of 2009.
Data with respect to the working-age 
population may better depict the evo-
lution of labour mobility than data 
concerning the overall population, 
which includes children as well as older 
people. As far as receiving countries are 
concerned, EU LFS data on the evolu-
tion of the number of EU-10 work-
ing-age (15-64) nationals confirm (see 
Chart 5) the decline of net inflows in 
2008 and especially in 2009, with a 
negative net evolution (higher out-
flows than inflows) recorded in the UK 
and Ireland. 2010 exhibits a very strong 
recovery of the number of EU-10 work-
ing-age nationals in the UK and in the 
category ‘other EU-15 countries’, while 
it continued to decrease in Ireland.
For EU-2 nationals (see Chart 6) the 
decline in intra-EU mobility has been 
concentrated in Spain, with a sharp 
decrease of the net inflows in 2009 
and a negative evolution in 2010. 
In recent years, most of the increase 
in the stock of working age EU-2 
nationals has been towards Italy. 
Nevertheless the global decline since 
2008 in labour mobility from EU-2 to 
EU-15 Member States has been less 
pronounced than for EU-10 nation-
als(13). This can be explained by three 
(13) This has led to a shift in the composi-
tion of labour flows involving relatively 
more EU-2 workers, as already foreseen 
by Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann 
in 2009, with the share of EU-2 workers 
among all EU-12 citizens living in the 
EU-15 countries having increased from 
48.5 % at the end of 2007 to 52.5 % at 
the end of 2010.
factors: firstly, the enlargement to 
the EU-2 countries took place more 
recently and is still impacting on 
workers mobility. Secondly, Bulgaria 
and Romania have been particularly 
adversely affected by the economic 
recession, thereby encouraging emi-
gration or discouraging return migra-
tion. Finally, the large differences 
in wages and GDP per capita with 
the EU-15 countries still constitute a 
strong pull-factor (see Section 3). 
Several data sources point out that the 
recession has both increased the num-
ber of EU migrant workers who have 
returned home, and reduced the num-
ber of those moving to EU-15 countries. 
Considering the yearly evolution of the 
‘stock’ (Tables 3 and 4 and Charts 5 and 
6), it appears that it has rarely been 
negative, indicating a general decrease 
in inflows rather than massive outflows. 
However, beyond the year-to-year evo-
lution of the stock of foreigners (which 
provides a good indication of the bal-
ance between inflows and outflows) it 
is also  relevant to  consider data of flows.
Long-run reliable and harmonised data 
on inflows and outflows exist for only a 
limited number of EU Member States. 
In the case of EU-2 citizens in Spain and 
Italy (their two main destination coun-
tries), these data seems to confirm (see 
Charts 7 and 8) that the net evolution 
has been mainly driven by changes 
in inflows, declining strongly in 2008 
and 2009 (especially in Spain) after the 
peak of 2007, in contrast to limited 
(though increasing) outflows(14). The 
balance between inflows and outflows 
remained positive for both countries 
for all years, though in Spain the net 
inflows decreased substantially, with 
outflows representing around half of 
the inflows. 
(14) The data used in Charts 7 and 8 refer to 
the Eurostat emigration and immigra-
tion statistics broken down by national-
ity, and not by country of previous/next 
residence (due to the scarcity of the 
emigration data recording the country 
of next residence). As far as inflows are 
concerned, a comparison of the immigra-
tion data of EU-2 nationals to the immi-
gration data from EU-2 countries has 
found that there are relatively limited 
differences between the two datasets 
(1-2 % for Italy and around 10-15 % in 
the case of Spain). 
The overall limited return mobility of 
EU-2 nationals (mostly Romanians) 
from Spain, despite a very adverse 
employment situation (see Section 4) 
can be linked to various factors: 
•	 the economic recession in Roma-
nia in 2009-2010 which discouraged 
nationals to return home, in contrast 
with Poland where the resilience to 
the crisis compared to most EU coun-
tries has probably increased return 
mobility (from the UK or Ireland);
•	 the overall intention of Romanian 
nationals living in Spain to stay for 
a long duration(15) and the  network 
effects and resulting mutual sup-
port within the emigrated pop-
ulation during the economic 
 downturn (see also Section 3.3);
•	 and, according to the ‘Mobility in 
Europe – 2010’ report(16), the rela-
tively favourable situation of EU-2 
nationals in Spain, in terms of access 
to unemployment benefits, social 
assistance, and health  services. 
In conclusion, overall the recession 
caused a slowdown of the inflows 
of EU-10 and EU-2 citizens in EU-15 
countries, but there is no evidence 
of a massive return migration to the 
countries of origin (Ireland being to a 
certain extent an exception). A signifi-
cant portion of the workers from the 
EU-8 and EU-2 decided to stay in the 
destination country rather than return, 
notably since the economic situation in 
the sending countries had also dete-
riorated as a consequence of the crisis 
(Koehler et al., 2010). In other words, 
labour mobility is, to some extent, 
self-regulatory in that the inflows of 
workers in receiving countries reduced 
when labour demand was weakened 
(potentially reducing pressure on local 
labour markets(17)) but the recession 
did not lead to substantial outflows of 
return to the countries of origin. 
(15) European Commission, 2010a. This report 
quotes (p. 63) a survey carried out of 
Romanians in Spain in 2007 that found 
that 78 % were intending to remain 
permanently and only 8 % expressed an 
intention to return to Romania. 
(16) European Commission, 2010a.
(17) Bräuninger and Majowkli, 2011.
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Where transitional restrictions per-
sisted, there may also have been an 
incentive to remain in the host coun-
try after becoming unemployed, 
due to the uncertainty of being 
permitted to return once economic 
 conditions improved.
2.6. Temporary 
mobility flows
The picture of intra-EU labour mobil-
ity presented in previous sections 
mainly covers workers who are ‘usu-
ally resident’ in the receiving coun-
tries, at least for a certain time. How-
ever, cross-border labour mobility can 
take other forms, for instance circular 
mobility or short-term periods abroad 
(from one week to a few months). In 
the EU, it seems that these alternative 
forms of mobility have increased in 
importance over the past decade.
According to the 2009 Eurobarom-
eter on geographical and labour 
mobility(18), around 10 % of EU citi-
zens declared that they had already 
worked and lived in another country 
at some time, with 51 % of them hav-
ing worked for less than two years, 
and 38 % for less than one year. 
These shares are significantly higher 
among the EU-12 citizens (respec-
tively 71 and 56 %). Other studies 
confirm that recent EU-mobility is 
largely characterised by short- and 
medium-term moves(19) and the size 
(18) European Commission, 2010b.
(19) European Commission, 2010a.
of compensation flows of the short-
term mobile workers back to their 
country of origin also suggests that 
this type of mobility is very important 
(see also Section 5.5).
Considering the development of 
mobility in the period 2004-07, it 
seems that many workers from EU-8 
and EU-2 countries did not intend 
(at least initially) to remain perma-
nently in the host country (Drink-
water, Eade, and Garapich, 2009). 
Rather they regarded their stay as 
an opportunity to earn money, of 
which a significant portion was sent 
home, and to gain skills, qualifi-
cation, and status. In this respect 
Pollard et al. (2008) have estimated 
that, in 2008, around half of the mil-
lion EU-8 migrant that had arrived 
in the UK since 2004 had already left 
the country.
However, it remains difficult to accu-
rately measure short-term labour 
mobility abroad from available data 
(Green et al. 2009). As underlined in 
Annex 1, Labour force survey data 
includes only individuals who had 
stayed (or who intended to stay) 
at least one year in the country. 
Poor data availability for short-term 
mobility makes it impossible to cover 
all mobile workers and constitutes a 
limitation to the estimated impact of 
mobility on the economies of send-
ing and receiving countries devel-
oped in Section 5. The present Sec-
tion 2.6  nevertheless is aimed at pre-
senting some evidence on  temporary 
 mobility flows.
Circular mobility has been underlined 
as a typical pattern of intra-EU movers 
from EU-12, in particular from Roma-
nia to Italy and from other EU-12 
countries to Germany and Austria, 
often involving seasonal work of low-
skilled manual workers (Potot, 2010). 
Sectors such as tourism, agriculture, or 
horticulture typically attract seasonal 
workers, from Poland, Bulgaria, or 
Romania, but also from non-EU coun-
tries. In the case of Germany (large 
receiving countries of seasonal work-
ers from EU-12) statistics are avail-
able per year and origin country; see 
Table 10. Around 300 000 seasonal 
workers from EU-8 countries and Cro-
atia come to work every year in Ger-
many, with the major recent develop-
ment being the decline of the share 
of Polish seasonal workers – mirrored 
by the rise of the Romanians which 
represent 35 % of the total in 2010 
compared to around 7 % in 2003.
The posting of workers is a specific 
form of circular migration whereby a 
worker is sent by his/her employer to 
another country to work for a limited 
duration. At the EU level, data on 
E101 forms (the certificates produced 
for social security purposes when 
a worker is posted in another EU 
Member State) indicate that around 
1 million workers are posted yearly 
(in the period 2007-2009)(20).
(20) These data are analysed in detail in Euro-
pean Commission (2011a) “Posting of 
workers in the European Union and EFTA 
countries: Report on E101 certificates 
issued in 2008 and 2009 (2011)”, avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobSe
rvlet?docId=6554&langId=en.
Chart 7: Inflows and outflows of EU-2 citizens in Spain,  
in 2004-2009 (in thousands)
Chart 8: Inflows and outflows of EU-2 citizens in Italy,  
in 2004-2009 (in thousands)
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Around two-thirds of recorded post-
ings originate in EU-15 and EFTA 
countries and one-third in EU-12 
countries. However, posted workers 
represent 0.25 % of the working-
age population in the EU-15 send-
ing countries compared to 0.5 % in 
the EU-12 sending countries, with 
Poland playing a significant role as 
it sent more than 200 000 posted 
workers in 2009 - 92 % of them 
to EU-15 countries. Among EU-15 
countries, Germany and France are 
the largest sending countries, with 
respectively 170 000 and 160 000 
posted workers in 2009, while Por-
tugal, Luxembourg, and Belgium 
also send more than 50 000 posted 
 workers per year.
More than 85 % of posted workers 
are sent to EU-15 countries, while 
EFTA countries attract around 8 %, 
and EU-12 countries the remaining 
7 %. The largest receiving countries 
are Germany and France, followed 
by Belgium and the Netherlands. 
In Germany the majority (around 
three-quarters) of posted workers 
are sent from EU-12 countries (mostly 
Poland), and this is also the case in 
the Nordic countries. In other EU-15 
countries most posted workers come 
from other EU-15 countries.
The recent evolution is comparable 
to intra-EU mobility as analysed in 
Section 2.5 (negative impact of the 
weaker labour demand due to the 
economic recession). Indeed, com-
pared to 2007, the data suggest 
some stagnation or even decrease 
in the number of postings, especially 
during 2009, with France, Poland, 
and Germany sending significantly 
fewer posted workers abroad in 2009 
than in 2007. During the same peri-
od, the only notable increase was 
in the number of posted workers 
from Romania although the overall 
 numbers remain limited (26 000 in 
2009 or 7.5 % of all posted workers 
originating in EU-12 countries). 
Table 10: Foreign seasonal workers to Germany by nationality, 2002-2010
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons %
Poland 252 902 84.8 265 414 85.8 279 961 86.4 272 757 85.1 230 353 78.2 224 078 76.9 190 582 68.7 184 241 64.2 174 071 60.9
Hungary 4 082 1.4 3 361 1.1 2 665 0.8 2 203 0.7 1 693 0.6 1 688 0.6 1 788 0.6 1 835 0.6 1 949 0.7
Romania 20 612 6.9 22 681 7.3 24 808 7.7 30 642 9.6 48 517 16.5 53 719 18.4 73 075 26.3 89 172 31.1 97 517 34.1
Slovenia 252 0.1 219 0.1 190 0.1 158 0.0 138 0.0 117 0.0 110 0.0 118 0.0 100 0.0
Croatia 5 826 2.0 4 969 1.6 4 578 1.4 4 520 1.4 4 705 1.6 4 575 1.6 4 162 1.5 4 248 1.5 4 665 1.6
Bulgaria 1 492 0.5 1 434 0.5 1 249 0.4 1 320 0.4 1 293 0.4 1 182 0.4 2 865 1.0 3 045 1.1 3 520 1.2
Czech 
Republic 2 676 0.9 2 130 0.7 1 881 0.6 1 520 0.5 1 169 0.4 1 019 0.3 798 0.3 686 0.2 704 0.2
Slovakia 10 260 3.4 9 260 3.0 8 702 2.7 7 263 2.3 6 582 2.2 4 979 1.7 4 190 1.5 3 601 1.3 3 469 1.2
Total 298 102 100 309 468 100 324 034 100 320 383 100 294 450 100 291 357 100 277 570 100 286 946 100 285 995 100
Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Germany.
Chart 9: Posted workers, by sending country, 2009 (in thousands)
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Source: Administrative data from EU Member States and EFTA countries on E101 certificates issued to work-
ers for posting to EU Member States and EFTA countries. 
Note: Data do not include E101 certificates issued for persons active in 2 or more Member States, multiple 
destinations, or international transport. Figures for UK relate to April 2009 to March 2010 and figures for 
Germany to 1 January 2009 to 30 November 2009.
Chart 10: Posted workers from the EU-15 and EFTA and from the EU-12,  
by receiving country, 2009 (in thousands)
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Source: Administrative data from EU Member States and EFTA countries on E101 certificates issued to 
workers for posting to EU Member States and EFTA countries. 
Note: Data do not include E101 certificates issued for persons active in 2 or more Member States, multiple 
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2010 and figures for Germany to 1 January 2009 to 30 November 2009.
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3. whaT influences 
mobiliTy flows wiThin 
The eu?
3.1. Theories 
of migration
In the literature on migration, different 
theories analyse the motivation and 
pattern of international labour mobil-
ity. For instance the push-pull approach 
assumes that there exist factors which 
attract immigration (pull) and others 
that generate emigration (push) (Lee, 
1966). In a way, this theory isolates 
two aspects of the decision to migrate, 
with the decision to leave the home 
country being determined by push fac-
tors, and the choice of the destination 
country determined by pull factors(21). 
The most obvious push and pull fac-
tors are income levels and employ-
ment opportunities. However, the driv-
ing factors are not only or necessar-
ily macro-economic factors. Sector-level 
developments can also be important, 
as has been the case in Ireland and 
Spain, where the volume of residential 
construction grew at more than three 
times the average EU-15 pace between 
1999 and 2006, providing a strong pull 
factor for foreign construction workers.
Migration can also be analysed in cost-
benefit terms at the micro-economic 
level, with economic agents (individu-
als or households) deciding whether 
or not to migrate (Sjaastad, 1962). 
Migration is then seen as a form of 
investment in human capital with 
the pure monetary costs (and ben-
efits) supplemented with the social, 
cultural, and psychological costs (and 
benefits) of migration (Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann, 2008). In the follow-
ing section we start by analysing the 
macro-economic drivers, moving on 
to take account of other factors, and 
then concluding with an analysis of 
the results of recent opinion surveys. 
(21) We try to separate here push and pull 
factors for analytical reasons. In the real 
world, it may be hard to disentangle 
push and pull factors, as it is the com-
parison between the respective home 
and foreign variables that matters.
3.2. Macro-economic 
drivers
As already underlined in ‘Employ-
ment in Europe’ in 2008, relative 
income levels seem to have been key 
push factors behind intra-EU mobil-
ity, with the poorest EU-8+2 Member 
States having seen the largest net 
outflows of migrants to EU-15 over 
the period 2004-2009 (Chart 11). 
In 2010, differences in income level 
within EU-27 remain large, with 
Bulgaria and Romania at the bot-
tom, with a gross national income 
(GNI) per capita of around 40 % 
of the average EU-15 level, meas-
ured in purchasing power stand-
ards (PPS) (Table 11). Nevertheless, 
Bulgaria and Romania have seen 
the fastest convergence,  together 
with Slovakia and Poland. Also 
Latvia and Estonia have seen fast 
convergence, notwithstanding the 
decline in their relative income 
level between 2007 and 2010 as 
a result of the financial crisis. In 
general, the poorest EU-8+2 Mem-
ber States have seen the fastest 
convergence to the EU-15 income 
level – evidence that suggests that 
emigration rates (i.e. emigration as 
a share of the sending population) 
from EU-8+2 to EU-15 will tend to 
decline over the medium-term.
Purchasing power parity estimates 
are important, since they take 
account of the higher cost of living 
in the destination country. Never-
theless, migrants can use part of 
their income as remittances or for 
consumption in their home country. 
As a result, differences in income 
at current exchange rates may also 
affect migration decisions (Brücker 
et al., 2009). At current exchange 
rates, GNI per capita in 2010 was 
Chart 11: Gross national income and population net outflows to the EU-15, EU-8+2
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Sources: DG ECFIN (AMECO) for GNI. Population flows estimated on the basis of Eurostat migration statis-
tics and other sources, see details in Holland et al. (2011). 
Table 11: Gross national income per capita (PPS) in EU-8+2 Member States  
(in % of EU-15 level)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 change‘04-’10
change
‘07-’10
Czech 
Republic 62 64 65 66 69 70 70 7 3
Estonia 48 52 55 58 58 56 56 8 -2
Latvia 39 42 44 48 50 51 47 8 -1
Lithuania 43 46 48 51 53 51 49 6 -1
Hungary 53 53 53 52 55 56 56 3 4
Poland 43 45 45 47 50 53 54 11 7
Slovenia 75 77 77 77 80 78 78 3 1
Slovakia 48 52 54 59 64 65 67 19 8
Bulgaria 31 32 33 33 38 39 39 8 5
Romania 29 30 33 36 41 41 40 11 4
Source: DG ECFIN (AMECO). Changes in percentage points.  
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below 50 % of the EU-15 aver-
age in all EU-8+2 Member States, 
except Slovenia. Again, incomes are 
converging to the EU-15 average 
(Table 12).
By contrast, among EU-15 Member 
States, income levels are less likely 
to have been the key pull factor 
(Chart 12). Migration has been redi-
rected, independently of the destina-
tion’s income level, by the  economic 
 opportunities in the destination 
countries, the transitional arrange-
ments in place during this period 
(see Box 2), as well as other factors, 
such as network effects (see “Other 
factors influencing mobility” below). 
So far, we have focused on the effect 
of relative income levels on migra-
tion. However, the expected income 
level is as crucial to potential migra-
tion since it has to make up for the 
sunk cost of migration. The pre-
sent divergence in short- to medium-
term growth prospects of Member 
States will undoubtedly affect the 
flows to individual destination Mem-
ber States, particularly shortly after 
the end to the transitional arrange-
ments for EU-8 mobile workers. The 
expected income is evidently related 
to wage and employment develop-
ments and prospects in the destina-
tion Member States. With regard 
to wages, statistical issues(22) have 
rendered comparisons of hourly 
wage data over time very difficult. 
Nevertheless, Commission estimates 
suggest that wages have converged 
further, with average hourly gross 
wages and salaries in EU-10 and 
EU-2 at, respectively, 31 % and 14 % 
of the average EU-15 level in 2009, 
compared with 24 % and 9 % in 2006.
The employment rate has acted as a 
push factor, with the EU-8+2 Mem-
ber States with the lowest employ-
ment rates having, in general, seen 
the largest outflows (Chart 13). On 
the receiving side, the EU-15 Mem-
ber States with the highest employ-
ment rate have generally seen the 
largest inflows (Chart 14, left-hand 
panel), with two important groups 
of  exceptions (Chart 14, right-hand 
panel). One group contains the Mem-
ber States with the highest employ-
ment rates (Denmark, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden), which have seen 
relatively low inflows from EU-8+2 
over 2004-2009. The other exceptions 
are among the main attractors: Italy, 
Spain, and Ireland, with employment 
rates that were, respectively, the low-
est of EU-15, below the EU-15 aver-
age, and only slightly above average.
(22) Changeover from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE 
Rev. 2.
Table 12: Gross national income per capita (euro) in EU-8+2 Member States  
(in % of EU-15 level)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 change ‘04-’10
change 
‘07-’10
Czech 
Republic 31.3 34.8 37.4 39.0 46.5 44.8 45.2 13.8 6.2
Estonia 26.2 29.7 33.5 37.3 39.1 36.8 36.3 10.1 -1.1
Latvia 18.1 20.8 24.2 30.5 34.6 32.3 28.8 10.6 -1.8
Lithuania 19.8 22.4 24.5 27.7 31.9 29.5 28.8 9.0 1.2
Hungary 29.8 30.9 30.0 31.7 34.1 32.1 32.8 3.0 1.1
Poland 19.9 23.4 24.7 26.8 32.1 28.6 31.3 11.4 4.6
Slovenia 51.5 53.1 54.3 57.0 61.6 61.9 60.8 9.2 3.8
Slovakia 23.2 25.9 28.5 33.5 40.0 41.8 42.1 18.9 8.6
Bulgaria 10.2 11.2 11.9 12.7 15.3 16.5 16.4 6.2 3.7
Romania 10.4 13.3 15.6 19.0 21.7 19.7 19.7 9.4 0.7
Source: DG ECFIN (AMECO). Changes in percentage points.
Chart 12: Gross national income and population net inflows from EU-8+2, EU-15
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Sources: DG ECFIN (AMECO) for GNI. Population flows estimated on the basis of Eurostat migration statis-
tics and other sources, see details in Holland et al. (2011).
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Box 2: The impact of the transitional arrangements on intra-EU mobility patterns
In addition to the impact of enlargement on intra-EU mobility flows described in Section 2.4, it is important to assess what has been the impact 
of the various levels of openness of the labour markets of receiving countries. ‘Old’ Member States had the possibility to keep restrictions to 
EU law on free movement of workers during a period of transitional arrangements of maximum seven years and the choices they made had 
a certain impact on the distribution of labour flows across the receiving countries.
While the restrictions applied by certain Member States may have reduced the global inflows from EU-10 to EU-15 countries (Brücker et al. 
2009), most studies suggest that the main effect of the restrictions was to redirect potential foreign workers to EU-15 countries with easier 
access to labour markets (Münz and Tamas, 2006; Brücker et al. 2009; Barrell, Riley, and FitzGerald, 2010).
As far as EU-10 workers are concerned, the well-known diversion of the flows occurred from Germany and Austria (which kept restrictions 
until the end of the third phase of the transitional arrangements on 30 April 2011) to the UK and Ireland, who decided to open their labour 
markets from May 2004. Until the end of 2003, almost three-fifths of the EU-10 citizens living in EU-15 Member States were in Germany and 
Austria; this share has decreased to 28 % at the end of 2010 (see Table 4) – mirrored by the rise of the share of the UK and Ireland, from 16 % 
to around 45 % on the same period.
Nevertheless, while the link between the ‘open regime’ of the UK and Ireland and the high share they took in the inflows of EU-10 workers in the 
post-accession period is quite obvious, the same effect did not occur in other countries. Despite the ease of access to the Swedish labour market 
also from 2004, there was little shift in the share of EU-10 citizens resident in Sweden, suggesting that the transitional arrangements cannot fully 
explain the changes. Moreover, despite the lifting of the transitional arrangements in 2006 (at the end of the first phase) in Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, and Finland, there has not been a clear rise in share of EU-10 workers in any of these countries between 2006 and 2009 (see Table 4). 
Finally, the UK had already received the highest inflows from the EU-8 countries in 2002 and 2003, suggesting that the distributional shift from 
Germany to the UK was already an ongoing process, and one cannot attribute this entire shift to the presence of transitional restrictions.
Holland et al. (2011) have conducted econometric work to estimate the likely impact of the transitional arrangements on the distribution of 
EU-8 citizens across the EU-15 versus other factors such as employment opportunities in the host country (measured by the unemployment 
rate) and the earnings potential (captured by GDP per capita)(1). It appears from this research that transitional restrictions only explain a lim-
ited part of the evolution of the distribution of EU-8 citizens across the EU-15. For instance the lower unemployment rate in the UK (than in 
the other EU-15 countries) played a relatively bigger role in attracting inward mobile workers than the ease of access to the labour market. 
Nonetheless, the transitional restrictions still explain roughly 20 % of the shifts in share between 2003 and 2009 in the UK and Germany. 
Holland et al. (2011) recognised that this should be considered as the lower limit of the estimated impact of the transitional arrangements, as 
there remains a significant residual category in each country that cannot be explained by the model. It is possible that this partly reflects more 
refined distinctions between the types of labour market restrictions across countries that the simple restriction index used cannot capture. Nev-
ertheless, these results suggest that some earlier studies may have overestimated the role of transitional arrangement in the location decision, 
as they have not adequately accounted for some more traditional factors driving the location decision. While there has been a clear shift in the 
distribution of EU-8 citizens across the EU-15, this shift was already ongoing prior to the 2004 enlargement, and can be explained to a large 
extent by differences in the macro-economic developments within the potential destination countries. Finally some specialised researchers on 
migration pointed out that the visible shift in the destination countries of EU-8 workers should not directly be interpreted as a diversion effect 
due to different level of labour market access. Indeed, those who moved to the United Kingdom would not necessarily have moved to Germany 
if its labour market had been opened from 2004 – notably because of their socio-economic characteristics or language skills. 
Interestingly, some effects of the transitional arrangements on the distribution of EU-8 citizens across EU-15 Member States may have an impact 
in the long run, notably due to the importance of network effects. Many studies have found that an existing network or diaspora is one of the 
most important factors driving the destination decision of migrants (see for example Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010; Pedersen et al. 2008) and one 
could expect the distribution of EU-8 citizens across the EU-15 economies to remain largely constant over time. A look at the recent evolution 
of inflows (see Section 2.5) shows that in 2010 the UK remains by far the main destination country of EU-10 citizens, despite the fact that this 
country has been quite affected by the economic recession. This raises the question of whether the end of the period of transitional arrangements 
on 1 May 2011 will have a significant impact on mobility to Germany and Austria (the only two countries having kept substantial restrictions until 
the end of the third phase) or if the UK will continue to attract most of the flows from EU-10 countries. Recent anecdotal evidence (from press 
reviews) and some first analytical research(2) seems to indicate that, a few months after the end of the transitional arrangements, there are no 
massive flows from EU-8 countries to Germany and Austria. Several sources(3) indicate that labour mobility to Germany is likely to increase in the 
coming years given the relatively promising employment outlook there. These increased inflows could also come from the EU-15 Member States 
very affected by the economic crisis (Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) and not necessarily from the EU-12 countries. 
In the case of EU-2 mobile workers, it is not clear that the restrictions on labour market access through transitional arrangements had 
a significant impact on the location decision in the same way as they did following the 2004 enlargement for EU-8 mobile workers. In addi-
tion to the key macro-economic developments and the ease of access to the labour markets, other factors may have determined the location 
decision of EU-2 mobile workers. These may include cultural and linguistic factors, which are likely, in particular, to make Italy and Spain 
attractive locations for Romanians. 
(1) For more details on the methodology used and the results by individual country, see Holland et al. (2011), Section 3.6 “Estimates of the impact 
of transitional arrangements on migration”.
(2) See notably European Commission (2011c).
(3) Holland et al. 2011; Bräuninger and Majowkli, 2011.
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Unemployment rates seem to have 
played a limited role in emigra-
tion decisions, as indicated by 
a zero correlation between the 
unemployment rate (in the previ-
ous year) and the emigration rate 
in a given year. For example, for 
some years, Romania and some 
Baltic countries had an unemploy-
ment rate even below the EU-15 
average (Chart 15) and, yet, high 
emigration rates. On the other 
hand, at the start of the sample, 
double-digit unemployment rates 
in Poland and Slovakia did not 
trigger massive outflows, at least 
measured in relative terms. The 
transitional arrangements, as well 
as country-specific structural fac-
tors (such as the country size) may 
have played a role here.
The Table 13 below shows the evolution of the average net growth of EU-2 nationals for each country group (based on the year when the 
receiving Member States started to apply EU law on free movement for EU-2 workers). It appears that the impact of opening the labour market 
early (in Finland, Sweden, and most EU-10 Member States) on net inflows from EU-2 has been very limited. As for the  countries that opened 
their labour markets in 2009 after the end of the first phase, the net inflows have also been very limited following the opening (Denmark, Hun-
gary) or decreased significantly compared to the previous years (Spain, Greece and Portugal) which can partly be explained by the economic 
recession. Meanwhile, the countries that continued to use transitional measures have received significant inflows since 2007. In the case of 
Italy, since 2007, no work permits have been required in several key sectors which can explain the strong rise in mobility from EU-2 countries.
In fact, since the 2007 enlargement, the main shift in the distribution of the stock of EU-2 mobile citizens has been the decline of the share 
of Spain in the period 2006-2009 (from 49 % to 40 %) and the rise of the share going to Italy (from 27 to 38 %). This development can be 
explained by two factors: firstly, the partial opening of the labour market in Italy from 2007 (no work permit required any more in several key 
sectors) and secondly, the degradation of the Spanish labour market since 2008 (see also Section 2.5). 
Beyond the effect of the transitional restrictions on the distribution of inflows, some side-effects have been observed in those countries that 
retained restrictions. The restrictions appear to have encouraged irregular forms of labour mobility in the respective countries. Holland et al. 
(2011) point out that some EU-8 and EU-2 citizens might have chosen alternative or illegal routes to employment. Since the free movement 
per se ceased to be restricted, it would have been easy to travel on a tourist or student visa and to overstay the permitted duration and then 
enter the labour market via an irregular channel. Moreover, the high proportion of self-employed amongst EU-10 workers in Germany or EU-2 
workers in the UK may reflect an abuse of this channel of entry into the labour market, since self-employment became unrestricted following 
accession (see Section 4.3).
Table 13: Average annual net growth of EU-2 nationals, by group of countries (in thousands and in % of the total resident population)
Group of receiving Member States
2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010
in 
thousand
in % of 
total pop.
in 
thousand
in % of 
total pop.
in 
thousand
in % of 
total pop.
Member States granting free access from 2007 2 0.00 13 0.02 10 0.01
Member States granting 
free access from 2009
Spain 137 0.32 150 0.33 21 0.05
Others 10 0.03 13 0.04 19 0.05
Member States not 
applying free movement
Italy 58 0.10 238 0.40 116 0.19
Others 15 0.01 70 0.03 76 0.03
Total EU-25 222 0.05 484 0.10 242 0.05
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat migration statistics and EU-LFS (for more details see notes of Tables 3 and 4). 
Note: Total resident population considered for the ratio is calculated as an average on each period. 2003-2006 corresponds to the period before accession of 
EU-2 countries; 2007-2008 corresponds to the first phase of the transitional arrangements; 2009-2010 corresponds to the first two years of the second phase of 
the transitional arrangements. Groups of countries based on Table 4 as follows: 1) Member States granting free access from 2007: CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, PL, SI, SK, 
FI and SE; 2) Member States granting free access from 2009: DK, EL, ES, HU, PT; 3) Member States not applying free movement: BE, DE, IE, FR, IT, LU, MT, NL, 
AT, UK. ES and IT treated separately due to their size in EU-2 inflows. 
Chart 13: Employment rates and population net outflows to the EU-15, EU-8+2
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS for employment rates (lfsa_emprt). Population flows estimated on the basis of
Eurostat migration statistics and other sources, see details in Holland et al. (2011).
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3.3. Other factors 
influencing mobility 
Macro-economic factors alone do 
not provide a sufficiently satisfac-
tory explanation of the diversity in 
bilateral intra-EU migration flows. 
Macro-economic pull factors, such 
as the three-to-one ratio in wages, 
have not led to a massive emi-
gration from EU-12 to EU-15, and 
increased uncertainty following 
the financial and sovereign crisis 
may have reduced temporarily the 
appetite for emigration (see Section 
2.5). Moreover, transitional arrange-
ments have been, and continue to 
remain, in place. Another explana-
tion is that macro-economic pull 
factors are often balanced by non-
economic - social, cultural and/or 
psychological - factors, such as ties 
to family and friends, and concerns 
about the different languages and 
culture abroad. These factors may 
lead potential migrants to choose a 
form of  temporary migration.
In some cases, however, non-eco-
nomic factors such as the existence 
of community networks can rein-
force (or counteract) macro-eco-
nomic factors. Community networks 
are interpersonal ties connecting 
present and future migrants to 
settlers in the destination country 
(Massey et al., 1993), which can 
help migrants with issues such as 
 housing,  administration, language, 
and the search for employment. 
Several studies have found that an 
existing network is a very important 
pull factor (see for example Delbecq 
and Waldorf, 2010, Pedersen et al. 
2008, and Ruyssen, Everaert, and 
Rayp, 2011). Due to mutual support 
within the emigrated population, 
this clustering may help explain why 
dramatic changes in the economic 
prospects of individual EU-15 Mem-
ber States have not led to an abrupt 
reversal of net  emigration flows.
Finally, demographic factors also 
influence future intra-EU mobility 
flows over the medium-term. Accord-
ing to the standard population pro-
jection by Eurostat(23), the total EU-12 
population in 2025 will be 3 % lower 
than in 2010 with the EU-15 popu-
lation unchanged over this period. 
However, for the age group 15-34 
years, the decline will be 14 % in 
EU-15 and 29 % in EU-12. The rapid 
drop in this age group in EU-12 
is expected to significantly reduce 
the potential pool of migrants from 
EU-12 to EU-15 because, in general, 
migrants are fairly young, as they 
need a certain period of higher 
income to compensate the sunk costs 
of migration.
(23) EUROPOP 2010, no migration.
Chart 15: Unemployment rates in selected Member States and aggregates
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Chart 14: Employment rates and population net inflows from EU-8+2, in EU-15 Member States
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS for employment rates (lfsa_emprt). Population flows estimated on the basis of Eurostat migration statistics and other sources, see details
in Holland et al. (2011). 
Note: Employment rate: average ‘04-’09, in % of population in age group 15-64 years. 
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3.4. What do recent 
opinion surveys say 
about reasons to stay 
and move? 
A 2011 Eurobarometer survey of 
young people (aged 15 to 35) con-
firms some of the above conclu-
sions(24), indicating that young peo-
ple from EU-8+2 would be more 
willing to work in another EU Mem-
ber State than the EU-27 average. 
Unsurprisingly, young people from 
the poorest Member States (Bulgar-
ia and Romania) show the highest 
inclination among EU-8+2 countries 
(more than 70 %), while the low-
est inclination was observed in the 
Czech Republic (55 %, below the 
EU-27 average of 57.5 %).
In 2010, a Eurobarometer survey 
on geographical and labour market 
mobility(25) found that, of all possible 
motives to work abroad, the finan-
cial one rated highest at the EU-27 
level and for all EU-8+2 Member 
States(26). At the EU-27 level, culture, 
lifestyle, and language were also 
highly rated but this was less so for 
the EU-8+2 Member States, where 
good employment opportunities, 
and the presence of family or friends 
abroad, often rated higher.
(24) Youth on the move, Flash Eurobarom-
eter No 319b, fieldwork January 2011, 
publication May 2011 (European Com-
mission, 2011b).
(25) Geographical and labour market mobil-
ity, Special Eurobarometer No 337, field-
work November - December 2009, publi-
cation June 2010 (European Commission, 
2010b).
(26) Except for Romania.
Chart 16: Age distribution of recent intra-EU movers and total active population 
(aged 15-64), 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages).
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as economically active working-age foreign nationals resident for 
seven years or less in another Member State
Chart 17: Sex distribution of recent intra-EU movers and total active population 
(aged 15-64), 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as economically active working-age foreign nationals resident for 
seven years or less in another Member State
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4. main characTerisTics 
of mobile workers in 
The eu
In this section the main characteris-
tics of mobile workers in the EU are 
analysed with a particular focus on 
the situation of working-age nation-
als from the EU-10 and EU-2 Member 
States and their labour market status.
4.1. Age and gender
Before focusing on the working-age 
population (15-64), it is important 
to note that 85 % of the EU-10 as 
well as of the EU-2 nationals living 
in other Member States, are of work-
ing-age(27) (i.e. aged 15-64) compared 
to 67 % of the total resident popula-
tion(28). In other words intra-EU mov-
ers from EU-10 and EU-2 countries 
are more likely to be in the economi-
cally productive period of their life 
than the native population. 
Moreover, among those of working-
age (15-64) it appears that recent 
intra-EU movers are younger than 
the overall labour force in both the 
sending and receiving countries (see 
Chart 16) and that this is particularly 
true of recent movers from EU-2 and 
EU-10 countries. Persons under 35 
years represent 62 % of EU-2 work-
ing-age movers and 70 % of EU-10 
working-age movers, compared to 
only 34 % in the EU-15 labour force. 
Conversely, close to half of EU-15 
movers are aged 35 and more. 
In terms of gender (Chart 17), women 
represent around 45 % of the active 
population in the receiving as in 
the sending countries. This share is 
higher among recent intra-EU movers 
from EU-2 (50 %) and EU-10  countries 
(47 %) but much lower among recent 
movers from EU-15 countries (40 %).
(27) Estimates based on Eurostat migration 
statistics combined with the EU LFS when 
necessary.
(28) In the case of EU-15 mobile citizens, the 
share of those of working-age (15-64) is 
lower, around 75 %, notably due to the 
numerous retirees living in other Mem-
ber States. 
4.2. Labour market 
status and impact of 
the recession
In 2010, working-age citizens from 
EU-10 and EU-2 countries had a high-
er rate of employment on average 
when they moved abroad than in 
their countries of origin (Chart 18). 
This was particularly true in the case 
of EU-10 movers, with a higher rate 
of employment than the origin coun-
try average (a difference of 14 per-
centage points). At the same time 
they were also more likely to be 
in employment than the residents 
in the receiving EU-15 countries 
(+9 percentage points). 
As far as EU-2 movers are concerned, 
their employment rate was higher 
than the average in the sending 
countries (+4 percentage points) but 
somewhat lower than the average in 
the receiving EU-15 (-2 percentage 
points). This was due in particular 
to a higher share of unemployed 
persons among EU-2 movers (16 %), 
far above the average among EU-10 
movers (8 %), or amongst EU-15 total 
working-age population (7 %). 
It is to be noted, however, that EU-10 
and EU-2 movers both had very low 
rates of inactivity (respectively 18 and 
21 %) reflecting the fact that the main 
reason for their move abroad was 
to find work. Moreover, in relation 
to their main destination  countries, 
recent EU-2 movers had a higher 
employment rate than the average 
of the working-age population in 
Italy and the UK, or very close to it in 
other EU-25 Member States (includ-
ing Spain), with Germany being the 
only exception (see Chart 20). This 
means that, wherever they go, EU-2 
movers tend to participate to at least 
the same extent as the average local 
population. The same applies to the 
EU-10 movers (Chart 19), again with 
the exception of Germany. 
Finally, the significant gap between 
the average employment rates of 
EU-10 and EU-2 movers (11 percent-
age points, see Chart 18) comes most-
ly from differences in their distri-
bution across destination countries. 
Indeed, when considering the main 
destination countries separately, the 
employment rate of EU-2 movers is 
comparable to the average among 
EU-10 movers(29) (see Charts 19 and 
20). It is therefore the concentration 
of EU-2 movers in destination coun-
tries having low employment rates 
(Italy, Spain) which explains their 
overall less favourable performance, 
compared to EU-10 movers (con-
centrated in the UK and Germany, 
having both relatively high average 
employment rates).
(29) The case of Spain (not depicted for EU-10 
in Chart 19) is interesting since in 2010 
EU-2 movers have on average (58 %) a 
slightly higher employment rate than 
EU-10 movers (56 %). 
Chart 18: Labour market status of recent intra-EU movers and total population 
(aged 15-64), 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages).
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less 
in another Member State
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Of course the situation depicted for 
2010 is significantly affected by the 
economic recession that started in 
2008 and led to a strong rise in unem-
ployment, notably in countries having 
received large inflows of EU-12 mov-
ers (Spain, the UK, and Ireland). Com-
paring the employment situation to 
the pre-crisis period (2007), it appears 
(see Chart 21) that all groups of for-
eigners have been affected (declin-
ing employment rate and increasing 
share of unemployment) but it is par-
ticularly true for EU-2 recent movers.
The strong rise of the share of unem-
ployment among EU-2 movers (from 
9 to 16 %) is mainly due the con-
centration of EU-2 recent movers in 
Spain (the EU Member State with the 
highest unemployment rate in 2010) 
as it accounts for 62 % of all unem-
ployed EU-2 recent movers. 26 % of 
working age EU-2 movers living in 
Spain are unemployed in 2010 (com-
pared to 10 % in 2007) which can be 
explained by their socio-economic 
characteristics (on-average young 
and low-skilled) and predominance 
in sectors strongly impacted by the 
crisis, in particular the construction 
sector. Nevertheless, it also reflects 
the general labour market situation 
in Spain where all groups of citi-
zenship (including Spanish nationals) 
have seen their unemployment rate 
more than doubled between 2007 
and 2010 (Table 14). 
This adverse situation has pushed 
Spain to request, in July 2011, a tem-
porary suspension of free movement 
of workers with regard to Romanian 
workers, arguing a general market 
disturbance of the Spanish labour 
market (see also Box 1). 
In the other main destination coun-
tries, the impact of the crisis on 
the labour market situation among 
EU-2 recent movers has been lim-
ited (see Table 14). For instance in 
Italy, where the number of working-
age EU-2 nationals has more than 
doubled between 2007 and 2010 
(from 324 000 to 791 000,  according 
to  EU-LFS), the share of those unem-
ployed has increased (from 6 to 
9 %) but their employment rate has 
remained high, much greater than all 
other citizenship groups.
EU-10 nationals that stayed in the 
destination countries have been 
affected in different ways by the eco-
nomic recession. While their unem-
ployment rate remained relatively 
low in the UK, Italy, and Austria 
(and evolved more favourably than 
the national average since 2007), it 
has strongly increased in Spain and 
Ireland, the two receiving countries 
most affected by the crisis. 
Chart 19: Employment status of recent EU-10 movers  
compared to total working-age population (15-64)  
in the main destination countries, 2010
Chart 20: Employment status of recent EU-2 movers  
compared to total working-age population (15-64)  
in the main destination countries, 2010
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Chart 21: The impact of the recession: labour market status of recent intra-EU 
movers, compared to nationals and non-EU citizens (aged 15-64) in 2007 and 2010
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As far as the EU-12 who returned home 
in 2009 to EU-12 countries are con-
cerned, the ‘Mobility in Europe-2010’ 
report’(30) found, on the basis of EU-LFS 
data, that they tend to have higher 
rates of unemployment or inactivity 
than ‘non-migrants’. This could be 
explained by the difficult economic sit-
uation in many EU-12 countries during 
2009 (with the exception of Poland) 
and by the fact that the timing of 
the return was often not chosen, but 
imposed by economic circumstances in 
the destination country (loss of job). 
Moreover, the abovementioned report 
points out that ‘the figures could be 
misleading because of returnees not 
necessarily actively looking for work 
and having the income earned abroad 
to support them until a job that suits 
them come along’.
(30) European Commission (2010a).
4.3. Self-employed 
and employees
Restrictions on workers under tran-
sitional arrangements only apply to 
employees, and not to self-employed 
persons. As a result several sources 
suggest that there has been a dispro-
portionate share of self-employment 
amongst recent movers from EU-10 
and EU-2, notably to circumvent 
the restrictions. Some of these self-
employed workers may be ‘bogus 
self-employed’, i.e. workers that 
would in normal conditions have the 
status of employees.
In 2010, the share of self-employ-
ment amongst recent movers from 
EU-10 and EU-2 in employment was 
generally lower (see Chart 22) than 
the share of self- employment in 
the sending countries, and equal to, 
or lower, than the share of self- 
employment in the EU-15 receiving 
countries. Nevertheless the share of 
self-employment amongst recent 
movers from EU-10 and EU-2 has 
increased substantially since the same 
calculation was made for 2007(31) (see 
European Commission, 2008a).
Moreover, there seems to be signifi-
cant country differences. Compar-
ing the share of self-employment 
among various groups of recent 
intra-EU movers it appears that it 
is much higher amongst the group 
for which salaried employment is, 
or has been, subject to restrictions 
on the free movement of work-
ers (see Chart 23). For instance, in 
the UK (whose labour market was 
open to EU-10 workers from 1 May 
2004), the share of  self-employment 
amongst EU-10 recent movers is very 
(31) From 6% in 2007 to 14% in 2010 for EU-2 
movers and from 9% to 12% for EU-10 
movers.
Table 14: Evolution of working-age population (in thousands) by group of citizenship and labour market status (in %),  
in main destination countries of EU-12 nationals, 2007-2010
Receiving 
country Indicator
National EU-15 EU-2 EU-10 Non-EU-27
2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
IT
Total WAP (in thousand) 36 715 36 257 91 115 324 791 69 115 1747 2 267
Employed (%) 58 56 61 60 73 69 64 67 66 61
Unemployed (%) 4 5 3 4 6 9 6 5 6 8
Inactive (%) 38 39 36 35 20 21 30 28 27 31
ES
Total WAP (in thousand) 26 777 26 708 458 576 662 754 63 79 2 849 3 143
Employed (%) 65 59 63 56 73 59 73 59 69 55
Unemployed (%) 5 13 7 14 10 26 (5.8) 23 10 26
Inactive (%) 29 28 30 30 17 15 21 18 21 19
UK
Total WAP (in thousand) 36 686 36 921 712 752 32 96 543 708 1 861 1 866
Employed (%) 72 70 73 69 87 77 80 81 60 60
Unemployed (%) 4 6 5 6 : : 5 5 6 8
Inactive (%) 24 24 23 25 : 17 14 14 33 32
DE
Total WAP (in thousand) 48 459 47 809 1 480 1 443 101 116 422 477 3 636 3 701
Employed (%) 71 73 70 70 64 67 62 65 50 52
Unemployed (%) 6 5 7 6 9 8 10 9 13 11
Inactive (%) 23 22 23 24 27 25 28 26 38 37
IE
Total WAP (in thousand) 2 565 2 625 107 99 14 14 175 158 134 106
Employed (%) 68 60 69 61 64 48 86 66 64 53
Unemployed (%) 3 9 5 10 : : 5 16 5 10
Inactive (%) 29 31 26 28 32 38 10 19 31 37
AT
Total WAP (in thousand) 4 911 4 925 125 143 18 37 75 80 422 421
Employed (%) 72 73 73 76 61 59 72 68 60 60
Unemployed (%) 3 3 (4.0) (3.4) : (9.1) (5.5) (4.8) 8 7
Inactive (%) 25 24 23 21 (27.5) 32 22 27 33 33
FR
Total WAP (in thousand) 37 207 37 440 806 792 30 57 32 48 1 460 1 613
Employed (%) 65 65 67 68 59 56 48 64 46 46
Unemployed (%) 5 6 5 6 : (11.6) (18.6) (9.2) 13 14
Inactive (%) 30 29 28 26 33 33 33 27 41 40
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages).
Note: ‘WAP’ refers to working-age population (15-64). “:” indicate figures too small to be reliable. Figures in brackets are of limited reliability. No criteria of duration 
of residence applied in these tables (all working-age EU-15, EU-10, EU-2, and third-country nationals are included). As a result, some figures may slightly differ from 
other tables or charts (for instance Charts 19 and 20). 
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low, while the share is much  higher 
among EU-2 recent movers upon 
which restrictions apply. As far as 
Germany is concerned, both EU-2 
and EU-10 have faced restrictions to 
their access to the labour market, 
and the share of self-employment 
is relatively high in both groups 
(respectively 19 and 32 %).
On the contrary, Spain which 
has applied free movement since 
1 January 2009 to EU-2 citizens, has 
a very low share of self-employ-
ment amongst the recent mobile 
workers from EU-2 countries (3 %) 
compared to the 8 % share in 2008 
before the opening of the labour 
market. Italy, for its part, has mod-
erate shares of self-employment 
among EU-10 and EU-2 work-
ers, which is consistent with its 
 relatively open labour market. 
For the UK, Kausar (2011) confirmed 
that the share of self-employed 
among EU-2 workers has been signif-
icantly higher than for native, EU-8, 
and non-EU workers. Fellmer and 
Kolb (2009) reported that in Germa-
ny, many workers from EU-8 Member 
States, especially in the construction 
sector, were hired by companies but 
were registered as self-employed. 
4.4. Employment 
structure by economic 
activity
The employment structure by sector 
varies significantly between mobile 
workers and the overall resident popu-
lation of sending and receiving coun-
tries, as well as between nationality 
groups of mobile workers (Table 15).
As far as EU-15 movers are con-
cerned, they are over-represented in 
the accommodation and food service 
activities, professional, scientific, and 
technical activities, and information 
and communication. On the other 
hand, they are less likely to work 
in the health sector, wholesale and 
retail trades, public administration, 
or agriculture.
Mobile workers from the EU-10 Mem-
ber States tend to work mainly in 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
trade, accommodation, and food 
service activities and are also over-
represented in construction, admin-
istrative and support activities, and 
activities of households as employers 
(i.e. private personnel(32)). 
As for mobile workers from EU-2 
countries, compared to the aver-
age in the EU-15 countries, their 
employment is concentrated in a lim-
ited number of sectors: construction, 
activities of households as employers, 
and accommodation and food service 
activities. While these three sectors 
represent more than half (53 %) of 
all recent EU-2 in employment, their 
aggregate share in local employment 
in EU-15 countries is only about 14 %.
Both EU-10 and EU-2 recent movers 
are under-represented in the public 
administration, education, human 
health, social work and professional, 
and scientific and technical activities. 
In terms of the share of recent intra-
EU movers of total employment in 
EU-15 countries, the same patterns 
can be found (Table 16). The share 
of EU-2 amongst the group “activi-
ties of households as employers” is 
particularly high (around 5 % of all 
workers in this sector in the EU-15 
Member States) which is explained 
by the levels recorded in Italy (11 %) 
and Spain (8 %). This is, however, 
(32) This corresponds to the NACE Rev. 2, 
Category 97 which includes the activities 
of households as employers of domestic 
personnel such as maids, cooks, wait-
ers, valets, butlers, laundresses, garden-
ers, gatekeepers, stable-lads, chauffeurs, 
caretakers, governesses, babysitters, 
tutors, secretaries, etc.
Chart 22: Share of self-employed citizens and employees among overall 
employment and recent intra- EU movers (in employment) in the EU, 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages).
Note: Intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in 
another Member State
Chart 23: Share of self-employed and employees among recent intra-EU movers  
(in employment) in selected EU-15 Member States, 2010
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Note: Intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in 
another Member State
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Table 15: Employment of total resident populations, recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals by economic activity, 
2010 (% of total employment by group)
Economic activity (Nace Rev. 2)
EU-15 EU-10 EU-2
Third-
country 
nationals
Total 
resident 
population 
 EU-15 
recent 
movers
Total 
resident 
population 
 EU-10 
recent 
movers
Total 
resident 
population 
 EU-2 
recent 
movers
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.9 (0.9) 8.5 3.2 21.7 6.9 3.6
B Mining and quarrying 0.2 : 1.0 : 1.1 : (0.3)
C Manufacturing 14.9 12.7 20.1 22.1 19.3 11.2 9.6
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.7 : 1.1 : 1.4 : :
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0.7 : 1.0 : 0.9 : (0.2)
F Construction 7.6 7.0 8.4 10.4 8.2 21.2 8.8
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 14.1 10.3 14.5 15.0 14.0 7.2 11.4
H Transportation and storage 4.9 3.8 6.2 6.2 5.2 3.6 3.5
I Accommodation and food service activities 4.8 10.1 3.1 13.4 2.9 14.2 13.0
J Information and communication 3.1 6.8 2.3 1.7 1.7 : 3.1
K Financial and insurance activities 3.3 5.4 2.3 (1.1) 1.6 : 2.1
L Real estate activities 0.8 : 0.9 : 0.2 : (0.3)
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 5.4 9.2 3.4 2.7 2.0 (1.1) 3.6
N Administrative and support service activities 4.3 5.5 2.6 7.2 1.9 5.9 7.1
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 7.5 2.1 7.0 : 5.9 : 1.7
P Education 7.6 7.2 7.8 2.1 4.8 : 4.3
Q Human health and social work activities 11.5 8.9 6.2 7.1 4.7 4.7 8.6
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.7 2.9 1.4 (1.1) 0.7 : 1.5
S Other service activities 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 1.3 3.0 2.8
T Activities of households as employers, … 1.4 (1.5) 0.2 2.5 0.4 17.5 13.6
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0.1 1.8 (0.0) : : : 0.6
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in another Member State. Third-country nationals are defined as working-age 
foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in an EU Member State. “:” indicate figures too small to be reliable. Figures in brackets are of limited reliability. For some activi-
ties (e.g. agriculture, construction, accommodation, and food service activities) the LFS may understate the number of employed due to underestimation of seasonal workers.
Table 16: Share of recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals among EU-15 employment by economic activity, 2010  
(per 1 000 employed in activity)
Economic activity (Nace Rev. 2)
 EU-15 
recent 
movers
 EU-10 
recent 
movers
 EU-2 
recent 
movers
Third-
country 
nationals
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1.6) 5.8 10.5 20.0
B Mining and quarrying : : : (20.3)
C Manufacturing 4.3 7.5 3.2 10.0
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply : : : :
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities : : : (5.8)
F Construction 4.6 6.9 11.9 18.2
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3.7 5.4 2.0 12.7
H Transportation and storage 3.9 6.6 3.2 11.1
I Accommodation and food service activities 10.6 14.5 12.6 43.3
J Information and communication 11.1 2.7 : 16.2
K Financial and insurance activities 8.3 1.7 : 10.1
L Real estate activities : : : (6.3)
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 8.5 2.5 (0.8) 10.6
N Administrative and support service activities 6.6 8.9 5.9 26.6
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 1.4 : : 3.5
P Education 4.8 1.4 : 9.1
Q Human health and social work activities 4.0 3.2 1.7 12.0
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 8.7 (3.0) : 14.2
S Other service activities 4.3 3.3 4.9 17.1
T Activities of households as employers, … 5.2 9.2 53.6 144.5
U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 86.5 : : 88.7
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in an EU-15 Member State. 
“:” indicate figures too small to be reliable. Figures in brackets of limited reliability. For some activities (e.g. agriculture, construction, accommodation and food service 
activities) the LFS may understate the number of employed due to underestimation of seasonal workers.
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much less than the share constitut-
ed by recently arrived third-country 
nationals (14.5 %). 
More generally, the recently arrived 
third-country nationals have a higher 
share of local employment in the 
EU-15 countries than recent EU mov-
ers from EU-12 Member States – with 
the exception of manufacturing and 
construction (where the shares are 
roughly equal). 
This 2010 sectoral distribution of 
employment in EU-15 has, in many 
Member States, been affected by 
the recession, with the sectors most 
affected since 2007 being manufac-
turing, construction, and to a certain 
extent, ‘other services’ (see Table 17). 
These declines have, however, not 
substantially affected the overall sec-
toral distribution of employment in 
the EU-15 countries. 
As far as mobile workers from EU-10 
and EU-2 are concerned, their global 
level of employment in the EU-15 
countries increased strongly over 
the period 2007-2010 (by 20.5 % and 
43.2 % respectively) due to the sig-
nificant inflows of workers. How-
ever, growth has been lowest in the 
construction sector which has led to 
a fall in the share of the construction 
sector in the employment of EU-10 
(from 14 to 11 %) and EU-2 movers 
(from 27 to 22 %) living in EU-15 
countries. This is also to a certain 
extent the case within the manu-
facturing sector. On the other hand, 
the sectors with the stronger growth 
of employment of EU-10 and EU-2 
movers have been, at EU-15 level, 
trade, accommodation, food services, 
transportation, and information and 
communication (i.e.: mainly ‘accom-
modation and food services’ for both 
EU-10 and EU-2, and wholesale and 
retail trade for EU-10 workers).
4.5. Employment 
structure by occupation
Around 57 % of the EU-15 recent mov-
ers are employed in high-skilled occu-
pations (ISCO Categories 1, 2, and 3), 
35 % in occupations requiring inter-
mediate levels of education (ISCO Cat-
egories 4 to 8), and less than 10 % 
in elementary occupations (ISCO Cat-
egory 9), see Table 18. This confirms 
the profile of EU-15 recent movers as 
being, on average, older and more 
highly-skilled (see section on educa-
tional level below) than the other 
groups of intra-EU movers.
The profile of the EU-10 and EU-2 
recent movers is radically different: 
they are concentrated in occupations 
requiring low or intermediate quali-
fications, with highly-skilled occu-
pations representing only 17 % of 
EU-10 movers and 7 % of EU-2 mov-
ers. Elementary occupations account 
for as much as 40 % of the EU-2 
movers in employment and around 
30 % of EU-10 movers as against only 
10 % of all jobs in EU-15 Member 
States. A similar over-representation 
can be found in ‘plant and machine 
operators and assemblers’ among 
the EU-10 movers and for the ‘craft 
and related trade workers’ among 
the EU-2 movers.
The occupational distribution among 
recently arrived third-country nation-
als is different, with a higher share of 
highly-skilled occupations (22.6 %). 
At the other end of the skill spec-
trum, few are employed as ‘craft and 
related trades workers’ and ‘plant 
and machine operators and assem-
blers’ while the categories ‘service 
workers and shop and market sales 
workers’ (21.5 %) and ‘elementary 
occupations’ (32 %) are by far the 
most popular among recently arrived 
third-country nationals. 
This occupational distribution on the 
basis of citizenship is also visible in 
the share of recent intra-EU movers 
in total employment in EU-15 Mem-
ber States, by occupation (Table 19). 
The occupations in which the EU-10 
recent movers have the highest share 
of total employment are the elemen-
tary occupations (16 out of 1 000 jobs 
in EU-15) followed by ‘plant and 
machine operators and assemblers’ 
(10 out of 1 000 jobs in the EU-15) 
and by ‘craft and related trade work-
ers’ and ‘service workers and shop 
and market sales workers’. In all 
other occupations, they have a very 
low share of total employment. 
Table 17: Sectoral share in employment and employment growth (2007-2010) in the EU-15 countries by group of citizenship
Sectors
All EU-15 residents EU-15 foreign nationals EU-10 foreign nationals EU-2 foreign nationals Third-country nationals
Share 
2007
Share 
2010
Emp.
growth
Share 
2007
Share 
2010
Emp.
growth
Share 
2007
Share 
2010
Emp.
growth
Share 
2007
Share 
2010
Emp.
growth
Share 
2007
Share 
2010
Emp.
growth
A 3.2 2.9 -12.8 1.5 0.9 -40.2 2.6 2.6 18.5 6.8 6.0 26.3 2.7 3.1 19.4
B-E 18.2 16.5 -11.0 18.3 16.0 -12.1 21.2 19.7 12.0 14.1 13.6 37.9 17.4 15.2 -10.1
F 8.3 7.6 -9.9 9.5 8.9 -5.5 14.1 11.1 -5.6 26.6 21.8 17.5 14.2 10.7 -22.3
G-J 25.1 26.9 5.2 27.1 30.1 11.6 30.8 34.2 33.8 23.1 25.2 56.1 29.6 31.3 8.9
K-N 13.9 13.7 -3.5 16.6 16.6 0.6 11.5 12.3 28.7 6.9 7.5 56.1 12.4 12.8 6.0
O-Q 25.0 26.5 4.3 17.7 19.1 8.4 11.3 12.7 35.1 4.7 6.0 85.6 11.0 12.8 20.8
R-U 6.3 5.9 -9.4 9.3 8.4 -9.4 8.3 7.4 6.7 17.7 19.8 59.5 12.7 14.2 15.4
Total 100 100 -2.0 100 100 0.5 100 100 20.5 100 100 43.2 100 100 3.2
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: No criteria of duration of residence applied in these tables (all EU-15, EU-10, EU-2, and third-country nationals in employment are included). In order to draw 
a time comparison 2007-2010 and due to the modification of the sectoral nomenclature used (from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE Rev. 2), the sectors have been grouped 
in larger categories: A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing. B-E: Mining and quarrying; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, etc.; Water supply; sewerage, waste manage-
ment, etc. F: Construction. G-J: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Transportation and storage; Accommodation and food service 
activities; Information and communication. K-N: Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities; Professional, scientific, and technical activities; Administrative 
and support service activities. O-Q: Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; Education; Human health and social work activities. R-U: Arts, 
entertainment and recreation; Other service activities; Activities of households as employers; Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies.
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As for the EU-2 recent movers, they 
fill 17 out 1 000 jobs in elementary 
occupations and 8 out of 1 000 jobs 
for ‘craft and related trade workers’, 
but account for a negligible (less than 
0.1 %) share of total employment in 
the first four occupations listed in 
Table 19, i.e. those that require high-
er (or intermediate) qualifications. 
For their part, EU-15 recent movers 
have a relatively high employment 
share amongst professionals (around 
1 %) and legislators, senior officials, 
and managers (0.7 %).
Finally, recently arrived third-country 
nationals fill 50 out 1 000 jobs in 
elementary occupations and 23 out 
of 1 000 in ‘service workers, shop and 
market sales workers’. For all other 
occupations, their share in total 
employment in EU-15 Member States 
is around or lower than 1 %.
4.6. Educational 
attainment
The skill level of mobile workers is 
particularly important in terms of 
assessing the impact of mobility flows 
on the economies of the sending and 
receiving countries. The departure 
of large numbers of highly skilled 
workers may have a negative impact 
for the sending country in terms of 
“brain drain” while, for the receiving 
countries, an inflow of high-skilled 
workers will tend to raise overall pro-
ductivity. Inflow of low-skilled work-
ers may also be positive for receiving 
countries, if they enter occupations or 
sectors with labour shortages. 
It should be noted that the analysis 
developed below is based on the 
highest educational attainment as 
declared in the Labour force sur-
vey which may imply certain caveats. 
Indeed, this source has some prob-
lems in recording the educational 
attainment of foreigners, in particu-
lar if qualifications were obtained 
outside the host country. More gen-
erally, educational attainment is the 
most commonly used proxy for ‘skill 
level’. However, this proxy does not 
take account of an individual’s expe-
rience or their on-the-job training. 
Around 22 % of EU-10 recent mov-
ers have a high educational attain-
ment, 61 % are medium-skilled, and 
around 17 % low-skilled (Chart 24). 
EU-2 recent movers are, on average, 
less qualified with only 14 % having 
a tertiary education, half of them 
secondary education, and the rest 
(34 %) being in the low-educated 
category. Therefore, as far as send-
ing countries are concerned, there 
does not seem to be a strong brain 
drain effect given that the share of 
Table 18: Employment of total resident populations, recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals by occupation, 2010  
(% of total employment by group)
Occupation (ISCO) 
EU-15 EU-10 EU-2
Third-
country 
nationals
Total 
resident 
population 
EU-15 
movers
Total 
resident 
population 
EU-10 
movers
Total 
resident 
population 
EU-2 
movers
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers 9.0 12.6 6.9 4.8 3.4 1.5 4.4
2 Professionals 14.8 27.6 15.2 6.6 11.8 2.5 11.4
3 Technicians and associate professionals 17.6 16.8 14.9 5.2 9.7 3.3 6.7
4 Clerks 11.7 7.8 7.6 4.7 5.6 2.5 5.8
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers 14.6 14.4 13.0 16.9 13.3 15.9 21.5
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 2.5 1.4 6.9 1.1 17.1 2.5 1.3
7 Craft and related trades workers 12.4 8.1 15.9 15.6 15.7 24.0 10.8
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 7.3 4.1 11.7 14.5 11.7 7.5 6.0
9 Elementary occupations 10.0 7.3 7.8 30.5 11.8 40.4 32.1
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in another Member State. Third-country nationals are 
defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in an EU Member State. 
Table 19: Share of recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals among EU-15 employment by occupation, 2010  
(per 1 000 employed in occupation)
Occupation (ISCO) EU-15 movers EU-10 movers EU-2 movers Third-country nationals
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers 7.1 2.8 0.7 7.8
2 Professionals 9.5 2.2 0.7 12.2
3 Technicians and associate professionals 4.8 1.4 0.8 5.9
4 Clerks 3.4 2.0 0.9 7.8
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers 5.0 5.9 4.6 23.3
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 2.8 2.3 4.3 8.4
7 Craft and related trades workers 3.3 6.4 8.3 13.7
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 2.8 10.1 4.4 12.7
9 Elementary occupations 3.8 15.9 17.3 50.1
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers and third-country nationals are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less in an EU-15 Member State.
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the high-skilled persons among the 
EU-10 recent movers is lower (22 %) 
than the share in the origin coun-
tries’ active population (25 %). This 
is even more so where EU-2 recent 
movers are concerned, with a highly 
educated share of 14 %, much below 
the 19 % in the origin countries’ 
active population.
Compared to the labour force in the 
receiving countries (EU-15), the share 
of those having a medium level of 
education among EU-10 and EU-2 
recent movers is significantly higher. 
However, the share of highly-educat-
ed is higher in the active population 
of EU-15 (29 %) than among EU-10 
(22 %), and especially EU-2 recent 
movers (14 %). 
Finally, a large gap between the two 
groups of recent movers exists at the 
lower skill level. For the EU-10 recent 
movers the share of low-educated is 
much lower (17 %) than in the aver-
age EU-15 population (26 %), while 
for the EU-2 recent movers it is much 
higher (34 %). The educational attain-
ment pattern of EU-15 movers is com-
pletely different since almost half of 
them are highly-educated (49 %).
A comparison of the occupational 
distribution of recent EU movers 
compared with their levels of edu-
cation suggests a significant ‘down-
skilling’ of recent movers from the 
EU-10 and EU-2 countries(33). This is 
especially true for EU-10 recent mov-
ers, 30 % of whom work in elemen-
tary occupations even though only 
17 % are categorised as low-skilled. 
At the other end of the skills spec-
trum we see that, for both EU-10 and 
EU-2 recent movers, the  proportion 
(33) This comparison has already been made 
in the 2008 version of ‘Employment in 
Europe’ (see chapter 2) and is based on 
a classification of ISCO occupations in 
three groups: those requiring high skills 
(ISCO 1-3), those requiring intermediate 
skills (ISCO 4-8) and the low-skilled occu-
pations (ISCO 9). The share of each group 
of occupations is compared to the dis-
tribution of the educational level: high 
skilled (ISCED 5-6), medium (ISCED 3-4) 
and low (ISCED 0-2). For more details, see 
correspondence table in ‘Employment in 
Europe -2008’, page 104.
of those who are high-skilled (respec-
tively 22 and 14 %) is higher than 
the proportions in occupations 
that require high-skills (respectively 
17 and 7 %). Overall, the data on 
recent EU movers working in occupa-
tions requiring less than their educa-
tional level (e.g. high-skilled working 
in intermediary and low skilled occu-
pations and medium-skilled working 
in low skilled occupations) suggests 
that the share of workers employed 
in occupations below their qualifica-
tions level is over 30 % for EU-10 as 
well as for EU-2 recent movers(34). 
What explains this so-called down-
skilling? According to Holland et al. 
(2011), the fact that many recent 
EU movers from EU-10 and EU-2 
countries have come for a limited 
(34) One can also calculate the share of recent 
EU movers working in occupations that 
require in theory a higher educational 
attainment than the one they currently 
have (low-skilled working in intermedi-
ary and high-skilled occupations and 
medium-skilled working in high skilled 
occupations). It gives the following fig-
ures: 18.5 % among EU-2 workers and 
15.8 % among EU-10 workers. It should, 
however, be noted that most of these 
“theoretically under-qualified” workers 
are low-skilled workers in the following 
occupations: ‘craft and related trades 
workers’, ‘plant and machine operators 
and assemblers’, and ‘services workers 
and shop and market sales workers’. This 
shows the limitation of the correspond-
ence established between educational 
(ISCED) and the occupation (ISCO) clas-
sifications since the ISCO occupations at 
1-digit level are broad categories which 
include jobs requiring very  different 
 levels of skills.
duration, mainly to take advantage 
of better employment prospects 
and higher salaries than in their 
countries of origin, could explain 
why they have been inclined to 
accept lower skilled jobs than they 
would have in their home coun-
try. In order to explain why many 
high-skilled recent movers are not 
employed in high-skilled occupa-
tions, Wadsworth (2010) suggests 
the same reasons, but also points 
out the possible unwillingness of 
employers to employ EU-8 and EU-2 
citizens in high skilled jobs given 
difficulties in both language and a 
lack of information about the value 
of qualifications and skills acquired 
in another country (or difficulties in 
having them formally  recognised). 
Finally, the recession and its impact 
on return mobility may have influ-
enced the educational composi-
tion of EU movers. The ‘Mobility in 
Europe-2010’ report’(35) found, on the 
basis of EU-LFS data, that the return 
migration in 2009 was disproportion-
ate among those with upper second-
ary level qualifications rather than 
those with tertiary education or only 
basic schooling. This finding could 
be consistent with the recession hit-
ting those with vocational qualifica-
tions working in manufacturing and 
 construction in particular. 
(35) European Commission (2010a).
Chart 24: Educational attainment of recent intra-EU movers and total active 
population (aged 15-64), 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as economically active working-age foreign nationals resident for 
seven years or less in another Member State.
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4.7. Other labour-
related characteristics
In terms of working time, recent 
intra-EU movers seem to follow the 
overall pattern in the EU-15 receiving 
countries, with around 20 % working 
part-time and the rest working full-
time (Chart 25), although somewhat 
more EU-2 movers tend to work 
 part-time (23 %). 
In terms of the type of work contract 
(Chart 26), one-third of EU-2 recent 
movers (being employees) have fixed-
term contracts, compared with 15 % 
of EU-10 recent movers, and 19 % for 
EU-15 recent movers. The high share 
of fixed term contracts among recent 
EU-2 movers is linked to the substan-
tial proportion of them working in 
Spain where some 25 % of contracts 
are fixed term (the highest propor-
tion in the EU). In fact in Spain over 
50 % of EU-2 employees have fixed 
term contracts.
With regard to EU-10 movers, it is 
important to note that their share 
of fixed-term contracts is low due 
to their low share (9 %) in the main 
destination countries, the UK and Ire-
land. In these countries, the distinc-
tion between fixed-term and indefi-
nite duration contracts cannot be 
interpreted in the same way as other 
Member States since there is a low 
level of protection against dismissal, 
whatever the form of contract. In 
other main receiving countries, the 
share of fixed-term contracts among 
EU-10 employees is much higher 
(around 30% in Germany and 25% in 
Austria and Italy).
Chart 25: Share of full-time and part-time jobs among recent intra-EU movers and 
total employment, 2010
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less 
in another Member State.
Chart 26: Share of fixed-term contract versus indefinite duration contract, among 
recent recent intra-EU movers and total employees, 2010
Fixed-term contractIndenite duration 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
EU-2 movers
Total EU-2 population 
EU-10 movers
Total EU-10 population 
EU-15 movers
Total EU-15 population 
EU
-2
EU
-1
0
EU
-1
5
86 14
81 19
83 17
85 15
98 2
67 33
% of total  
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, EU LFS (annual averages). 
Note: Recent intra-EU movers are defined as working-age foreign nationals resident for seven years or less 
in another Member State.
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5. economic impacT 
of inTra-eu mobiliTy
5.1. Economic growth, 
GDP per capita
Economic theory predicts that migra-
tion will affect (potential) GDP: in 
the receiving country, labour migra-
tion increases the labour force and 
is, as a result, expected to raise GDP 
while the opposite is true for the 
sending country. 
Intra-EU mobility can raise the over-
all EU GDP if it improves labour 
allocation, through a better match 
of workers’ skills and job vacancies, 
which would boost overall produc-
tivity. While changes in the labour 
force affect GDP, migration does not 
necessarily change GDP per capita 
significantly. It is even likely that GDP 
per capita in the receiving country is 
reduced initially. As it takes time for 
the capital stock to adjust, productiv-
ity could fall initially. 
Over time, GDP per capita can be 
expected to rise again as the share of 
the working-age population (in the 
total population) is boosted by the 
immigration of mostly young work-
ers (D’Auria, Mc Morrow, and Pichel-
mann, 2008). The extent of these 
effects depends, however, on the skill 
characteristics of the migrant popula-
tion and how these relate to the skills 
of the native population and the job 
vacancies in the receiving countries.
Most empirical studies analysing the 
economic impact of migration con-
firm these theoretical expectations. 
This is also the case with studies 
analysing specifically the recent EU 
enlargement(s), such as D’Auria, Mc 
Morrow and Pichelmann, 2008, Brück-
er et al., 2009, and Baas, Brücker and 
Hauptmann, 2009. These studies find 
a significant long-term increase in EU 
GDP and EU GDP per capita (both 
of 0.2-0.3 %) following the intra-EU 
population flows since 2004. For EU-15 
Member States, these studies predict 
a slightly higher ( long-term) increase 
in GDP (0.3-0.4 %), but also a minor 
decrease in GDP per capita, as a result 
of migration from EU-8. EU-8 countries 
would, in turn, see a sizeable decrease 
in GDP (of 1-2 %), but a slight increase 
in GDP per capita (0 to 0.5 %).
In what follows, the focus will be on a 
recent analysis by Holland et al., 2011. 
This study simulates the impact of the 
observed flows from EU-8+2 to EU-15 
over the period 2004-2009, using the 
National Institute Global Economet-
ric Model (NiGEM). The estimates of 
long-term effects are based on the 
assumption that all the population 
shifts that have occurred up to 2009 
were permanent, with no further 
assumptions about population shifts 
since then(36). The GDP impact for an 
individual Member State is evidently 
closely related to the relative size of 
the net cumulated population flows 
from/to that Member State, relative 
to the size of the domestic popula-
tion. The simulation results presented 
in Table 20 have also been fine-tuned 
to take account of the age structure 
of the migrants relative to the host 
and sending countries(37).
According to Holland et al., 2011, 
the population flows have raised the 
long-term level of EU-15 potential 
output by up to 0.9 %, with flows 
from EU-8 and EU-2 each contributing 
about half of the impact. This impact 
seems very large compared to the 
studies cited above. However, those 
studies considered only the migration 
flows up to 2007 and were restricted 
to the impact of flows from EU-8 to 
EU-15. The exception to the latter 
restriction was Brücker et al., 2009, 
which estimated a long-term EU-15 
GDP effect of 0.3 % for EU-2 flows, 
adding up to a total effect of 0.6 % 
for EU-8+2. Taking into account the 
(36) Annex 2 provides more information on 
the econometric background to Holland 
et al., 2011.
(37) Section 4, on the characteristics of 
mobile citizens, showed that the share 
of 15-64 age olds is larger in the migrat-
ed than in the native population. An 
adjustment, based on the EU LFS sta-
tistics, was appropriate as a result. The 
study also fine-tuned for differences in 
productivity  levels. These results are not 
presented here.
flows over two more years would 
then yield a larger GDP effect given 
that about one-third of the present 
stock of EU-8+2 migrants in EU-15 
have arrived since 2007 (see Section 2, 
on the extent of intra-EU mobility). 
According to Holland et al., 2011, the 
biggest boost to GDP came from pop-
ulation flows to Ireland and the UK 
from EU-8 and to Spain and Italy from 
EU-2. However, the long-term impact 
on GDP per capita of EU-15 Member 
States is expected to be negligible. 
The shock to the sending countries 
is seen to have been much larg-
er than to the receiving countries. 
The biggest effects are estimated 
to have been in Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Lithuania, where the potential 
level of output may be permanently 
reduced by 5-11 %. Also for Latvia 
and Estonia, the reduction will reach 
3 % of potential output. However, 
the impact on GDP per capita is sig-
nificantly smaller – though it remains 
negative in most of the sending coun-
tries. GDP per capita may decline by 
0.5 to 3 % for Romania, Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slo-
vakia. The study concluded also that 
remittances can partially offset the 
negative growth impact in the short 
to medium term. However, remit-
tances cannot mend the longer-term 
problem of lower potential growth 
as a result of lower labour input. 
Holland et al., 2011, also developed 
a model of the location decision of 
the mobile workers from EU-8+2 
to EU-15, which makes it possible 
to assess the role of the transi-
tional arrangements in the location 
decision, taking account of macro-
economic and demographic develop-
ments (see main results in Box 2). 
One of the findings is that the 
long-term effect of the transitional 
arrangements can be expected to 
raise the potential level of output 
in Ireland, the UK, and Sweden by 
0.1 % or more. By contrast, they 
are expected to reduce the level 
of potential output in Germany, 
 Austria, Belgium, and Denmark by 
at least the same amount. 
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It should be noted that the studies 
referred to above, when estimat-
ing the impact of intra-EU mobility 
on GDP, only consider in their cal-
culations foreign workers that are 
‘usually resident’ in the destination 
country. This is mainly due to data 
availability. Therefore ‘posted work-
ers’ (see Section 2) are not taken into 
account. The same applies to sea-
sonal workers and short-term mobile 
workers who are not picked up in 
population statistics.
5.2. Labour market
While the impact of migration on 
potential output of receiving coun-
tries is estimated to be positive, even 
in per capita terms, migration con-
tinues to raise concerns regarding 
the labour market impact for native 
workers in EU-15 Member States. At 
the current stage, a basic graphical 
or statistical analysis of recent labour 
market developments in EU-15 Mem-
ber States will not be able to single 
out the impact of immigration, as 
the effects of the crisis still dominate 
labour market developments.
Theoretically, an increase in the 
labour supply due to immigration 
lowers the price of substitute fac-
tors and raises the price of comple-
mentary factors. The labour market 
outcome in the receiving country 
depends, as a result, on the degree 
of substitution between the skills of 
immigrants and natives. In an open 
economy, the subsequent expan-
sion of labour-intensive activities 
renders the overall labour market 
outcomes uncertain. 
Immigration may in any case have 
positive labour market effects in 
terms of relieving labour shortages 
in segments where native work-
ers are absent. Moreover, migrants 
react fast to regional differences 
in economic opportunities, increas-
ing labour market efficiency (Diez 
Guardia and Pichelmann, 2006). One 
caveat is that the standard theo-
ry assumes that wages adjust and 
labour markets clear.
As migration is a growing phenom-
enon worldwide, research on its 
labour market impact has expand-
ed significantly. This literature has 
been comprehensively surveyed in 
Okkerse, 2008, while two meta- 
analyses of the literature can be 
found in Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 
2008, and Longhi, Nijkamp, and 
Poot, 2010. A general conclusion, 
common to most studies, is that 
the wage and employment effects 
of an immigration shock are very 
small. Effects that do exist tend 
to be short-term and concentrated 
on natives or past immigrants who 
are close substitutes to these immi-
grants in labour market terms (Kerr 
and Kerr, 2011).
For an empirical assessment of the 
labour market impact of increased 
intra-EU mobility following the 
recent EU enlargement(s), we 
return to the four studies ana-
lysed under the GDP impact (Sec-
tion 5.1). These confirm the very 
limited long-term impact of post-
enlargement mobility flows on 
real wages and unemployment. In 
general, they find a short-term 
decline in real wages and a short-
term increase in unemployment in 
Member States that have received 
large inflows.
Table 20: Long-term impact on output of EU-8+2 migration to EU-15, age adjusted
EU-8 migration to EU-15 EU-2 migration to EU-15
GDP per capita GDP per capita
Belgium 0.4 0.1 Belgium 0.3 0.1
Denmark 0.6 0.1 Denmark 0.1 0.0
Finland 0.2 -0.0 Finland -0.1 -0.1
France 0.0 0.0 France 0.1 0.0
Germany 0.2 0.0 Germany 0.1 -0.0
Greece 0.1 0.0 Greece 0.6 0.1
Ireland 3.0 0.0 Ireland 0.3 0.0
Italy 0.2 0.0 Italy 1.3 0.1
Netherlands 0.3 0.0 Netherlands 0.1 0.0
Austria 0.4 0.0 Austria 0.5 0.0
Portugal 0.1 0.0 Portugal 0.3 0.0
Sweden 0.4 -0.0 Sweden 0.0 -0.1
Spain 0.2 0.0 Spain 1.7 0.1
United Kingdom 1.2 0.2 United Kingdom 0.2 0.0
EU-15 0.4 0.1 EU-15 0.4 -0.0
Czech Republic -0.2 0.1 Bulgaria -5.4 -1.7
Estonia -3.0 -0.7 Romania -10.6 -3.1
Hungary -0.4 0.2 EU-2 -9.4 -3.0
Lithuania -6.0 -1.4
Latvia -3.3 -0.7
Poland -1.8 0.7
Slovenia -0.4 -0.1
Slovakia -2.3 -0.5
EU-8 -1.5 0.4
Source: Holland et al., 2011. Estimates not available for LU (see annex 2).
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As a result of the inflow from EU-8, 
Holland et al., 2011, found a sig-
nificant negative long-term effect on 
real wages in Ireland (-1.6 %) and 
the UK (-0.4 %), while for EU-15 as a 
whole, the long-term effect on real 
wages is comparable to the findings 
of D’Auria, Mc Morrow and Pichel-
mann, 2008, at -0.1 to -0.2 %. As for 
the inflow from EU-2, Holland et al. 
(2011) estimated that it had a larger 
effect on real wages, specifically for 
Spain and Italy (-0.7 % for both coun-
tries), but also for EU-15 as a whole 
(at -0.3 %). By contrast, an increase in 
real wages, as a result of the popula-
tion outflows, is seen in sending coun-
tries (only for those for which wages 
were modelled in NiGEM). As for the 
long-term impact on unemployment 
rate, Holland et al. (2011) estimated 
that it is very small (at maximum 0.1 
percentage point), for inflow from 
EU-8 as for inflow from EU-2.
One caveat is that these results may 
suffer from an aggregation bias and 
results for specific skill groups, sec-
tors, or occupations may differ sig-
nificantly from the aggregated results 
(Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann, 
2009). D’Auria, Mc Morrow, and 
Pichelmann, 2008, and Brücker et 
al., 2009, also present disaggregated 
results that show that the employ-
ment effect for low-skilled workers 
would be larger than for the aggre-
gate in EU-15 (negative) and in EU-8 
(positive). However, in the long-run, 
most studies find that the employ-
ment effects are rather moderate, 
even for less-skilled workers (see also 
Baas, Brücker, and  Hauptmann, 2009).
Finally, the caveat on the non-inclu-
sion of postings, seasonal workers, 
and other short-term mobile workers 
(see GDP impact) also holds here.
5.3. Public finances 
and welfare system
There is a degree of public concern 
that the generosity or accessibility 
of the welfare state may influence 
migrants’ decisions when choosing 
the country of destination. However, 
Brücker et al., 2009, conclude that con-
cern about welfare abuse by EU-8+2 
immigrants is probably misplaced. The 
study found limited evidence with 
respect to the impact of immigration 
on the welfare systems. The higher 
dependency among immigrants on 
non-contributory allowances(38) can be 
explained by the characteristics of 
immigrants – mainly their education 
level, age, and number of children. 
After controlling for such character-
istics, Barrett and Maitre, 2011, also 
find that rates of welfare receipts for 
EU-born migrants are about equal or 
less than for natives.
The overall impact of intra-EU mobil-
ity on public finances goes beyond 
the issue of welfare disbursement. In 
general, empirical studies estimate 
the net fiscal impact of immigration 
to be very small and slightly positive 
(Kerr and Kerr, 2011, and Rowthorn, 
2008). This also seems to be the 
case for immigration from EU-8+2 
to EU-15 (D’Auria, Mc Morrow, and 
Pichelmann, 2008). 
In practice the net fiscal impact of 
an individual migrant depends on 
that person’s age, education, and 
duration of stay. The extent of tem-
porary migration in the flows from 
EU-8+2 to EU-15(39) would tend to 
have a positive fiscal effect in so 
far as migrants return home before 
being entitled to specific benefits. 
In a longer-term perspective, how-
ever, intra-EU mobility may put the 
public finances of EU-8+2 Member 
States under pressure in so far as 
large outflows of young citizens dis-
tort the population balance between 
those of working age and those no 
longer working (Kahanec, Zaiceva, 
and  Zimmermann, 2009).
(38) Non-contributory allowances are social-
insurance schemes for which entitle-
ment is not linked to prior contributions; 
examples: housing and family allow-
ances and transfers targeted to groups 
which are exposed to the risk of social 
exclusion.
(39) See Section 4, on characteristics of 
mobile workers in the EU.
5.4. Brain drain or 
brain gain? 
The effect of outflows of high-
skilled citizens on potential growth 
of the sending countries has 
sparked concerns. However, this 
traditional brain-drain assumption 
has been challenged by some theo-
ries and observations. The so-called 
‘brain-gain’ assumption states that 
the possibility of future migration 
induces people to get more educa-
tion (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). 
Moreover, temporary and return 
migration, which is large in the 
flows from EU-8+2 to EU-15, may 
be seen as an investment in lan-
guage and other new skills and in 
professional networks. These skills 
can be transferred back home on 
returning (Kahanec, Zaiceva, and 
Zimmermann, 2009).
Section 4, which addressed the char-
acteristics of mobile workers in the 
EU, concluded that there was little 
evidence of a strong brain-drain 
effect in the migration from EU-8+2 
to EU-15, since the share of high-
skilled persons amongst mobile citi-
zens is lower than the share in the 
origin countries’ active population 
for EU-8. This is even more the case 
as far as EU-2 mobile citizens are 
concerned. Moreover, the outflow 
of skilled labour is somewhat com-
pensated by an improvement of the 
education level among the EU-8+2 
population, with EU-8+2 tertiary 
attainment rates for 30–34 year 
olds catching up with the rest of 
the EU (Table 21). The increase of 
tertiary attainment rates between 
2004 and 2010 was faster than 
the EU-27 average in each EU-8+2 
Member State, except Bulgaria. 
In the case of Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Slovenia, this attain-
ment rate already exceeded the 
EU-27 average in 2010. Never-
theless, the absence of a general 
brain-drain effect does not pre-
clude such effects in specific sectors, 
such as the medical profession in 
Poland, where regional problems 
are observed ( Kaczmarczyk, 2010).
Chapter 6  Intra-EU labour mobility and the impact of enlargement
277
5.5. Remittances
The section on the growth impact 
of intra-EU mobility referred to the 
cushion that remittances may offer 
to counter-balance to some extent 
the negative GDP impact for EU-8+2 
Member States(40). Remittances in a 
strict sense are defined as current pri-
vate transfers to the country of origin 
from migrant workers resident in the 
host country for more than a year. In 
view of the large role of temporary 
migration in the flows from EU-8+2 to 
EU-15(41), remittances in a strict sense 
are topped up by the balance-of-pay-
ments item “compensation of employ-
ees”, which is the income of migrants 
who have lived in the host country for 
(40) In Holland el al. (2011) the adjustment 
of the impact (of population outflows to 
the EU-15 on GDP) to take into account 
remittances has been done, but only for 
three countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
and Hungary). In all cases, the originally 
negative impact on the GDP becomes 
positive after this adjustment (and the 
already positive impact on GDP per cap-
ita becomes larger). Furthermore, the 
authors point out that one would expect 
“an even greater positive impact on out-
put in Bulgaria and Romania once remit-
tances are taken into account, given the 
magnitude of remittances to these coun-
tries relative to the size of their GDP”.
(41) And in view of the difficulties in assess-
ing the length of stay of migrants in the 
host country.
less than a year (which includes border 
and seasonal workers). This follows 
World Bank practice in this respect (see 
for example, World Bank, 2011).
The detail of separate remittance and 
compensation flows will not be ana-
lysed, due to limited data  availability 
(see also Eurostat, 2010(42)). Never-
theless, the large role of temporary 
migration is reflected in the large 
share of compensation in the aggre-
gate flows of compensation and 
remittances. This share is very high 
for EU-8 Member States, at about 
80 % in 2009, and even higher in the 
Member States with possibilities to 
commute to EU-15 (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia). 
For EU-2 Member States, the share of 
compensation is much smaller (Bul-
garia: about 40 %; Romania: less than 
20 %).These shares tend to overstate 
the weight of temporary migration 
(in number of migrants) as short-term 
migrants will send a larger part of 
(42) Eurostat started compilation of detailed 
data only in November 2009. Data are 
reported on a voluntary basis and are, 
therefore, still incomplete, especially for 
years prior to 2004. Remittances are very 
difficult to compile as they represent 
numerous, small transactions through a 
large variety of channels.
their earnings back home. Finally, it is 
important to note that these numbers 
do not account for unrecorded remit-
tances sent home by migrants through 
informal channels, suggesting that the 
true size of the actual transfers is likely 
to be largely underestimated.
On average since 2004, remittance and 
compensation flows (from all countries) 
received by EU-8+2 Member States 
amounted to at least 1.7 % of nomi-
nal GDP (of which 1.5 % was received 
from the EU-15) (Table 22). The excep-
tions on the downside were the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia, in line with the 
limited population outflows from these 
Member States. On the upside, Bulgaria 
and Romania were the largest receivers 
of remittance and compensation flows 
in % of GDP. 
Not surprisingly, the flows to EU-8+2 
Member States of remittances and 
compensation from EU-15 Member 
States are closely correlated with the 
cumulated population outflows to the 
latter countries since 2004. The excep-
tion is Bulgaria where remittance and 
compensation flows are particularly 
high relative to population outflow. 
For almost all EU-8+2 Member 
States, the average share of remit-
tance and compensation flows in 
GDP in the period 2008-2010 was 
below the average of the three 
previous years. This is a result of 
reduced employment opportuni-
ties for migrant workers, who often 
work in cyclically-sensitive sectors 
(Dietz, 2009, see also Section 4.2, on 
the impact of the recession on intra-
EU movers). Nevertheless, these 
flows continue to make a fairly sta-
ble and large flow of income in the 
migrants’ country of origin. 
It should also be noted that, as the 
remittance and compensation flows 
are expressed in nominal terms, the 
sizeable exchange rate movements 
over recent years will also have 
played a role. For example, some 
of the recent drop in remittance 
outflows from the UK reflects the 
decline in the relative value of the 
pound sterling (Koehler et al., 2010).
Table 21: Tertiary educational attainment, age group 30-34 years
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27 26.9 28.0 28.9 30.0 31.1 32.3 33.6
Bulgaria 25.2 24.9 25.3 26.0 27.1 27.9 27.7
Czech 
Republic
12.7 13.0 13.1 13.3 15.4 17.5 20.4
Estonia 27.4 30.6 32.5 33.3 34.1 35.9 40.0
Latvia 18.5 18.5 19.2 25.6 27.0 30.1 32.3
Lithuania 31.1 37.9 39.4 38.0 39.9 40.6 43.8
Hungary 18.5 17.9 19.0 20.1 22.4 23.9 25.7
Poland 20.4 22.7 24.7 27.0 29.7 32.8 35.3
Romania 10.3 11.4 12.4 13.9 16.0 16.8 18.1
Slovenia 25.1 24.6 28.1 31.0 30.9 31.6 34.8
Slovakia 12.9 14.3 14.4 14.8 15.8 17.6 22.1
Source: Eurostat, Europe 2020 indicators (t2020_41)
Table 22: Remittance and compensation flows received by EU-8+2 Member States, 
in % of nominal GDP
Period Origin BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK
99-03 world 4.5 0.5 0.2 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.3
04-07 world 5.4 0.8 1.9 2.1 2.6 1.7 2.2 3.9 0.7 1.8
08-10 world 3.2 0.6 1.7 2.2 3.5 1.7 1.8 3.4 0.6 2.0
04-07 EU-15 4.0 0.7 1.5 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.8 3.5 0.7 1.4
08-10 EU-15 2.1 0.5 1.4 1.7 2.8 1.4 1.5 2.9 0.6 1.6
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat BoP and World Bank
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When comparing population outflows, 
the size of remittances (including com-
pensation) and the estimated impact 
of outflows on GDP (age-adjusted, 
see Section 5.1), a high correlation is 
observed between population outflows 
and the size of remittances (Chart 27). 
The correlation between the impact 
on GDP and the size of remittances is 
much lower, with an outsized impact 
on GDP for EU-2 and the Baltic states, 
which may be linked to the difficulties 
in modelling these quickly changing 
and/or small economies. For the Mem-
ber States with the smallest outflows 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slo-
venia), the average size of remittances 
exceeds the impact on GDP. 
In these comparisons, attention must 
be paid to the fact that these quantities 
are not fully comparable: remittances 
are expressed in percentage of nomi-
nal GDP and are an observed average 
over 2004-2010. The impact on GDP is 
the long-term impact in  percentage 
points of real GDP of a model simula-
tion of the intra-EU mobility flows as 
observed over 2004-2009.
5.6. Social situation of 
migrants
The analysis of the social situation of 
(EU-12) migrants in EU-15 is hampered 
by the scarcity of data (see also Euro-
found, 2010). Eurostat publishes data 
on income and living conditions (EU-
SILC) according to citizenship, with a 
distinction between foreigners from 
inside and outside EU-27(43). In the for-
mer, the specific subsample of foreign-
ers from EU-12 is unfortunately too 
small to allow for reliable estimates. 
Nevertheless, data for EU-27 foreign-
ers resident in EU-15 can be used as 
an approximation of data for EU-12 
migrants resident in EU-15, if at the 
same time the share of EU-12 in 
EU-27 foreigners is considered. In 
what follows, this approach is fol-
lowed and the social situation is ana-
lysed with a focus on relative poverty 
rates for EU-27 foreigners. 
In EU-15 Member States, the risk of 
having a disposable income (after social 
transfer) below the poverty threshold 
is 24 % larger for EU-27  foreigners 
than for nationals (Table 23)(44). For 
most of the EU-15 Member States 
with a large share of EU-12 foreign-
ers, the gap between the two groups 
is even larger, especially in Austria 
where the at-risk-of-poverty rate of 
EU-27 foreigners is almost twice the 
rate for nationals. Two exceptions to 
this are Ireland and the United King-
dom, where the poverty risk is larger 
for nationals. For the EU-15 Member 
States with a smaller share of EU-12 
foreigners, the EU-27 indicator is less 
relevant for the situation of EU-12 for-
eigners. Nevertheless, in all cases but 
one, the poverty risk is again clearly 
larger for EU-27 foreigners. 
The results match with those of Sec-
tion 4 which showed a relative high 
employment rate for EU-12 foreign-
ers, but at the same time, an over-
representation in low-skilled and, as 
a result, low-paid jobs. 
(43) Unfortunately, EU-SILC does not provide 
information on how long the foreigner 
has been in the country.
(44) Chapter 3, Section 5.7, concluded that 
at comparable educational level, activity 
status, age, sex, and country of residence, 
an EU-migrant is 1.5 times as likely to 
face the risk of poverty or exclusion as a 
person born in the country of residence.
Chart 27: Population outflows, impact on GDP and remittances
Remittances (incl. compensation)Impact of mobility on GDP (-)Net population outflows
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
SK
SI
RO 10.6%
PL
HU
LT
LV
EE
CZ
BG
Sources: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat BoP, World Bank, and Holland et al., 2011. 
Note: Remittances: remittances plus compensation of employees, % of GDP, average ‘04-’10 (source: DG 
EMPL calculations based on Eurostat BoP and World Bank)  
Impact of mobility on GDP: impact of intra-EU mobility ‘04-’09 as simulated through NIGEM, sign inverted, 
long-term effect, age adjusted (source: Holland et al., 2011)  
Net outflows: outflows over ‘04-’09, in % of domestic population (source: Holland et al., 2011)
Table 23: Relative poverty rates of EU-27 foreigners in EU-15, 2009
ARPR EU-27 
foreigners
ARPR 
nationals ARPR ratio
% EU-12 
in EU-27 
foreigners
Italy 20.4 16.4 1.24 86%
Greece 29.0 17.9 1.62 81%
Finland 18.7 13.9 1.35 58%
Ireland 11.5 13.7 0.84 57%
Spain 23.3 18.2 1.28 49%
United Kingdom 12.9 16.0 0.81 44%
Austria 19.6 10.4 1.88 43%
EU-15 18.4 14.8 1.24 40%
Denmark 19.1 13.2 1.45 35%
Germany 17.6 15.5 1.14 31%
Sweden 28.4 12.3 2.31 26%
Netherlands 9.0 9.5 0.95 25%
Belgium 18.1 12.1 1.50 12%
France 16.9 10.3 1.64 7%
Sources: DG EMPL calculations based on EU SILC 
Note: ARPR = at-risk-of-poverty rate, i.e. the share of people with a disposable income (after social transfer) 
below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. ARPR ratio is the ratio of the ARPR of the EU-27 foreigners and the 
nationals of the Member State. Portugal not included because of unreliable data.  
% EU-12 = percentage share of EU-12 nationals in EU-27 foreign population, based on Table 4
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6. key findings
Recent East-West mobility 
flows have been substantial 
in absolute terms…but limited 
compared to overall population 
and migration flows from 
outside EU
Before the two latest enlarge-
ments, the issue of free move-
ment of workers was a subject of 
concerns, notably with regard to 
the impact of increased inflows of 
workers on the economic and social 
situation in both the receiving and 
sending countries. This chapter 
has described and analysed recent 
trends of intra-EU labour mobil-
ity, with a particular focus on the 
mobility of citizens from the new 
EU-10 Member States (which joined 
on 1 May 2004) and EU-2 (which 
joined on 1 January 2007).
In absolute terms the inflows 
from EU-12 countries to EU-15 
countries have been considerable, 
about 3.6 million people over a 
relatively short period of time 
(2003-2010), representing a net 
annual growth of half a million, 
peaking at almost one million in 
2007. However, those numbers 
are limited compared with the 
population sizes of both receiv-
ing and sending countries, and 
compared to migration flows of 
 third-country nationals. 
Outflows from EU-12 countries 
were affected by income 
differentials (and employment 
opportunities) and directed 
towards a limited number of 
receiving countries
Flows from EU-12 countries were 
directed towards a limited number 
of countries: in 2010, around 85 % 
of EU-10 movers were established 
in six EU-15 Member States, primar-
ily the UK and Germany, followed 
by Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Austria, 
while three-quarters of EU-2 movers 
were in Italy and Spain (around one 
million each).
From the perspective of sending 
countries, the outflows (relative to 
the population of the countries) have 
been large, especially from  countries 
having a relatively low level of 
income compared to the EU aver-
age (Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Bulgaria), which has clearly been an 
important push factor behind intra-
EU mobility. Differences in respective 
employment opportunities have also 
played a role.
Decline of mobility due to the 
recession – but no massive 
return flows to home countries
Intra-EU mobility seemed to follow 
the trends of the economy: while 
in the 2004-2007 period of strong 
economic growth EU-15 countries 
received high inflows from EU-12 
countries, this trend changed radi-
cally with the economic recession. 
In 2009, the fall in labour demand 
generated a strong decline in the 
inflows especially in countries 
affected by the recession (Spain and 
Ireland) and also triggered some 
higher return outflows to the origin 
countries. There is, however, no evi-
dence of a massive return migration 
to the countries of origin with a sig-
nificant portion of the workers from 
the EU-8 and EU-2 having stayed in 
the  destination countries. 
Interestingly, the decline in intra-
EU mobility during the crisis has 
been less pronounced for EU-2 than 
for EU-10 nationals. This is because 
the enlargement to the EU-2 coun-
tries took place more recently and 
is still impacting workers’ mobil-
ity – but also because Bulgaria 
and Romania have been adversely 
affected by the recession and that 
the large gaps in GDP per capita 
with the EU-15 countries still con-
stitute a strong pull-factor. How-
ever, as regards future migration 
from EU-2, there are indications 
that many of the EU-2 nationals 
who wanted to move have already 
done so and that demographic fac-
tors (shrinking young generation) 
will reduce the pool of potentially 
mobile workers. 
The distribution of flows from 
EU-12 among EU-15 Member 
States resulted from economic 
and social factors, rather than 
from regulatory measures
The transitional arrangements 
regime and the resulting diverse 
levels of openness of the labour 
markets of receiving countries have 
influenced the distribution of labour 
flows across the receiving countries – 
but only to a certain extent. 
As far as EU-10 workers are con-
cerned, there was an evident diver-
sion of flows from Germany and 
Austria (which both kept restrictions 
until the end of the third phase 
of the transitional arrangements on 
30 April 2011) to the UK and Ire-
land, which decided to open their 
labour markets from May 2004. How-
ever, the shift in the distribution was 
already ongoing prior to the 2004 
enlargement, and can be explained 
to a large extent by differences in 
economic developments within the 
potential destination countries. 
In the case of EU-2 countries, many 
workers had already settled in other 
EU Member States before the 2007 
enlargement and the transitional 
arrangements do not seem to have 
significantly influenced the evolu-
tion of mobility flows since then, at 
least not in comparison to economic 
(and other destination-specific) fac-
tors. Member States having opened 
their labour market to EU-2 workers 
as early as 2007 have received very 
limited inflows. As for those having 
opened in 2009 (after the end of the 
first two-year phase), the inflows have 
either been limited or have decreased 
(compared to the previous years) at 
the moment when the restrictions 
were lifted- which can be partly 
explained by the economic recession. 
Meanwhile, the countries that con-
tinued to use transitional measures 
have received significant inflows since 
the accession– in the case of Italy no 
work permits have been required in 
several key sectors since 2007 which 
can explain the strong rise in mobility 
from EU-2 countries.
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This seems to suggest that transi-
tional measures have only a lim-
ited influence on the distribution of 
intra-EU mobility and that mobility 
flows are driven by other factors, 
such as labour demand, network 
effects through an existing foreign 
 population, or language. Network 
effects seem for instance to have 
played a determinant role in the 
concentration of EU-2 nationals in 
Spain and Italy – and in the lim-
ited return mobility to the origin 
countries, despite the worsening of 
 economic conditions. 
Recent movers from EU-12 
are young and likely to be in 
employment…
The analysis of the characteristics of 
recent movers from EU-12 showed 
that: 
•	 they are on average younger than 
the overall population in both 
sending and receiving countries 
and have a higher rate of employ-
ment when they move abroad than 
in their origin countries;
•	 while EU-10 mobile citizens are 
significantly more likely to be in 
employment than the residents in 
the receiving EU-15 countries, the 
employment rate of EU-2 recent 
movers is lower, closer to the aver-
age in the main receiving countries;
…they work in specific sectors 
(accounting for a small share 
of total employment) and 
are concentrated in low and 
medium skilled occupations…
•	 at the sectoral level, recent EU-10 
movers work primarily in manu-
facturing and trade while recent 
EU-2 movers’ most popular sectors 
of activity are construction and 
domestic services, with ‘accommo-
dation and food service activities’ 
being the third most frequent sec-
tor for both EU-10 and EU-2 mov-
ers. Even in those sectors, the share 
of recent movers from EU-12 in 
total employment in the receiving 
countries is limited;
•	 In 2010, employment of EU-10 
and EU-2 recent movers was rela-
tively concentrated in low- and 
medium-skilled occupations. While 
this reflects partly their overall 
skill profile, there is a significant 
number of workers experiencing 
a phenomenon of ‘down-skilling’ 
(around 30% of both EU-10 and 
EU-2 movers being employed 
below their qualifications). 
…but have been strongly 
affected by the economic crisis, 
in particular EU-2 nationals…
EU-2 nationals constitute the group 
of citizenship that has been the most 
affected by the crisis, with a very 
high share of unemployment. This is 
mainly due to their concentration in 
Spain (the labour market the most 
affected by the recession) combined 
with their, on average, low educa-
tional attainment or predominance 
in sectors strongly impacted during 
the recession (construction). Inter-
estingly, in the other main receiv-
ing countries, unemployment among 
EU-2 has remained moderate. 
The large share of low-skilled among 
EU-12 movers (and especially among 
EU-2 movers) has not only made 
them vulnerable to job losses during 
the recession (in particular in Spain) 
but may also inhibit re-employment.
An overall positive effect of 
mobility flows on the economies 
of receiving countries, despite 
some caveats
All in all, EU-12 movers seem to have 
played a positive role in the econo-
mies of receiving countries, contrib-
uting to the skill mix, and working 
in sectors and occupations where job 
shortages needed to be filled. 
A review of recent econometric stud-
ies has confirmed the overall posi-
tive effect of (post-accession) labour 
mobility flows on the economies of 
receiving countries. Existing research 
shows that the population flows 
from EU-12 since 2004 raised the 
long-term level of EU-15 potential 
output with the largest boosts taking 
place in EU-15 Member States that 
received large inflows (in proportion 
to their population). 
As far as the labour market of the 
receiving countries is concerned, 
most studies confirm the very small 
long-term impact of migration on 
real wages and unemployment. In 
general, they find only short-term 
evidence of a decline in real wages 
and increased unemployment in 
those Member States which have 
received large inflows. While there 
is also recent evidence of a negative 
(though limited) long-term effect 
on real wages for Spain and Italy (as 
a result of inflow of EU-2), as well 
as for Ireland (due to inflow from 
EU-8), there is no significant long-
term effect expected on unemploy-
ment. However, research including 
disaggregated results show that the 
employment effects for low-skilled 
workers would be larger than the 
aggregate – though they would 
remain moderate. Another caveat 
is that the period on which these 
effects are estimated (2004-2009) 
was mostly characterised by eco-
nomic growth, whereas the reces-
sion has made the labour market 
integration of mobile workers much 
more difficult. 
The presence of EU-12 movers 
plays a limited role in the 
current employment crisis
However, it is clear that recent 
EU-12 movers played a very minor 
role in the labour market crisis 
of individual Member States. For 
instance in 2010 they represent only 
about 1.5 % of all unemployed per-
sons in EU-15 countries. The effects 
of mobility from EU-12 seem lim-
ited for most receiving countries 
and existing evidence shows that 
intra-EU mobility has generally not 
led to serious labour market distur-
bances. The current labour market 
difficulties faced by a number of 
Member States are rather attribut-
able to a variety of factors, notably 
the recession as well as structural 
labour market problems. 
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Some risks for the sending 
countries – but overall no 
massive brain drain
As far as the sending countries are 
concerned, the significant emigra-
tion from certain EU-12 countries of 
mostly younger workers has sparked 
concerns about brain drain. How-
ever, as the share of highly skilled 
workers among recent movers from 
EU-12 countries seems lower than in 
the origin countries’ active popula-
tion, there does not seem to be a 
strong brain-drain effect for these 
countries. This is especially the case 
for the EU-2 countries, which have 
lost significant shares of their active 
population, but mainly in the low (or 
medium) skill segment. 
Moreover, enrolment rates for tertiary 
education in the EU-8 and EU-2 coun-
tries have substantially accelerated over 
the past years, which may begin to 
compensate for the outflow of skilled 
labour. The absence of a broad brain-
drain effect does, however, not pre-
clude such effects in specific sectors or 
occupations, such as the health sector. 
While recent studies find that the 
2004-2009 outflows to the EU-15 had 
a strong negative impact on the GDP, 
especially in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Lithuania, the impact expressed in GDP 
per capita is much lower. Moreover, 
the significant remittances sent back 
to the origin countries (especially in 
the case of EU-2 countries) can partial-
ly offset the negative growth impact 
in the short to medium term, though 
they cannot mend the longer-term 
problem of lower potential growth as 
a result of lower labour input.
EU mobility can play a strong 
role in the EU employment 
recovery
In conclusion, current available 
evidence does not seem to point 
towards serious mobility-induced 
labour  market disturbances. Post-
enlargement mobility may have had 
some economic (or social) costs for 
the receiving and sending countries. 
However, it seems that those costs 
will not be reduced by restricting 
labour mobility but by addressing 
them through specific policies. More-
over, as the experience of the 2004 
enlargement has shown, restricting 
the free movement of workers may 
have, in certain cases, some negative 
side-effects, such as an increase in 
undeclared work. 
Finally, freedom of movement of 
workers is one of the fundamental 
freedoms of EU law. It makes a posi-
tive contribution to labour markets 
throughout Europe and as such rep-
resents a key element of the Europe 
2020 Strategy. At the same time, 
it is a powerful and positive sym-
bol of what Europe means for the 
 individual EU citizen.
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annex 1: eu daTa 
sources available To 
measure inTra-eu 
mobiliTy
Monitoring the evolution of intra-
EU mobility of workers, notably in 
the context of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements, requires data about 
the number of EU citizens living in 
other Member States and its evolu-
tion over time. Two main EU sources 
of data have been used to this end: 
Eurostat migration statistics and the 
EU Labour force survey. In this chap-
ter, EU mobile citizens are defined 
according to their citizenship and 
not their country of birth (prefer-
able when dealing with migration) 
since restrictions on free movement 
under transitional arrangements are 
linked to citizenship and not country 
of birth. Therefore the assessment 
of the two EU sources is focussed 
on the citizenship variable and not 
on the country of birth. The analysis 
presented below shows the pros and 
cons of each source and the difficulty 
to have a reliable and harmonised 
measurement of the evolution of the 
number of ‘EU foreigners’ living in 
each of 27 EU Member States. This 
is partly explained by the very suc-
cess of the free movement of citizens 
and workers which, by definition, 
implies that EU citizens are less and 
less required to register, request a 
residence or work permit, etc.
Eurostat migration 
statistics:
The EU and its Member States have 
made great efforts recently to 
improve the quality and compara-
bility of the migration data at EU 
level. In 2007, a Regulation(45) has 
been adopted to set the frame under 
(45) Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on Community statistics on 
migration and international protection 
and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics 
on foreign workers, OJ L 199, 31 July 
2007, p. 23.
which EU Member States should col-
lect and publish migration statistics, 
in particular the population stock (of 
foreigners ‘usually resident’ in the 
country) and flows, disaggregated 
either by citizenship or country of 
birth. The adoption and implemen-
tation of this regulation has lead to 
a substantial improvement of data 
availability. However, there remain 
important gaps, especially when 
measuring the extent of intra-EU 
mobility. While data on third-coun-
try-nationals are broken down by 
groups of citizenship (EFTA, candi-
date and other non-EU countries but 
also groups according to the level 
of development), there is no obliga-
tion for the Member States to break 
down the ‘EU foreigners’ by indi-
vidual (or group of) citizenship. A 
number of Member States go beyond 
the minimum requirements and pub-
lish data broken down by individual 
citizenship for EU foreigners. How-
ever, this is not the case in all Mem-
ber States (or for all years). Several 
countries (including France and the 
UK) only publish the total number of 
‘EU foreigners’, not broken down by 
individual citizenship.
Another limitation, in a labour mar-
ket perspective, is that the only vari-
ables available are, for each declar-
ing country and citizenship (or group 
of citizenship), the age group and 
the gender. There is no information 
on the duration of residence, the 
employment status, or the education 
level. Moreover, the population data 
are fairly complete when dealing 
with all age classes taken togeth-
er but for the specific working-age 
population (15-64), less data about 
‘EU foreigners’ is available. Finally, 
the fact that the regulation of migra-
tion statistics has been implemented 
recently implies some breaks in the 
series before 2009 (or that the data 
is simply not available before 2009). 
Two other limitations of Eurostat 
migration statistics can be men-
tioned here: firstly the fact that 
they are mostly based on admin-
istrative registers may lead to 
 underestimation because some 
 foreigners may not register out of 
fear, lack of discipline or motiva-
tion; secondly, that the registration 
may occur with a delay, therefore 
possibly involving a bias in any 
dynamic analysis of these data.
A last remark concerns the use that 
is made of the Eurostat migration 
statistics in this chapter: using the 
stock of foreigners to draw com-
parison over time (i.e. calculate net 
migration from other countries) can 
be misleading since the evolution 
of the stock does not reflect only 
inflows and outflows but also the 
natural evolution (births and deaths) 
of foreigners living in the country. 
For instance, according to the EU LFS 
(described below), around 13 % of 
the EU-10 and EU-2 nationals living 
in the EU-15 are individuals aged less 
than 15 and interestingly around half 
of them were born in their current 
country of residence.
Beyond the data on population 
stock by citizenship, Eurostat migra-
tion statistics also contain data on 
the inflows and outflows of foreign-
ers, including EU foreigners (broken 
down or not by citizenship, depend-
ing on the declaring country). How-
ever, analysis of this data, notably 
by Holland et al. (2011), seems to 
indicate that, at least in the case 
of EU-10 and EU-2 foreigners living 
in EU-15 countries, the availability 
and comparability (to the popula-
tion stock data) of the flow data is 
limited. For instance, the difference 
between in- and outflows for a cer-
tain year almost never match the 
evolution of the population stock 
(far beyond the differences that 
could be explained by natural evolu-
tion of the stock of foreigners). The 
difference could be partly explained 
by the fact that Member States are 
obliged to follow the ‘usual resi-
dence concept’ for migration flows 
but not when compiling population 
stock data. Moveover, the quality 
of data on outflows may be limited 
by the fact that foreigners leaving a 
country might not de-register from 
their former residence administra-
tion. For this chapter, the  population 
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stocks by citizenship have been con-
sidered as a more complete and reli-
able source than the flows and are 
therefore used as one of the two 
main data sources. Flow data is used 
only in exceptional cases, in order to 
catch recent trends, notably in the 
case of Spain and Italy.
EU Labour force survey 
(LFS):
The EU LFS aims primarily to meas-
ure unemployment and labour mar-
ket participation, but it collects also 
other information on the resident 
population, in particular national-
ity, which can be used to produce 
estimates of the number of EU citi-
zens residing in another Member 
State. EU LFS data can therefore be 
used to complete the missing data 
in the Eurostat population stocks 
by citizenship (for countries such 
as France and the UK for instance) 
but also to obtain more informa-
tion about the characteristics of EU 
mobile citizens such as: age and gen-
der, employment situation (status, 
sector, occupation), and education 
level. However, using the EU LFS in 
order to estimate the number and 
characteristics of resident foreigners 
and in particular of ‘EU foreigners’ 
can suffer limitations, described in 
Employment in Europe, 2008 (Chap-
ters 2 and 3). The main  limitations 
are the following:
•	 replying to the survey is not com-
pulsory in most Member States and 
the non-response rates among for-
eigners are very high, due notably 
to language issues;
•	 in many Member States, there is a 
delay in entering the reference sam-
ple frame and very recently arrived 
foreigners may not be covered well. 
Generally, the EU LFS only covers 
persons who have stayed or intend 
to stay for one year or more and 
therefore short-term mobile work-
ers (i.e. seasonal workers or posted 
workers) are not covered;
•	 a comparison with Eurostat migra-
tion statistics shows that the LFS-
estimated stocks of EU-10 and EU-2 
foreigners living in EU-15 coun-
tries are constantly lower than the 
migration statistics (with the excep-
tion of Ireland). However, Marti 
and Rodenas (2007) undertook a 
review of the sampling procedures 
for the LFS in several EU countries 
and showed that the LFS approach 
is more likely to capture foreigners 
in some countries than others: Aus-
tria, Belgium, France,  Luxembourg, 
Sweden, and the UK;
•	 the small sample size in many coun-
tries reduces the possible use of the 
data broken down by citizenship 
(or group of citizenships), in partic-
ular when too many variables are 
crossed to analyse this population.
Despite the limitations quoted above, 
the EU LFS has several advantages 
which make it a very valuable source 
to use in this chapter:
•	 for some countries (such as France, 
the UK) it is simply the only source 
providing data on the stock of 
EU foreigners broken down by 
 citizenship;
•	 the LFS data are available on 
a quarterly basis and published 
around four months after the 
data collection and it is there-
fore possible to identify recent 
trends while population statistics 
are published on an annual basis 
a bit more than one year after the 
reference period;
•	 one variable in the Labour force 
survey provides information about 
how long the foreigners have been 
living in the country. It therefore 
enables an estimate of the inflows 
that occurred over a certain time 
and helps to distinguish the recent 
intra-EU movers (i.e. the EU-10 and 
EU-2 citizens that have arrived since 
the 2004/2007 enlargements) from 
the ‘EU foreigners’ that have been 
in the country for a longer time.
•	 while the use of LFS data might 
under-estimate the absolute num-
ber of EU movers, it is likely to give 
a reasonable indication of the way 
flows have changed over time.
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annex 2: economeTric 
background To 
holland eT al., 2011
To assess the macro-economic impact 
of population movements, Holland et 
al., 2011, adopted a series of model 
simulation exercises, using the Nation-
al Institute Global Econometric Model 
(NiGEM). NiGEM is a global model, in 
which the economies of EU Member 
States (with the exception of LU, CY, 
and MT) are modelled individually. 
All country models contain the deter-
minants of domestic demand, export 
and import volumes, prices, current 
accounts, and net assets. Economies 
are linked through trade, competi-
tiveness and financial markets and 
the models are solved simultaneously.
The core parts of the model relevant 
to the mobility simulation are the 
labour market and the production 
function in each economy. Labour 
markets are described by a wage equa-
tion and a labour demand equation. 
Wages depend on productivity and 
unemployment, and have a degree 
of rational expectations embedded in 
them – that is to say the wage bar-
gain is assumed to depend partly on 
expected future inflation and partly 
on current inflation. The speed of the 
wage adjustment is estimated for each 
country. Wages adjust to bring labour 
demand in line with labour supply. 
Employment depends on real 
wages, output, and trend productiv-
ity. Labour supply is treated as exog-
enous to factors other than popula-
tion projections. Inward migration 
raises the population, which feeds 
directly into labour supply. Produc-
tion functions have a constant elas-
ticity of substitution, with labour 
and capital as factor inputs, esti-
mated rates of labour-augmenting 
technical progress, and an elastic-
ity of substitution of around a half. 
Inward migration raises  potential 
labour supply, and therefore rais-
es potential output through the 
 production function.
In order to assess the macro-economic 
impact of population shifts between 
the EU-8/EU-2 and the EU-15 since 
2004, Holland et al., 2011, run two 
NiGEM model simulations, adjusting 
the level of the population in each 
country over the period 2004-2009 
by the observed population shifts. In 
this baseline scenario, it is assumed 
that the cumulative population shift 
between 2004-2009 is permanent. 
After applying these exogenous 
“shocks” to the population in each 
country, the model is allowed to 
run, to determine the impact that 
this change has on the major macro-
economic indicators in each country. 
Further detail on NiGEM is provided 
at http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/logon/
economics/NiGEM%20Overview.pdf
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